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 Abstract
The subject of combat motivation continues to challenge historians, sociologists, 
psychiatrists and the military establishment. Despite a considerable body of research, 
the subject remains multifaceted and complex.
    Combat motivation is a cyclical process within which motivations to fight 
before combat, during combat and after combat, are subject to significant changes. The 
impelling forces for the cycle have been the myths of popular culture. These have 
shaped how potential combatants understood war and provided the intrinsic motivation 
to enlist. These attitudes were extrinsically reshaped by training but not removed, and 
soldiers carried into combat ideas from popular culture that suggested appropriate 
behaviour; actual participation in combat rapidly reshaped these attitudes. Post-combat, 
a personal composure was sought to make sense of fighting experiences, and some 
memoirists extended this into the public sphere. A bifurcation of memoirs reveals not 
only the perpetuation of traditional myths, but also revelatory attempts to dispel them 
and thus reshape the popular culture of warfare; specifically, past commemoration and 
future imagining. Three substantive sections of this thesis will analyse each part of this 
motivational cycle. By drawing upon evidence from earlier wars it will be possible to 
demonstrate a continuity of combat motivation throughout the twentieth century. This 
will also reveal how media representations of the American experience of war have 
been subsumed into the British cultural template.
 Research has tended to conflate motivation with morale, but they are different 
concepts. Motivation provided the reasons why combatants were prepared to fight; 
however, morale represented the spirit in which it was undertaken. This thesis will 
separately analyse the elements of morale as a hierarchy of personal needs.  
  A central theme of this thesis is that motivations were dependent upon a 
complex of interests that combined: the public and the state, military culture, and the 
core personal orientations of the individual combatant. As a campaign that sits on the 
transitional boundary  of post-modern warfare, the Falklands War provides an 
opportunity to assess continuity and change within this complex as it has adapted to the 
impact of war. 
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Glossary
AFC   Air Force Cross
AFM   Air Force Medal
AFOAC Armed Forces Operational Awards Committee
AOSB  Army Officer Selection Board
BEM   British Empire Medal
Brig.  Brigadier
Capt.   Captain
CTP  Career Transition Partnership
CBE   Commander of the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire
CGC   Conspicuous Gallantry Cross
CGM   Conspicuous Gallantry Medal
CGS  Chief of the General Staff
CO   Commanding Officer
Col.  Colonel
Cpl.   Corporal
CPO  Chief Petty Officer
CSM    Company Sergeant Major
DCM   Distinguished Conduct Medal
DFC   Distinguished Flying Cross
DFM   Distinguished Flying Medal
DMS  Directly Moulded Sole
DSC   Distinguished Service Cross
DSM   Distinguished Service Medal
DSO   Distinguished Service Order
ECHR  European Court of Human Rights
FN FAL  Fusil Automatique Léger A self-loafing assault rifle of 7.62 calibre 
manufactured by Fabrique Nationale of Belgium and used by 
Argentinian Forces during the Falklands War. British Troops used the 
semi-automatic SLR variant. 
GBE   Knight Grand Cross of the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire
GHQ   General Headquarters
GPMG  General Purpose Machine Gun, a belt-fed light machine gun of 7.62 
calibre used as an infantry assault weapon when fitted with a bipod and 
in a Sustained Fire (‘SF’) mode when fitted with a tripod.
GS General Service
GSC General Service Corps
GST Graduated Settlement Time
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HCPAC  House of Commons Public Account Committee
 
IDF   Israeli Defence Force
IED  Improvised Explosive Device
JFO  Job Finding Only
JNCO  Junior Non-Commissioned Officer - OR4 and below
JSP   Joint Services Publication
KBE   Knight Commander of the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire
KCL  King’s College London
L.Cpl.  Lance Corporal
LCU   Landing Craft Utility capable of carrying 120 troops or four vehicles
LPD Landing Platform Dock, an amphibious assault ship with a displacement 
of 17,000 tons (approx.) HMSs Fearless and Intrepid
LSL  Landing Ship Logistic, a civilian manned ship operated by the Royal 
Fleet Auxiliary e.g. Sir Galahad
Lt.   Lieutenant
Lt.Col.  Lieutenant Colonel
Lt.Gen. Lieutenant General
Maj.   Major
Maj.Gen. Major General
MBE   Member of the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire
MC   Military Cross
MCTC Military Corrective Training Centre
MiD  Mentioned in Dispatches
MM   Military Medal
MO  Medical Officer
MoD   Ministry of Defence
MODSHC MoD Honours Committee
MSM  Meritorious Service Medal
NCO   Non Commissioned Officer
NGO   Non Governmental Organisation
OBE   Officer of the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire
OC   Officer Commanding
PoW   Prisoner of War
PTSD   Post Traumatic Stress Disorder
RAF   Royal Air Force
RAMC  Royal Army Medical Corps
RAP  Regimental Aid Post
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RBL   Royal British Legion
RCB  Regular Commissions Board
RM   Royal Marines
RMO  Regimental Medical Officer
RN   Royal Navy
RSM   Regimental Sergeant Major
SAMA 82 South Atlantic Medal Association 1982
SAS   Special Air Services
SFA  Service Forces Accommodation
Sgt.   Sergeant
SLR  Self Loading Rifle (see FN FAL) occasionally referred to by British 
troops as a ‘slur’
SNAFU Situation Normal All Fucked Up.  Originally coined by American troops 
during the Second World War its has been adopted within the British 
military
SNCO Senior Non-Commissioned Officer - OR5 and above
SSG  Sum Selection Grading
STUFT  Ships Taken Up From Trade
SUS  Service Personnel Under Sentence
TA   Territorial Army
VC   Victoria Cross
WO   Warrant Officer
WOSB War Office Selection Board
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Introduction
 The title to this thesis alludes to the Shakespearian definition of a soldier (As You 
Like It, Act II, Scene VII) and posits two challenges. Firstly, to reveal the extent to 
which combatants have been motivated by cultural myths to strive against almost 
insuperable odds to seek fragile, overinflated, and arguably  illusory reputations. 
Secondly, to seek out an objective understanding of why these myths have been so 
powerful. The structure of this thesis is predicated on the argument that  combat 
motivation is a cycle within which motivations to fight; before combat, during combat, 
and after combat are subject to significant changes. This cycle has been driven by the 
myths of popular culture. These have shaped how potential recruits understood war and 
were motivated to enlist. These attitudes were only partially reshaped by training, and 
soldiers carried into combat ideas from popular culture that suggested appropriate 
behaviour; the experience of fighting rapidly reshaped these attitudes. Post-combat, 
personal composures were sought to make sense of fighting experiences; some of these 
extended into the public sphere, often with an intention to dispel traditional myths and 
reshape popular understandings of warfare. Britain entered the last quarter of the 
twentieth century with a robust cultural template of war and military  endeavour. Whilst 
this had been founded on the efforts of the home nations and the Empire, it had been 
richly augmented by media representations of the American experience. It is impossible 
to understand motivations to fight during the Falklands War without a context of how 
the combatants incorporated this cultural legacy. Therefore, substantive arguments will 
draw not only upon sources related to the Falklands campaign, but also experiences and 
understandings of other wars of the past century that  indicate continuity or (rather more 
rarely) a shift in attitudes.
 The Falklands conflict arrived in 1982 like a bolas from the blue. It not only  
entangled Britain diplomatically  and politically but also militarily. The British armed 
forces were looking towards the Soviet threat in Eastern Europe whilst mired in the 
unforgiving task of gendarmerie activity in Ulster. Consequently, the Falklands were 
effectively unprotected with only  a token garrison of eighty Royal Marines.1  The 
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1 Martin Middlebrook, The Falklands War 1982, (London, Penguin, 2001), p. 43
Falklands campaign as it played out, provides a fascinating insight into Britain in the 
early 1980s, particularly how attitudes towards war had evolved since 1945. Except for 
the Admirals 2 who ran the Falklands campaign from London, none of the British forces 
had seen action during the Second World War. Therefore, their mindset had been shaped 
around the significant cultural changes, increased economic prosperity, liberalisation 
within society and the erosion of deference that characterised post-war Britain. An 
increased public antipathy towards matters military 3  can in part be explained by the 
role of Britain’s armed forces in peacekeeping, extraction from empire and the 
hegemony of the American military-industrial complex that had emasculated Britain 
during the Suez crisis and subsequently placed it as a front-line outpost of U.S. nuclear 
deterrence capability. Therefore, the embryonic questions relate not only to how the 
British armed forces were motivated to go to war in the South Atlantic and achieve a 
decisive military  victory, but also the extent to which veterans reshaped public 
understandings of warfare. Before 1982, few people knew that the Falkland Islands 
were in the South Atlantic. Anecdotally many thought they were somewhere off 
Scotland.4 The realisation that they were thousands of miles away would arguably have 
suggested to the most junior combatants that the logistics of fighting an expenditure-
constrained war so far from home would be problematic. A concern no doubt 
exacerbated as the ragtag STUFT armada of warships, cruise liners, and North Sea 
ferries set sail with stores plundered from the dustiest corners of the MoD inventory.
 Developing the research framework first sets out to establish if there is such a 
thing as a template for the motivated combatant and if so, is it universal as to time and 
place? It is a subject that enjoys a wide-ranging and long-reaching secondary literature 
with many contested views. Primary testimony  from published sources and oral 
archives can be used beyond the boundaries set by  its initial formulation; therefore, it 
becomes possible to build an understanding of how memories inform combat 
motivation, and combat motivation informs memories.
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2 Sir John Fieldhouse, Sir Henry Leach, Sir Terrence Lewin
3 Patrick Mileham, ‘Fifty Years of British Army Officership 1960-2010: Part II: Prospective’ in Defense & 
Security Analysis, Vol. 20, No.2, (2004), pp. 189-190
4 John Geddes, Spearhead Assault, (London, Arrow, 2007), p. 38
 Fear of injury  has been a consistent de-motivator throughout the twentieth 
century. During the Great War, Norman Demuth was ‘never as afraid of dying […] as I 
was of being maimed. I was scared stiff of being maimed’.5  Testimony from the 
Falklands War will echo this concern and reveal the extent to which a combatant’s 
immediate comrades assuaged this fear. The primacy of the cohesive combat group 
featured strongly in twentieth century  commentary, but it  was the Greek general 
Onasander who wrote, in the first century CE, that military leaders should station 
‘brothers in rank beside brothers; friends beside friends; and lovers beside their 
favourites’.6 ‘Greek love’ did not of course accord with the sensibilities of the twentieth 
century military and yet, despite draconian penalties, occasional primary references to 
its continued, albeit limited, appeal can be found. Of more significance has been the 
continued soldierly obsession with heterosexual sex. However, this has been rather 
glossed over in the construction of a heroic warrior myth acceptable for public 
consumption, and both orientations are discussed in Chapter 4.5. More broadly this 
chapter draws a distinction between matters of morale and issues of motivation, which 
are often erroneously conflated. Although primary group theories have become a mantra 
since 1945, other components revealed themselves as essential to understand why men 
were prepared to fight in warfare. These included: the role of ideology and the influence 
of a modern state to co-opt its citizens into a fighting force; the coercive power of the 
armed forces; the cynosure of leadership and hierarchy; the regimental tradition and 
professional induction into an ‘elite’ brotherhood; recognition, reward and status; and, 
rebarbatively, the pleasure of being able to kill. The passage of millennia has in no way 
diminished the topicality of this work. As the military historian Sir John Keegan put it:
I think rightly, in the search for an answer to the question how human reason influences 
human instinct in the awful business of combat, we are entitled to ask why?7
It will become evident from the literary review that there are a number of constantly 
developing access points to asking this question; however, what seems most 
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5 Max Arthur, Forgotten Voices of the Great War, (London, Ebury Press, 2003), p. 165
6  Anthony Kellett, Combat Motivation: The Behavior of Soldiers in Battle, (London, Kluwer-Nijhoff, 
1982), p. 42
7 John Keegan, ‘Towards a Theory of Combat Motivation’ in Paul Addison & Angus Calder (eds), Time to 
Kill: The Soldier’s Experience of War in the West, (London, Pimlico, 1997), p. 4
undeveloped in the secondary literature is a sense of how motivations adapted according 
to the position of the participant  in a combat cycle. Rather than arguing for the sentience 
of say primary  group theory over ideology or vice versa, it is more rounded to assert 
that motivational influences were nuanced according to whether a fighter was 
anticipating combat, participating in it, or winding down from it. Combat motivation 
was actually a cycle where previous experience of combat would inform the possibility 
of future action. Developing this argument and positioning sources within the analytical 
framework that follows is, therefore, a key intervention. 
  
 The twentieth century had a distinct  periodisation that distinguished it as an area 
for research.8  The military sociologist Charles Moskos categorised the period 
1914-1989 as comprising a modern/late-modern period. This eventually  gave way, 
following the collapse of the Warsaw pact, into a post-modern period shaped around 
multinational peacekeeping. For Britain, both world wars started with small volunteer 
armies designed for imperial policing and minor campaigns. Of necessity, the modern 
period was characterised by mass conscription, the concepts of total war, and the 
ideology of national survival. In an environment where the Fourth Estate was integrated 
into the war effort, public support was garnered and maintained, despite often 
staggeringly high casualty rates. The impact of military service was felt through the 
whole of society. The late-modern period saw a reversion to a volunteer forces (National 
Service ended by 1963) and the military  resorting to its historical practice of recruiting 
the rank-and-file from disadvantaged working-class backgrounds. Set against  a 
background of potential nuclear Armageddon, the attitude of the public towards the 
Cold War became one of increasing detachment and indifference. The Falklands 
campaign embraced a paradox: it contained many  of the features of the Great War, yet 
was sustained by an 8,000 mile logistics link. It was arguably not only  the last example 
for Britain undertaking a campaign during this particular epoch but was also to define 
British warfare during the early  post-modern era. The Government was able to espouse 
Churchillian rhetoric and imperial thunder as a rationale for fighting it and yet  an 
arguable consequence was to restore war as a legitimate policy, subsequently played out 
Page 7 of 304
 
8  Charles Moskos, John Williams & David Segal, The Post-Modern Military: Armed Forces After the 
Cold War, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 1-2
in Iraq and Afghanistan. Reflecting on his Falklands experience Lt. Gen. John Kiszely 
suggested that the Falklands War was indeed a throwback to the world wars, 
symmetrically  fought by infantry with fixed bayonets against  identifiable opponents, 
uncluttered by rules of engagement, or allied interference:
So was the Falklands an archetypal example of combat, the very simplicity of which 
lends itself to a model that can be transferred to future times and places? Or does it 
appear to be a throwback to a bygone imperial era […] It seems to me that there are 
certainly aspects of the Falklands War, particularly at the lower tactical level, that have 
relevance to the future, and that therefore reward some study.9
 To take up the Keegan and Kiszely challenges, it is necessary  is to provide a 
research context derived from the extant literature and then apply it to an analytical 
framework. It is a truism that military activity  drew succour from prevailing cultural 
attitudes, anxieties and aspirations. In this regard, a modern/post-modern periodisation 
reflects several stages of evolution. These are the building blocks that situate 
motivations to fight during the Falklands War. The following milestones, developed for 
this thesis, are intended only to provide a general context, rather than establish an 
analytical or theoretical framework. 
‘Southborough’ - the Southborough Report (1922) was officialdom’s first formal 
investigation into shell shock, but it failed to reconcile opposing views. Rivers (of 
Craiglockhart fame) and Moran perceived stress reaction to being an inevitable 
and individual response to sustained attrition. By contrast, Lord Gort  VC saw 
collapse as cowardice, for which the protection was service within an elite 
fighting group. It might be argued that the cultural output  and sources of the inter-
war period reflects this dichotomy.
‘Cold War’ - emerged from Second World War sociological research, which was 
distilled from participant interviews, the template was laid for increased 
bureaucracy  and professionalism within the armed forces as a response to the 
possibility of nuclear warfare. One by-product of this reshaping was the 
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9 John Kiszely, ‘The Land Campaign: A Company Perspective’, in Stephen Badsey, Rob Havers & Mark 
Groves (eds), The Falklands Conflict Twenty Years on: Lessons for the Future,  (London, Frank Cass, 
2005), p. 108
emergence of the technocratic career officer, short on charismatic leadership skills 
but educated to the hilt.
‘Cultural Revolution’ - marked the demise of deference during the 1960s with its 
shift to the rights of the individual. This was laid bare in the swathes of protest 
against the Vietnam War and fuelled a widespread antimilitarism during the 
1970s. In Britain, many schools projected an antipathy towards the military, 
insofar as many barred Army careers advisors. Attitudes towards the role of the 
army in Ulster were equivocal, and responses to public war commemorations 
were often tokenistic.
‘Falklands Bounce’ - The British victory in the Falklands in 1982 restored a lustre 
to the military  and began the renaissance of the warrior-hero. As in 1945, it 
became acceptable to celebrate a morally justifiable victory in war over a fascist 
opponent. The Falklands War has produced a plethora of resource material. 
Interestingly  primary sources have shown a shift away from those of the officer 
and commander and increasingly reveal the perspective of the rank-and-file. 
Much of this can be grounded in a response to, and a rationalisation of, post-
traumatic stress.
“Desert Sands’ - Although mired in political controversy the contribution of the 
fighting forces in the Gulf War, Iraq and latterly Afghanistan continues to retain 
widespread public support. The emergence of beaux sabreurs from these 
campaigns has augmented the rationale for the public to re-establish its 
relationship  with heroes of the past. Public commemoration of, and engagement 
with, war sacrifice has arguably not  been stronger since the end of the Second 
World War. This interest is reflected in the expansion of relevant scholarship and 
the revival of interest in matters socio-military throughout the educational system. 
 To set some realistic boundaries for the scope of this research, I will prioritise 
research around the role of the infantry combatant. There are good reasons for this: the 
twentieth century saw the comprehensive development of industrialised warfare with 
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the possibility  of using technology  to take the fight to the enemy from extensive 
distances. However, for the infantry soldier evolution has been much slower. During the 
Falklands War, the role was still fulfilled by  foxholes, foot-slogging and fixing 
bayonets. Combat for the infantryman remained an up close and personal business. 
Where appropriate, evidence will be drawn from other branches of the armed forces. 
Although this research is intended to focus on the British, it will draw on relevant 
sources and scholarship that  have informed the western way of warfare during the 
twentieth century. Consequently, the Falklands War can be used as a benchmark not 
only to illuminate continuities and change in the theory and application of combat 
motivations, but also the broader agency of warfare as a driver of historical trends.
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Using Oral Histories and Memoirs
 Much of the primary evidence used in this thesis makes use of published 
combatant memoirs, oral history recordings held at the IWM, and interviews from the 
broadcast media. There are four issues that arise from drawing on these sources and 
working across them:
1. The validity of oral sources generally.
2. Challenges posed by using published memoirs.
3. Concepts of composure that are implicit within both types of source.
4. The validity of reusing such sources, beyond their primary interlocution, or intent.
 Oral history has had to fight a battle for acceptance against  a traditional view 
that documents are the ‘proper’ source for historical research because oral testimony has 
been deemed so unreliable. Summerfield pointed out that Hobsbawm ‘dismissed oral 
history because it  was a ‘remarkably slippery medium’.10  The reality  has been rather 
more nuanced; as Thomson asserted, documentary  sources could reflect precisely  the 
same characteristics.11 However, the most powerful argument for oral evidence has lain 
in its ‘powerful recovery role’ because it has rescued testimony that would have never 
found its way into written sources.12  This emerged strongly from oral histories of the 
Falklands War. Many of the interviewees, particularly from the lower ranks, have had to 
be coaxed into providing the ‘raw’ testimony that  ‘gives it authority’.13  Because raw 
testimony was often lacking in introspection, the narration of memory has been 
dependent upon the relationship  between the interviewee and audience. Formal 
interviews have been particularly sensitive to the status of the interviewer and have 
determined the extent and manner in which a story may have been revealed.14  Whilst 
conducting his doctoral research Thomson found that prospective interviewees were 
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10 Penny Summerfield, ‘Culture and Composure: Creating Narratives of the Gendered Self in Oral 
History Interviews’, in Cultural and Social History, Vol. 1, No. 1, (2004), p. 65
11 Alistair Thomson, Anzac Memories: Living with the Legend, (Melbourne, OUP, 1995), p.227
12 Summerfield, ‘Culture and Composure’, p. 66
13 Timothy Ashplant, Graham Dawson & Michael Roper (eds), The Politics of War Memory and 
Commemoration, (London, Routledge, 2000), pp. 47-48
14 Summerfield, ‘Culture and Composure’, p. 69
more biddable if he boosted his credentials as a ‘university tutor’ rather than a research 
student.15  The same has applied to Falklands research. Students have not garnered the 
same degree of access that established entities such as the IWM or TV production 
companies have enjoyed, or the degree of empathy that war-veteran interviewers such 
as Hugh McManners have been able to leverage. Using secondhand sources has meant 
that the plural researcher could not ask specific research questions; instead these have 
had to be framed around extant narrative. A compelling example of how this can work is 
revealed by the Falklands testimony of Cpl. Lou Armour (Chapter 3.9). In answer to a 
general question about Argentine casualties, his gradual breakdown in front of the 
camera revealed a raw uncomposed testimony that signalled not only of suppressed 
trauma but also an absence of demonisation (Chapter 2.5), ‘I just don’t see them as 
enemy’.16  Essentially, oral testators were passive participants; by contrast, writers of 
published memoirs were powerfully pro-active.
 Samuel Hynes applied Hobsbawm’s critique of oral history to war memoirists, 
‘they  are unsatisfactory, restricted, biased, afflicted by emotion, and full of errors’.17 
The reason being that, ‘they  stand too close to the centre of the war’s values […] they 
act out mottoes on the flags and slogans on the posters’.18  However, all sources (oral 
and memoir) need to be weighted and judged, and ‘triangulation’ with a range of 
sources is ultimately the way subjectively to mitigate inaccuracies (there is no singular 
accuracy). Clearly it is essential to recognise that memoirs have to satisfy  a dual 
purpose. Not only do they have to represent the needs of the author, but also the 
commercial demands of the publisher. As Lucy  Robinson has pointed out, since 1997, 
Falklands memoirs have seen a shift from top-down analyses to bottom-up descriptions 
of the war.19  Arguably, there are two reasons for the 1997 transition. Firstly; as Yuval 
Noah Harari has pointed out, although the traditional image of the romantic warrior 
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15 Thomson, Anzac Memories, p. 230
16 Falklands War: The Untold Story, Prods. Michael Bilton & Peter Kominsky, Yorkshire TV - Castle 
Communications, (1987), [on VHS]
17 Samuel Hynes, The Soldiers’ Tale, (New York, Viking Penguin, 1997), p. 15
18 Ibid, p. 28
19 Lucy Robinson, ‘Soldiers’ Stories of the Falklands War: Recomposing Trauma in Memoir’, in 
Contemporary British History, Vol. 25, No.4, (2011), p. 571
hero still persists, public awareness of PTSD has increasingly legitimated the combatant 
as a victim and a survivor.20  Because PTSD only entered the medical canon in 1980, 
Falklands memoirists were the first who were able to use it to redefine the combat 
experience.21  Secondly; although Vincent Bramley’s Excursion into Hell (1991) paved 
the way, commercially  successful accounts of the SAS during the first Gulf War (1991) 
underpinned the demand for ‘rank-and-file’ memoirs. These were specifically  from 
members of elite fighting units and elided gritty realism with survivor testimony.22 
Therefore, it might be argued that this commercial development of the genre threw up a 
salute to the literary  form of the Byronic hero. For the historical researcher, there are 
some important caveats that relate to the use of memoirs as primary sources. The 
majority  of Falklands memoirs are presented explicitly as acts of commemoration, 
memorialisation, and/or a cathartic response to PTSD.23 However, the memoirs reveal a 
tendency to cross reference and cite other testators as a means of asserting validity; 
consequently, Robinson asserted that memoirs should be understood as ‘[…] an ongoing 
negotiation of the competing claims and structuring effects of other narratives and other 
claims to the truth’.24  Since 1996, the MoD has exercised its displeasure of ‘elite 
forces’ memoirs. It has not only been able directly to control the activities of serving 
personnel, but also extend its influence over retired veterans through their regimental 
connections.25  Some successful memoirs have been repackaged as second editions; 
therefore, when using them as evidence, researchers should be aware that their 
recomposition often reflected these external influences.
 
 Oral histories and memoirs have been constructed ‘through the perspective of 
the present’; consequently, memories may have developed as more meaningful from the 
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20 Yuval Noah Harari, ‘Martial Illusions: War and Disillusionment in Twentieth Century and Renaissance 
Military Memoirs’ in Journal of Military History, Vol. 69, No.1, ( 2005), p. 47
21 Robinson, ‘Soldiers’ Stories of the Falklands War’, p. 569
22 Steven Mitchell (pseud, Andy McNab) Bravo 2 Zero (1993) and Immediate Action (1995); Rowlands 
Gill (pseud. Chris Ryan) The One That Got Away (1995)
23 Robinson, ‘Soldiers’ Stories of the Falklands War’, p. 571
24 Ibid, p. 584
25 Hugh McManners, Falklands Commando, (London, Harper Collins, 2002), p. 12
point when they were created.26  The process by  which memories have been created has 
been termed ‘composure’ and this implicitly embraced a dual meaning. Firstly  it 
described the process by  which an individual achieved a sense of relative comfort  with 
their past; secondly the public language of metaphors and cultural forms through which 
such past could be expressed.27  Public language has been subdivided into ‘general’ 
forms which would be understood by the public collective, and ‘particular’ forms, 
which would emerge from discreet groups such as a platoon, company, battalion, 
regiment, etc. Ultimately ‘composure’ emerged from a complex relationship  between all 
these factors.28 As close-knit groups, (cohesion is discussed in Chapter 2.1) the military 
has been well placed to formulate common memories. As Ben-Ari has pointed out, the 
genesis of its particular memory has been based upon ‘[…] cultural or folk 
understandings of military  life’.29  For the British military, the ‘idealised masculinity’ of 
the ‘soldier hero’ has provided an effective catalyst.30 The downside is that such a model 
as interpreted by a particular group, has introduced a pressure to conform to the ideal 
whilst suppressing alternative narratives and failings.31 The challenge for historians has 
been to find ingress into what has often been a closed shop; reanalysing oral interviews 
and memoirs for the specific purpose of this research has revealed plurality  within the 
evidence that has allowed access, and both sources stand up well to alternative readings. 
Analysis of Falklands testimony has revealed a continuum of composure in both 
substance and style. At one end of the scale, an oral interviewee such as David Cooper 
testified at length without hesitation, deviation or repetition.32  By comparison, Jim 
Mitchell lacked any meaningful sense of rehearsed memory.33  Within memoirs, 
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Bramley’s Excursion to Hell (1991) was presented for popular consumption in the 
earthy language of a common soldier, whilst Lukowiak’s A Soldiers’ Song (1999) was 
styled for the Guardian’s readership.34
 By reusing testimony beyond the boundaries set by the initial interview or the 
intentions of the memoirist, it becomes possible to build an understanding of how 
memories inform combat  motivation, and combat motivation informs memories. In the 
context of military  memory, the essential point that emerges from using both types of 
source is that composure that has emerged from a ‘particular’ group may not tell the 
precise truth, but enough of it to sustain robust analysis.
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Surveying the Literature
  This review will provide an overview of how the understanding and modelling 
of combat motivation has been addressed; it  will reveal a multi-disciplinary approach, 
and categorise the published resources as potential sources. Some are historiographical; 
others are clearly not, but together they constitute a broad context for the work. To 
provide an analytical framework, a number of different ‘schools’ conceptualised for this 
review will be briefly examined. To establish a relevant historiography, this review not 
only draws upon the milestones set out in the introduction, but also the range of 
different access points provided by  contemporary sources. Such sources embrace 
sociology, medicine, personal testimonies, and the nuanced arguments of historians.
The American Sociologists
 
 Since the late 1940s, and emerging from scientific analysis of experiences in 
World War II and Korea by Stouffer and Marshall, a growing body of researchers have 
assumed an arguably  dominant position with their didactic focus on primary group 
theory. According to their arguments, groups empowered and protected, this was 
necessary  because it was an inescapable fact that participation in warfare was a 
desperately  frightening business, and its participants were very young men, often 
teenagers. They did not have emotional maturity, and instead often replaced it with 
bravado when part of a group, timidity when not.35 Whilst this was manifestly true of 
civilian as well as military life, it has been asserted that, despite training and its 
inculcation of a group ethos of discipline and co-operation, military culture created a 
dependency and thus an immaturity  that was more pronounced than in civilian life.36 
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Marshall discovered that only  twenty-five percent of soldiers were active participants, 
the remainder would avoid fighting.37 To him primary group theory held the key.38
 The work of Stouffer et al. has been held up as a benchmark for understanding 
how primary groups functioned. His conclusion was that groups fulfilled two main 
functions in combat motivation: to set standards of group  behaviour, and protect the 
individual from stress.39   In essence, he argued that  when the need of the individual 
soldier were met by the small group of which he was a member, and in turn, the 
interests of this group were congruent with the wider requirements of the military 
leadership, then the group would risk personal death or injury to protect its members 
and achieve the required objective.40  Psychiatrists Grinker and Spiegel concluded from 
their investigation of Second World War US airforce crews, 'The men seem to be 
fighting more for someone than against somebody’.41  However, group loyalty  did not 
exist in a vacuum, and it was essential that it be sustained by sound and impartial 
leadership: 
The principal factor governing [the spirit  of group loyalty] is the quality of the 
leadership […] Certainly as important as [the leader's] technical ability is his 
personality, upon which, in the final analysis, depends his capacity to influence morale 
[…] The attitude of more remote elements both in the army and on the home front are 
also significant.42
 Group cohesion and effective leadership (despite occasional failings) were 
decisive factors in the outcome of the Falklands War. The Argentinian forces were at 
least as well armed as the British troops and they outnumbered them, but they lacked a 
group outlook and a tolerant, self-sacrificing leadership. Clear evidence of this is 
revealed by the fact that following their surrender, Argentinian officers were allowed to 
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keep  their pistols to protect them against their own men.43 As late as 1994, Professor Sir 
Lawrence Freedman, the official historian of the Falklands War, remained strongly 
aligned to the Stouffer/Marshall thesis, ‘What keeps men in battle are ties of friendship, 
affection, good humour, machismo, sense of honour, or sportsman like behaviour’.44 
This is an oversimplification that does not take full account of either the Vietnam 
experience or extant scholarship. Moskos and others have commented on how the US 
policy in Vietnam of rotating men in and out of combat each for their twelve-month tour 
of duty inhibited group cohesion. Such an environment meant each soldier was ticking 
the days off his personal calendar, and thus the war became a matter of individual 
survival and motivation. The influence of a powerful national ideology has been 
presented as a counter to group theory, and public responses to the Vietnam experience 
exposed deep flaws in its salience. However, individual self-interest, as well as an often 
inchoate ideology, may have combined with, rather than contradicted, group theory. 
According to Moskos:
[…] primary groups maintain the soldier in his combat role only when he has an 
underlying commitment to the worth of the larger social system for which he is fighting. 
This commitment need not be formally articulated, nor even perhaps consciously 
recognised. But he must  at  some level accept, if not  the specific purposes of the war, 
then at least the broader rectitude of the social system of which he is a member. 45
The limitations of primary-group theory  are revealed by comparing the different 
performance of armies, ostensibly with similar standards of training and equipment. 
Wesbrook argued that, ‘The basic problem is that the soldier must not only  respond to 
the demands of his peers while fighting but also the demands of the nation and the 
military organisation to fight’.46
 The issue of motivation being sustained by an underlying ideology, whether 
inchoate or more fully  developed, emerged in the research conducted by Shils and 
Janowitz. This was undertaken in the aftermath of the Second World War and studied 
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the combat motivation of German soldiers. Whilst acknowledging the presence of a 
general but low-level belief in Nazi ideology, they placed their emphasis on motivation 
as emerging from the primary  group. In 1986, Bartov re-ignited the ideological 
argument. In essence, his argument was that, because primary groups were constantly 
broken up and re-formed, motivation had no chance to form within a primary group; 
therefore, it had to have been ideologically based. This was not so much an attachment 
to Nazism, but the more emotional appeal of a better world that would arise from 
victory.47
 Primary  group theory has retained its topicality notwithstanding the shift  
through the modern and post-modern phases of scholarship (see above). During 2006, a 
vigorous debate surrounding combat motivation during the Iraq War was played out 
between Wong and MacCoun. Professor Robert Wong’s research group, based at the 
U.S. War College, asserted the persistence of the traditional arguments, arguing in 
favour of motivation being rooted in the emotional support provided by a primary 
group. It also identified an emergent ideological presence because: soldiers were better 
educated than their forebears; were better informed because of extensive media 
coverage; and, importantly, had exercised a personal choice to volunteer.48  Professor 
Robert MacCoun’s research group criticised Wong’s for not addressing the distinction 
between social cohesion (emotional support) and task cohesion (goal sharing) as 
catalysts for primary group formation. Their critique was evidence based, asserting that 
whilst there is a reliable correlation between task cohesion and combat performance, it 
was absent with social cohesion.49
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The Regimental Tradition
 
 The implicit focus of the ‘sociological school’ on American armed forces has 
been its great weakness. The reason being that the US Army has had a much weaker 
regimental tradition than the British Army. Along with the emotional and morale factors 
of group formation, Newsome placed emphasis on human relationships ‘extrinsically 
derived’ when combat units were created as part of a functioning managerial hierarchy. 
An essential difference between the American experience and the British was that the 
US tended to manage individuals centrally, whereas the British regimental system 
meant that this responsibility  was decentralised and delegated.50  Therefore, it is 
necessary  to look beyond the primary  group towards a more layered structure to reveal 
aspects of motivation in the British Army. 
 The regimental tradition remains shrouded in mythology; the army that  went to 
war in 1914 and existed in 1982 mutatis mutandis emerged from the Cardwell-Childers 
reforms of the 1870s, which initiated a wide-scale reorganisation and amalgamation. As 
well as inheriting the mess-silver and ancient battle honours of superannuated regiments 
it made necessary a continued ‘reinvention of “tradition” with a vengeance’.51  The 
whole purpose of tradition was to inculcate its members with a strong regimental loyalty 
and to promote a sense of superiority over others. For recruits, there was a right of 
passage that had to be earned. As the military historian Richard Holmes observed:
The conclusion of basic training is marked by a passing-out  ceremony, designed to 
emphasise the change of tribal status from youth to warrior […] Red or green berets, 
arm patches, lanyards: the marks of the fighting caste vary [ …] they form part of a 
ritual designed to demonstrate that  the recruit is no longer an object of scorn […] he is a 
man, a comrade and a soldier.52
Therefore, each regiment differentiated itself with its own symbols, rituals and 
peculiarities of dress, often minor, but emotionally significant. Once this hegemonic 
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control had been implemented, it enabled a regiment to legitimate its use of discipline 
and control over its members. John Baynes’ research revealed:
[…] all the other ranks in the battalion were caught  up, whatever their origins, in the 
powerful grasp of the Regiment. By the time they had lived for two or three years in the 
atmosphere of the Regimental tradition […] had been constantly reminded of their duty 
to it, the Regiment could claim them as its own.53
 Whilst the Coldstream Guards was raised in 1650, and the Parachute Regiment 
formed in 1941, both demonstrate that no matter how quickly or slowly myths and 
traditions are manufactured they remain equally  powerful. Elements of this tradition 
include, recruitment, discipline, and access to resources. The first of these requires 
discussion of the social gulf between officers and men. In 1914, officers were almost 
exclusively  ‘gentlemen’ recruited from the reformed public schools who required a 
private income to maintain themselves to the required standard. By contrast, the rank-
and-file were recruited from the most deprived parts of society.54
 During the World Wars it became necessary for the British Army to recruit  
officers, disparagingly referred to as ‘temporary  gentlemen’, from lower down the 
social pecking order. In peacetime, they  tended to revert to their traditional sources. By 
the time of the Falklands War, improved social mobility had resulted in some company 
commanders (in some regiments) being promoted from the ranks. However, it was 
evident that all from CO upwards had been educated at  elite public schools. By 1982, 
recruitment of ‘other-ranks’ had substantially reverted to being from amongst the 
socially disadvantaged, so a disempowering and hierarchical social gulf still existed. 
Two embedded Falklands journalists noted that:
The officers treated their men well, but with a paternalism that  bordered on contempt. 
‘They have everything done for them,’ was a frequent  complaint. ‘If there’s something 
wrong with the chips in the mess they come and tell us’.55
To suggest, as the authorities did, that throughout the ‘cultural revolution’ its officer 
cadre had become meritocratic, falls short of the truth. Until the early  1980s, public 
schools remained the most fecund recruiting ground for officer cadets. According to the 
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military historian Anthony Beevor, ‘they made up about half the entry, although 
representing only 6 percent of their age group’.56  During the Falklands War, the class 
system, with all its insidious cliquishness and rivalry was rooted in Army culture. 
 The regiment worked effectively  in the enforcement of discipline. The 
increasing technology of warfare during the twentieth century  had caused a shift from 
reliance on dominance and submission, such as the practice of imposing field 
punishments during the Great War, to a wider use of manipulation through incentives, 
persuasion and goal-setting;57  in other words, an outcome of Cold War professionalism. 
However, this must be placed in context, because a breach of any leniency within the 
regimental code would rapidly result  in a reassertion of ascriptive control. As the 
military historian John Ellis commented:
The basis of any army is discipline, unquestioning obedience of the orders of one’s 
superiors […] and any signs of democratic thinking or individualism that  might threaten 
such a response must be ruthlessly stamped out […] as far as their inferiors are 
concerned, officers are omnipotent.58
 The regimental tradition could undermine morale among the common soldiery 
when it limited the availability of basic resources and equipment. The Government has 
never been lavish in its allocation of budgets, and the MoD has occasionally  been 
exposed for sublime incompetence and stultifying procrastination in its procurement 
practices, but the armed forces have been their own worst enemy. According to Beevor:
Its tribal intricacies, based on regimental and arm loyalties, and the byzantine rivalries 
in the Ministry of Defence between the Services turn the process into a three 
dimensional game of noughts and crosses with the players trying to block each other 
and save themselves.59
Good commanders and their regiments have also had to know how to win political 
battles to sustain their subordinates.
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British Pragmatists
 A consequence of the cultural revolution was a demonisation of the armed 
forces. As a counter-blast, some historians sought to provide a human face to the 
complex and adaptive nature of soldering. They  have examined the broad sweep of 
factors that influence morale, motivation and effectiveness. The study of motivation and 
morale is complex not least because military  hierarchies often confused them. 
Effectiveness has had to take account of a whole range of material and situational 
factors. Euphemistically  (a linguistic technique embedded in military culture) this may 
be called the ‘fog of war’ others may more harshly refer to it as incompetence.60  It is 
only by  examining how the authorities provided for the basic requirements of service 
and the fundamentals of life, as perceived by testosterone-fuelled young men, that 
combat motivation in the round can be understood. The cliché states that an army 
marches on its stomach, but it also marches on its feet. Trench foot  is synonymous with 
the First World War, but it has longer legs. Describing the winter of 1914-1915 Captain 
Ferrers commented that:
[…] this constant immersion in icy cold water played havoc with the feet, and made 
them swell to such an extent  that  at  times it  was agony to keep on one’s boots. To take 
them off, however, to gain relief would have been fatal, as it  would have been 
impossible to pull them on again […].61 
Twenty-five years later, nothing much had changed. According to Captain John Graham 
of the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, 'We had in two or three months the same 
experience as the infantry in the First World War endured for years. Some people got 
trench foot […]’.62  L.Cpl. Vincent Bramley revealed that the same sad story was 
manifestly evident during the Falklands War:
An old complaint suffered by troops during many wars was afflicting us in a modern 
war: trench foot. Our boots, badly and cheaply made, coupled with our old-fashioned 
socks with puttees, caused this condition.63
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This false economy  was, as Ellis asserted, an example of the parsimony the authorities 
adopted when considering the wellbeing of the troops. Everything was stripped back to 
the essentials. So whilst food has always provided the calories necessary  to do the job it 
has often proved repetitive and unappetising. Soldiers have never been well paid and in 
its provision of ‘the little vices of life’ such as drink, tobacco and sex, the authorities 
have consistently proved tokenistic and prurient.64  Holmes believed soldiers had an 
almost ‘universal preoccupation with sex', and cited Baynes’ comment that most Great 
War soldiers ‘were ready to have sexual intercourse with almost any woman whenever 
they  could’.65  The authorities did at least  make provision with ‘blue lights’ for officers 
and ‘red lights’ for other ranks; however, during the Second World War a greater degree 
of discretion was required.  Of the other two vices, the appeal of tobacco has remained 
consistently strong. Cigarettes were equally  important in the Falklands as in the First 
World War; Holmes cites Ferguson’s assertion that they literally ‘saved men’s lives’.66 
During the First World War, divisional commanders had the discretion whether to issue 
a rum ration. For those who received it, ‘It  was a precious thing, and serving it  out was 
almost like a religious ceremonial […]’.67  The continuing role of alcohol in military 
culture is demonstrated by  the ‘booze cruise’ enthusiasm of the Task Force en-route to 
the Falklands. As one veteran recalled, ‘We were all restricted to two cans per man per 
night but no one took any notice of this and the bar was soon drunk dry. An extra 
shipload of booze had to be sent for’.68
Deal Makers
 
 Not all soldiers were inherently attack-minded aggressors. The ‘Deal Makers’ 
have identified the propensity of soldiers to form an accommodation with their enemies. 
During the Great War a ‘live and let live’ system emerged whereby one set of trench-
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fighters identified to their opponents their desire to maintain a peaceful lifestyle. The 
simplest way  of achieving this was inertia. The principle being, we will remain passive 
unless you are aggressive, in which case we will retaliate.69  Sometimes actual 
communication took place between sentries, and at other times a ritualistic form of 
combat took place. Clearly, such behaviour was in direct opposition to official policy 
and its assumption that all men are innately aggressive. Ashworth's research revealed 
that the military authorities responded by increasingly  reducing the ability of local 
commanders to determine the level of aggression, and by 1916 had instigated ‘an 
impersonal, centralised control [that] constrained trench fighters to violence’.70
 One of the main reasons that men kept fighting during both world wars was that 
they  had limited alternatives; assuming they  did not want to risk desertion or suffer 
from self-inflicted wounds, the only realistic opt-out was to surrender.71  Such activity 
was fraught with risk, and evidently, despite public mythology to the contrary, both 
sides in both world wars were enthusiastic executioners of prisoners. Because this was 
tacitly approved at the highest levels, there was no lack of awareness of its dangers, and 
Ferguson argued that it  ‘was one of the most important reasons why men kept fighting 
even when they found themselves in dangerous, if not hopeless, positions’.72  Ferguson, 
with his predilection for economics, has extended the economic game-theory approach 
to prisoner taking and prisoner killing. The essence of the Ferguson model was that 
surrender resolved into a cost/benefit analysis of six factors: The risk of death or injury 
by continuing to fight, the risk of punishment from his own side if caught, the 
likelihood of being killed by the enemy, the quality of life as a PoW, the coercive effects 
of military  discipline against surrender, and finally, the cultural aversion to surrender.73 
Such a formulaic model, which applied logic rather than emotion to the business of fear 
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and killing, does not sit  comfortably, but provides an insight to juxtapose with chivalric 
notions of combat and surrender.  
Killers
By drawing evidence from primary testimony and relating it to psychoanalysis, 
the ‘Killers’ explored the idea that a motivation to combat was the pleasure of killing. 
Whilst this idea contradicted the norms of actual behaviour in British society, the fiction 
of violence in literature and film has retained a compelling leisure interest. As the 
historian Joanna Bourke pointed out:  
Did actual combat dent the pleasures of imaginative violence? For most  combatants the 
answer must  be ‘no’. Time and time again, in the writings of combatants from all three 
wars [Great War, Second World War and Vietnam], we read of men's (and women's) 
enjoyment of killing.74
Gray sought to validate this process by reference to Freud’s identification of the 
thanatos (death) instinct, which is in perpetual challenge with the conflicting instinct for 
order and preservation. The rather bleak outlook is that because pleasure of destruction 
is so implicit within the human condition, warfare will continue to develop upon its 
long tradition.75  Ferguson adopted a similar view by challenging the perception that  the 
Great War was an experience of dogged stoicism with the notion that, ‘men wanted to 
keep  fighting’. They  found killing an easy business, and more men suffered nervous 
breakdowns because they were not allowed to kill rather than being forced to do it.76
 The psychiatrist, Theodore Nadelson, asserted the view that ordinary  men can 
become transformed: 
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The true killers in Vietnam were ‘ordinary men’ before enlistment […] soldiers became 
addicted to the excitement and sense of freedom created by the licence to kill. While the 
act itself could assume the quality of a sexual arousal […].77
Bourke also conflated the urge to destroy and sex. ‘Killing was intrinsically 
“glamorous”. It was like “getting screwed for the first time” and gave men “an ache as 
profound as the ache of orgasm”’.78  Keegan shared the view that ‘men can behave 
disgustingly  in combat’. Combatants may have become wrapped in a frenzied fantasy 
that could manifest an extreme form of cruelty  where the prospect of killing became 
unbounded.79  Aspects of military training, such as the bayonet fetish, could act as a 
catalyst for frenzy  because they  sought to inculcate aggressive behaviour underpinned 
by a ‘kill or be killed’ ethos. However, there was a distinction between theory and 
practice. Keegan identified a leviathan figure that he called the ‘big man’:
This is a combatant  ‘who has the ability to project  a dominant presence on the 
battlefield, often but not necessarily a senior officer. They are usually not nice […] 
while they quite often instigate disaster […] they have power over other men 
nonetheless.80 
Men inexperienced in battle needed an example to follow, and they may have fallen 
under the influence of a ‘big man’, a natural leader who was also a killer.
 
Cultural Analysts
 There is a symbiosis between warfare and public attitudes and this encapsulates 
not only literature and film but also the business of commemoration and the manner in 
which they can be exploited as political tools. Writers such as Henty and Kipling shaped 
the traditional language of warfare that sent troops to fight in 1914 and Newbolt’s Vitaï 
Lampada is often cited as the apotheosis of this tradition. According to Fussell, it was 
not a language that could be sustained following the Great War.81 Whilst this may have 
been true of mature literature, the nature of boys’ literature and comics during the inter-
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war period espoused the traditional imperialistic values. Winter argued that it  was the 
Second World War rather than the First  that acted as a cultural watershed in attitudes 
towards war, but this was challenged by Dawson: 
The soldier hero has proved to be one of the most  durable and powerful forms of 
idealised masculinity […] Celebrated as a hero in adventure stories telling of his 
dangerous and daring exploits, the soldier has become a quintessential figure of 
masculinity […].82
It was a robust image that was exploited and reflected in the massive popularity  of 
books, television, and films with a war theme, that had ingrained itself within popular 
culture at the time of the Falklands War and remains with us today, not least because it 
is an image that is robustly exploited by the Armed Services and the state.83 It  strongly 
suggests a hegemonic construct  that provides the public with a distorted and idealistic 
vision of army life. This is certainly reflected in the attitudes of many recruits who still 
have an entirely  unrealistic view of military service, often believing that they will live in 
a holiday camp atmosphere whilst at the same time being transmuted overnight into 
Ramboesque avengers.84
 
 The manner in which the state celebrated war provided a cultural affirmation of 
the high status of combatants. Ashplant et al. have sought to demonstrate how politics 
has been central to the business of war commemoration. They cited Hobsbawm and 
Ranger's assertion in The Invention of Tradition (1983) that an official version of the 
past, sustained by invented tradition and symbols, is necessary  not only to reinforce 
common culture but also to cement social cohesion and legitimise authority. Anderson's 
Imagined Communities (1983) asserted the centrality  of a monument, such as the 
Cenotaph, as symbolising how national elites may persuade citizens to die for the nation 
as the price of belonging to the national community.85  Kevin Foster concluded that the 
essence of commemoration was (and is) not only to expunge the visceral realities of war 
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but also present it  as orderly, meaningful and heroic, ‘[…] Establishment remembrance 
tends to accuse the post-war present of mediocre survival […]’.86
 Popular representations of war and commemoration, pervasive throughout the 
post-war period and entrenched within the national psyche, were essential to the 
mythical web woven by the Conservative government in 1982. They evoked powerful 
images of British stoicism and heroism built around the centrality of the soldier hero. 
These myths enabled Thatcher: to present herself as embodying the spirit  of Churchill, 
to restore a sense of national pride, and project a sense of utter rightness in pursuing the 
war.87  The government took rigorous steps to maintain absolute control of their 
narrative ‘by  endeavouring to discredit the views of dissenters, where possible harassing 
them into silence’.88  Typical was the treatment meted out to Lawrence and Bramley 
whose role in the historiography is touched upon below.  
Men in White Coats
Attitudes towards combat stress have significantly changed the relationship of 
the public towards the business of soldiering. In 1914, there was no recognition of 
‘shell-shock’ having a psychological cause, it was either physically induced or arose 
from a fundamental lack of ‘moral fibre’; therefore, a justification for executing 
cowards. Since the Vietnam War and the identification of PTSD as a legitimate 
psychological injury, there has been much greater opportunity for a collaborative 
approach towards the historiography  of the combat mindset. In British society, a 
growing cynicism of Establishment institutions has shifted social values away from 
collective obligation towards the rights of the individual.  Psychologists Jones and 
Wessely asserted that: 
Recent decades have seen a major shift  in our sense of self and what  is right  and proper 
as regards our emotions […] from a position of advocating or admiring resilience and/or 
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reticence, western values have shifted to encouraging and valuing emotional display or 
vulnerability.89
 In his analysis of the Great War experience, Lord Moran was a trailblazer. His 
concept of a ‘reservoir’ of courage suggested that every soldier had only  a limited 
capacity of courage that needed to be topped up: 
Even prodigal youth had to husband its resources […] A man's willpower was his 
capital and he was always spending so that  wise […] Officers watched the expenditure 
of every penny lest their men went bankrupt.90 
His evidence to the Southborough Committee (1922) was largely ignored, and by  the 
start of the Second World War the army had only made a token investment in 
psychiatric provision. As a result of the growing body of evidence emerging from both 
World Wars and post-war campaigns, it became evident not only  was Moran 
substantially  correct, but also the rate at  which the reservoir was expended could be 
constrained by such factors as effective training, good leadership and a strong group 
commitment. From studies of the wars that took place in the 1950s and 1960s, Belenky 
concluded that individual personality  was not a determining factor in assessing a 
propensity  towards PTSD. Individuals existed on a continuum that ranged from the 
heroic to being a casualty. The course of travel along such a continuum would 
inevitably be determined by the circumstances of battle together with primary group 
factors. The psychologist Jon Shaw explained that, ‘Particularly potent in inducing 
shock and demoralisation is surprise, whether at the strategic, operational or tactical 
level’.91  
 
 The initial view that emerged from the Falklands was that psychological 
casualties were negligible at only two percent of all casualties. Further research 
increased this estimate to eight percent. One premature conclusion was that the presence 
of elite units, such as the Paras and the Royal Marines, kept  this figure down, ignoring 
the possibility  that such units perhaps had a tendency  to play down anything that 
undermined their self-image. A study conducted ten years after the war suggested that 
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50% of combatants had partial symptoms of PTSD, whilst  twenty-two percent suffered 
the full disorder.92  The official recognition of PTSD as a defined psychiatric illness is 
relatively recent. As Wessely pointed out, it was not enjoined within the psychiatric 
canon until 1980. Old attitudes tend to die hard, and there remains a persistence of the 
view that combat stress is generally a short-lived condition; however, if it becomes 
chronic then it  must have been caused by pre-war events. Wessely also argued that the 
recognition of PTSD has caused a slow fissure with established military  academic 
teaching. The military  mind has struggled to accommodate the idea of PTSD as an 
individual response to combat because their dogma emphasised the protection of the 
primary group and the palliative of leadership. Military training and culture continues to 
be centred on group formation and loyalty. Traditional views remain strongly 
garrisoned, and the ‘most  powerful discourse in military teaching’ is that emotional 
breakdown is the polar opposite of motivation. Compassion might be awarded for 
demonstrable courage, but anything less will receive little understanding.93 
Consequently, the authorities have yet to offer effective treatment.  
 The psychology of leadership  feeds into motivation. Dixon identified that a 
significant cause of incompetent leadership resulted from an authoritarian personality. 
This manifested itself in a number of ways, but most notably in an obsession with status 
and the pecking order, asocial behaviour, and reactionary and straight-jacket thinking. 
Such personality  traits were, in his view, the product of childhood socialisation, ‘The 
author is only too well aware that  to suggest that a general’s personality may […] bear 
the hallmark of his “potty-training” reduces some people to nervous giggles’.94  It is an 
inescapable fact that many officers with this form of ‘achievement motivation’ found 
the armed forces offered a natural environment until they were challenged beyond their 
capabilities. Fortunately, others possessed a ‘needs motivation’ that was focussed on 
task completion, necessarily  challenging the hierarchy  in the process. When motivating 
the troops such leaders were most likely  to communicate the common touch. During the 
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Falklands War, Brig. Julian Thompson emerged as an abundant possessor of these 
qualities.  
Quest Narrators 
Modern warfare produced an abundance of personal testimony. Fussell cited 
Auerbach as demonstrating how many of these narratives shared the characteristics of a 
mediaeval romance quest, ‘of the sort written in France by Chrétien de Troyes […] and 
in England by Sir Thomas Malory’.95  The essence of a quest narration is to unravel an 
individual journey through unfamiliar territory. The narrator will face numerous tests 
and mysteries, gain experience and skills necessary to overcome strange enemies, be 
sustained by organisational rituals and emerge from all the trials encountered into, ‘a 
community of the elect’.96
 Narratives of the Falklands War reveal a difference in style between officers and 
other-ranks. Lt. Col. Nick Vaux of 42 Commando described his experiences in March to 
the South Atlantic (2007). Whilst this was a colourful and insightful account, it did not 
get under the skin of the combat experience. Any criticism was muted, and it essentially 
served as a panegyric. There was no risk of this book rocking the Establishment boat 
and Vaux retired in 1990 as a Major General. By  comparison, Surgeon Commander 
Rick Jolly was prepared to criticise; there is considerable evidence from him that the 
medical provision was inadequate and that success in treating so many casualties, 
without loss of life, was the result of professionalism and improvisation.97 Jolly was the 
only combatant decorated by both sides, and he continues to be a committed advocate of 
support for PTSD sufferers.  Until 1997, two-thirds of Falklands written testimony was 
produced by officers; after 1997 the same proportion came from the rank-and-file. The 
shift in the ratio also marked a shift from an explanation of decision making to the 
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experience of implementation.98  The nature of the books written from the ‘rank-and-
file’ tended to be much more critical, often possessing a cathartic quality that related 
feelings of disempowerment, the somewhat cosy interpretation of officer-man relations 
made by senior ranks, and the struggle to come to terms with the visceral death of 
friends. Mark Eyles-Thomas, a junior soldier, commented:
[…] the events of the Falklands in general and Mount  Longdon in particular have 
shaped my life, for both good and bad. The one overriding factor for me has always 
been the motivation to achieve for myself the things that  my friends were unable to. 
There is not a day goes by when I do not think of them.99
Most of them underwent life-changing events whilst very young; Eyles-Thomas was 
only seventeen, too young to serve in Northern Ireland.
 There is no doubt that personal survivor testimony exerted a powerful and often 
raw view of the combat experience and this certainly chimed with the current ‘Desert 
Sands’ view of warfare and its focus upon the individual.100  They provide a unique 
means to shape an understanding of combat. However, these testimonies require a 
careful interrogation as potential research sources. Narratives are not constructed in a 
vacuum; they  are written to serve a purpose, often as a marketable commodity, and the 
view they project may be distinctly refracted because of the manner in which they are 
collectively ‘composed and recomposed’.101
Evangelists
 
 These link ‘quest narrators’, who wished to reveal the reality of combat, with 
more academically focussed work, both of which sought to expose official fabulation. 
Perhaps as a result of the standards of adult literacy, much of this work has, in earlier 
decades, tended to come from the officer class. Not so in reflections of the Falklands 
War; Bramley has written several books, and his most  notorious revelation of the 
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murder of PoWs invoked the wrath of the authorities, instigated an official enquiry and 
placed him under threat of prosecution:
Suddenly we heard screaming […] A dull shot was heard and we saw an Argentinian 
fall over the cliff. There was more screaming […] Below the cliff line a party of our 
lads were burying the 'battle-dead' Argies who had been centralised for this purpose. I 
tried to see more but  Captain Mason shouted for Johnny and me to come over. 'Forget 
that. The OC will deal with the bastards […] We left  the 'topping' to follow his 
instructions.102
Whilst there appeared to be a solid core of truth in this allegation (discussed in Chapter 
3.7), the evidence suggested it was exaggerated in scale. Robert  Lawrence, an officer in 
the Scots Guards who was seriously wounded during the Falklands War, was critical of 
the official response to his injuries. The army has always advertised itself as being 
strong on pastoral care; however, army support following injury  appeared to be 
uncompromising. It  required those who needed support to accept it on the Army’s terms 
and not their own. According to Lawrence, ‘[…] all I ever wanted was for the Scots 
Guards to […] Be the family they  had always claimed to be […] Instead I think I just 
became an embarrassment to them’.103  The film Tumbledown (1988) based on his book 
provoked a number of ad hominem attacks on Lawrence. Anecdotally, these seem to 
have been semi-official in nature and conspired in the officers’ mess of the Scots 
Guards.
 Fitz-Gibbon has deconstructed the Falklands War Battle of Goose Green, and the 
role of Lieutenant-Colonel ‘H’ Jones VC; whilst Wilsey has also undertaken a character 
analysis of Jones. There is no doubting Jones’s personal bravery, and what official 
mythology demands of its warrior heroes; however, whether Jones was deserving of 
Britain’s highest gallantry award ahead of many others is debatable. What is more 
certain is that the media demanded a hero, and they lobbied furiously on behalf of 
Jones. Fitz-Gibbon commented on Jones’ VC citation that, ‘The idea that the 
devastating display of courage by Colonel Jones had completely undermined [the 
Argentinian] will to “fight further” is pure fantasy’.104 In the moments leading up to this 
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event, ‘There is considerable evidence that Colonel Jones was becoming irritable with 
the OC ‘A’ Company. Estimates […] range to assertions that the Colonel had effectively 
sacked Major Farrar-Hockley’.105 From Farrar-Hockley’s perspective, ‘it  cannot be said 
that H’s courageous sorties […] Inspired the soldiers […] Few, if any, were aware of 
what he was doing’.106  Farrar-Hockley went on to win the MC and retired as a Major 
General; he is yet to publish a memoir and is seldom quoted.
 
 The institutional motivation of awards will be discussed in Chapter Three (part 
1). The issue of awards by the British has always been parsimonious and weighted in 
favour of the senior ranks. The apparent lottery system of the reward system provoked 
much disquiet and occasional outrage because of its failings, notably in the case of Cpl. 
Stewart McLaughlin.107  McLaughlin featured regularly  in Falklands narratives of the 
Battle of Mount Longdon, and his case study is discussed in Chapter 3.7. Decorations 
could also become devalued if they  were dispensed too freely. According to 
Cincinnatus, during the Vietnam War the Americans issued over 1.2 million bravery 
medals:
[An] indication that the Vietnam-era army had difficulties can be seen in its willingness 
to present awards and decorations to men for doing no more than what they were being 
paid to do.108
Cincinnatus exposed the fact that whilst General William C.Westmoreland was prepared 
to present Vietnam as a military success that failed because of a lack of social and 
political will power, leadership was the real failing.109
 
 A revealing aspect of the desire to evangelise was pointed out by  Dixon. He 
asserted that the armed forces have consistently  fostered a culture of anti-
intellectualism. It  certainly  seems that  the limited publications of serving officers have 
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tended towards an anodyne and formulaic narrative. It  is only when the shackles were 
off, and the pension secured that there was a tendency to cut loose. The saddest feature 
of anti-intellectualism was that it often reflected actual suppression of intellectual 
activity rather than any  lack of ability. This is suggested by the rapidity with which so 
many military men rushed into print soon after retirement.110  The use of such testimony 
raises a challenge for the researcher that must be confronted head on. There is a raft of 
opinion that military experience is a prerequisite for embarking upon a study of this 
kind.Diana Henderson asserted an argument for caution: 
We as historians are asking in a sense, what it was like to be there? I believe we should 
be asking what  might it have been like to be there? […] Many of [us] have never ‘worn 
a red coat' and therefore I advocate that  we take great  care when expounding upon ‘the 
soldier's experience’.111
Nevertheless, it is essential to get beyond the myopia of distinctly  personal experiences 
and the tendency to close ranks around the overly perfected image of the warrior-hero. 
Often published accounts are nuanced to satisfy  the demands of the reader, they are 
after-all a commercial commodity. However, an un-badged historian has the potential to 
bring a generous helping of objectivity, a pinch of cynicism and hopefully  a dollop of 
empathy to the process. As Robinson observed: 
Falklands Veterans who wrote memoirs [have] […] defined how combat  is understood. 
As such they are uniquely positioned to illuminate the changing relationship between 
memoir, memory and war in the twentieth century.112
Primary Source Collators
 
 This final category has a highly qualified value as a literary evidence and is 
subject to the important caveat that sources seldom speak for themselves. However, it 
does signpost sources for more thorough analysis as an aid to methodology. This genre 
has tapped into the archival sound resources available at inter alia the Imperial War 
Museum. Bereft of analysis, sources are chopped up into tasty  morsels and bundled 
together into somewhat arbitrary categories. Two issues emerge from their use. Firstly, it 
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is preferable to get the full sense of a combat experience by analysing it as a continuous 
narrative. Secondly, it may be wise to follow Thomson’s counsel of unpeeling the layers 
of selected and rehearsed memory that have often been developed as ‘strategies of 
containment’.113  Engaging with the original sources is vital to this process as two 
examples reveal. Ulrich Burke (Devonshire Regiment) and Richard Tobin (Hood 
Battalion, Royal Naval Division) crop up frequently as Great War narrators.114  The 
tapes suggest that Tobin delivered a well-rehearsed and frequently refined account, 
whilst Burke responded to his interlocutor with an immediacy and freshness.115
 
 It is evident from the diversity of sources that understanding combat motivation 
remains a contested field for historians. The challenge was acknowledged by Keegan, 
‘[…] you may even […] push us a shade further to a convincing theory of combat 
motivation […]’.116  An imperative in attempting to answer the question of why  men 
fight is to envisage how the various factors can combine. Compliance theory asserts that 
the exercise of power can take one of three-forms; coercive, remunerative or normative 
(i.e. persuasive). Those upon whom such power is imposed can respond in either an 
alienative, calculative or a morally engaged manner; consequently, there are a diverse 
range of compliance relationships.  It has been argued that, during the twentieth century, 
only a normative power/moral response relationship  has been an effective motivator.117 
A further argument suggested that motivation could be boiled down to the combined 
effects of four factors: submission, fear, loyalty and self-pride.118  The fact remains that 
there have been few historians’ theses produced since 1970 that have researched this 
question, and most pertinently considered combat motivation as a process comprising a 
before, during and after. From a medical perspective, it has been argued that ‘It is 
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helpful to conceptualise the stressors of war along the following time line: pre-
deployment, deployment, sustainment, hostilities, reunion and reintegration’.119 
 There has been a tendency in this field of research to take a top  down, functional 
and homogenised approach to the fighting soldier, echoing the Clausewitz view that:
The end for which a soldier is recruited, clothed, armed and trained […] The whole 
object  of his sleeping, eating, drinking and marching is simply that he should fight  at 
the right place at the right time.120
Current scholarship is more reflective of Desert Sands and is oriented towards the 
means of recruitment and service rather than its ends. By taking a ‘bottom-up’ view, it 
will be possible to establish that motivation does not resolve into a few simple tropes. 
At different times, different forces come into play. Therefore, the substantive chapters of 
the research process will integrate the historiography with the analytical structure that 
follows. 
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Research Framework
The range of evidential sources set out above have to be placed within a coherent 
research framework. Following the publication of the Face of Battle (1976) Keegan felt 
that he had stumbled upon a universal theory of combat motivation, ‘inducement, 
coercion and narcosis’, until it was pointed out to him that this triumvirate could equally 
apply  to running a university  department, or marriage.121  Nonetheless, it does contain 
essential truths that are integrated within the research framework for this thesis. A 
pictogram is attached as Appendix 1, and this requires explanation. The model 
comprises three elements: Morale Factors; Personal Orientations; and Cyclical 
Motivations, which reflect the Before, During, and After of combat. 
Morale
 The expressions morale and motivation, although often used interchangeably, 
are not the same thing. In essence, they reflect the interplay between the ‘what’ and the 
‘why’ of combat. The ‘what’ factors of morale are facilitators of the spirit  with which 
the serviceman embarked upon combat. The ‘why’ refers to the means by which 
participants justified their action. Therefore, it was possible for a combatant to have 
high morale/esprit but low fighting motivation and vice versa. As such, morale served as 
an aid or an inhibitor to motivation. Because morale is essentially an expression of how 
human needs are met, then the impact of morale on motivation can be considered in 
hierarchical terms. For this reason aspects of morale are separated from motivational 
forces, are discussed separately, and are positioned within the hierarchy  of needs 
deficiencies first theorised by Abraham Maslow in 1943. 
Personal Orientations
  Motivation and morale factors impact upon individuals in different ways 
depending upon each personal orientation towards combat. Extant research reveals that 
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there are three inter-linking personal motivations towards military service and the 
prospect of combat. These are universal constructions that have been applied throughout 
this research. The constructions are: needs versus achievement, intrinsic versus 
extrinsic, and existentialist warrior commitment versus jobseeker.  
 According to Dixon, the needs-motivated soldier was primarily driven by  self-
determined standards of excellence. By contrast, those who were achievement-
motivated were driven by  the desire for the approval of others. At its worst, 
achievement-motivation lead to the development of an authoritarian personality  that 
was obsessed with atychiphobia (fear of failure):
[…] those sorts of behaviour - conformity, obedience, and physical bravery - which 
earn social approval and increased self-esteem are the very ones rewarded by steady 
advancement in military organisations. Conversely, many of the traits associated with 
the more entrepreneurial aspects of need-achievement - unconventionality and scant 
regard for the approval of others - are not welcomed in military circles.122
It does not require a leap of imagination to envisage the appeal of honours to the 
achievement-motivated; however, it  is important to distinguish the authoritarian from 
the autocrat because these terms have also often been interchanged. Both types of 
personality, in a leadership role, could tend towards either the martinet  or the avuncular. 
An autocratic leader may  have been hard on his subordinates but was more likely to be 
concerned for their welfare and recognition because of his identification with task 
completion. By contrast, an authoritarian may have courted popularity  from his 
followers, but  this was only a veneer because self-enrichment was their driving force. 
Lt. Col. ‘H’ Jones, arguably the most iconic figure of the Falklands War, has been 
described by  one of his officers as, ‘Not hysterically  authoritarian, but not far off it’.123 
However, it may be argued that he was a needs-motivated autocrat, although not 
necessarily an entirely competent one for the role he fulfilled during the campaign. 
 The evaluation of intrinsic versus extrinsic combat motivations remains a 
contested field. The terms themselves are controversial and require a definition. 
Sociologically, they have often been applied as absolutes; however, for this research 
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they  are used as heuristic devices that should be envisaged as existing on a continuum. 
Intrinsic motivation is closely allied to needs-motivation because it ‘is valued for its 
own sake and appears to be self sustained’.124  It embraces ideas of nationalism, 
ideology, rationality, public service and role fulfilment within a military framework. 
This demands that a serviceman could find a sense of satisfaction and self-actualisation 
within a military context, even though military  hierarchies have not been entirely 
conducive to independence of spirit. Bartov and Fritz were advocates of ideological 
motivation; based upon studies of the German Army during the Second World War they 
argued for the intrinsic motivation of Volksgemeinschaft.125  By  contrast, extrinsic 
motivation relied upon the application of indirect forces. At its crudest level it  was 
coercive, but applied with more subtlety inculcated a modified set of values through 
training and the formulation of group  identities. In the commercial world, it has been 
argued that  the ideal extrinsic motivator has been ‘strict pay for performance’.126 
However, this accorded with neither the traditional generosity  of the Government nor 
military sensibilities, according to Beevor:
One thing is certain: an army, to mix a paraphrase, does not march on its pay scales 
alone. ‘If you turn us into a monetary organisation’ said a major from the Parachute 
Regiment, ‘you get a monetary mentality’.127
The services have developed their own carrots and sticks built around adoption within 
the regimental tradition and its primary  groups, where status partially substituted for 
salary, and coercion produced normative behaviour. It has been argued by  Bruce 
Newsome that intrinsic motivation has no significant purchase, and its effects are 
exaggerated; intrinsic motivations may  have encouraged recruitment but were irrelevant 
to the act of combat:
[…] the literature, particularly the American literature, exaggerates intrinsic 
motivations. Motivations to serve, which are intrinsic, are not  completely transitive 
with combat  motivations, which are largely extrinsic. An emphasis on intrinsic 
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motivations can even be counter-productive, encouraging, at  best, myopia and, at 
worst, atrocities.128
This disregards the orientation of existential commitment, which makes a stronger case 
for individual agency. The argument for the existence of an existential warrior 
commitment establishes the difference between the motivation to undertake a soldierly 
career in which participation in combat was perceived as an unlikely and/or unwelcome 
necessity, compared with the desire of a natural warrior actively to seek out combat. 
Rune Henriksen asserted:
There is such a thing as a ‘natural soldier’: the kind who derives his greatest 
satisfaction from male companionship, from excitement, and from the conquering of 
physical obstacles. He doesn’t want  to kill people as such, but he will have no 
objections if it occurs within a moral framework that gives him justification.129
Based upon his methodologically disputed research,130  S.L.A. Marshall concluded that 
only 25% of ‘well-trained and campaigned season troops’ will actually fire on the 
enemy.131  CPO Sam Bishop, who served on HMS Antelope during the Falklands War, 
joined the Royal Navy as a jobseeker rather than an existentialist-warrior:
I’ve always said, years ago, if ever there is a war breaks out I’m swimming back to 
Belfast. I didn’t join for war; I didn’t want to go but I thought well I’ve got to go. The 
taxpayers have been paying my wages for all these years [ …].132
Henriksen argued that  existentialist-warrior motivation moved beyond the sense of 
normative behaviour expected by the public collective:
[…] the essence of the difference between a soldier and a warrior […] Sacrificing one’s 
life is a gift, not a duty, and the willingness to consistently pursue life-threatening 
situations is antithetic to instrumental gains.133
It was argued by Professor (and Second World War veteran) Jesse Gray, that a sizeable 
minority of soldiers were captivated by a strong warrior impulse for the opportunity to 
kill and destroy:
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Danger provides a certain spice to experience […] Its origin appears to be sexual, if we 
understand sex in the widest sense given to it  by Freud. The increased vitality we feel 
where danger is incidental is due to awareness of mastery over the environment. It  is an 
individualist, not a communal drive.134 
This concept of frenzy, which embraced the desire to kill and the propensity  to commit 
atrocity, fed into motivations relating to recognition and reward. Although existentialist 
warriors were less motivated by honours, they were arguably the most likely to be 
considered for them provided that they were a low embarrassment risk. For the 
Falklands War Cpl. McLaughlin is a relevant case study that reveals a strong warrior 
ethos mired by accusations of atrocity. 
 Arguments regarding these orientations remain topical. MacCoun et al. asserted 
that concepts of motivation enshrined within group  theories of social cohesion were 
largely irrelevant to military  performance, because what  mattered was a commitment to 
task completion and meeting shared professional goals.135  Whilst acknowledging that 
motivations evolved during the transition into combat, Wong et al. continued to 
maintain the critical power of strong emotional bonds.136  
The Motivation Cycle
 The history of combat motivation is the history of relationships: the compact 
individuals made with themselves, the symbiosis between the combatant  and the social 
collective, adaption to the military hierarchy  and its culture, participation in primary 
groups, membership of the regimental tradition, leading and being led. The 
historiography reveals that each of these categories has had its advocates. The purpose 
of this thesis is to establish how all of these factors were relevant, but shifted in relative 
importance to the individual according to circumstance. Therefore, answering the key 
question of why the British armed forces were motivated to combat during the 
Falklands war, envisions as a cycle comprising three interdependent phases. 
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Chapter One - will analyse the time before combat when a volunteer shaped a 
personal motivation to enlist. This chapter will investigate the power of a popular 
culture and ideology to shape intrinsic motivations, particularly through books 
and film. It will examine recruitment policy, and how extrinsic factors such as 
training, discipline and conformity have been used to create a modified set of 
intrinsic values built around membership of functional groups.
Chapter Two - describes the experience of combat. It will assess the effect of 
functional groups; the primary group, and the broader regimental tradition, the 
role of formal and informal leadership and how this has informed officer-man 
relations. The chapter will conclude by considering frenzy. The extent to which 
combatants have been motivated to set aside societal norms of behaviour will be 
considered.
Chapter Three - will deal with post combat experience and comprises two parts. It 
is during this phase that a combatant will either leave the armed forces with a 
reshaped set of attitudes or will stay in the forces where their experiences will be 
adapted into military culture, potentially  to be called upon in another combat 
situation. The first  part will consider the relationship  between the combatant, the 
military establishment and society in the provision of medals and honours. The 
Second part will consider broader issues of resolving the immediate after-effects 
of combat, the response of the public and the demands of ceremonial, and what 
efforts the authorities have made to reintegrate combatants back into the armed 
services or assist them into civilian life. Finally this chapter will consider the 
emotional fallout of combat and the responses to combat trauma.
 What is needed to test this approach is a tidy  symmetrical little war; fought 
along traditional lines, with a beginning a middle and an end; uncluttered by 
complications of peacekeeping, guerrilla warfare, American hegemony and religion. 
The Falklands War meets these criteria, and it is from this conflict as influenced by 
previous wars of the twentieth century, that  sources will be applied to develop some 
relevant case studies and answer the following research questions: why did soldiers join 
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the army and how were they  conditioned for combat; how did they cope with the 
business of combat; what were their reactions to post-combat recognition and 
rehabilitation; and finally, what were the ‘fog of war’ morale factors that supported or 
inhibited these events?
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Chapter 1 - Before Combat
 The aim of this chapter is to understand the enlistment motivations of those who 
served in the Falklands War, and it is necessary to situate their attitudes and experiences 
within the evolving perspective of the twentieth century. In it, I will argue for a cyclical 
relationship  between the individual, collective social attitudes, and the armed forces. 
The evidence for this cycle will reveal how nascent individual attitudes of the young 
have been shaped by a powerful collective outlook, how the military  selected recruits 
and reshaped their attitudes and how these then fed back into civilian life through 
narratives of motivation and combat and developed the collective outlook. The 
analytical substance of this chapter will comprise two sections. The first will examine 
the cultural environment where intrinsic and existentialist motivations have been shaped 
and will examine the role of books and film in underpinning cultural formation. The 
second section will begin by examining how such motivations have been extrinsically 
adapted through recruitment policy and training to create a reformed set of intrinsic 
values. The extent to which pay has been a significant motivator will be examined, and 
the chapter will conclude by investigating the changing manner in which discipline, and 
conformity with military culture, has been enforced both officially and unofficially. So 
that this analysis can be properly  framed and provide a context for the Falklands War, 
the following introduction will provide a context to the way British society  has adapted 
and reacted to participation in warfare during the twentieth century.
 A sizeable chunk of contemporary British social history can be examined 
through the lens of preparation for, participation in, and recovery from, total war. Total 
war is often a loosely  used and abused term, frequently employed in a limited sense to 
explain the more barbarous concomitants of warfare.1 Whilst the Falklands War of 1982 
cannot be described in any objective sense as a total war, the motivations of the service 
personnel who fought in it  were shaped by  the national experiences of what had gone on 
before. There has been a significant shift in cultural attitudes towards war during the 
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twentieth century, and the extent to which chivalric notions of war have been consigned 
to the myth-recycling bin of history has been extensively  researched.2 Consequently, it 
is widely understood that demonisation processes, encouraged by all powers, made little 
distinction between combatant and civilian as legitimate targets in pursuit of outcomes 
and solutions. However, this is only  one part of a three part model of total war. 
Geographical reach is the second (albeit  outside the scope of this chapter), and the third 
part measures the extent to which governments have garnered the available economic 
resources of their states to meet their aims. It is in this third part  that shifts in the 
relationship  between the citizen and the state can be found.3 War is expensive, and the 
opportunity-cost sacrifices required of the national collective may be substantial. In 
times of crisis, governments effectively  have to sell the notion that ‘we are all in this 
together’ and that future benefits outweigh present-day hardships.
 
 The first two years of the First World War continued the British tradition of 
voluntary military service. This ended in 1916 with the introduction of conscription, 
which lasted until the end of the war.4  The government learned an important lesson 
about resource utilisation and in 1938 did not procrastinate.5 Shortly before the outbreak 
of the Second World War, conscription was reintroduced and subsequently  augmented.6 
The effect of the Conscription Act (18 December 1941) was to raise the maximum call 
up age for men from 41 to 50 and conscript unmarried women aged between 20 and 30 
into non-combatant roles. Although women were released from conscripted service at 
the end of the war, compulsory national service for young men aged between 17 and 21 
continued until 1961.7  Some important factors emerge from compulsory service that 
reshaped the relationship between citizens, soldiers, and government.  A consequence of 
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conscription was to draw into military service middle-class and skilled working-class 
recruits who, as a matter of personal preference, had historically avoided it. Not only 
was the military awash with talent but also developed a symbiosis, created out of 
necessity, with wider society. Military service became the accepted norm.8 According to 
military historian Anthony Kellett, this development upset much of the received wisdom 
within the military  elite that envisaged the erosion of ‘traditional military virtues’ 
through ‘excessive individualism, inadequate discipline and […] unpatriotic working-
class politics’.9  The Government discovered that democracy  increased its legitimacy to 
nationalise the lives of its citizens in the service of the modern state.10
 During a period spanning fifty-five years, the public, government, and military 
formed a nexus unique in modern British history; it has not lasted. Over the past thirty 
years, the public attitude towards the armed forces has been shaped largely  by 
controlled media coverage of events in the Falklands, Iraq and Afghanistan. According 
to Phillip Knightly: 
It  is now clear that in the wars of our time, Vietnam was an aberration […] the 
Falklands provided a model of how to make certain that government  policy is not 
undermined by the way a war is reported. The rules [are]: […] control access to the 
fighting; exclude neutral correspondents; censor your own; and muster support, both on 
the field and at home, in the name of patriotism, labelling any dissenters as traitors.11
 News of casualties continues to be carefully  managed. In 1982, ‘sombre’ BBC 
reports of ‘hysteria’ during the Sir Galahad disaster were suppressed, whilst ITN reports 
of ‘extraordinary heroism’ made it  past the censor. Film of the attack was not broadcast 
until the war was won.12  As is widely reported, between 2001 and 31 December 2011, 
404 British service personnel died in Afghanistan. However, publicly available data 
from the MoD of non-fatal injuries is incomplete, although for the same period they 
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have been estimated at 11,341.13 Because the public are denied any meaningful context 
of combat, not only in terms of casualties but also how combatants respond to them, 
fighting troops all tend to be reified by the public as heroes in a non-discriminatory 
manner; however, as the spouse of a long-service Parachute Regiment SNCO put it:
 […] she knew of only two types of men within the regiment […] there were the ones 
who were just stupid little boys and the ones who were just  nasty little men […] one of 
the things that  the stupid little boys and the nasty little men had in common was that, 
deep down, they were both cowards.14
As Richard Holmes observed, the truth lies somewhere in between, ‘A thick brand of 
decency is folded around the darker strands of self-indulgence […]’.15  The military has 
had its paladins and its passengers, it cavaliers and cowards, just  as in every other 
occupational group. These are often revealed by the fundamental personal orientations 
that led to enlistment, moral courage being arguably rarer than its physical concomitant. 
 Given that the last national servicemen are now reaching their 70s, the 
experience of military service, that once diffused the nation, is now a much weaker 
force. Attitudes towards, and understanding of, service life are shaped not so much by 
intimate testimony as by media representations. For this reason, it  might be argued that 
the general public now has a substantially  unrealistic view of service life, effectively  a 
reversion to 1914. A generation previously, members of the Falklands Task Force had a 
clearer view of these realities, good and bad. The important distinction is of course that 
they, unlike their post-1916 forebear informants, were all volunteers. However, if they 
had shaped their expectations on the reminiscences of friends and family, wise counsel 
would advise that nostalgic composure tends to gild the good and eschew the bad. 
Professor David French considered that:
The great  majority of soldiers regarded the [Second World] war as an unpleasant but 
necessary job that  had to be completed so that they could then return to their everyday 
civilian lives.16
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Many National Servicemen were also keen to get back into ‘mufti’ without delay, and 
there have always been plenty of vacancies in the armed forces for recruits. Wisdom is 
of course not a notable characteristic of youth. 
 Therefore, it  is necessary to analyse the linkages between personal outlook and 
public opinion that have motivated young men to volunteer for the armed forces with 
the implicit risk that their service will have put them in a combat situation. The 
motivations of the pre-1916 volunteers have been summarised by  Ferguson into five 
categories:
1. Successful recruitment techniques - military bands, posters, rousing speeches, etc.
2. Female Pressure - overtly handing out white feathers, more subtly questioning 
masculinity. 
3. Peer Group Pressure - joining up with ‘pals’.
4. Economic Motives - unemployment, pressure from employers to enlist.
5. Impulse - i.e. none of the above.17
Jumping forward to the present day four similar groups emerge:
i. Altruistic Motives - duty, service, patriotism, etc.
ii. Self-improvement - self esteem, skills and training, discipline.
iii. Experience - adventure, rites of passage, romance & the warrior myth.
iv. Economic Motives - unemployment, pay and benefits.18
There can be little doubt as to the essential truth of these categories. However, what 
they  fail to nail is the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic motivations, how they 
interact with each other, and how they have developed and shifted according to 
circumstance and experience. A demonstration of how youth can rapidly synthesise 
external pressure into an internalized impulse is illustrated by the experience of Norman 
Demuth during the First World War:
I was given a white feather when I was sixteen, just after I had left school […] I was so 
astonished I did not know what  to do about it  […] I thought  this must give me some 
added bounce because I must look the part, so I went  round to the recruiting offices 
with renewed zeal.19
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However, the existence of intrinsic motivation in all but a minor sense has been 
disputed by Newsome: 
Intrinsic motivations to serve may be strong, but just a short  exposure to the realities of 
combat usually destroys a soldier’s prior motivations. Bravado in the calm of 
peacetime is quickly forgotten upon the shock of combat.20
Newsome also validly asserted the difference between those who enlisted for a job 
rather than the prospect of fighting. However, to reduce intrinsic motivation to bravado 
is to accord it less than its full measure. Chapter Two will examine the predominant 
motivators during combat such as leadership, warrior spirit, and group theories. It is of 
the essence of this thesis that these factors did not arise in isolation; motivation has been 
a cyclical process and factors that were most relevant during combat have been 
inextricably linked with what goes on before and after. Evidence will emerge of soldiers 
who enlisted merely  to serve yet developed an intrinsic motivation to fight. It  has been 
argued that ideology sustained the will to fight in Hitler’s army.21 This argument can be 
extended in a moderated British form, ‘Political ideology cements the armed forces to 
civilian society and validates the strains and sacrifices of the soldier’.22  It is a truism to 
state that ideological motivation did not emerge from a battlefield epiphany. It was from 
the melting pot of civilian attitudes, myths, prejudices and cultural references towards 
military service that a potential volunteer intrinsically  developed sufficient motivation 
to enlist. Graham Dawson’s research revealed that:
Of particular interest  […] was the intense fascination and excitement generated for men 
and boys by the military side of the war. This was evident across a wide range of 
contemporary cultural forms: from the massive popularity of war adventure stories as 
bestselling fiction, comics, films and television series, to the use of war themes by the 
tourism and leisure industries, and by the military themselves, in museums, open days, 
historic sites and spectaculars such as the Royal Tournament[…].23
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Persuasive arguments have been made, based upon Kleinian psychology, of how this 
cultural exposure interacted with the psyche of certain individuals.24  Through a process 
of introjection and projection, selected influences from the social world were absorbed, 
and an investment in them was made. According to Klein, individuals created and 
constantly developed internal phantasy (sic) figures or ‘imagos’ that acted out narratives 
in their imaginations.25  Clearly  such narratives, constantly  reinforced, acted as strong 
intrinsic motivators. The issue for motivation is how realistic and sustainable they 
proved to be once they collided with reality. According to Moskos, ‘Like other 
stereotypes, popular portrayals of enlisted men, such as the heroic fighting man or the 
happy-go-lucky garrison soldier, distort as much as they reveal’.26
 The concomitant of an individual wish to enlist was the desire of the authorities 
to recruit. It is revealing to understand how both have changed over time and military 
historian Hew Strachan pointed out that: 
The pre-1914 armed forces recruited their other ranks and ratings predominantly from 
unskilled labour […] in the big cities, and from the unemployed. In 2000 the armed 
forces still fished in the same pool. In 1914 the working class as a whole constituted 
about 80 per cent of the nation’s population, but by 2000 those who earned their living 
in manual occupations were a minority.27
At the start of the twentieth century, the social gap between officers and other ranks was 
vast. Because leadership emerges as such a significant motivator, this chapter will not 
only analyse recruitment of the rank-and-file but also continuity  and change within 
officer recruitment. Obvious areas of difference are the greater alternatives potential 
officers still have to express personal ideals through participation in the voluntary 
sector, experience adventure and travel at modest cost, and access greater career choice 
with a university degree.28
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 Nonetheless, the argument that military service offered compelling economic, 
status and career rewards remains to be discussed. Ben-Ari pointed out the ‘classic’ 
debate between Huntingdon and Janowitz that has argued over the civilianisation of the 
armed forces since the Second World War.29  Huntingdon has asserted the continuing 
dominance of the warrior ideology with its implicit  embrace of hierarchy, discipline and 
authoritarianism. By contrast, the sociologist Maurice Janowitz advised that as a career 
choice:
There has been a change in the basis of authority and discipline in the military 
establishment, a shift  from authoritarian domination to greater reliance on 
manipulation, persuasion, and group consensus. The organisational revolution which 
pervades contemporary society, and which implies management  by means of 
persuasion, explanation and expertise, is also to be found in the military.30
Clearly one of the big changes the military  has also been forced come to terms with is 
the influence of the family. Military historian Anthony Beevor pointed out that it was no 
longer realistic to expect soldiers to remain unmarried despite the instability this 
potentially created for military organisation:
The change of view which has taken place was not  entirely altruistic: something had to 
be done because the dissatisfaction of wives was persuading so many of the Army’s 
best officers and NCOs to leave.31
In other respects there has been a continuity  in the desire for maintaining a tight control. 
Professor Richard Holmes concluded that: 
The sheer size of human waring groups has brought with it  problems of motivation and 
control; and military training, therefore, needs to include devices which, in Dixon’s 
words [On the Psychology of Military Incompetence] ensure cohesion, incite hostility, 
enforce obedience and suppress mutiny.32
Therefore, this chapter will examine the extent to which the coercive nature of extrinsic 
motivation has changed.
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1.1 Cultural Hegemony
 Received wisdom argues that Britain has never been a militaristic society 
perhaps because militarism is antithetical to liberal democratic principles.33  Whilst the 
modern military has never assumed a dominant role in government, it may be asserted 
that some features of militarism have maintained a strong hold. At the macro level: 
Britain continues to apply high status to military  endeavour,34 there is a commitment to 
maintaining a comprehensive military capability,35  and a consistently broad political 
consensus that it may be aggressively deployed in the national interest.36  At the micro 
level, Maurice Janowitz asserted the persistence of the view that military  service is; ‘a 
kind of preparatory school for life, for “making a man” out of a recruit’, and acting as, 
‘a reformatory  for youthful delinquency’.37  This particular canard emerges from the 
media almost every time groups of young people are portrayed as behaving badly or 
illegally.38 If militarism within a society  can be expressed as a continuum, then British 
society has tended to view outright pacifism through a long lens and has, according to 
Edgerton, ‘[…] pioneered a distinctly modern militarism’.39 The purpose of this section 
is to analyse a sense of the national attitude and memory  towards military  service and 
warfare, and how these have nurtured military  ‘imagos’ for potential recruits. The 
national view must of course be qualified; as Winter concluded, ‘collective memory is 
not the same as national memory […] Nations do not remember, groups of people do’.40 
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 A key argument is that there exists a sufficiently strong collective that has 
formed, and continues to maintain, a positive association with, and powerful influence 
over, matters military. The roots of this collective can be found in the last quarter of the 
nineteenth century, with the conscious invention by the ruling elite, of traditions 
designed to cement the populace with new bonds of loyalty to the state. Conscious 
invention succeeded mainly by broadcasting on a wavelength to which the public was 
ready  to tune in.41  This collective view does not embrace a shared political ideology, 
but it does encapsulate the long reach of history, fable and tradition embodied within the 
idea of the nation and, importantly, fear for the continuity  of the nation. It  is arguably no 
coincidence that the invention of military  accoutred royal ceremonial reflects the fact 
that Britain’s previously  unassailable world dominance, was from the late nineteenth 
century, under threat. Strategically, Wilhelmine Germany was only the first bête noire in 
an emergent series; it was a foundation upon which other more sentient values were 
built. The essential components of this collective view included a sense of moral 
justification and national superiority, unselfconsciously eliding between the benefits of 
hierarchy and status on one hand and the desirability of egalitarianism on the other, 
according to time and place. When it came to fighting hard and winning honourably  (as 
the collective still requires that  Britain does) the collective did not just rely on male 
spokesmen:42
As one Vietnam War novel succinctly put  it  in 1967; there was ‘no more bloodthirsty 
creature on the face of the globe than a well-educated young woman with liberal 
convictions’.43
The only difference between the sexes is that, for most of the twentieth century, women 
have had to rely on male agency to conduct the actual fighting, being constrained to a, 
‘“feminine”, supportive role’.44 To reflect 130 years of social change, not least a dilution 
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of hubris and a shift to postmodern imperialism under the aegis of the United States, 
rebranding the collective as ‘Jingo Lite’ may be appropriate.  
 Books and film have been both a powerful means to shape positive attitudes 
towards combat, and represented a subtle and long term investment in culture 
formation. This was because they  often had a multigenerational lifespan that adapted to 
changes in outlook. According to Falklands historian David Monaghan: 
An awareness of the [...] great  moments in the nation’s heavily mythologized military 
past  had been so thoroughly instilled in the consciousness of the British public by [...]
popular culture that, in moments of national crisis, the barest reference is sufficient to 
arouse a surge of patriotic feeling […] such references are all the more effective when 
couched in the quasi-chivalric language developed in the nineteenth century to elevate 
British militarism above the realm of national debate.45
Such attitudes to combat can be separated into two parts: firstly, the sensitising of 
malleable minds to the possibility of recruitment; secondly, the shaping of attitudes of 
servicemen to the imminent prospect of combat. 
Popular Culture and Potential Recruits
 
 Whilst recognising the tremendous growth in newspaper readership from the last 
quarter of the nineteenth century onwards; it  may  be argued that books and films tend to 
be structural, whilst  the media avers to the transitory, the polemic, and the didactic. In 
1927, The Times captured the view of the political elite, ‘The modern democratic world 
contains so many […] very slightly  educated minds that  it is more important than ever 
before to prevent them being led astray by ill-chosen ideas […]’.46 This was particularly 
the case for the young, and the manner in which they engaged with the collective.  
 There has been a relationship that linked popular culture and propaganda with 
recruitment. Dominant fantasies of combat literature have fuelled the desire to emulate 
heroes ‘read about since infancy’, despite the existence of the ‘literature of 
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disillusionment’ oeuvre.47  Dixon considered that the popularity  of books and films 
developed the martial spirit  during periods of peace, ‘like that of pornography following 
an age of sexual repression [providing] vicarious satisfaction of hitherto frustrated 
drives’.48  Winter, despite his cautionary  thoughts about national identity and memory, 
believed that ‘film does indeed have power in projecting national stereotypes and 
narratives’.49  These of course may  have served to validate individual fantasies. Kellett 
observed that febrile imaginings were often detached from reality; they may not only 
have intrinsically  encouraged recruitment, but also sown the seeds of future 
disassociations that may have required robust extrinsic measures:
A soldier’s preconceptions regarding the risks, hardships, duration, and so on, of 
combat are an important  part  of his mental preparation for battle. They are shaped by 
popular conceptions of war (through films, books, and so forth) […] There is therefore, 
a marked potential for demoralization if the battle […] differs substantially from the 
soldier’s mental image of it.50
 Education has been the key to unlocking the contemporary  impact  of popular 
culture and propaganda. The growth in its provision during the Victorian era culminated 
with the ‘watershed’ of Forster’s Education Act 1870.51  This had the significant 
consequence of extending literacy, which affirmed the benefits of status hierarchies, and 
encouraged an autodidactic embrace of the heroic role models found in literature. 
Military historian Gary Sheffield revealed that:  
Even in 1935, a classical scholar who had grown to manhood in the nineteenth century 
could write that, ‘There are worse ways of educating a boy than to familiarize his mind 
from childhood with great tales of splendid tales and heroic men’.52
The Boy’s Own Paper, published between 1879 and 1967, has remained in the public 
consciousness as an exemplar, conflating Britishness, character and adventure. There 
were 72 imperial campaigns during the Victorian era, which the British public, far from 
the fighting, found profoundly important, entertaining and exciting.53 The J.K. Rowling 
Page 57 of 304
 
47 Bourke, An Intimate History of Killing, pp. 5-8
48 Norman Dixon, On the Psychology of Military Incompetence, (London, Pimlico, 1994), pp. 202-203
49 Winter, ‘Matrix of Memory’, p. 861
50  Kellett, ‘Combat Motivation’, in Belenky, Contemporary Studies, p. 220
51 Eric Evans, The Forging of the Modern State, (Harlow, Pearson, 2001), p. 407
52 Gary Sheffield, Leadership in the Trenches: Officer - Man Relations, Morale and Discipline in the 
British Army in the Era of the First World War, (New York, St Martin’s Press, 2000), p. 49
53 Niall Ferguson, Empire: How Britain Made the Modern World, (London, Penguin, 2004), pp. 355-256
of his day, and master of the imperial potboiler was G.A. Henty. His output was 
prodigious, with over 120 books published during a 40-year career.54   Invariably his 
young heroes exuded qualities of intelligence, loyalty, modesty  and ‘pluck’. According 
to Ferguson his sales, up to the 1950s, exceeded 25 million. That they  are still in print, 
and available as e-books, attests to his enduring popularity. Herbert Wootton was:
Very keen on becoming a soldier. I had two uncles, both regulars who had served 
through the South African War of 1899-1902. As a youngster I was thrilled with their 
stories. I became a keen reader of G.A. Henty’s books on the war [ …].55
Not only  did the volunteers of 1914 sign up with Henty in their heads and hearts but 
also the conflation of sport and war. It is a cliché to cite Newbolt’s Vitaï Lampada with 
its stirring evocation of cricket, dead colonels and endorsement to ‘Play up! play up! 
and play  the game’.56  However, it  was a metaphor that  elided into the Great War 
recruiting effort. One 1914 recruiting poster urged ‘young men of Britain […] play  the 
greater game on the field of honour’.57  Another from 1915, ‘Rugby  union footballers are 
doing their duty […] British athletes will you follow this glorious example?’.58  The 
implicit theme of war as fun was not restricted to literature, as evidenced by  the growth 
in war toys. By 1905, the firm of Britain’s Ltd was annually manufacturing over five 
million lead-cast toy  soldiers, and diverse manufacturers, from soap  to cigarettes, 
comfortably  exploited a brand of full-fat imperialism. It all served to feed an illusion of 
ignorance because practically no one had the first idea of what total war was really  like. 
The soldiers who volunteered in 1914 anticipated an ‘adventure’59  and ‘imagined it 
would be an affair of great  marches and great battles quickly decided’.60  As Sergeant 
Jim Davies of the Royal Fusiliers put it:
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On the day war was declared […] We were full of enthusiasm […] I was young and 
stupid, full of patriotism and the Boy’s Own Paper.  That’s what my childhood was 
based on. I couldn’t get into the army quick enough.61
 Before the introduction of conscription in 1916 it is evident, not least  from the 
carrot and stick nature of recruiting posters, that some potential volunteers required a 
nudge, ‘Modern mass wars require in their early stages a definitive work of popular 
literature demonstrating how much wholesome fun is to be had at the training camp’. 
According to Fussell, Ian Hay’s First Hundred Thousand was a ‘a classic in this 
genre’.62  During the Second World War, film rather than literature emerged as the 
medium of choice to assuage the doubts of conscripts who had learned from their 
fathers not to be so willing to respond to service life with unquestioning deference and 
obedience. The Way Ahead (1944) was originally released as an army training film, the 
New Lot (1943).  Whilst its characters found basic training unpleasant, by  the end of the 
film, they emerged as a dedicated and cohesive band of brothers. The implicit messages 
of the film concerned the sympathetic nature of army life, the leavening of social class, 
and the effectiveness of good officer-man relations. The film met Fussell’s criterion by 
being a popular and critical success.63
 During the First World War, actual combat experience was subject to so much 
censorship, not only  by  the government but by the troops themselves,64  that the public 
were left with their traditional references; augmented by febrile demonisations as 
typically published in Horatio Bottomley’s John Bull magazine.  According to Fussell, it 
was during the inter-war period that the language of war fundamentally and irrevocably 
changed because of its failure to cope with the consequences of industrialised warfare. 
However, Fussell’s research was built around ‘high-culture’ that had shifted the 
representation of war ‘from epic to ironic, euphemistic to realistic, heroic to 
disenchanted’.65 Ashplant et al. emphasised the alternative view put forward by  Winter 
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that the Great War reinvigorated the traditional narrative, and it survived until the end of 
the Second World War.  Evidence for this may be found in the way the story of the ‘pals 
battalions’ worked its way into cultural memory. They are remembered as a ‘genuinely 
popular mass movement’, coming from ‘a time of intense, almost mystical patriotism 
and of the inarticulate elitism of an imperial power’s working-class […]’.66  The inter-
war period reflected a broadly  based antiwar sentiment as evidenced by the popularity 
of Dick Sheppard’s Peace Pledge Union. However, whilst disillusionment theory has its 
place in the lexicon of war and memory, it  is more assuredly the influence of popular 
culture that has constantly reinvigorated the heroic narrative. As Historian Gary 
Sheffield argued, ‘The First World War exercised a terrible fascination for men who had 
not been old enough to serve in the war’, particularly as survivor narratives tended to 
focus on the more positive and rewarding aspects of their service.67
 Each generation could augment the pantheon of past heroes with modern ones of 
its own.68 Young men were influenced strongly by the nature and style of boys literature 
and comics published during the inter-war period. Biggles’ first rotation was in the 
White Fokker (1932), and it was the development of flying as a combat technology that 
inspired the image of a ‘knight of the air’. Films such as Things to Come (1936) may 
have exploited public fears of aerial bombing but the fighter pilot was a heroic defender. 
It was an image that was to become engrained in the public consciousness as a result of 
the Battle of Britain. In the meantime, the youth of Britain had to be hegemonised; 
according to historian Owen Dudley Edwards, ‘The Battle of Britain was won on the 
playing-fields of Greyfriars’.69  The point of course was that Greyfriars was a fictional 
public school invented by the publishers of Magnet, one of the most popular boy’s 
comics of the period. Magnet was under the ownership of the Tory grandee Lord 
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Camrose.70  The Magnet inculcated its readers with the ideas that would motivate them 
to fight  if the time came. They were instructed on the relationship  to authority, how to 
cope with injustice, and the importance of camaraderie. Most importantly they  had to be 
confident of victory. The historian Brian Bond suggested that: 
Magnet readers fought  the Battle of Britain with a stock of ideas and attitudes which 
would stand them in good stead […] their training deprived them of the means of 
envisaging defeat. Lord Camrose had killed them all on the eve of the Battle of Britain. 
So they went out and won it.71
 
 The influence of British cinema during the inter-war period was minimal. The 
enormous expansion of cinema as a mass entertainment was fuelled by Hollywood, with 
the British contribution largely limited to the ‘quota quickie’. That during this period, 
the heroic Boy’s Own narrative remained pickled in imperial aspic, is indicated by the 
fact that one of the few big budget movies, The Four Feathers (1939),72  was a tale of 
conformity, courage, redemption, and putting the natives in their place. It was in the 
post-war era that the British war movie emerged as a powerful genre. In addition to 
Winter’s assertion of a new national narrative, the Second World war experience:
[…] entered British cultural memory as a narrative of popular democratic 
accomplishment […] greater material security and rising living standards remained 
sutured to the political values of common sacrifice, egalitarianism, and democratic 
expectation […].73
The important point to make is that culture is a constantly  propagating hybrid. It may 
take on new forms but still retain essential characteristics of the old.  A consequence of 
the First World War may have been a cultural desire for change; nonetheless, ‘the 
‘heady  experience’ of the Second World War ‘generated a massive nostalgia’ that lasted 
until the mid 1980s, and manifested in large film and TV audiences.74 Some of the more 
highbrow newspaper critics ‘professed amazement’ at this demand, and the film critic of 
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the News Chronicle described it as a ‘baffling attribute of the British picture goer’. 
Others, such as William Whitebait of the New Statesman, realised this was much more a 
reflection of the persistence of the collective ideal:
A dozen years after World War II we find ourselves in the really quite desperate 
situation of not  being sick of war, but  hideously in love with it […] The more we lose 
face in the world’s counsels, the grander, in our excessively modest way, we swell in 
this illusory mirror held up by the screen.75
Defining a ‘war film’ is potentially problematic because of the occasional blurring 
between content and context. Nonetheless, Nicholas Pronay identified 85 British films 
set during the Second World War, made between 1945 and 1960. Similarly, Ramsden 
noted around 100 made between 1946 and 1965.76  These were of course additional to 
the rich crop of American war films with their implicitly  heroic narrative, largely absent 
from inter-war productions. British films were immensely  popular, and ‘were the first  or 
second top-grossing British films in almost every year between 1955 and 1960’.77 
Amongst the most popular were the PoW movies, perhaps because they  so comfortably 
captured the public school ethos of dealing with institutionalised authoritarianism whilst 
accommodating the Camrosian ideals, in essence Greyfriars with jackboots. Less widely 
acknowledged is the debt that nearly every PoW film owed to Jean Renoir’s classic 
‘disillusionment’ film La Grande Illusion (1937). These films almost exclusively 
portrayed officers in leading roles, thus it was the male officer class that  was 
stereotyped as heroic, cementing the notion of hierarchy  and aspiration to status within 
the collective. As Penny Summerfield observed, these films were explicitly  male, and 
offered ‘comforting versions of national identity, conservative representations of social 
class, and accounts of gender in which war encourages male bonding and enhances 
masculinity’.78  The arrival of television vastly extended their shelf life, and throughout 
the 1960s and 1970s they were constantly repeated.79 With only three TV channels there 
was little alternative for school-holiday and Sunday  post-prandial viewing. The 
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consequence was that the collective cultural template was consistently  reinforced by 
new inductees from the post-war generation. In essence, they served, in Henry Rousso’s 
construction, as ‘vectors of memory’, an explicitly commemorative and apparently 
truthful development of the national narrative.80  Despite the social revolution of the 
1960s, the appeal of war had plenty of fight left in it.  New ‘big-budget’ films not only 
reprised the World War Two narrative, but also began to include an American take on 
the warrior-hero, as shaped by the Vietnam experience.81  During the 1970s, despite 
growing opposition, boys remained fascinated by war. It seems that  the experiences of 
the World War Two generation did little to ameliorate the attitudes of the baby-boomers. 
In response to criticism of the comic Valiant, the editorial director of IPC Magazines 
commented:
It’s an irrefutable fact that  the second world war is today the most popular feature in 
boys’ comics […] If I could do anything to change this trend within the commercial 
structures by which I have to abide, I would. In fact I do that as far as possible, but if 
your readers are constantly clamouring for something, what else can you do?.82
Popular Culture and the Combatants
 The important point is that films, books and comics, no matter how well made, 
were fiction and could never reflect the full reality  of war. They distorted as much as 
they  informed and, according to Beevor, this had significant implications when intrinsic 
motivations unravelled as a result of extrinsic realities:
According to both officers and NCOs, recruits have ‘some very peculiar views of what 
the Army’s like’. More could certainly be done to disabuse them of some of their 
misconceptions, yet the extent  of the latest  generation’s video view of the world is 
deeply disturbing. Sergeant  instructors are continually astonished by their lack of touch 
with reality. 83
However, a cultural reference and/or a dominant imago has proven to be remarkably 
resistant, and evidence from the Falklands War emerges to substantiate this. The 
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persistence of the heroic narrative wrapped in glamour and excitement can be evidenced 
in aspects of public celebration at the outset  of the Falklands War. On board SS 
Canberra, a marine sergeant had an in vino veritas epiphany declaring:
This is the best  thing that’s ever happened to me. I’ve been in twenty years and I’d 
given up hope that I’d ever see a shot fired in anger in a proper war’.84
The fleet had set sail for the South Atlantic against a backdrop of bands, bunting and 
bellicose well-wishers. It might  easily have been mistaken for 1914 save for the modern 
innovation of some young ladies baring their chests in morale-boosting anticipation of 
derring-do to come. In Chapter 3.7 the role of Cpl. McLaughlin as an existentialist 
warrior will be discussed. In the context of susceptibility to the influence of books and 
film, McLaughlin was the member of a small group within ‘B’ Company of 3 Para 
known as the ‘green-eyed boys’. Historians Jennings and Weale revealed that this clique 
developed a series of behaviours that  owed ‘[…] loyalty to their fantasy ideal of the 
“airborne warrior”’.85  Their group  ethos was not  only derived from regimental heroes, 
but also the fictional exploits of German soldiers during the Second World War in books 
by Sven Pederson and Charles Whiting. The Danish author Pederson wrote under the 
nom-de-plume Sven Hassell. He claimed his books were ‘strictly anti-military’ and 
intended as a more grisly  version of All Quiet on the Western Front. In his obituary 
published on 2 October 2012, The Guardian described his books as crude and brutal 
war comics without the pictures, devoured especially  by teenage boys.86  Any nuance of 
anti-militarism cannot be laid at the door of Whiting, whose books, published under the 
pseudonym Leo Kessler, were overtly  violence and sex-drenched money-spinners, 
exploiting the sub-genre created by Pederson.87  Films such as The Deerhunter (1978) 
and Apocalypse Now (1979) were also formative.88  Embedded journalists, expressed 
considerable surprise at the way books, comics and films had shaped the attitudes and 
language of soldiers. They cited the example of an ‘indignant’ Blues and Royals officer, 
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‘The swine have gone and blown up my tank’, and asserted, ‘They really  did [use 
clichéd sporting metaphors] “We’re going to knock the Argies for six”’. ‘“it’s just like 
Apocalypse Now” said a marine in awe watching the tracer crackle over the side of 
Mount Harriet’.89  In summary, the power of popular culture to influence military 
behaviour was summed up by Robert Lawrence, ‘[…] people going to war find 
themselves acting as they have seen people act in the films about people going to 
war’.90  The blurring of fiction and reality  has a persistence that is embedded to this day 
within military culture. Hennessey commented on his officer training that:  
Sandhurst  relies on scenes from war movies for roughly 57% of the course teaching 
material, and there was barely a lecture we attended that  didn’t  make use of one of the 
stock Sandhurst  war films [e.g. Gladiator (2000), Saving Private Ryan (1998), Full 
Metal Jacket (1987), A Bridge to Far (1977)] for an element of instruction.91
The fundamental problem is that fiction occludes reality. The collective narrative still 
wants stories of victory and heroes, it wants to be entertained and sated, it wants 
assonance with its core beliefs. However, the actual experience of war has often been 
life changing, according to a Falklands veteran:  
I've seen many films and read many books describing war and its spoils but it  is not 
what it seems. Other might  feel differently but I thought  it  was a con. There is no glory 
in killing.92
The Impact of Ideology
 
 Because government legitimacy was a rationale for recruitment, it  is important 
to consider the role of political ideology  as an intrinsic motivator. Received wisdom 
suggested that British armed forces were conservative by nature and political 
conviction.  Contemporaneously  with the Falklands War, Major David Jenkins a serving 
officer in the Royal Anglian Regiment, commented:
I suppose I’m finding more and more that  the people in the Army are becoming 
increasingly right  wing: or perhaps I’m becoming increasingly left wing, and they just 
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seem like that to me. But  there’s certainly a kind of unthinking Toryism which is on the 
increase […]. 93
He explained how idealism and a heroic imago, ‘There never was a knight like the 
young Lochinvar’, were his incentives to join-up, but he also expressed strong 
disagreement with the decision to go to war. This poses two extremely important 
questions: How effective has a political ideology been as a motivation to enlist, and to 
what extent has the government shaped it? 
 In the western democracies, commitment has been to societal values and not to a 
narrow political mindset. If service personnel did become politically conservative, then 
it resulted from subsequent extrinsic conditioning. Moskos’ view of the American 
serviceman could substantially be applied to the British soldier when he stated that:
Quite consistently, the American combat soldier displays a profound scepticism of 
political and ideological appeals. Somewhat paradoxically, then, anti-ideology itself is 
a recurrent and integral part of the soldiers’ belief system.94
Despite ideological indifference, the American soldier was elementally a nationalist 
believing that, ‘the United States is the best country in the world […]’.95 This argument 
was further developed by William Henderson, former commander of the U.S. Army 
Research Institute:
American societal characteristics beyond those required for nationalism provide 
additional sources of motivation to the American soldier […] usually based on a 
soldier's vague but often firmly held belief that  the system that put him in the Army and 
that he is 'defending' is probably the best political and social system possible.96 
From a British perspective, the rush of assertive imperialism in 1914 did not  last beyond 
1916. Contextualised around the Second World War, Holmes referred to the ‘underlying 
belief in the validity of the struggle’ and juxtaposed the opinions of Montgomery, who 
believed soldiers were motivated (often passively) by the democratic of the rightness of 
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the cause; with Slim, who emphasised the spiritual element  of ‘faith in a cause’ as an 
intrinsic motivation.97
 Although the lack of a political ideology as a motivation to enlist is a strand of 
continuity  that stretches from 1914 to the present day, one of the great changes has been 
in the relationship with the government. Whilst the collective retains its essential 
characteristics it is far more discriminating, and the correctness of a political policy has 
to fit within it. During the Great War, the Reverend Leonard Andrew of the Royal 
Fusiliers, was able to comment, ‘Half of the men I’m sure, had no idea what they were 
fighting for. But they went and gave their lives’.98 However, by  the turn of the twentieth 
century Wong et al. concluded, ‘Soldiers who are educated, comfortable discussing 
ideological topics, and volunteers are more apt  to fight for the cause’.99  This suggests 
that, by  the time of the Falklands War, the collective view had significantly evolved. 
Calder argued that  the traditional upper class imperialist myth (for God, King and 
Empire) that sustained propaganda during the First World War was, as a result of 
Dunkirk and the Blitz, transformed into one of communitarianism.100  It was the case 
that the economic realities of the post-war world transformed Britain from paternalistic 
benefactor to reluctant supplicant as it slipped down the pecking order of nations. 
However, the loss of Empire was undoubtedly a dent to the collective pride. As a British 
diplomat expressed it to the Labour politician Dennis Healey, ‘When the British Empire 
finally sank […] it would leave only two monuments, one was the game of Association 
Football, the other was the expression “Fuck Off”’.101
 In 1982, Argentina was much better at football, leaving Britain buttressed only 
by its Ozymandian pedestal of vulgar belligerence. Historiography reveals how 
successfully  Thatcher’s Conservative government were able to tap into the robust 
Page 67 of 304
 
97 Richard Holmes, Acts of War, p. 277
98 Levine, Somme, p. 262
99  Leonard Wong, Thomas Kolditz, Raymond Millen & Terrence Potter, ‘Combat Motivation in Today’s 
Soldiers: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute’ in Armed Forces & Society, Vol. 32, No.4, 
(2006), p. 20
100 Angus Calder, Myth of the Blitz, ( London, Pimlico, 1992), p. 204
101 Ferguson, Empire, p. 365
Anglo-Saxon aspect of collective imperialist memory  that was not extinct but merely 
latent. As Philip  Smith argued, ‘Falklands rhetoric is founded upon cultural structures 
with a long tradition’.102  David Monaghan asserted that  the government ‘encouraged a 
view of the Falklands War as a key moment in the British national myth’.103  This, as 
Gilbran concluded, ‘[…] awakened the warrior spirit of the British people, a people who 
thought this spirit had died with the end of empire’.104  Consequently, as Foster 
summarised: 
The war in the Falklands consecrated the solder hero as both the agent of the nation’s 
return to its ‘rightful and necessary identity’ and as the embodiment  of that  identity, a 
reification of the ‘national essence’.105 
The rhetoric did not fit comfortably with the facts. As eloquently explained by Tony 
Benn in the House of Commons: Britain had been prepared to negotiate a hand-over of 
the islands, had a long record of arms sales to the ‘dictators’ and, under the terms of the 
1981 Nationality  Act, planned to deny the rights of the Falkland Islanders to automatic 
British citizenship. Nonetheless, the Conservative government garnered significant 
public support. Subject  to the caveat that a self-selecting group can only provide an 
indicator of public opinion, a Mass-Observation survey, conducted during the voyage of 
the Task Force, revealed that 52% of respondents advocated war rather than a negotiated 
settlement.106
 Rhetoric, which translated into victory, was an effective recruiting sergeant. 
Applications to enlist  enjoyed a surge following the Falklands War, no doubt assisted by 
the timely (and sanitised) broadcast in November 1982 of a seven-part BBC 
documentary  about Parachute Regiment recruit training.107  It is the final aspect of 
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propaganda which deserves a mention, not least because it leads into the next section of 
this chapter dealing with recruitment and its extrinsic concomitants.  ‘Join the Army  and 
see the world’, as the strap-line to years of army recruitment campaigns, has become a 
cliché. The emphasis on postings to sunny  climes, skiing trips, sports and other 
adventures is a benignly dissimulative tradition. It has failed its own stated objective of, 
‘giving the public full and fair information on the advantages and disadvantages of a 
service career’.108  The Sandhurst brochure was described by Hennessey  as offering a, 
‘kind of CentreParcs with more guns and less cycling’. However, the reality of his 
training in leadership, character and intellect  that the brochure ‘enticingly’ offered was, 
‘best developed by MARCHING, IRONING and SHOUTING’.109  
 The impetus to enlist was not primarily driven by political ideals even though, 
during the twentieth century, governments have been remarkably  successful indenturing 
the populace to their purpose. It is reasonable to assume that soldiers fighting in the 
Falklands War had drawn upon family  memories from fathers and uncles who fought in 
the Second World War and grandfathers in the First. Often these family memories will 
have been adapted, over time, to emphasise the positive aspects of military service. The 
careful cultivation of national myths and traditions through education, literature and 
film, etc., have shifted the prospect of military  service from the fringes of respectable 
society into the mainstream. However, these are essentially  works of fiction that distort 
the realities of military life, often leading to unrealistic expectations from potential 
recruits.
1.2 Education and Enlistment
 
 To provide a context for army recruitment it will be helpful to examine the 
numbers. Information provided by the MoD in answer to Parliamentary questions 
seemed more concerned with form rather than substance. In response to a question 
about the percentage of army leavers with combat experience (a significant question in 
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the context of motivation and skill retention) the Defence Secretary commented that 
such information, ‘[…] is not held centrally and could be provided only at 
disproportionate cost’.110  As at January 2009 the army was only  marginally below 
strength with a total compliment of 101,910. Of this number, 14.5% were officers. The 
infantry component was 21.75% approx. By comparison, in 1905 the strength of the 
regular army (excluding colonial and native troops) was 195,000.111  Between 2003 and 
2007 the average turnover was 12,820 (reflecting an overall reduction of about 5,000 
during the period). These numbers indicate an average length of service of just under 
eight years.  Significantly, for the Infantry (those with the most combat experience) this 
reduces to about  five and a half years.112  It  should be noted that full resettlement 
provision for army leavers only kicks in after six years service.113
 Although the state co-opted its older citizens into the armed forces during the 
major wars of the twentieth century, the forces still preferred young recruits aged 
between seventeen and twenty-six. This was not only because they were fitter, but also 
because they were more biddable and prepared to take risks.114 It  is noteworthy that  the 
average age of the twenty-two soldiers killed during the Battle of Mount Longdon, in 
1982, was just over twenty-two.115  Since the ending of conscription, those who entered 
military service perceived it not so much as a ‘hiatus in the transition to adulthood’ but 
an experiential phase between adolescence and adulthood. As the statistics suggest that 
few enlisted for a long-term career, the role of education as a conditioner of hearts and 
minds for potential military  service, has to be investigated as the first step in a process 
of extrinsic motivation that managed the expectations of service volunteers.   
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 It is impossible to avoid linkage to the taxonomies of social class and the 
persistent gulf between recruitment of officers and other-ranks. When recruiting the 
rank-and-file the military  has never, except for certain specialisms, demanded any 
formal academic attainment. The impact of the 1870 Forster reforms was not only to 
give the working classes a basic grasp of literacy and numeracy, but also to foment 
enthusiasm for empire and sacrificial warrior-hood. Education inculcated ‘Habits of 
order, obedience, sobriety, and respect for the established social structure’.116  As a 
schools’ inspector from the Great War era stated:
The schoolchild had his spirit  broken by ‘severity and constraint; this reduced the child 
to ‘a state of mental and moral serfdom’; once this was achieved, ‘the time has come 
for the system of education through mechanical obedience to be applied to him in all its 
rigours’.117
Baynes was rather more scathing of pre-Great War volunteers:
Most  recruits from the real lower classes came into the Army with a mental age of 
about ten. Their training and instruction as soldiers would raise this to about twelve or 
thirteen, but few of them ever developed a truly adult approach to life […].118
Baynes considered this an advantage because the simple mind was resilient and easily 
encouraged to optimism. At the end of the twentieth century, education still did not 
count for much. A recruit who enlisted in 2002 observed that:  
By and large they were streetwise kids from poor or working-class backgrounds. They 
might  not have much upstairs academically, but most were […] in possession of a 
different  kind of brightness than found in a classroom. In other words, just the kind of 
lads that have been serving the infantry for hundreds of years.119
 
 A significant change in recruiting for the rank-and-file has been the shift  from 
fulsome to lacklustre support within the state education system. During the 1970s and 
1980s, there was an anti-militarist tendency in some schools and education authorities 
not to allow access to Army recruiting teams.120  It  is a viewpoint that is still current; 
commenting on recruitment activity in Hackney during 2009, Labour councillor Angus 
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Mulready-Jones said, ‘It seems that the government’s response to recruitment problems 
is to target younger and younger people from more and more disadvantaged areas’.121 It 
is a fair point because in 2010 29.8% of Armed Forces recruits were aged under 
eighteen.122  Consequently, it can be argued that recruits from disadvantaged 
backgrounds joined up in spite of their formal education, not because of it. Journalists 
Bishop and Witherow described the army that went to war in the Falklands: 
Many of the men were from Britain’s economic wastelands […] and they had better 
experience than anyone else in the country of its imperfections and injustices. They 
joined up in many cases because there was nothing else to do. The war was not won on 
the playing fields of Eton but  on the tarmac playground of a Glasgow 
comprehensive.123
Whilst some of these soldiers were undoubtedly attracted by imaginings of adventure 
and action, the majority had the gumption to do so because of the opportunity to learn a 
trade, get off the dole, and/or escape a dysfunctional family existence; the opportunities 
for adventure being a subordinate and self-justifying consideration. The point to 
emphasise is that, in the economic context, it is a false dichotomy to separate intrinsic 
and extrinsic factors as absolutes.  As Private Graham Carter MM put it:
I don’t  care who you are. I think you don’t particularly join the army these days to 
actually go to war […] Most  people don’t particularly want to go to war […] So I really 
wasn’t looking forward to the prospect of going down to the Falklands […].124
 For its rank-and-file, the armed forces have necessarily  placed a premium on 
physical fitness over intellect. During the First World War, this extended into a theory 
that combat effectiveness and motivation to fight was dependent upon body  type. The 
capacity of a recruit  to display valourousness was effectively disconnected from the 
mind and instead emphasis was placed upon sexual development and hairiness. This led 
to an assumption that men whose distribution of body fat or shape of hip approximated 
to the feminine would make less effective soldiers.125  During the Second World War, 
physical inspection began to be augmented by personality tests. However, it  must be 
argued that, consistently within military culture and the collective ideology, the image 
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of the ideal soldier is constructed around overtly  masculine physical characteristics. 
According to Jary, a veteran of the savage bocage fighting during 1944, this was a myth:
None of the NCOs or soldiers who made [my] Platoon what it  was resembled the 
characters portrayed in most books and films about war. All were quiet, sensible and 
unassuming men and some, by any standard, were heroes. If I now had to select a team 
for a dangerous mission and my choice was restricted to stars of the sports field or 
poets. I would unhesitatingly recruit from the latter.126
 The generation of soldiers that went to war in the Falklands were, as potential 
recruits, subjected to a range of tests known as the SSG. The system remains in place 
today  and the outcome is to grade each recruit from 1 to 5. SSG1 roughly  equates to ‘A’ 
level standard and thus offers the pick of the jobs. SSG5 means that the recruit is 
virtually  illiterate and is only  fit for the infantry.127  According to Major ‘W’, a recruiting 
officer for the Royal Anglian Regiment, the SSG4s and 5s were, ‘too thick even to be a 
soldier’. He did not warm to SSG1s as:
They were the sort  who were possibly going to question and argue too much […] We 
liked best  the 2s and 3s; most  of all the 3s, they were what you’d call ideal other-ranks 
material.128 
The perception that most  of the army had about intelligence levels within the Parachute 
Regiment was misplaced as the Paras only  took down to SSG3.129  Not so for other 
regiments, Falklands veteran Simon Weston described a recruitment test:
[…] you would be confronted with two round shapes and one square one, and have to 
say which was the odd one out  […] Unbelievably, people actually failed. If brains were 
made of chocolate, the people who fail the infantry test  wouldn’t fill a Smartie with 
theirs.130
The overall failure rate during recruit selection runs at around 40%.
 For potential officers, the desirability of a lifetime military career with its 
concomitants of success can be seen as a powerful motivator, even though for most, 
particularly in the last decades of the twentieth century, careers have been much shorter. 
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The desire for adventure is of course highly relevant, but in more practical terms such a 
career offered the chance to:
• be part of a prestigious organisation, 
• exhibit symbols of personal status, 
• exercise management control at an early age, and 
• be part of a profession that has low academic standards of entry. 
Janowitz’s theory was that aspiration to the superior position of the commissioned 
officer arose because ‘An officer’s conception of honour, purpose and human nature 
lead him to assume that he is the standard bearer who embodies the superior virtues of 
men’.131  However, for much of the twentieth century, the size of the volunteer forces 
meant that the number of officer vacancies was limited, and the military establishment 
maintained its role as a self-appointed arbiter of these superior virtues. Therefore, it 
follows that the army has got what it wanted, not necessarily what it needed, to meet the 
motivational necessities of leadership.
 The beating heart of the officer recruitment process was embodied within the 
public school tradition. With the end of the purchase of commissions following the 
Cardwell-Childers reforms, the British public school system set about preparing the 
officers and administrators of empire with a vengeance. It has been the public schools 
that have provided a common ideology around which the officer corps defined itself. 
Janowitz asserted, ‘Authority was ascribed, in that  persons were born into the officer 
class or they were excluded. Seldom could they earn such a position through personal 
performance’.132  This ‘stultifying’ preparation must be responsible in part for the 
weaknesses within the British military command system.  According to military veteran 
and psychologist Norman Dixon, there are two main reasons why  the public school 
system has traditionally trained officers to lead but not to think:
The first  resides in the belief that enforced application to unpleasant, boring tasks 
develops ‘character’, and the second that any truly intellectual exercise, by which is 
meant  the cultivation of independent  thinking as opposed to rote-learning, harms that 
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fine sense of loyalty and obedience which such schools strive to inculcate. To think is 
to question and to question is to have doubts.133
Mosse overtly linked ‘character’ with the concepts of manliness, patriotism and physical 
courage implicit within an elite education and endorsed by popular literature.134 It is this 
notion of ‘character’ which has shown a remarkable continuity  amongst the qualities 
required of officers recruited during the past 130 years. There is also evidence 
suggesting that military  culture has always been suspicious of intellectualism. Whatever 
the admixture between the practical and the academic, picking the ‘right sort of chap’ 
has remained of paramount importance. Family tradition, son following father into the 
forces, with the implication that ‘character’ is an inherited characteristic, has played a 
powerful role.
 From the 1870s onwards, entrance into the fee-paying Royal Military Colleges 
at Sandhurst and Woolwich was determined by competitive examination. However, this 
flattered to deceive, as attendance at a crammer ‘virtually  guaranteed’ an exam pass and 
acceptance for the right sort  of candidate.135  The recruitment requirements of the First 
World War delivered a jolt to the system; 247,061 new commissions into the British 
Army were made, and just  under 100,000 of these were to officers who came from the 
lower-middle or working classes.136  Although these officers were required to maintain 
pre-war class distinctions, they never achieved a seamless integration with their 
‘regular’ counterparts.137  Widely referred to as ‘temporary gentlemen’ they were often 
subject to overt discrimination, for example, being assigned to separate officers messes. 
This suggests a fear that officer motivation was dependent upon social class boundaries 
being maintained and not diluted. Equilibrium was re-established during the inter-war 
years. 80% of officer cadets had attended a public school and this dominant influence 
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had only slightly waned by the mid 1960s.138  During the inter-war years, there was a 
shortfall of officers recruits from the usual sources. Despite attempts to free-up the 
system, military  culture remained resolute.  General Sir Walter Kirke linked class purity 
and the motivation to serve, it was:
[…] important not  to take any drastic measures to attract a new class of officer, whose 
entry in any considerable numbers would probably have the effect  of curtailing the 
existing supply from the superior classes.139
 
 There have been a very few cases where soldiers have joined in the ranks and 
made it to the upper echelons. Famously only William ‘Wully’ Robertson made it all the 
way from the bottom to the top.140 Mostly, the few who made the leap into the officers’ 
mess, were commissioned into non-combatant and socially marginal roles, such as the 
quartermaster or riding master.141 During the inter-war years, a small number of rankers 
were inducted into Woolwich and Sandhurst, but as ‘army cadets’ rather than 
‘gentlemen cadets’. Almost inevitably they were commissioned into the support arms 
rather than the elite infantry or cavalry  regiments. Military historian Anthony Clayton 
revealed that, within the fighting regiments, a subtle pecking order was maintained:
[…] officers of the Guards looked down on everyone else, within the cavalry Dragoons 
looked down on Lancers, in the Infantry, the Rifle and Light  Infantry regiments 
claimed a social cachet, and within a county or region, one of several regiments would 
have a particular social status […] One or two regiments became known for their 
willingness to accept  a Jewish officer who otherwise met  the regiment’s professional 
and social requirement […].142
The custom was reinvigorated for the post-war volunteer army and remains active, with 
regiments maintaining a ‘table of social prestige’.143  Getting into Sandhurst is still only 
the first  stage in being accepted into a regiment. In a highly competitive process, 
regiments undertake their own selection process from the pool of cadets.144  Fitting in 
socially and economically as well as militarily remain important considerations. It 
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might be argued that membership  of a nepotistic self-selecting group, where blue-
blooded officer status juxtaposes with a working-class rank-and-file, has sustained a 
cultural investment in the ‘lions led by donkeys’ myth.145
 During the Second World War the armed forces eventually had to expand the 
pool for officer recruitment. By the spring of 1941, only 24% of officers were drawn 
from the public schools. However, this was not evidence of a nascent meritocracy. The 
process ‘concealed a system of preferences’.146 Recruiters, denied the ability to take on 
public school or Oxbridge alumni, took the next best available from grammar schools 
and red-bricks, provided that they  looked the part. Although the effect of post-war 
national service leavened the social polarisation between officers and the rank-and-file, 
its influence must not be overrated. Many national servicemen did not accept 
commissions because they could not afford them. The wealthier regiments maintained a 
hidden ‘means test’ to remain socially  exclusive.147  In 1947, Woolwich and Sandhurst 
amalgamated into the Royal Military Academy (non-fee-paying). Entrance was initially 
determined by  passing the WOSB although this was replaced by the RCB.148  The 
battery of practical tests to which officer candidates were (and still are) exposed was 
primarily  looking for the ability to fit in.149 It was through the ability  to perform well in 
such practical tests that  a candidate could demonstrate ‘character’. This was confirmed 
by research conducted in 1987, by City  University  Business School, who concluded that 
the RCB officers did not grade candidates on potential, but on how their senior peer 
group would judge them.150  According to Hennessey, who was accepted into Sandhurst 
in 2003:
The unlucky ones were deemed to lack some elusive quality which couldn’t be taught 
at  Sandhurst, and to this day I’m not  sure what that  is. I’ve served with a number of 
men who struggled so severely to learn fundamental lessons that  even to pass them out 
of Sandhurst  was highly questionable and to select  them over other, far better, men who 
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never even got  there is only to see how early in the process the Army can get things 
strangely wrong.151
No great requirement for academic achievement formed part of the philosophy; the 
1957 War Office Grigg Report commented that: 
There was an implication that the services are a career for the ‘duller’ boy’, based on 
the assumption that  junior officers obey senior officers as a duty, and that, because the 
senior officer was always right, there was no need for the junior officer to doubt  or 
hesitate […] The moderating official line was that, ‘there was also room, too, for 
officers who are not  specially “good at  their books, but who have common sense and 
[. . .] imagination”’.152
Given that the entry requirements for Sandhurst were well below those required for 
university,153  it is no surprise that, in 1966, a proposal to make Sandhurst a degree-
awarding institution, was turned down as unnecessary. It was during the 1960s that 
many of the officers who served in the Falklands were culturally assimilated into the 
armed forces. Until 1972 they were still legally ‘gentlemen’,154  and throughout the 
1970s and early  1980s, public school boys made up 50% of the Sandhurst entry, despite 
representing only 6% of their age group.155 During the last two decades of the twentieth 
century, British officers were more professional than ever before, and yet their 
materialistic lifestyles were more redolent of the eighteenth century than the present.156 
This was borne out by the comments of Tim Spicer,157  who in 1982 was operations 
officer in the Scots Guards:
The battalion was completely unprepared for going to war. We’d been doing public 
duties from Chelsea Barracks for five years, and were exhausted by it  […] We could 
shoot  straight and were fit, but  our tactics were very rusty. Some of our officers were 
uninterested in military matters, used to coming in at  ten in the morning, leaving at 
three in the afternoon, living the old-fashioned guards officer lifestyle. They had 
become social soldiers […]. 158
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Falklands veteran Hugh McManners, in a lengthy and astringent  critique of class 
culture, commented that, ‘Inside the British Army, the effect of institutionalised 
snobbery is insidious and widespread’.159  According to Spicer (educated at Sherborne): 
The public-school boy tends to be better at the sort  of leadership required by the British 
Army because he has been practising it  throughout his school life. Although other sorts 
of school might also provide individuals who happen to be good leaders, they do not 
give them the same tremendous advantage […].160
These remarks contain a strong sense of self-justification and by  extension could apply 
to any career requiring management skill. The fact that a huge number of effective 
leaders in many organisations, public and commercial, uniformed and otherwise, have 
been educated by the state, would perhaps suggest the latter.
1.3 Remuneration
 The question of pay does not feature highly in the literature of military service, 
fighting purely  for pay has been antithetical to the collective view. In recruitment 
advertising, money was subordinate to the positive benefits of army life. A recruit did 
not realistically join the services expecting to become wealthy. In his considerations of 
the motivations to enlist, along with coercion and normative control (i.e.moral 
commitment combined with group values), Henderson identified ‘utilitarian control’, 
which is predicated on the assumption that service personnel can be motivated 
economically. In a utilitarian world, ‘no job is worth getting killed for […]’.161 
Mercenary armies of the past, the ‘security specialists’ who worked for Aegis and the 
respondents to advertisements in Soldier of Fortune magazine, would suggest that the 
risk versus reward equation was rather more nuanced. Nonetheless, conventional 
soldiering has a long history of poor pay and conditions, which has ‘compounded the 
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moral ambiguities inherent in the trade of war to push soldiers to the fringe of 
respectable society’.162
 During the First World War, ordinary  soldiers were paid one shilling a day. 
Relative to average earnings in 1914 this equates to about £5,850 (p.a.) today.163  This 
was substantially  less than Dominion soldiers who were paid more than five times as 
much, hence the acrimonious soubriquet of ‘fuckin’ five bobbers’.164  It was even more 
demoralising to be confronted with the spending power of their officers on morale 
enhancers.165 A subaltern was paid 7s 6d. per day, currently equivalent to about £44,000 
(p.a.); however, lodging and field allowances would lift this to an equivalent of around 
£70,000. For regular officers, there was the additional requirement for a private income. 
A modest regiment such as the Cameronians recommended an annual minimum of 
£200, the Coldstream Guards expected at least  £400, and some cavalry regiments 
£1,000.166  This highlights the massive social gulf between officers and other ranks and 
the huge barriers to entry for those of humble means. The inter-war period saw officer 
recruitment substantially revert  to being class based. The consequence was that during 
the Second World War pay became an inhibitor to expansion of the officer cadre. As 
Adam, The Adjutant-General, put it:
It  is still clear, from the mass of evidence, that the low rate of pay of a Second-
Lieutenant, and the inevitable increased expenses that an officer’s status involves, are 
holding back many suitable candidates, especially those with families or those that 
have to support their relatives.167
During the latter part  of the twentieth century there was a much greater expectation that 
officers should be expected to live off their pay, although this had arguably still not 
permeated the elite regiments. For the rank-and-file, official parsimony is still evident. 
The present generation of soldiers expect to have a family life; however, the quality of 
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housing has been a persistent problem. Complaints about married quarters were often 
trivialised by the authorities, and this could have been ‘deeply demoralising’.168 
According to a Falklands veteran:
Home was in army quarters provided by those bloodsuckers at the Ministry of Defence. 
Scores of Paras and their families were stuffed into a block of flats called Williams 
Park which would have been OK had the dump not  been condemned years earlier by 
the council as unfit for habitation.169 
 British Army pay scales for 2009-2010170  revealed a substantial erosion of 
relative differentials over the past 100 years.171 However, junior ranks within the police 
and fire service were better off than their service counterparts. After basic training, a 
private soldier earned £16,681 (p.a.) compared with £22,700 (approx. plus overtime) for 
police constables and firemen. The maximum pay for a WO1 was £45,836, which was 
£1,000 below the starting pay for a Major. Currently, the maximum pay  for a subaltern 
is about the same as a corporal. It  is only  the pay scale for a senior Lieutenant-Colonel 
(£65,717-£76,095) that exceeds that of a police Chief Superintendent. Higher pay and 
generous pensions were naturally the preserve of the long-serving, and turnover 
statistics suggested that most recruits never got the chance to move up the pay-scales.172 
Considered in isolation Henderson was right; pay by  itself was not worth dying for, and 
the extent to which other rewards may have altered the balance will be discussed in 
Chapter three.
 
1.4 Training and Discipline
 The new recruit/officer cadet has had to be inculcated with the values that 
military culture required. Mastering the basic technical skills of the job was essential, 
but the imperative was to ensure that the serviceman always followed orders and always 
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fought. The most  desirable outcome of training was to take intrinsic motivation in its 
raw form and, through systematic extrinsic processing, produce a refined set of 
normative and intrinsic values that were agreeable to the military  palate. If the adapted 
intrinsic motivation that impelled a soldier to fight started to fade, then stringent 
extrinsics took over. Soldiers could not be made fearless, but they  could be coerced by 
the knowledge that the consequences of avoidance might have been worse than the risks 
of fighting.173  Therefore, this section will investigate how training has operated, how 
approaches to formal discipline have developed, and finally, how unofficial methods of 
coercion and control have maintained an unsavoury presence.
 Embarking upon basic training has, for many  recruits, had a profound impact, 
and the experience of the first  few weeks meant that  life would never be quite the same 
ever again. Research by Stouffer et al. revealed that:
The sheer coercive power of Army authority [is] a factor in combat motivation which 
must not  be forgotten simply because it is easy to take for granted. It was omnipresent 
and its existence had been impressed on the soldier from his first  days in the Army 
[…].174
This factor remained consistent, and there were a number of aims implicit within basic 
training. The most immediate of these was to dispossess the recruit  of his civilian 
sensibilities and initiate the process of ‘undermining the recruit’s self-image’. This was 
achieved by immediately proscribing freedom of movement and the ability to make 
personal choices, initiating a collective existence by denying privacy, and imposing a 
ubiquity of appearance (i.e. uniform and haircut).175  The purpose of this was to initiate 
the process of group identification and loyalty. Festinger’s theory of cognitive 
dissonance suggested that the harshness of training led to increased cohesiveness, 
because through shared privations membership  of a group was earned. The more 
difficult this was, the greater likelihood that the recruit  would exaggerate the positive 
aspects of group membership, whilst downplaying those that  were unpleasant.176 
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Uniforms were of course symbolic of power, and the lack of any badges on those of the 
recruits served to ‘emphasise the hierarchical structure of armies and encourage 
deference’.177  The next step  was to bring the weight of this hierarchical authority 
structure to bear. By volunteering for military service, the recruit had accepted the 
contractual legitimacy of enlistment, even though the precise conditions of the 
agreement reflected the superior bargaining power of the military. The first and essential 
condition required instant and unquestioning obedience.178  Any  indication of 
individualism or questioning was dealt with ruthlessly, because ‘without discipline there 
was little chance of persuading men to stoically accept all the horrors of modern 
warfare’.179 The recruit  was required to obey the myriad of rules and regulations whilst 
tired, hungry  and dirty, even when they  were applied arbitrarily or vicariously. It has 
been a universal approach, ‘We see in all armies a harsh and often bullying or brutal 
process for breaking in recruits’.180  Curtis reflected on his induction into the Parachute 
Regiment in September 1980:
From day one I got screamed at, humiliated and belittled but […] the abuse was 
psychological rather than physical: we were all worthless shits and how dare we even 
consider ourselves worthy of becoming paratroopers.181
Physical intimidation has been effectively (and illegally) deployed at the discretion of 
the training staff. However, the purpose of the breaking down process was not generally 
about individual persecution. It  was the playing out of long-established rituals that have 
been proven to provide ‘a comprehensive framework of behaviour designed to serve, 
inter alia, as a precaution against disorder and a defence against  the randomness of 
battle’.182  Mileham offered a similar analysis and cited Weber. The inculcation of 
obedience, required because of the deterministic nature of warfare, was:
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The consequently rationalized, schematically trained and accurate execution of 
received orders – without  giving expression of personal criticism – and the constant 
inner submission to that objective.183
 Recruits are still inducted into a regiment, not generally  into the army, and each 
regiment has its own traditions and ethos. They are motivated to become the current 
torch bearers of a timeless tradition (even if it is largely  inherited and invented). It is a 
vital part of the bonding process and a palliative to the unpleasant aspects of soldiering 
(if they could do it so can you). The physical manifestations of this difference are to be 
found in the subtle variations of uniform. These are often possessed of a symbolic value 
far more than their material worth.184  The Royal Marines, Parachute Regiment (and 
others) award their coloured berets for successful completion of training phases, thus 
turning a cheap bit  of cloth into an object of desire and marker of a rite of passage, to be 
coveted and protected.185 Military practice has been to reward conformity by easing up 
on the relationship between stick and carrot, and it would be unfair to categorise 
training as unremittingly draconian. Sensible training staff have always known that a 
word of praise, no matter how sparingly given, could be a tremendous motivator 
because it  validated the earning of a place in the organisation. As one Falklands veteran 
put it:  
Many say that the Paras are ‘brainwashed’, and to some extent this may be true, 
certainly it is not difficult to convince recruits that  they have joined the best regiment in 
the army – because that is want they want to believe.186
 A key aspect of the conditioning process was categorised as ‘bull’. Whilst the 
vulgarism ‘bullshit’ enjoys widespread contemporary  usage, anecdotally  the etymology 
traces back to Australian soldiers of the Great War who, not renowned for their 
compliant behaviour, used it to describe the arcane methods by which military  culture 
sought to imbue organisation, discipline and obedience. Obsessive cleaning, polishing, 
and marching, have in certain situations become self-sustaining rituals that have had an 
impact on military efficiency, as in cases where equipment has been cleaned to the point 
of destruction. From a recruit’s perspective, it may also have seemed to be entirely 
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pointless and almost certainly stultifyingly boring. However, there have been some 
apparent positives, at least from the military  perspective, ‘“bull” made its effect by 
constraints upon the “creativity” of thought’.187  Despite what Jary may have thought, 
and what the military might continue to say about the use of ‘initiative’, the reality  is 
that anything approaching independence of thought and action has been the preserve of 
the most senior commissioned ranks. Perhaps not even then; McManners argued that the 
purpose of Staff Training188  has been ‘to eliminate individualism and produce reliable 
staff officers free of idiosyncrasy’.189  Parade ground drill skills not only presented an 
image of discipline and efficiency, but also were taught because ‘it [was] the quickest 
way to teach “instant, unhesitating, and exact obedience to orders”’.190  MacCurdy 
considered the downside of tradition, but concluded that  drill was psychologically 
essential to ‘inculcate the habit of automatic obedience’.191  Montgomery considered 
drill skills to be integral to collective discipline because they  ‘developed an instinctive 
obedience to orders’.192  In this sense, such discipline was hegemonic rather than self-
actualising, ‘perhaps the most important feature of “bull” is its capacity to allay 
anxiety’.193 Recruits did not have to worry about making choices, because not only  were 
they  made for them, but also they did not have the time to reflect upon the alternatives. 
That bull may, in extremis, have fuelled obsessive-compulsive behaviour should, in the 
context of this thesis, merely be noted.
 In the post-war period the regime at Sandhurst offered up no special rules or 
favours for officer cadets. They  were required to ‘adopt a schizophrenic style and 
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manner, behaving as quasi-officers while role-playing the “squaddie”’.194  An officer 
commissioned in 1951 described the experience:
At Sandhurst I had drilled into me duty, loyalty, integrity, [ . . .] I was trained to think 
and behave as an officer and leader. Any deviation from the laid down standards and 
requirements was decisively punished and, if necessary, a cadet  would be returned to 
his unit as unsuitable officer material.195
 
Independence of thought was not encouraged, and officer cadets were made to absorb 
service culture through a process of ‘intensive indoctrination’. Finlan described military 
academies, such as Dartmouth196  and Sandhurst, as ‘enormous disk drives into which 
officer cadets were inserted. The formatting procedure was comprehensive in scope to 
alter norms, values, beliefs and appearances radically’.197 Following his appointment in 
1991, Maj.Gen. Timothy  Toyne-Sewell sought to alter the nature of Sandhurst, when he 
announced, ‘the modern officer does not benefit from being harangued by  impeccably 
turned out colour sergeants. I want cadets to enjoy the place. It is something they 
haven’t done for years’.198 However, it would seem that his ideas did not achieve much 
purchase. During the initial stages of training, Sandhurst cadets still receive the full 
measure of military  beasting. Hennessey  noted in a diary extract from January 2004 
entitled ‘Bugger’:
Ours is a day to day struggle for survival, the priority being not to do anything which 
might  upset  the malign despot who rules our waking (and sleeping) hours […] Daily 
the misdemeanours which incur his wrath change so we can never be sure when we 
might  be pleasing him or not […] the crap here is so extreme and unrelenting that the 
pauses in it seem like paradise […].199
The point is that, during the obedience-conditioning phase of basic training, those in 
authority would exercise it by finding fault  with anything.  At the micro level, there was 
no logic to this process, what was right one day was wrong the next. It only  began to 
become rational when recruits realised that it was part of a greater game of inculcating 
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compliance, and of winnowing out those who could not  take the pressure or 
motivationally accommodate themselves to the bigger picture. Many recruits, officer 
cadet or otherwise, realised it was possible to win the occasional minor victory by 
manufacturing a small attention-drawing fault that distracted from a larger one.200 
Falklands veteran Simon Weston realised:
The strictness and severity had to be maintained as a way of getting people to say, 
“OK, I want out,’ because the Army has to have a good reason to throw someone out. 
It’s much easier if they can get the undesirables to go voluntarily. In those 
circumstances a certain amount  of harshness and ill-treatment is necessary, as part of 
the weeding-out process.201
 The downside to the basic training regimes was that  each lacked any heuristic 
quality, so in many respects, rather than assisting the transition from adolescence to 
adulthood (as the collective believed), it had a regressive effect. Many newly qualified 
soldiers had little idea how to manage money, immediately  racking up debt on 
consumer electronics and similar objects of desire.202  Falklands veteran Philip Williams 
spoke from personal experience:
You never have to make up your own mind about  anything; they do that for you. And 
they provide everything: clothes, bedding, food. So in a way, your mind stops working, 
and that’s pretty dangerous when you come to think of it.203
Such danger may have become manifest because the essence of hierarchical systems, 
predicated upon command and control, has been the expectation of a willing response to 
superior orders that ‘foregoes critical judgement in the selection of alternatives’. Orders 
retain the automatic presumption of legitimacy; therefore, so do any sanctions for 
failure to obey. Consequently, ‘obedience to orders has become a normative 
expectation’ and as such the subordinate may have suspended moral judgment and felt 
absolved from any responsibility. In essence, it is the doctrine of respondeat superior.204
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 Two examples from the Falklands War reveal the positive and negative aspects 
such normative behaviour. During the preparations for the attack on Mount Longdon 
L.Cpl. Vincent Bramley considered that:
The Platoon sergeant  was an incredible pain to us all […] we had all served long 
enough to respect and obey without question but the guy acted like a wet fart.205
Clearly in such a situation soldiers are required to suppress any subjective personal 
judgements. Of more concern during the same battle was the hesitation of some of the 
Paras to start shooting. According to Jennings and Weale, ‘They were so conditioned by 
their experience on the ranges and in Ulster that they were scared to open fire without a 
direct order from an officer or NCO’.206
 The nadir of respondeat superior is found in the prosecution of war crimes. The 
suspension of moral judgment and the motivational empowerment of ‘frenzy’ will be 
discussed in the following chapter, suffice to say that in the midst of battle, much has 
gone on that would shock the sensibilities of the collective. The important point is that it 
did not require a distorted ideology or a psychopathic personality to commit an atrocity.  
 Therefore, it may  be asserted that fear was the binding agent of ensuring 
normative behaviour. Fear of letting down the regiment, contempt of colleagues, the 
impact on career prospects and ultimately of punishment. Robert Lawrence emerged 
from the Falklands War as a seriously injured hero, yet his postwar experiences broke 
the normative spell, ‘I […] just couldn’t  stop  reacting against the whole army set-up 
[…] I had lost my fear of it’.207  How the armed forces fear-motivate through formal 
punishment will now be discussed.
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1.5 Punishment and the Blind-Eye
 
 Stouffer et al. concluded that the ‘best predictor of combat behaviour is the 
simple fact of institutionalised role’.208 The soldier had a simple extrinsic choice, fight 
when ordered or face the consequences. However, life was never so simple, and the 
reality  was that enforcement of military discipline contained an inherent  paradox. 
Because the giving of orders was very much a top down process, there was the need for 
a ‘tacit consensus’ to avoid orders being wilfully misconstrued or ignored entirely. 
Holmes asserted that ‘Wise leaders know that nothing is so destructive of cooperation as 
the giving of orders that cannot or will not be obeyed’.209  The most ‘obstreperous’ 
interpreters of orders tended to be the ‘better and more warlike’ fighting units.210  These 
analyses tend to be borne out by the fact that at  an organised level, during the twentieth 
century, the British army has only suffered three mutinies of any note. The first of these 
occurred at the notorious Étaples training base in 1917. The contemporary description 
of it by Corporal Andrews is informative:
All of us going to Étaples had combat experience. But  when we got there we found the 
discipline was literally Prussian. After three years of war the troops were in no mood to 
be messed around by base wallahs of all ranks and regiments.211
The mutiny  started when a military policeman shot and killed a regular army corporal 
for crossing a bridge to go into the town.212 The cause of mutinies mostly  resolved into 
a sense that the military contract had been broken.213  At Étaples, it was the belief that 
experienced troops were entitled not to be treated like recruits. At Shoreham 
Demobilisation camp in 1919, it was because the authorities procrastinated over the 
demobilisation process whilst the troops were usefully employed on labouring duties.214 
In 1943, the ‘Salerno Mutiny’ occurred when 196 experienced soldiers from the 50th 
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and 51st divisions refused to be deployed as reinforcements for the 46th Division, 
insisting, in a display of group  loyalty, that they be sent back to their own units to 
continue fighting. The authorities imposed draconian prison sentences and the death 
penalty for the three sergeants involved. Sentences were suspended on condition that the 
mutineers fight with new units, which they  all did.215  The root cause of each of these 
three mutinies was not a refusal to fight but a failure of leadership to recognise the ‘tacit 
consensus’.
 The institutional imperative to react to disobedience with savage punishment of 
the hanging and flogging variety  enjoys a long tradition. Flogging in the army was 
abolished on active service in 1881.216  Denied the lash, the military responded by 
introducing Field Punishment No.1. which involved forfeiture of pay, up to two hours a 
day fettered to a fixed object, and hard labour. This sanction was handed down on 
60,210 occasions during the First World War.217 Clearly such punishments were only for 
the rank and file. Officers and gentlemen were not immune from disgrace, according to 
Lieutenant Norman Collins:
I can remember the battalion being paraded, and this officer stood out in the middle 
while his badges of rank were cut off, and he was marched away to join the regiment as 
a private […].218
Inevitably  it  was the rank and file who received the strictest discipline. According to 
John Brophy: 
The possibility of severe punishment hung perpetually over the private soldier and 
indeed some regular NCOs boasted that  if they really wished to they could make sure 
that any man under them would be sent to military prison.219
Baynes’ analysis suggested that soldiers were not  averse to heavy discipline, because ‘to 
allow a soldier to disobey orders is really  to insult  him’.220  Even allowing for present 
day sensibilities this seems a bit rich, but at least Baynes acknowledged that 
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punishments were occasionally  excessive. With exemplary punishments, publicly 
administered, the essence of military discipline becomes clear, pour encourager les 
autres. It is a philosophy  that continues to apply. The aspect of punishment and 
deterrence that troubles so many present  day  attitudes is the use and abuse of the Death 
Penalty during the Great War. Hugh McManners argued that:
The use of the death sentence to motivate troops is the ultimate essence of how military 
law functions in combat conditions. Fear of an inglorious, sordid and shameful death 
was thought to keep men at their posts […].221 
The number of death sentences imposed increased during the run up  to a major 
offensive.222 Charles Carrington reflected on sitting in judgment during courts-martial:
A memory that disturbs me is the hint  or warning that came down from above. That 
morale needed a sharp jolt, or that  a few severe sentences might  have a good effect. It 
was expedient  that  some man who had deserted his post under fire was shot  to 
encourage the others.223
Rifleman Henry  Williamson described his experience of being in a firing squad and how 
afterwards, ‘[…] the deserter’s name was read out on three successive parades as a 
warning’.224  Though the threat was real it  is important to retain a sense of proportion; 
around 5.7 million men served during the Great War, of these 3,082 received death 
sentences, of which all but 346 (including 3 officers) were commuted.225 However, there 
is a caveat because there is evidence of men being shot expeditiously. Lance Sergeant 
Charles Quinnell’s account is informative:
We had a sergeant […] a very regimental type of man. His first day in the trenches, two 
[…] miners slummocked along the front line […] Anyway this sergeant  didn't  know 
who they were and he yelled out, ‘Halt!’ […] but when they didn't obey he brought up 
his rifle, and bang he shot  the first  man through the head. Then he did exactly the same 
with the other man […] He was later court-martialled and reduced to corporal.226
It is a fascinating insight into how the demands of a rigid command structure can 
determine that  an act, tantamount to murder, even by  the standards of the time, should 
be judged to be an over-zealous misdemeanour. 
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 In 1930, the Death Penalty  for desertion was abolished in the teeth of great 
opposition, but  during the Second World War, General Auchinleck, whilst Commander 
of the North African campaign, formally asked for the death penalty  to be fully restored 
as an incentive to discourage false claims of psychological collapse. He was turned 
down for reasons of expediency and not morality.227  In Italy, Field Marshal Alexander 
was ‘itching to reintroduce the death penalty’ to discourage the estimated 30,000 British 
deserters.228 Although the ‘civilian’ death penalty was abolished in Britain in the 1960s; 
for the Armed Forces, it remained on the Statue Book until the Human Rights Act 1998 
Sec. 21(5) passed into law. This was not the result of an anachronistic oversight, and in 
1982, it  remained as a serious and intended deterrent. In 1983, a Select Committee 
reported:
Retention of the death penalty is necessary as a deterrent  given that a potential offender 
on the battlefield, where death may result  from disobeying orders, is unlikely to be 
deterred from assisting the enemy by no more than the possibility of imprisonment.229
In 1991, in a free vote, the House of Commons decided by a margin of 228 to 124 not to 
abolish the death penalty for six military offences:
• Serious misconduct in action.
• Communicating with the enemy.
• Furnishing supplies or aiding the enemy having been captured.
• Obstructing operations.
• Giving false air signals.
• Mutiny, incitement to mutiny or failing to suppress a mutiny.230
These definitions are so vague as to allow any courts-martial considerable latitude of 
interpretation. Whilst the retention of the death penalty  has proven to be theoretical, it is 
such latitude that continues to underpin the approach to more mundane military crimes 
and misdemeanours.
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 Military law remains complex, wide-ranging and reflective of a hierarchical 
command system. Guidance is currently  enshrined within JSP 830 - The Manual of 
Service Law, Version 2.10, MoD, 31 Jan 2011. It sets out Section 19 of the Armed 
Forces Act  2006. This contains arguably the most sweeping provision of military law, 
which can be interpreted so widely as to fill in the gaps where other parts of the 
legislation cannot be made to stick:
Conduct prejudicial to good order and discipline
(1)    A person subject to service law commits an offence if he does an act that is
                prejudicial to good order and service discipline.
(2)   In this section “  act” includes an omission and the reference to the doing of an 
act is to be read accordingly.
(3)   A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable to any punishment  
mentioned in the Table in section 164, but any sentence of imprisonment 
imposed in respect of the offence must not exceed two years.
Essentially  this is an update of Section 69 of the Army Act 1955, which applied during 
the Falklands War. It can be used in summary judgment on an offender (i.e without the 
need for a formal court-martial), and the guidance document makes it  clear that the 
terms ‘prejudice’, ‘good order’, and ‘discipline’ can be interpreted widely. It suggests a 
conflict with civilian law which rests on the principle of ignorantia juris non excusat.231 
Whilst a civilian cannot claim ignorance of the law as a defence, intentions and actions 
are permissible unless it  can be proven that they are specifically proscribed by law. 
Section 19 turns this principle on its head. Those subject to service law can, in effect, be 
prosecuted ex post-facto,232 and their defence will substantially depend on the quality  of 
the advocacy. As Section 19 is widely used for low grade ‘offences’, this may be 
effectively non-existent. A CO has a wide range of sanctions up to and including 28 
days imprisonment.233 Short terms are often served in the garrison guardhouse under the 
aegis of the regimental police; detainees will not be allowed a sedentary incarceration. 
Such a punishment was awarded to the hapless bugler whose failure to strike the right 
notes on a cold day embarrassed his attendant CO at a post-Falklands funeral.234 
Perhaps not the first occurrence of a ‘prejudicial’ embouchure?
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 According to Holmes, ‘The Army operates its own prison “glasshouses” where 
the ethos is still substantially “retribution and deterrence”’.235  There remains only one 
‘glasshouse’ in the United Kingdom although, in line with the service predilection for 
euphemism, it is not called a prison, rather the MCTC and is located in Colchester. SUS 
are detained for between fourteen days and two years. Training programmes are geared 
around remedial military skills for those who will be returned to their units, and basic 
vocational skills for those who are to be dishonourably discharged. Bad behaviour is not 
an easy way out of the forces. As with conventional training the system works through a 
system of earned privileges for good behaviour. These include: the degree of 
confinement, the amount of ‘bull’, different  identification badges, and access to 
telephone and the media.236  Effectively a SUS is kept under closer confinement and 
subject to a more stringent regime than a civilian inmate in an open prison. The military 
may eschew the term prison for the MCTC, but it is manifestly a place of incarceration. 
That the majority of COs are not despots, and manage their subordinates with a wise 
touch, is borne out by the fact that the capacity of the MCTC is only  314 inmates (about 
0.16% of regular service personnel). Regrettably, the imprisonment statistics for ex-
service personnel are not so encouraging.  
 The final area of overt deterrence used by the MoD is relevant to the research 
community  because it concerns the efforts made to suppress books and publications by 
Special Forces personnel. Since 1996, the MoD has made extensive use of gagging 
contracts and the Official Secrets Act to prevent publication by former personnel. For 
those still serving the strictures of ‘conduct prejudicial […]’ are likely to be applied 
with vigour.237
 According to Stewart, ‘Those who neither understand nor want to understand the 
military, view all militaries as rigid, authoritarian and brutal organisations built on fear 
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and punishment’.238  Whilst there is an essential truth in this statement it must be 
qualified. Military organisations are hierarchical and can easily  tend towards 
authoritarianism. They rely on extrinsic measures such as coercion as part of the 
conditioning process, and a framework of law biased heavily in favour of the 
authorities. However, because a strong sense of contract underpins the relationship 
between the rank and file and the command structure, a brutal and institutionalised 
despotism may historically  have been threatened, but has never been fully played out. 
During the Second World War, an experiment to toughen up recruits with ‘hate’ training 
was introduced by the War Office. Attempts to inculcate brute aggression involved visits 
to slaughterhouses and the liberal use of animal blood during training exercises. It was 
unsuccessful and soon abandoned.239  Some American commanders in Vietnam 
deliberately  humiliated and degraded their soldiers to ‘inflame their fighting spirit’; 
however, this also failed. This theory of ‘displaced rage’ may  still have its advocates but 
is in reality a manifest failure of leadership.240  
 However, there has been a subculture within the armed forces of brutality  and 
violence that operated below the official radar screen. This took two forms: firstly, the 
use of violence by junior commanders who, for personal reasons of control or rage 
displacement, stepped beyond the bounds; secondly, the use of casual violence amongst 
the rank and file themselves. During the Great War, given the official punishment 
regime described above, it is perhaps no surprise that Bill Sugden declared:
Our sergeant major is an absolute pig […] He swears and strikes the men […] It  is a 
cowardly thing to do as he knows the men dare not strike back […] They seem to 
forget we have all given up our jobs to do our best  for the country, and do not expect  to 
be treated like a lot of riffraff.241 
A strand of continuity is revealed by jumping forward to the Falklands generation; 
McNally  described punishment parades, held during his basic training, that were 
awarded for the most minor of transgressions:
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Punishment parade consisted of standing to attention on one leg for as long as humanly 
possible under the watchful gaze of our Drill Sergeant  Major, a Scot’s Guardsman […]
the most  frightening man I had ever encountered in all my years on this planet […] On 
seeing this foot touch down, he would break into convulsions, like a psychopath […] 
Weaker soldiers who collapsed were kicked and punched and struck over the head with 
a pace stick.242
This does not seem to be an isolated case; according to a Parachute Regiment recruit 
(training in 1981), recruits suffered so many instances of gratuitous violence that they 
became almost inured to it. Describing the methods applied by a training sergeant to 
impose silence during a pay parade (spirits were understandably high), ‘The sergeant 
strode up to me, with his face millimetres from mine […] I tensed but said nothing, 
expecting his first punch at any time’.243
 Steve McLaughlin provided evidence of a disturbing continuity into the present 
century. He enlisted in the Royal Green Jackets in 2002 at the age of 30. Being a decade 
older than his peer group, he had a mature perspective. He suggested that most 
sergeants did not use casual violence but identified a small group: 
[…] who take a great  pride in their ability to give someone a dig or ‘a jab’. The 
problem is, the jabs are often for the most minor misdemeanours. Certain individuals in 
the Regiment deliberately cultivated and revelled in the hard-man image. As a grown 
man of a similar age and background I found it pathetic and disturbing […].244 
He explained how instructors set out to ‘completely dominate’ recruits and that  the use 
of physical intimidation should not necessarily  be regarded as bullying because for 
many years it had been used as ‘a proven system of training rough and ready  lads’.245 
More recently, instructors have had to be careful not to get caught by leaving 
incriminating marks on their victims and many  instructors, no doubt through experience 
and received wisdom, looked back nostalgically  on the 1970s and 1980s as a time when 
‘[…] it was considered fairly  routine to hit a failing recruit - or at  least rough him up a 
bit’.246  Part of the process of training service personnel was to redefine their sense of 
identity, For some, particularly members of the infantry, aggression was required as a 
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dominant trait. Inevitably, amongst young men with a taste for beer and a superfluity  of 
testosterone, this spilt out into casual violence. Simon Weston described a posting to 
Berlin in 1978:
There were some rough times […] but  that is only to be expected […] you have that 
sort of wild-boy attitude and lots of money to spend, lots of cheap beer to drink.  There 
was always somebody getting beaten up […] I got duffed up when I first  joined, by a 
gang of lads from the Welsh Guards. It was no big deal.247
Much of the violence was built around a sense of group identity, which acted as an easy 
excuse to defend the honour of the most appropriate group to the circumstances 
(platoon, regiment, etc.). One perspective was that aggression was supposed to be 
controlled, ‘so that you only fight when the brass say so […]’.248  However, the reality 
revealed something of the Nelson touch. Because of the benefits of reinforcing a group 
loyalty and encouraging aggression, officers and NCOs of the Falklands generation 
were often sanguine about turning a blind-eye:
Officer: you expect  them to behave like soldiers, to get involved in fights and to get 
drunk and so on. In a way you are disappointed if some of them don’t, but of course you 
can’t acknowledge it, or inform them. 
Corporal: Soldiers should be young and fit, rough and ready, not powder-puffs!249
In the post-Falklands Parachute Regiment, a company commander thought it  had 
proved invaluable that the Paras were ‘good gutter fighters’, and a L.Cpl. stated, ‘the 
lads are all scrappers anyway’.250  Such behaviour does not fit with the image of 
officership, so there is a certain novelty value in the following account of an event on 
board MV Norland returning from the Falklands in 1982:
 […] the best  ruck I witnessed was when one of their Majors [Scots Guards] removed 
the crowns from his lapels and laid out a rather inebriated Jock guard […] That’s 
something you don’t see every day.251
 Normally, officers have acted through the agency of others in matters of 
unofficial discipline. Following an Army  investigation in Germany in 1948, it became 
apparent that officers were conniving in the beating up of soldiers held in custody  in the 
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guardroom. One commented it was ‘the only way of keeping down the toughs’.252  It is 
evident from a number of sources that the turning of a blind-eye was not an uncommon 
practice when it came to the rank and file imposing their own rough hewn sanctions on 
each other. During basic training, and because of the imposition of vicarious 
punishments, recruits perceived to be letting the team down were often given rough 
treatment by their peers.253  Chris Phelan described his experience of the Parachute 
Depot in 1971 following some pilfering amongst the recruits:
Of course they had a kangaroo court - when the corporals weren’t  there - and they 
broke his hand, broke his fingers, you know [and] somebody got  stabbed in the neck 
with a bayonet […] It was a very nervy time, very apprehensive.254
On first posting from the training depot, newcomers had to earn their place in the group. 
According to Beevor, this may have involved bizarre and occasionally degrading 
initiation practices:
The group rationale is to try to drive out  weaker members who may let  them down […] 
Some junior ranks privately continue to justify their treatment  of newcomers: ‘fucking 
up deserves a thump,’ They say with an air of knowing understatement.255
Because of the way that aggression and a resort to fighting could become so normative 
and ingrained within military culture, it could emerge under the most bizarre of 
circumstances and certainly not when the authorities, who may have encouraged it, 
actually wanted it. It exposes the fragility of primary group motivation when it is largely 
sustained by  internecine aggression. During the Falklands War, in the midst of the Battle 
for Mount Longdon, Vince Bramley was operating a GPMG and fulfilling a vital role of 
providing fire support. He fell into an argument and: 
We started fighting, there and then, fists flying, half rolling about the hillside, trying to 
kill each other as if it were a Saturday-night brawl. Lieutenant  Oliver rolled down 
beside us and quickly pulled us apart  […] ‘The fucking enemy is that  way, not  here,’ he 
said, pointing towards Stanley.256
During the battle, taking any disciplinary measures would have been virtually 
impossible; in its aftermath, given all the casualties and controversies, largely irrelevant. 
Page 98 of 304
 
252 French, Military Identities, p. 191
253 McLaughlin, Squaddie, p. 57
254 Jennings & Weale, Green-Eyed Boys, p. 26
255 Beevor, Inside the British Army, p. 30
256 Bramley, Excursion to Hell, p. 111
1.6 Summary
 The essence of this chapter has been to assert the significance of intrinsic 
motivation as a means of attracting volunteer recruits and to validate the role of 
conscripts denied the choice to enlist. Popular culture rather than political ideology 
formed the nucleus of intrinsic motivation and this has consistently  sustained an 
idealised image of warriors and warfare upon impressionable young men. By contrast, 
the disillusionment oeuvre that emerged from the Great War onwards has achieved 
relatively little purchase.
 Officer recruitment has relied heavily upon the public school ethos, except in 
times of mass mobilisation, and this continuity  was only slowly eroding at the close of 
the twentieth century; not so for the rank-and-file.  At the turn of the century, education 
sutured working-class children to the obligations of empire, but by the 1970s this had 
broken down as antimilitarism swept through the state education sector. Nevertheless 
recruits from disadvantaged backgrounds successfully  continued to be sought. Whilst 
potential officers had career choices, economic disadvantage continued to shape hearts 
and minds for many of the rest.
 The purpose of basic training was to apply  vigorous extrinsic motivations that 
reshaped the mindset  of recruits. Stripping away civilian sensibilities enabled the armed 
forces to recalibrate their recruits with an augmented set  of intrinsic motivations built 
around professional competence, group loyalties and obedience to legitimate authority. 
These implanted values were ring-fenced by the formal coercive sanctions of military 
law and the informal strictures of military culture.
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Chapter 2 - During Combat
 In the previous chapter, the role of culture in its various guises was identified as 
an intrinsic motivator of recruitment for both officers and the rank-and-file. The manner 
in which these motivations were extrinsically  adapted through training, organisational 
indoctrination and hierarchical control was then discussed. The purpose of this chapter 
is to analyse and develop the arguments that  translate peacetime motivations into the 
actuality of combat. The changing nature of warfare during the twentieth century means 
that attempting to resolve combat into simple ideas of loyalty  and ideology does not 
come close to explaining the gallimaufry of factors that determine why combatants do 
not run away and are able to kill.1 
 The analysis within this chapter, of motivation during combat, comprises five 
linked elements. The first three sections will discuss group  cohesion, the British 
regimental system, and formal concepts of leadership. This triumvirate provides a sense 
of the top-down perspective of combat motivation. The main arguments that  will 
emerge from this analysis will be firstly to identify and draw evidence-based 
conclusions from the four pillars of group  theories: social cohesion, task (or situational) 
cohesion, ideology, and coercion. Secondly, an analysis of the British regimental 
tradition will demonstrate how it emerged as a unique system that acted as a filter 
between primary groups and the upper reaches of the command structure. The limited 
effectiveness of the regimental role in sustaining combatants will be evaluated. Thirdly, 
the impact of formal leadership will be discussed, and it will be shown that  the 
characteristics required of leaders in combat differ from the skills required by senior 
commanders. Formal leadership derives from the regimental tradition and its hierarchy 
but has performed a subtle role in binding primary groups to official goals. Evidence 
from both leaders and led will show that different notions of what has been expected 
from a leader still persist and can have a deleterious effect on motivation. The last two 
sections will assume a bottom-up perspective. The fourth section will analyse the role of 
informal leaders, ‘big men’ or ‘leviathans’, who sometimes emerged during combat and 
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had the personal power to usurp formal leadership structures. They had the charisma to 
inspire and motivate others and make decisive interventions in battle; however, their 
contributions were finely balanced because they may have unwittingly  undermined 
formal objectives. The final section will investigate the role of frenzy. It will analyse 
what has made so many combatants behave brutally  in combat: from institutional 
demands that are wrapped in the euphemism of aggression, the pleasures of killing, 
through to the desire for revenge, and the cultural demonisation of opponents.
 In the context of the Falklands War, although the Argentinian forces 
outnumbered the British and were at least as well equipped, they lacked ‘the will to 
prevail’. Leadership  and cohesion were decisive factors.2  During the Falklands War, 
when Lt. Alistair Mitchell of the Scots Guards briefed subordinates before the Battle of 
Mount Tumbledown, he emphasised the importance of these factors:
In the end this is going to disintegrate into utter chaos. It is going to be a case of little 
groups of guardsmen having the courage to keep going forward. And that is what 
happened […].3
By drawing upon evidence from across twentieth century warfare, organised around the 
five themes set  out above, this chapter will attempt to advance the arguments why 
Mitchell’s junior Scots Guardsmen, and their contemporaries fought as they did.
2.1 The Primary Group
 According to the military  sociologist, William Henderson, ‘For the key  to what 
makes men fight […] we must look hard at military groups and the bonds that  link men 
within them’.4  The mid nineteenth century  military theorist, Ardant du Picq, captured 
the essence of the primary group before it became the subject of sociological theory:
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Four brave men who do not  know each other will not dare to attack a lion. Four less 
brave, but knowing each other well, sure of their reliability and consequently of mutual 
aid, will attack resolutely.5
The optimum size of a primary group was established two millennia earlier, by the 
Chinese military strategist Wu Qi, as two groups of five men formed into a section.6 In 
essence, it  survives to this day amongst British ground forces. An eight-man section, 
comprising two fire teams under the command of a corporal, is the smallest operational 
unit. Arguably the Great War was the genesis of primary group  theory, which began to 
emerge from the nostalgic recollections of the ‘front experience’.7  These recollections 
are necessarily tangled with the myth of the ‘pals’ battalions with existing social 
structures transplanted into khaki. Psychopathologist John MacCurdy  made an early 
attempt to unravel myth from reality; he asserted that soldiers are intrinsically and 
compulsively  ‘herd animals’ that are ‘happy, secure and efficient’ when part of a social 
group, ‘disquieted, timid and ineffective’, when not.8  MacCurdy’s observations smack 
of the intuitive, and this is also a charge that has been levelled at the military 
sociologist, S.LA. Marshall. Much controversy has surrounded the accuracy of his data 
and yet his instinctive conclusions, derived from the Second World War and the Korean 
War, are compelling:9
I hold it to be one of the simplest  truths of war that  the thing which enables an infantry 
soldier to keep going with his weapons is the near presence or the presumed presence 
of a comrade.10
 MacCurdy and Marshall have fed into the caucus of work into primary group 
theories that emerged at the end of the Second World War, which has subsequently 
exercised a powerful grasp  over military organisation and extrinsic motivation training. 
Stouffer et al. surveyed over half a million soldiers and provided a robust foundation for 
all that has followed: 
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The group in its informal character, with its close interpersonal ties, served two 
principal functions in combat  motivation: it  set  and enforced group standards of 
behaviour, and it supported and sustained the individual in stresses he would otherwise 
not have been able to withstand. These are related functions: the group enforced its 
standards principally offering or withholding recognition, respect, and approval, which 
were among the supports it  had to offer, while the subjective reward of following an 
internalised group code enhanced an individual’s resources for dealing with the 
situation […].11
Work that followed sought to deconstruct elements of this conclusion inter alia, the 
meaning of social ties and ideological fit  with higher organisational goals. Much of the 
emphasis of research into Second World War U.S. aircrews, undertaken by Grinker and 
Spiegel, was focussed on the powerful emotional bonds that form within primary 
groups, ‘[…] they are brothers-in-arms in more than a figurative sense. They  actually 
feel towards each other as if they were brothers’.12  This sense of familial loyalty and 
obligation is of ‘the highest significance’ to effective motivation.13  Whilst a group was 
in training, and combat was theoretical, the group had the luxury  of time to develop 
strong social bonds (or antipathies) and exposure to combat, resulting in death or injury, 
could have had deleterious effects on group cohesion. It  was an argument against group 
theory  also made by Bartov. Loyalty, ‘[…] cannot be lightly transferred to new and 
untried men […]’.14 Out of combat it may have taken some time for new inductees to be 
accepted as proven members of the group. However, whilst fighting, the overwhelming 
need to unite and protect the group meant that although a group was thrown together by 
chance, ‘[…] they rapidly become united to each other by the strongest bonds […]’.15 
Therefore, primary groups were social or situational (i.e. task oriented) or a combination 
of both. Henderson was an advocate of the elision between social and situational 
cohesion inferring that the greater the threat to the group, the more intense the mutual 
affection; therefore, the more effective the response to hardship and danger.16  A 
contrasting assertion was that social cohesion was of limited significance in 
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encouraging men to fight, but when the shooting started the necessity of survival meant, 
‘it can be argued that  strong primary-group bonds are not a cause of combat motivation, 
but are a direct  response to the experience’.17  Military  ethos remains ‘corporative in 
spirit’; therefore, the individual has been expected to subordinate personal interests to 
the interests of the group, which in turn has been expected to submit to the will of the 
hierarchy of command.18  A major element of recruit training has been to strip  away 
individuality, and through discipline, loss of privacy and physical stress imbue a spirit 
collectivised through shared hardship.19  However, this set up the possibility  of conflict 
if the interests of the group diverged or divorced from the national political and military 
interests.20  Reflecting on social cohesion, sociologist  Maurice Janowitz maintained that 
the value of interpersonal relationships, ‘lies precisely  in their independence of formal 
organisation’. For this reason, such a group may have protected itself by not integrating 
with the hierarchy.21  Moskos took this argument further, asserting that a primary group 
was only effective in combat when it had at least some form of commitment to its 
national cultural foundations, even if inchoate or unconscious;22  however, he went on to 
counsel against misty-eyed notions of camaraderie. Using the Hobbesian metaphor of 
self-interest he asserted that a primary  group in combat was ‘better understood as 
pragmatic and situational […]’.23  The experience of the Korean War indicated that the 
longer a primary group  was in combat the more it tended to focus on its own interests 
rather than those of the military hierarchy. This sense of detachment became explicit 
during the Vietnam War when, as military historian Hew Strachan commented, there 
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was a widespread experience of primary  groups in open dissent and ‘refusing to perform 
according to institutional norms’.24  The political backdrop  to Vietnam was of course 
increasingly  divisive. By contrast, the ideology of Nazi Germany was uncompromising. 
It is from research into Eastern Front fighting during the Second World War that an 
alternative argument to the motivational power of group cohesion was developed. Initial 
research by Shils and Janowitz, conducted shortly after the war, suggested that National 
Socialism was a relatively insignificant motivator compared to primary group 
cohesion.25  However, this was challenged in 1991 by Omar Bartov. His assertion was 
that the high casualty rates meant that groups were rapidly  destroyed, and that  cohesion 
was maintained because the German army was fully committed to political ideology. 
Such commitment  also validated the committing of atrocities.26  Historian, Professor 
Stephen Fritz, also asserted the primacy of ideology, ‘The extraordinary resilience of the 
German soldier thus also demanded the celebration of a positive ideal’.27  In his 
construction, this ideal was the ‘seductive’ promise of a harmonious, integrated and 
classless Volksgemeinschaft.28  The idea that ideology was the dominant motivator in 
combat starts to break down when one considers evidence in the round. During periods 
of heavy  fighting and casualties on the Eastern Front or the Normandy bocage, 
reinforcements were not individually drip-fed into combat but were despatched as 
cohesive units that had trained together and were socially  bonded. The pressures of 
fighting suggest that these implants situationally cohered with the reinforced and with 
great rapidity. The impact of coercion is also relevant; primary groups were forced to 
cohere and fight as a protection against punishment. The German Army executed at 
least 15,000 soldiers during the Second World War and the British forces, denied the 
death penalty  some generals demanded, still threatened draconian punishments.29  The 
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four main pillars of: social cohesion, task cohesion, ideology and coercion remain 
topical, as is evidenced by  a testy spat worked through in the journal Armed Forces & 
Society during 2006. In 2003, under the aegis of the U.S. Army War College, Professor 
Leonard Wong and three academic colonels produced a study into combat motivation 
during the Iraq War. The conclusion that Iraqi regular forces were motivated by fear of 
retribution against them and their families is not a point of contention,30  nor is the 
assertion of what may be described as a second phase ideology. This is the notion that 
whilst first phase ideology  may often have been inchoate and framed around patriotism 
and national ideals, second phase ideology was a reaction to positive outcomes of war 
aims. As one Gulf War soldier commented, ‘There were good times when we see the 
people […] How we liberated them […] That lifted us up. We knew we were doing a 
positive thing’.31  The gauntlet was thrown down by the assertion that:
[…] cohesion, or the strong emotional bonds between soldiers, continues to be a 
critical factor in combat  motivation […] attempting to dissect  cohesion into social or 
task cohesion […] is best left to the antiseptic experiments of academia.32
Responding in 2006, MacCoun et al. challenged Wong et al. to explain the deficiency  in 
extant research that had established, ‘task cohesion has a modest but reliable correlation 
with group performance’; whereas, social cohesion had no such correlation, and may 
have served to undermine motivation.33  They further asserted that whilst many soldiers 
‘[…] firmly believe that  social cohesion is an important motivation in combat […] they 
do not do so on the basis of any true introspection’.34  Many of the notions of social 
cohesion they  claimed were based upon intrinsic absorption of popular culture within 
which emotional bonds in fighting units were thematically exploited. Although 
MacCoun et al. did not  cite Professor Jesse Gray, his observations that soldiers confuse 
friendship and comradeship tend to support their arguments: 
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The essential difference […] it  seems to me, in a heightened awareness of the self in 
friendship and the suppression of self-awareness in comradeship. Friends do not  seek 
to lose their identity, as comrades and erotic lovers do.35
Gray and MacCoun agreed that the intensity of comradeship  was as transient as the 
shared experiences which formed it. Some combatants formed lifelong friendships, but 
the majority did not. For this reason MacCoun et al. concluded that, ‘All of the evidence 
indicates that military performance depends on whether service members are committed 
to the same professional goals, not on whether they like one another’.36  Subsequent 
rebuttals by Kolditz and Wong asserted the validity of their arguments but did little to 
move the debate forward. 
 Therefore, a key intervention is the extent to which the four pillars of group 
theories can be evidenced during the Falklands War. The easiest to deal with is coercion; 
as historian Kevin Foster has asserted, ‘Motivation is a complicated business in which 
sticks and carrots are wielded simultaneously’.37  However, these were not just the sticks 
of hierarchical sanction, but the group codes interpreted by the leader and accepted by 
his subordinates. Whilst there is plenty of evidence for effective leadership, no primary 
or secondary evidence emerges to suggest men had to be forced to fight, even amongst 
those who had enlisted as jobseekers. There is also an absence of evidence suggesting 
ideology was a motivator. A trawl through the primary sources finds the occasional 
acknowledgement that the war was the right thing to do, even if the personal outcome 
was less than satisfactory.38  According to David Cooper, the war was justified because 
of the liberation of the islanders, but when the Task Force set sail most soldiers were 
ambivalent about what seemed to be a government adventure.39 Junior soldier Nigel Ely 
thought that:
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The passion and the aggression which we all had for getting on and finishing the job 
did not come from a loyalty to Queen and country or to the politicians who had sent us 
here, or from the thought of another power taking over a part  of the United Kingdom. 
The officers might  have thought about this Queen and country bollocks, but we blokes 
didn’t. We were doing this for ourselves and for the Regiment.40
There were few hearts and minds to win amongst the local population. This attitude is 
borne out by the survey conducted by Falklands veteran Lt. Col. Peter Bates. Following 
an enquiry via the IWM and subsequent conversations, Lt.Col. Bates kindly provided 
me with a copy of his unpublished Masters dissertation. This revealed that only 29.4% 
of respondents thought that the soldiers were concerned about the moral justification of 
the war and only 18.8% were concerned about letting the country down. By  contrast, 
88.2% were concerned about letting their colleagues down.41
 In the context  of the social versus task cohesion debate, Falklands veteran Hugh 
McManners observed that, ‘The units that fought in the Falklands War were very close-
knit, with strong personal bonds between their members. The closeness turned 
casualties and deaths into deeply personal events […]’.42  This is borne out by  the 
reaction of MarkEyles-Thomas. Throughout basic training, he had forged strong 
friendships with three men killed during the Falklands War on Mount Longdon. Their 
deaths resolved into a tremendous sense of guilt and responsibility for a perceived 
breach of trust.43  The argument that social groups operated in opposition to official 
goals is not strongly evidenced. Military historians Jennings and Weale have discussed 
the clique that formed within ‘B’ Company  of 3 Para prior to the war, ‘eschewing the 
letter of military law in favour of a free-wheeling, earthy  lifestyle […]’.44 In the event, 
this group (which included Stuart McLaughlin and Dominic Gray45) made a decisive 
contribution during the battle. The most extreme cases of consistent social opposition 
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probably  relate to the killing of superiors. Lt. Ulrich Burke provided very  credible 
testimony from the Great War:
We had an officer who I am very sorry to say, was an absolute pig to his men […] He 
was warned again and again don’t do it, they’ll shoot you […] Later on we went over 
on an attack and […] my platoon was behind his. As I passed I saw him dead […] his 
chest  was blown out. All the bullets had come in his back. He’d been shot by his own 
men.  You could not be a bully there.46
 The nadir of such leader retribution probably occurred during the Vietnam War 
in 1971, with 333 confirmed incidents of the ‘fragging’ of unpopular leaders.47  The 
sentiment, if not the actuality, emerged during the Falklands War. Embedded journalists 
reported of the challenging relationship that some Paras had with their leaders, leading 
on one occasion, to some discussion about ‘fragging’ a particular officer who had risen 
from the ranks.48 L.Cpl.  Bramley recalled a particular platoon Sergeant:
He was nasty and vicious in his orders […] His name is known and so is his back. He 
turned out  to be one of the small group who spent the night […] Hiding from a group 
of lads who had sworn to kill him in battle.49
There is no evidence to suggest that either threat extended beyond bravado.
 The evidence for the salience of task cohesion rather than social cohesion is 
more compelling, and the outward signs of comradeship can be misleading. Whilst it 
may  have reflected true friendships, it was also a ‘carapace’ that served to shield 
antagonisms and rivalries.50 As one Falklands veteran put it, ‘We really had to get along, 
to trust each other with our lives, even if we hated each other’s guts […]’.51  In similar 
vein, a wounded Para on board the hospital ship SS Uganda recalled, ‘When we heard 
that Steve Hope had died, the sigh of relief went right around the ship: no more getting 
your chinky nicked or being filled-in in the scoff queue’.52 Clearly an aggressive culture 
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and informal pecking order were antithetical to friendships. There was also a distinction 
between friendship, and comradeship fomented by the regimental tradition. Falklands 
veteran John Geddes commented:
I’ve heard it said that 2 Para is a family, but that’s a view that suits the officers to put 
forward. To me it’s quite clear that we were a brotherhood and what bound us together 
in a solid fraternity was our initiation into the Regiment. It’s a horrible test of guts, 
stamina and determination called P  Company and it’s the only membership card there 
is to the Airborne Club.53
Further evidence from the Falklands reveals not only  that entry to this brotherhood was 
founded upon skills not sociability, but also the rapidity with which task cohesion 
formed in combat. As a new member of his platoon in 1982, Mark Eyles Thomas 
recalled:
I can see other members of the section slightly ahead of me to my right […] a far better 
place to seek safety than the place I'm in. They are older, more experienced soldiers 
and I dare not  presume I can join them. With the enemy fire continuing in my direction, 
they seem to appreciate my predicament  and gesture towards me. Within seconds I am 
with them, unified, accepted as a comrade.54
It becomes evident that the regimental system was a key adjunct to primary group 
formation. Therefore, the next stage in this research process is to investigate the manner 
in which British regiments have managed the four pillars of combat cohesion.
2.2 The Regimental Tradition
 The regiment has defined the British army since the seventeenth century. Except 
in times of mass conscription, soldiers have been recruited into a regiment (or a corps), 
not directly the army per se. For the majority of time servers, their entire military 
service will have been defined within this one formation. There has never been such an 
entity as an officer corps, and officers are still commissioned into a regiment, not the 
army. According to army veteran and military historian Patrick Mileham, ‘Officers 
identify themselves in this way to this day’.55 Falklands veteran Simon Weston suggests 
it has been similar for the rank-and-file, ‘Although every soldier swears an oath of 
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allegiance to the Crown when he signs up, traditionally it  is his regiment that he fights - 
and, if necessary, dies - for’.56
 The genesis of the regimental tradition can be found during the English Civil 
War, and it officially  dates from the restoration of Charles II in 1660; for the subsequent 
350 years each regiment has attempted to distinguish itself from its contemporaries. 
Nuances of appearance, custom, and practice have been jealously guarded and 
augmented over time, most often with the intention of maintaining a sense of prestige. 
According to Brig. Shelford Bidwell, ‘[…] the sharper and more numerous the 
distinctions from other regiments are, the stronger the esprit de corps’.57  Since the 
seventeenth century, regiments have been renamed and merged and yet have sought to 
maintain a narrative of unbroken continuity with the past, often with the sense that past 
glories are guarantors of future triumphs. As a case in point, the largest regiment in the 
British Army is currently The Rifles. Taking just one of its genetic strands, between 
1685 and 1959, the Somerset Light Infantry underwent around fifteen name changes 
and evolutions. In 1959, it was merged into the Somerset and Cornwall Light Infantry, 
in 1968 into the Light Infantry, and finally in 2007 into The Rifles. It can claim ancestry 
from twenty-two regiments from which it can pick the best  bits to rework its future 
narrative. According to McManners, the tendency  to look backwards means that, 
‘through its regimental system, the British Army [particularly the officers who are its 
custodians] perpetuates an obsolescent dream of English upper-middle class life’.58
 Bidwell asserted that, ‘The Regiment is an entirely artificial creation […] The 
creation of a regiment is a technique based on a sound empirical knowledge of 
psychology’.59  An essential part of which has been to indoctrinate recruits with ‘a love 
of regiment’, and to establish the regiment as a legitimate source of discipline and 
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authority.60  Overtly extrinsic in its initial application, the aim has been to achieve a 
psychological osmosis so that being part  of the regiment became an intrinsic belief 
system. Therefore, the regiment has had to project an attractive institutional power and 
get its recruits while they were young enough not to have developed alternative 
loyalties. It might be argued that the appeal to working-class recruits, bereft of any 
personal sense of family history beyond living memory, has been that becoming part of 
a successful dynastic construct provided them, at least in part, with a timeless personal 
heritage. According to General Sir John Hackett:
Once you have established an awareness of difference, or otherness, you are some way 
to creating a feeling of betterness, and if you can develop that in your group, your unit, 
you can jack up your standards. ‘This may be good enough,’ you can say, ‘for those 
Queens Park Rangers or the Loamshire Fusiliers but it  simply will not do in the 
Fortieth Foot and Mouth’, or the Royal Death Watch, or whatever it happens to be.61
This was borne out by the taciturn testimony of Jim Mitchell who fought with the Scots 
Guards at Mount Tumbledown during the Falklands War. He expressed great pride in 
having been a guardsman and had no doubt that they would win the battle because of 
the regimental tradition, ‘Pride in the battalion was drummed into you. Running away is 
“not the done thing” even if it means your life’.62  The advantage of having a long 
tradition to draw upon meant that those regiments more recently lacking any particular 
distinguishing achievements could always bolster themselves with myths from the past. 
According to Kellett, whilst many of these myths embraced victories and battle 
honours, an important subtext was that they also reflected ‘[…] a tradition of sacrifice 
within a brotherhood […] heroic though hopeless last stands […]’.63  Less edifying 
performances were of course excised from the myth narrative. From the notion of 
sacrifice can be detected the elision of regimental tradition into group loyalties. The 
Parachute Regiment was formed in 1941 and is an exemplar of how myths can be 
quickly formed.64 In his study of the regiment, John Parker concluded that before 1982, 
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the Paras defined themselves through the myth of Arnhem, ‘It was magnificent only in 
the effort, courage and sheer bloody-minded spirit of the men involved. Everything else 
was a disaster […]’.65  Although the Arnhem story, the quintessence of a heroic last-
stand, established a reputation and tradition for the Parachute Regiment, the point must 
be made that the men who originally volunteered for the new regiment in 1941 did not 
have any traditions as reference points. They  joined on trust, often in opposition to the 
wishes their COs, who had to be instructed not to block any  applications.66  This 
suggests that, for those with a professional and/or warrior ethos, tradition is rather less 
efficient as a motivator than the opportunity to be part of a skilled elite with strong task 
cohesion. Those with a long term investment made in the regiment were arguably more 
prepared to cosset themselves in the comfort blanket  of mythology. According to 
Falklands veteran Chris Keeble:
The philosophy of our soldiers - whether it  is our regiment  or any other regiment - is 
that we are a body of people welded together by our traditions, by our regiment, by a 
feeling of togetherness.67
Senior officers were among the first to consider their regiments in such tribal terms, and 
this permeated the rank structure. Tribalism when in combat was coercive insofar as the 
fear of shaming the regiment was greater than the fear of the enemy.68  Fitz-Gibbon's 
research revealed that  this sense of shame extended to covering up  controversial 
incidents that did not reflect well on the Regiment:
One witness to a controversial incident during the [Falklands] war told me that when he 
was being interviewed by a senior officer, the tape recorder was switched off at a 
certain point so the discussion of the sensitive issue would not  go on tape. Another says 
he has often told half-truths to journalists and researchers […] Others admit  to having 
lied. And a senior officer admitted to me that since 1982 he has participated in the 
propagation of a myth about one of the battles in order to avoid discrediting his unit.69
Similarly, the prisoner-killing revelations made by Bramley and discussed in Chapter 
3.7, initiated a Scotland Yard investigation on the Falklands by Detective 
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Superintendent Alec Edwards and Detective Inspector David Shipperlee. Having 
extensively  interviewed veterans of the Battle of Mount Longdon they concluded there 
was no case to answer;70  arguably a case of 3 Para putting up  a barrier as impenetrable 
as a redcoat infantry square. The issue of how misplaced esteem was a significant factor 
in the events surrounding the sinking of Sir Galahad in 1982 are discussed in Chapter 
4.2.
 The regimental system retains powerful advocates, counterbalanced by those 
who hold a more nuanced view that errs towards primary groups. 18 Platoon featured 
on the Sandhurst required reading list; its author, reflecting on his experience as a 
subaltern in Normandy in 1944, commented:
To me that is the essence of good teamwork and the jewel in the crown of the British 
Army, the regimental system, is the strong foundation upon which we all, knowingly or 
unknowingly, relied.71
In his influential study of motivation during the Great War (albeit he did not distinguish 
between morale and motivation), Baynes (a Lieutenant-Colonel) also gave top-billing to 
the regiment:
First I would place Regimental loyalty; the pride in belonging to a good battalion, in 
knowing other people well and being known by them; in having strong roots in a well-
loved community.72
Along with Robert Graves, Baynes concluded that regimental spirit  was a far more 
significant motivator than ideology during the First  World War.73  Patriotism may have 
encouraged volunteers to the recruiting office but was ineffective at sustaining men in 
combat. Both Jary  and Baynes evinced a sense of sentimentality that requires 
moderation. During both world wars, the regimental system was infinitely capable of 
expansion as additional battalions were added to the regiment. However, during the 
First World War many recruits were re-badged into new regiments, as they passed 
through the bullring at Étaples, according to operational requirements. According to 
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Alan Hanbury-Sparrow (a regular officer), ‘The value of the regimental system 
diminished as the war went on […] the casualty lists put an enormous strain on these 
traditions […] I became increasingly cynical about their value’.74  During the inter-war 
period, a small army was able to restore its traditions, but in 1939, the rapid expansion 
of the forces caused a collapse in the regimental system. By July 1942, men were 
recruited directly into the GSC where they were individually screened for suitable 
military roles. The improvement in morale was significant as men were able to perform 
to their capabilities, and by 1943, a process of retrospective redeployment was 
underway.75  According to Professor David French, for war time conscripts, ‘[…] 
abstractions like the regiment were only of secondary  concern’, far more important  was 
the cohesion of the primary  group.76  As Richard Holmes (former TA Brigadier and 
Colonel-in-Chief of the Princess of Wales Royal Regiment) put it:
We must  not  get too misty-eyed about the pulling-power of the regiment. In a sense the 
system has always worked best when it was needed least, in peacetime or small wars.77
The fighting forces in the Falklands revealed a continuity that  fits comfortably into this 
construction.78  This idea is further developed by Kinzer-Stewart, whose research 
provided a sense of the linkage between a cohesive primary peer group and the 
hierarchy in which it was placed:
British troops have fostered horizontal and vertical bonding through the regimental 
system. Thus we see, in the case of British troops in the Falklands, that an open 
organizational climate, the officer’s credo of caring for his men, serving as an example 
and sharing training and discomfort, leads to strong positive relationships up and down 
the vertical dimensions of the command structure from private to regimental 
commander.79
The downside of strong relationships occurred when close colleagues were killed or 
injured. According to a Company Commander in 2 Para, soldiers were ‘sustained by the 
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desire not to let their comrades down or be seen to fail’, and this ‘created a powerful 
anxiety on the eve of the landings’.80  It might be argued that such intense pressure to 
maintain the prestige of the regiment sowed the seeds of the stress reactions so many 
encountered after the war. In understanding the effectiveness of the regiment, it is 
instructive to make a comparison with the United States. Newsome asserted that 
Regimental systems ‘assume that strong and persistent group relationships are necessary 
combat motivations’. By contrast, the centralised system used by the US forces, ‘must 
rely  on prior motivations to serve and extensive material rewards’.81  This can be 
challenged. The Americans remain strongly focussed on primary group processes but 
have paid relatively little attention to regimental esprit. By contrast, the British have 
always considered the primary group  as embedded within the regimental tradition;82  as 
Watson asserted, ‘The internalisation of organisational goals is […] the most effective 
of motive patterns’.83  Thus extrinsic methods have been used to recalibrate intrinsic 
motivations. Therefore, the question arises as to the necessity of the regiment in the link 
between high command and primary group. At its worst, the regiment has been hostile, 
reactionary and self-interested: undermining the interests of its members, the greater 
military organisation, and wider society  in its battle for a share of privilege and 
resources.84  By contrast, it has been extremely efficient in imposing normative controls 
on primary  groups ensuring they aligned with organisational requirements. It should be 
noted that  the absence of a regimental filter often allowed primary groups in Vietnam to 
operate in opposition to ‘institutional norms’.85  According to Field Marshal 
Montgomery, ‘most men do not fight well because their ancestors fought well at the 
Battle of Minden two centuries ago […] it is devotion to the comrades who are with 
them […]’.86 The essential truth is that task oriented primary group ties are fundamental 
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to effective combat motivation whilst regimental loyalty  may be a useful augmentation; 
as Holmes asserted, ‘inefficient, illogical and, at times, irritating though it is, the 
regimental system makes its own unique contribution to the valour of simple men’.87 
The experience of the twentieth century was that substantial numbers of worldly  wise 
conscripts were motivated to combat and although many young recruits were naive, 
they  learned quickly. The empty  minded pre-industrial ‘yokel’ soldier had become an 
anachronism by the end of the Great War.88 
2.3 Leadership
 Interpreting the pull of regimental myths and using them as an adjunct to task 
cohesion required the intervention of effective leaders. The regimental ideal espoused 
by Baynes was, throughout the 1960s and 1970s, central to the ‘Serve to Lead’89 
philosophy taught at  Sandhurst90  and its essence was defined by Field Marshal Slim. 
‘To serve’ meant applying the following priorities; firstly  country and regiment, second 
welfare of subordinates, lastly self-interest. ‘To lead’ meant:
[…] whether you command ten men or ten million men, the essentials of leadership are 
the same. Leadership is that  mixture of example, persuasion and compulsion which 
makes men do what  you want  them to do. If I were asked to define leadership I should 
say it is the Projection of Personality.91
 
However, post  Second World War research has suggested that there is a clear difference 
between leadership of a small fighting unit and of a battle group. Professor Ian Beckett 
made the distinction between the leadership  of junior officers and NCOs, and command 
exercised by senior officers.92  The requirements of senior command demanded a 
‘managerial and strategic emphasis’, whilst leaders of small fighting groups required ‘a 
degree of charisma - not glibness’. The problem was that the skills junior leaders 
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possessed were not necessarily congruent with the demands of roles to which they may 
have been promoted.93  The roles of ‘heroic’ leader, military  manager and technocrat, 
politician, public relations man, father-figure and psychotherapist remain 
incompatible.94  In this regard, the highly celebrated ‘H’ Jones of Falklands fame 
emerges as an example of conflicted leadership. A junior soldier observed that:
H was fired up and he was calling on his troops to follow him into the attack. At the 
same time he was calling into question their manhood as he tried to galvanise A 
Company and rally them to his side with a taunt.
‘Follow me!’ he yelled.
‘Guess what? They didn’t.
A Company were in no mood for public-school gestures or bullshit  rallying cries from 
the pages of Commando comic.95
Jones’ character and combat orientations will be discussed in Chapter 3.7. By contrast, 
his superior officer Brig. Julian Thompson, emerged as a senior commander who could 
walk with kings and still retain the common touch. Not only was he personally 
acquainted with most of his officers and many of his ‘other-ranks’, but also had the 
moral courage to delegate trust.96  The essence of the relationship between combat 
motivation and leadership was that it  had to work at a primary level and seamlessly 
elide into the higher command structure. In the military context, it  must also be noted 
that, because lives were on the line, leadership had no direct civilian comparison. ‘The 
central skill is perhaps best summed up  in Harold Laswell’s phrase, “The management 
of violence”’.97  Changes in the style of command since the Second World War have 
been the subject of a ‘classic debate’ between Janowitz and Huntingdon. Whilst 
Huntingdon asserted the persistence of a traditional ‘heroic warrior’ ethos; Janowitz has 
argued that social changes, not least the desire for career success, have emphasised 
managerial and technical skills. Military  professionals have increasingly benchmarked 
themselves against  corporate professionals.98 It has been argued by Gabriel and Savage 
that the pervasiveness of ‘managerial careerism’ and its implicit focus on political self 
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interest was a significant factor in the failure of the US army in Vietnam.99  General 
William Westmoreland, who commanded US Military  Operations in Vietnam 
(1964-1968), has been cited by Cincinnatus as an exemplar of the type:
He was a manager, a technician, a bureaucrat, rather than a troop leader. He was a ‘Big 
Corporate Military Executive’ […] Vietnam was an ideal milieu for him, for it afforded 
the opportunity to manage a war by statistics and computer […].100
Analysis of the Vietnam experience has done little to extirpate the worst implications of 
careerism amongst ‘command’ officers and these have included inter alia: 
1.  Unwillingness to express dissent about poor policies,
2. Disinclination to resign over policies that they later criticise,
3. Reliance on, and wilful misinterpretation of, statistics,
4. Attempted cover ups of incompetent and/or illegal acts by subordinates,
5. Misuse of annual officer reports,
6. Failure to consider alternative options,
7. Suppression of advice that does not chime with existing policy,
8. Persecution of whistle-blowers.101
That these failings have impacted upon the combat motivation of front line soldiers is 
emphatically borne out by Hauser:
No one wants to be the ‘last man to die’ in any war, but to accept orders to risk death 
[…] from officers whose authority has been eroded by an aura of careerism and 
dishonesty, was too much to ask.102
 Attempts substantively to distinguish between American and British practice in 
the business of career building should be disabused. British officers who aspired to 
command were subject to the same pressures and risked the same consequences. David 
French argued that ‘Officers who saw battle as a stepping-stone towards their own 
advancement were bitterly resented by their own men, who feared that they would 
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sacrifice them to further their own ambition’.103  Similarly, Jary ‘[…] discovered just 
how much soldiers resent and fear a young officer who sees battle as a means to win his 
spurs, possibly at the cost of their lives’.104 It is a consequence of the shrinking post-war 
British army that opportunities for command promotion have continued to be 
increasingly  limited. It is current practice that  the army produces the annual Pink List 
which provisionally names officers selected for the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel. It has 
been necessary to have ‘a flawless pattern of [annual] reports. Simply  being very good 
is not generally good enough’.105 Whilst serving in Northern Ireland a CO commented:
We’ve become so worried about  our careers that nobody dares let  their deputies have 
their heads. We’re afraid they will make mistakes, and we’ll lose out come confidential 
report time […] This fear of making mistakes only saves them up for the future.106
With such pressure to conform, it has not been surprising that the armed forces have 
produced so few ‘self-actualising’ commanders (see Chapter 4.1), and instead arguably 
encouraged the more destructive aspects of political schadenfreude.
 If command was the preserve of senior officers, then leadership was required of 
junior commissioned officers and NCOs. According to Richardson, it  was the most 
important factor for motivation and morale, ‘with good leadership all other factors are 
taken care of instinctively’.107  This view was shared by Moran, ‘Once men are satisfied 
that their leader has it in him to build for victory they no more question his will, but 
gladly commit their lives to his keeping’.108 These opinions call out to be deconstructed, 
to identify the facets of good leaders and the means by which these have satisfied their 
subordinates. 
 In 1927, F.C.Bartlett defined three categories of military  leader and the manner 
in which they maintained their position:
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• Institutional leaders, ‘[…] the established social prestige attached to their office’;
• Dominant leaders, ‘[…] personal capacity  to impress and dominate their 
followers’;
• Persuasive leaders, ‘[…] capacity to express and persuade their followers’.
In Sheffield’s determination, the best leaders used ‘personal and expert power’; 
however, those who coerced and relied on the position power of their office were the 
weakest.109  This analysis needs to be developed further. The historiography is replete 
with lists, and amongst these Henderson, Marshall, and Kellett are persuasive.110  Based 
upon an amalgam of these sources, it emerges that effective combat leadership  required 
the effective and combined application of the following four characteristics:
Rank power - This moved beyond notions of social prestige and imbued the holder with 
a sense of legitimacy. The orders they issued carried the weight of authority  down the 
hierarchical chain of command, and they were legitimate because they accorded with 
the cultural values that had been internalised by their subordinates. The leader was also 
expected to be an expert and apply superior knowledge and ability to any given 
circumstance. 
Reward Power - Besides using coercion and punishment to dominate subordinates, it 
required the effective distribution of rewards, not only  in terms of formal awards and 
promotions but also basic welfare needs. These must all have been applied with a 
resolute sense of fairness and justice. Reward was also knowing when it was 
appropriate to invest trust and delegate tasks (without abrogating responsibility) or 
when close supervision and control was more appropriate. 
Consistency  - Additional to ensuring that the leader did not expect  more of his 
subordinates than he was prepared to accept for himself, i.e. physical fitness, courage, 
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endurance, discomfort, etc., it also meant eschewing the protean in terms of behaviour 
and being predictable in problem-solving, demeanour and standards. Maintaining an 
innate respect for subordinates was as important as avoiding short term expediencies 
that compromised long-term goals.
Charisma - The influence of personality  was the glue that bound the above elements 
together and the catalyst that impelled them. According to Popper, ‘Leadership must be 
based upon personal relationships between leaders and soldiers, rather than upon an 
impersonal managerial style’.111  Because charismatic leadership was based upon the 
emotions rather than the logic of followers the ‘personal power to command’ may have 
displaced established customs, laws procedures and hierarchies.112  Therefore, such 
leadership had to be grounded in the values of the military organisation. The role of 
charismatic leaders was to transform the self-interests of their followers not only  to the 
collective organisational interests113  but also to make personal sacrifices ‘above and 
beyond the call of duty’. Rather than over reliance on material rewards or coercion, it 
was the essence of task cohesion that this was achieved by  infusing a sense of 
meaningfulness, self-esteem, commitment and moral purpose. Essentially a negotiation 
between leader and follower 114  based upon inspirational persuasion towards a distal 
vision.115  It has been asserted that one of the benefits of charismatic leadership was to 
elevate the needs deficiencies of subordinates within the Maslow hierarchy (Chapter 
4).116
 It is ‘a fundamental truth’ that a leader would not succeed unless he risked 
leading from the front,117  and subordinates expected to be inspired by confident 
Page 122 of 304
 
111 William Henderson, Cohesion, p. 11
112 Micha Popper, ‘The Development of Charismatic Leaders’, in Political Psychology, Vol.21, No.4, 
(2000), p. 730
113 Stouffer, Lumsdaine, Lumsdaine, Williams, Smith, Janis, Star & Cottrell, The American Soldier, p. 117
114 Hockey, Squaddies, p. 141
115 Boas Shamir, Robert House & Michael Arthur, ‘The Motivational Effects of Charismatic Leadership: 
A Self-Concept Based Theory’, in Organizational Science, Vol. 4, No.4, (1993), pp. 577-578
116 Ibid, p. 579
117 Holmes, Acts of War, p. 341
behaviour.118  Falklands veteran Eyles-Thomas gave the example of a platoon 
commander who had experienced at first hand the Warrenpoint attack in Ulster, ‘This 
experience seemed to provide a hidden motivation deep  within him and gave him a 
determined and vengeful manner’.119  Leadership from the front might have been an 
innate characteristic, but a charismatic leader, better aware of the risks, also had to be 
something of an actor. Sydney Jary, a Second World War subaltern, thought that: 
Before battle the commander must exude confidence and enthusiasm, whatever fears 
his private thoughts may hold. Just how thin a line divides this from deliberate 
deception? I call it the commander’s dilemma.120
It is a measure of the ‘lead from the front’ ethos that, during the Falklands War, 50% of 
the 177 soldiers killed during the land campaign were officers and NCOs.121  John 
Crosland OC ‘B’ Company, 2 Para during the Battle of Goose Green recognised that, 
because of his time with the SAS, he was the most experienced fighter. He claimed to 
have been honest with his men about the risks and consequences of death and injury.122 
Crosland’s leadership abilities were endorsed by his subordinates. Cpl. Martin 
Margerison, a veteran of Warrenpoint, believed one must lead from the front but 
command from the rear. Crosland was the biggest factor in minimising casualties; he 
was always willing to delegate and support, and was a good person to emulate.123 Curtis 
was more succinct, ‘Our OC, Major Johnny Crosland was a tough little bastard. He 
loved rugby and was an inspirational leader’.124  Philip Neame, the commander of ‘D’ 
Company professed a more arcane method of sinew stiffening and blood summoning 
leadership, ‘[…] with me and everyone else shouting their head off - probably all 
gibberish, but it all got the adrenaline going again and off we went’.125  Neame did 
himself an injustice because choosing the wrong words can be counterproductive. 
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Commando Ken Oakley recalled that just before the D-Day landings an officer advised, 
‘Don't worry if all the first wave of you are killed. We shall simply pass over your 
bodies with more and more men’.126   Contemporaneously, the captain of HMS Danae 
advised his crew that they  ‘[…] had the honour to be expendable’, swiftly earning the 
rejoinder, ‘fuck that for a lark’, from amongst the ranks.127 It  should be noted that in his 
final charge ‘H’ Jones also failed to get the tone right.
 Once leaders had established themselves in the eyes of their subordinates it 
became something of a perversity when official hierarchies and the perils of the Pink 
List (see above) upset the apple cart. Such was the case in the Falklands during the 
Battle of Goose Green. Following the death of Lt-Col Jones, command of 2 Para 
devolved to Maj. Chris Keeble. As one junior soldier commented, ‘[…] a good man 
who was more in touch with the blokes’.128 Keeble manufactured victory  with guile and 
bravado at a time when the battalion was a substantially spent force. He was not 
allowed, even temporarily, to retain the command he had earned. Lt. Col. David 
Chaundler was parachuted in (literally) from the UK to take over, and this did not sit 
well with Keeble. Chaundler recalled a ‘serious talk […] where Keeble told me the 
honourable thing for me to do was to fly back to Fearless and stay there for the rest of 
the campaign’.129 When Chaundler took over it undermined the motivation of the rank-
and-file because, as one junior soldier noted:
He looked so clean and sterile and so out of place. A lot  of the guys thought it  was a 
really bad move to demote our acting CO […] The new CO was probably just as 
capable, but was it right, most of us wondered.130
Failures of leadership from company officers did occur during the Falklands War, and 
the death of Jones was the apparent cause of one of them. One platoon commander was 
in tears. According to one of his subordinates, it was ‘Hardly  awe-inspiring to know that 
the man you have been trained to respect, the man who would lead you into battle, 
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decides to break down when the “going” hasn’t even started’.131  More concerning were 
failures that unravelled for ‘B’ Company of 3 Para during the Battle of Mount Longdon. 
Lieutenants Bickerdike and Cox were reliant on good platoon sergeants132 and a strong 
CSM  (John Weeks).133  It is asserted that Weeks did not  enjoy a good relationship with 
the OC of ‘B’ Company, Maj. Mike Argue. Despite being promoted from the ranks, 
Argue was unpopular amongst the enlisted men.134  Following an injury to Bickerdike, 
Weeks ‘shed any pretence of respect for Argue’ and countermanded his orders regarding 
the replacement platoon commander.135   In his own account Weeks speaks disparagingly 
of Lt. Cox, believing he did not have the necessary commitment and the battle was too 
fierce for him, ‘He needed a bit of encouragement and he got it!’.136 The encouragement 
was a punch in the face, and thereafter Cox was ignored by his subordinates.137  Cox 
tried to reassert his authority but was loudly countermanded by  Cpl. McLaughlin. Cox’s 
emotional response to being usurped was witnessed by ‘A’ Company from whose ranks 
Corporal Sturge counselled Cox, ‘Come on sir, we don’t  want to see our young officers 
not keeping it together’. Thereafter ‘A’ Company was kept clear of ‘B’ Company, ‘to 
avoid contagion’.138
 It is hard to imagine such behaviour being tolerated during the First  World War 
with its much greater emphasis on institutional leadership  and roles delineated by  social 
class. An interesting take on the relative importance of leadership emerges from the post 
Second World War Stouffer research. In answer to the question what  keeps men 
fighting? Officers placed most importance on leadership and discipline (19%) but only 
1% of enlisted men agreed. Their most important motivation (39%) was ‘ending the 
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task’.139  A notable change has been the gradual increase in informality that has defined 
the relationship between leaders and led.140 One might envisage a greater consensus had 
the survey been repeated in 1982. However, a fundamental problem has remained. 
According to Strachan:
For all the talk of meritocracy in […] Britain, little attention has been given to the 
ending of a system which has two points of entry – one for officers and another for 
private soldiers. The forces themselves fear that the consequences […] [and] leave 
them unpersuaded of the virtues of all-through promotion.141
Whilst some soldiers of Falklands vintage might have echoed the view of L. Cpl. 
Douglas Gibson of the Royal Anglian Regiment who defined officers as:
[…] the well-spoken people who have got a lot  of book learning and which gives them 
the know-how to be officers. These are hand-picked men and are likely to be of the 
very best sort.142
More from the same generation were likely to share the view of an unnamed Sergeant-
Major who, when considering whether to apply for a late-entry commission, concluded:
We call them ‘Ruperts’, those young officers: and when you see the way they behave, 
or at least some of them do, in the mess, you think to yourself ‘I don’t want  to mix in 
with that lot’.143
During the 1980s, the bifurcation of officers and other-ranks still resolved into very 
different notions of behaviour and leadership. Nigel Ely’s Platoon commander was one 
of the few who actively sought the advice of his subordinates and thus, ‘[…] won our 
respect within a very short time and made the Platoon what it became […] A very  rare 
officer’.144
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2.4 Leviathans 
 Alongside the formal command hierarchy, a significant aspect of leadership was 
the informal emergence of leviathan figures.  Each of these was a ‘big man’, who was 
‘capable of energising the raw human material […]’,145  and acted as a dominating and 
inspirational exemplar on the battlefield. It is from this caucus that existentialist 
warriors can be found, although not all leviathans were natural warriors. There is 
arguably a presumption that such figures emerged from the upper reaches of the rank-
structure. The American, Maj. Gen. William Garrison, who led a task force in 
Mogadishu in 1993, was clearly  capable of command leadership. According to 
Henriksen, Garrison was also a charismatic leader and an existentialist warrior:
[…] who avoided the pomp and pretence of upper-echelon military life. Soldiering was 
about fighting. It was about killing people before they killed you […] He embraced its 
cruelty […] Nothing pleased Garrison more than a well-executed hit […] Why be a 
soldier if you couldn’t exult in a heart-pounding, balls-out gunfight? 146
The important point to note is that leviathan figures emerged regardless of rank. 
Falklands veteran John Weeks fell into this category. He and his predecessor Sammy 
Doherty, both ‘tough men with sharp minds’, were the subject of a personality  cult, and 
regarded as ‘real soldiers’ by  their subordinates; McLaughlin was similarly reified.147 
There is a deficiency in the study of combat motivation because of ‘the reluctance to 
account for individual difference between soldiers in units’.148  The tendency to apply 
the term ‘hero’ to all combatants from whose ranks a few receive awards for acts of 
valourousness has been blatant  in the media and a comfortable myth within military 
culture. However, the truth remains that most soldiers are not natural warriors. In 1943, 
a War Office observer in Italy commented:
Every platoon can be analysed as follows: six gut-full men who will go anywhere and 
do anything, twelve ‘sheep’ who will follow a short  distance behind if they are well led, 
Page 127 of 304
 
145 John Keegan, ‘Towards a Theory of Combat Motivation’ in Paul Addison & Angus Calder (eds), Time 
to Kill: The Soldier’s Experience of War in the West, (London, Pimlico, 1997), p. 10
146 Rune Henriksen ‘The Myth of Intrinsic Combat Motivation’ in Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol.30, 
No.2, (2007), pp. 188-189
147 Jennings & Weale, Green-Eyed Boys, pp. 15-16
148 Henriksen, ‘The Myth, p. 195
and from four to six ineffective men who have not got what  it takes in them ever to be 
really effective soldiers.149
 
These numbers are of course subjective. Henriksen assessed that out of a platoon of 
soldiers only a couple are ‘genuine killers’, usually the platoon commander and his 
sergeant.150  Keegan inferred that, within a section of six or seven men, it may  often 
have been that  a ‘natural stronger character was looked to for leadership’.151  A Korean 
War survey  suggested warriors and passengers accounted for 15 to 20%, ‘at either end 
of a fighter continuum’.152  Cpl. Kelly of 2 Para recalled the Battle of Mount Longdon 
during the Falklands War, ‘Platoons get mixed together in battle, and the guy with the 
strongest personality  ends up taking over - regardless of rank’.153  This evidence all 
endorses the conclusions of S.L.A, Marshall.154  Whilst many leviathans will have 
constructed a warrior ethos as a justification for recruitment, others will have discovered 
an intrinsic appetite for it once in combat. Moran described this characteristic which 
arises initially from a sense of military competence and then, ‘He discovers he is less 
frightened, that he gains a kudos and in a sort of taken for granted fashion is held up as 
a pattern for others’.155  Marshall made a similar observation, ‘[…] there were a number 
of private soldiers whose earlier service had been lusterless, but who became pivots of 
strength to the entire line when fire and movement were needed […]’.156  The same 
Korean War survey revealed the essential personal characteristics of leviathans, ‘[…] 
‘fighters’ were found to be more intelligent, more masculine, more socially mature 
[and] showed greater emotional stability’.157 The positive aspects of this are revealed by 
Commander Ian Inskip of HMS Glamorgan during the Falklands War:
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Our master gunner, Brian Lister, was the only man on board who's seen action before, 
at  Suez […] he rubbed his hands together and said: ‘This is great, I haven't  done this 
for a long time.’ Knowing that  Brian thought it was alright  had a very calming effect on 
everybody else.158
Whilst they may  have encouraged task cohesion, there was also an implicit menace 
attached to leviathans. Their construction of personality invested them with personal 
power and their actions an inspirational charisma; however, they were often not only 
unpleasant, but also ill-equipped with the balanced skills of combat leadership.159 
During the Great War, according to Lt. Brockman, ‘There were some incredible people 
who I think liked [combat]. People with no fear at all, and they were an absolute 
menace to everybody else’.160  A more scathing and consistent analysis by  Jesse Gray 
concludes:
Little do they have to recommend them as friends or comrades. As a rule, they are vain 
and empty, contemptuous of all who are not  like themselves […] If their vitality and 
their will are admirable in themselves, there is little that is specifically human about 
their whole mentality. They hardly recognize other men as such and are capable of 
walking over bodies, living or dead, without  a qualm. In their secret hearts they despise 
friend and foe equally, these supreme egoists.161
There was a side of this behaviour which elided into authoritarianism and the desire for 
recognition. CSM Desmond Lynch DCM, was an undoubted ‘big man’. Whilst an 
instructor at Sandhurst he responded badly  for several weeks to a published account of 
the Battle of Sidi Bou Zid in Tunisia in 1943, ‘I was the star of that battle, the star’.162 
A leviathan figure invested with formal authority can do great damage and ‘H’ Jones 
was an example of the type. According to Holmes, his death ‘[…] highlights an 
inescapable question mark which hangs over such behaviour’. A leader who exposed 
himself to danger, rather than necessarily  having the imagined motivational effect, not 
only frayed the nerves of his subordinates, but also risked getting killed in the process, 
with potentially  disastrous consequences for tactical leadership.163  Ultimately the 
franchise owned by  a leviathan figure may have contained the elements of its own 
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destruction. Some fighters became progressively unwilling to face risks;164  this was 
compounded when the ‘big man’ had to cope with the great expectations of his 
superiors and subordinates, whilst knowing he was well past his best.165  
2.5 Frenzy
 Frenzy and atrocity have not been universal characteristics of the existentialist 
warrior although, as will be demonstrated in the McLaughlin case study, they have 
coexisted. In his analysis of the Second World War Fussell concluded that:
[War required] a unique context of public credulity and idealism […] [it] required the 
enemy to be totally evil, it required the allies to be totally good - all of them. The 
opposition between this black and this white was clear and uncomplicated, untroubled 
by subtlety or nuance […]’.166
This construction emerged in the role of the RAF fighter pilot. According to Richard 
Hillary, ‘The fighter pilot’s emotions are those of the duellist  - cool, precise, impersonal. 
He is privileged to kill well […] it should be done with dignity’.167  This notion of tac-
au-tac combat fits comfortably into the national myth of bravery with honour. 
However, there is a thick strand of visceral brutality that has sustained British 
combatants through the generations up to and including the Falklands War. According to 
Keegan, Combat, ‘[…] plumbs deeper into the realms of cruelty, frenzy and fantasy, 
which feed and are fed by each other’. He further asserted that  ‘men can behave 
disgustingly  in combat, killing everything that moves […]’.168  This was endorsed by 
Gray: 
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In mortal danger numerous soldiers enter into a dazed condition in which all sharpness 
of consciousness is lost. When in this state they can be caught  up into the fire of 
communal ecstasy and forget about death by losing their individuality.169 
According to the sociologist, Professor Kirson Weinberg, ‘Fear, tension and 
apprehension […] are normal responses in an abnormal situation’. Intensification of 
aggression was a desperate attempt to overcome danger by destroying the enemy before 
the psychological pressures became overwhelming. In this state of desperate aggression, 
many heroic deeds were performed.170  Another dimension draws upon Freudian theory 
and examines the paradox between pleasure and guilt. Modern man has retained the 
ambivalence of his prehistoric ancestor to killing potential opponents and the guilt of 
having done so. According to David Smith it  remains the case that, ‘The essence of war 
is to expose and amplify these unconscious desires […] to see strangers as enemies and 
to seek their destruction’.171 With an assemblage of powerful instinctive forces it is not 
surprising that the ability of a combatant to rationalise has been impaired. 
Rationalisation and restraint  are cognitively linked, and without  restraint a combatant in 
a state of frenzy has been reduced to a single destructive focus.172  However, it  is not 
enough to ascribe frenzy (by which it is meant the berserk state and the capacity  to 
commit atrocities) purely to the instinctual. The purpose of this section is to consider 
their more subjective aspects and these include: the manner of which institutionalised 
frenzy  has been initiated, the elision of institutional frenzy  into the bayonet fetish that 
remains embedded within military culture, the manner in which the pleasure aspects of 
killing have been rationalised and fed into the desire for revenge, and finally  how 
cultural demonisation of the enemy has acted as a justification.
 The capacity  of institutional authority to validate frenzy has been a powerful 
force. The electric shock experiments conducted by Milgram in 1961 were in part 
initiated by the trial of Adolf Eichmann.173 Milgram concluded that most people, despite 
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moral qualms, were not equipped to resist the demands of authority.174  Received 
wisdom of the British myth is that only foreigners behave in such a manner; however, 
the evidence suggests otherwise. The experience of the Great  War left a legacy of an 
endemic addiction for violence. Throughout the Empire, notably in Ireland and the 
Middle East, civilian insubordination was suppressed by extreme violence. The pre-
Dunkirk army of 1940 was obsessed with spies and fifth columnists. Many innocent 
civilians were swept up under suspicion and subjected to summary justice. One source 
recalls, ‘[…] the divisional provost officer [was] responsible for firing squads for 
anyone deemed guilty. His notion of justice was “teutonic” and there was no appeal 
against his decision’.175  With the post-war liberalisation of public attitudes, it might  be 
expected that the worst excesses of institutional frenzy would have been mitigated; 
however, it has been asserted that ‘today’s all-volunteer army’ is not representative of 
public attitudes ‘toward moral and legal issues in combat, despite formal training in 
accordance with the rules of warfare’.176  In the British experience, the most 
controversial example of this occurred on ‘Bloody Sunday’ in January  1972,177  when 
Support Company of 1 Para ignored the ‘yellow card’ rules.178  It was responsible for 
firing over 100 rounds, shooting twenty-six innocent civilians and killing thirteen of 
them. Thirty-eight years after the event the measured summary of the Saville Report 
implicitly  criticised Maj. Gen. Ford for being inappropriately bellicose, and explicitly 
criticised Lt. Col. Wilford of 1 Para for disobeying orders.179  During the 1973 inquest 
the coroner, Maj. Hubert O’Neill, was emphatically frank:
It  was quite unnecessary. […] the army ran amok that day and shot without  thinking 
what they were doing. They were shooting innocent people. These people may have 
been taking part in a march that  was banned but  that does not justify the troops coming 
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in and firing live rounds indiscriminately. I would say without  hesitation that it  was 
sheer, unadulterated murder.180
It should be noted that these examples relate to the treatment of civilians who have often 
been treated contemptuously as enemies out of uniform and thus a lesser opponent. In 
Hillary’s construction of the ‘warrior code’, death to a fellow combatant should be 
administered with dignity; clearly this should extend to the dignity of prisoners and not 
killing them. However, as the psychologist Edgar Jones has observed:  
There is a fundamental difference between killing in combat  and shooting prisoners of 
war […] The scale of this form of killing remains unknown and as such has become 
part of the mythology of warfare.181
The historiography is replete with primary source evidence of prisoner killing by British 
troops, sustaining the myth from the First World War to the Falklands War. An issue is 
the extent to which such actions have been validated by a higher authority. Joe Murray 
of the Hood Battalion provided a telling example from the Great War:
The whole battalion were on parade […] and Major-General Shute inspected us […] 
He said, ‘I’m going to tell you this much.  You know what you have got to do! The 
more prisoners you take, the less food you’ll get - because we have to feed them out of 
your rations’.182
The defence of Respondeat Superior,183  unequivocally rebutted during the Nuremberg 
Trials, has subsequently challenged the ability of lawyers to distinguish one case from 
another. There is no settled law on the issue, and for or the combatant, Walzer observed 
that legal subtleties are largely irrelevant:
When combatants are ordered to take no prisoners or to kill the ones they take […] Then 
it is not their own murderousness that is at issue but that of their officers’.184  
In August 1916, a GCHQ order bluntly stated:
Until it  is beyond all doubt that these have not  only ceased all resistance, but [ …] That 
they have definitely and finally abandoned all hope or intention of resisting further. In 
the case of apparent surrender, it lies with the enemy to prove his intention beyond the 
possibility of misunderstanding, before the surrender can be accepted as genuine.185
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It begs the question what, in the febrile atmosphere of close combat, constituted 
‘beyond all doubt’. Revealing a continuity with their Great War antecedents, the troops 
that fought in the Falklands were clearly  not minded to make such subjective 
judgements. Captain Adrian Freer of 3 Para advised that, ‘On Longdon, while we were 
fighting, no quarter was given’.186  For Maj. John Crosland:
We'd come across a trench in the darkness; it was impossible to tell if the Argentinians 
were willing to fight, and I would suggest  very strongly that we were not in the game 
of tapping on the door and asking them.187
Following the shooting of a downed Gazelle Helicopter crew, McManners and his 
immediate group ‘resolved not to take so much trouble over surrenders’.188  Geddes 
provided similar testimony, ‘We took no prisoners […] We didn’t shoot anyone with 
their hands up under white flags. They just didn’t have time to get their hands up’.189 
Ely  provided a graphic example of the realities of trench clearing and the niceties of 
interpreting surrender whilst in a state of hyper-aggression:
[…] I just  started to head-butt the twat with my para helmet  […]  He kept screaming at 
me in Spanish and calling out for his Mama. I had pinned him to the bottom of the 
trench... I just kept head-butting. Six, seven […] Twenty times, I can’t  really remember 
[…] I was frenzied. I wanted to kill him as quickly as possible […] I guess at some 
stage his head cracked […] I grabbed hold of the Slur and fired a couple of rounds into 
him. Then it was over.190 
The extent to which wounded opponents were able to clarify an intention to surrender 
clearly  tests the subjectivity  of ‘beyond all doubt’. Both Lukowiak and Bramley recalled 
incidents, which at the time seemed acceptable, but have later proved to be traumatic. 
Lukowiak recalled trying to treat a wounded Argentinian, only  to be moved aside by a 
sergeant who finished off the prisoner with a burst of machine gun fire.191  Similarly 
Bramley recalled that:
 A wounded Argentinian lay to my right  […] He had been hit  in the chest and screamed 
as he held the wound. A lad from B Company ran across the clearing at  him and ran his 
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bayonet  through him […] [and] walked back to his seat  among the rocks, as if nothing 
had happened.192
The use of the bayonet featured strongly  in Falklands narratives. It  has long maintained 
an institutional role as a totem of aggression that arguably extends to a bayonet fetish. 
In popular culture, the antics of Lance-Corporal Jones in BBC TV’s Dad’s Army may 
have served to render the ‘cold steel’ as a humorous anachronism; however, such an 
impression remains misleading. Ian Beckett has argued that ‘The use of bayonet, lance 
and sabre’ has been retained in the armed forces because they are so richly symbolic of 
traditional virtues of glory  and gallantry, which risk being devalued by ‘technology and 
professionalism’.193  Joanna Bourke commented that, during the First World War and 
inter-war years, ‘the bayonet fight represented the highest achievement of the warrior 
culture which was strongly  represented within popular culture as ‘a central motif in war 
stories’.194  As Jones pointed out, ‘There was [and is] a considerable difference between 
shooting a man at 400 yards and bayoneting him in the guts’,195  and for this reason 
bayonet training was a technique to, ‘arouse the pugnacity of the men’.196  It was 
standard practice for the Falklands troops, and remains so to this day. According to Pat 
Butler of 3 Para, ‘Bayonet fitting is standard. It is symbolic because it reinforces intent 
in the mind of the soldier.197  During the Falklands War, it was the intention of CSM 
John Weeks to build up psychological motivation in the moments before the Battle of 
Mount Longdon started.198  However, one of his subordinates, Kevin Connery, did not 
make the connection between the abstract of training and the reality of combat: 
I can’t  tell you how fucking shocked and surprised I was when we were at the base of 
Longdon […] I couldn’t help thinking some bastard was on drugs and that they had 
turned back the clock and we should be lined up in red tunics. And when I heard ‘fix 
bayonets’ that was it. I knew we were in a lunatic asylum.199
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In the event Connery, along with his colleagues Denzil Connick and Dominic Gray, 
displayed a degree of courage that bears comparison with McKay and McLaughlin. 
However, ‘One does not have to look too deeply to establish why they were not 
decorated’200 because of the vigour with which they  used the bayonet whilst  in a state of 
frenzy. According to Gray, the most effective way to bayonet an opponent was, through 
the eye, then turn and pull it out. It  went straight into the brain like that’.201  The three 
Paras are not isolated cases, according to Falklands veteran Robert Lawrence, ‘It  was 
absolutely horrific. Stabbing a man to death is not a clean way to kill somebody […] At 
one point he started saying, ‘Please […]’ in English to me’.202 Lawrence acknowledged 
he used his bayonet unnecessarily, and it was a decision he regretted.203  Given the 
traumatic consequences once the power of frenzy has dissipated, the question has to be 
asked why, in each case, the combatants choose to use their bayonets rather than their 
rifles? There is no evidence to suggest they were short of ammunition. It is a question 
that Weeks failed to answer satisfactorily, and he insisted rather unconvincingly that 
‘none of the lads liked killing’ and they did it for survival.204  His testimony reinforces 
the need to ask the unsavoury but necessary question, to what  extent is the pleasure of 
killing a combat motivation? 
 Grinker and Spiegel concluded that few combatants ‘anticipate pleasure from 
destruction or killing’.205  However, their research was primarily conducted into the 
motivation of Second World War aircrews who were inevitably  distanced from the 
consequences of their actions. One also has to consider Marshall’s assertion that 75% of 
combatants ‘may face danger but they will not fight’.206  Holmes and Keegan are more 
measured, recognising that some soldiers find killing pleasurable. Field Marshal Slim 
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recalled his delight at shooting a Turkish soldier during the First  World War, ‘I suppose 
it was brutal but I had the feeling of most intense satisfaction as that  wretched Turk 
went spinning down’.207  Recent historiography has been more revisionist; Jones cited 
Ferguson’s assertion of Freudian theory for why  many  men found pleasure in killing, 
‘men kept fighting [during the First World War] because they wanted to’.208  Freud’s 
concept of a Thanatos instinct  means that, in a combat situation, ‘men are in one part of 
their being in love with death’ and during a combat  situation this impulse overwhelms 
their Eros (life) instinct. Furthermore, the Thanatos instinct lurks within most people, 
which is why it is ‘hard to escape the conclusion that there is a delight in destruction’.209 
The Psychiatrist, Thomas Nadelson, who treated Vietnam veterans, was of the view that 
once ‘ordinary men’ had been trained to overcome their resistance to killing, they 
‘became addicted to the excitement and sense of freedom created by the licence to 
kill’.210  Bourke asserted that more men broke down in war because they were not 
allowed to kill, rather than under the strain of killing.211  In her detailed analysis of 
primary testimony, she discovered that men and women derived an enjoyment from 
killing.212  Evidence from the Falklands tends to be rather nuanced, but there is enough 
of it to conclude the existence of a strong degree of continuity. Much of the killing was 
undertaken with unhesitating gusto, framed around a euphemistic narrative of 
aggression. Captain Stewart Russell (a 2 Para corporal in 1982) was an exemplar:
You’ve got  to be meaner, badder and uglier and you’ve just got to be more vicious than 
the person you’re fighting. If you’re not prepared to be more vicious you shouldn’t be 
there and if you can’t be more vicious then you’re going to lose.213
However, the prima facie case for ubiquitous pleasure remains to be proven beyond all 
reasonable doubt.
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 What is more certain and consistent is that revenge elided into frenzy; 
confronted with blatant atrocity, reaction was likely  to be uncompromising. Such was 
the case when Belsen was liberated in 1945. Captain Richard Smith recalled, ‘It was the 
most extraordinary few hours […]’ with male and female camp guards being savagely 
beaten with rifle butts. The British commander admitted, ‘I have no control over my 
troops’.214  Research into Vietnam narratives reveals mutilation and abuse by the enemy 
was a profound cause of berserk behaviour. Other factors included a failure of 
leadership that manifested in insult or humiliation and, pertinently, the wounding or 
death of comrades.215  During the Falklands War and following the death of his friend, 
the seventeen year old Jason Burt, Mark Eyles-Thomas admitted, ‘I wanted to kill 
everything and everyone still inside the enemy’s position’.216  There is no evidence to 
suggest that the British forces had demonised the Argentine forces. Whilst ‘Argie-
bashing’ was a media trope, most of the British forces regarded the Argentinians as 
‘ciphers’.217 However, this did not extend to breaking the rules of war. A feature of the 
Gazelle incident was that the crew had been shot in the water whilst trying to swim 
ashore. As news of the incident spread anger was palpable; according to Vincent 
Bramley, ‘I personally felt that if we had caught those responsible we would have killed 
them for the cowardly act’.218  The controversial shooting of Lt. Jim Barry at the Goose 
Green schoolhouse evinced a similar response. Barry  was killed under a white-flag 
whilst attempting to negotiate Argentine surrender. His death provoked an enraged 
response to such ‘treachery’ and no enemy survivors emerged from the schoolhouse.219 
According to Eyles-Thomas, word of the incident spread to 3 Para, and ‘[…] enraged us 
[…] The war was now personal’.220  An official briefing by  the company intelligence 
officer, which strongly implied no prisoner taking, simply affirmed the view that had 
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already formed amongst the troops. Regardless of orders, ‘no one was keen to accept 
the enemy’s word anymore’.221
 The components of demonisation rest within Fussell’s polarised construction of 
‘totally  evil’ versus ‘totally good’ and demonisation exists as a component of total war. 
The Falklands War was not ‘total’ in any sense, and little evidence exists that Argentine 
forces were demonised, except in the hysterical effluvia of the tabloid press. At the heart 
of demonisation was an explicit racism. Propagandists have regularly attempted to 
ascribe national characteristics to allied forces to encourage demoralising, ‘phantasy 
fears’ amongst the enemy. Since Culloden, the berserk Highlander has been 
unequivocally British, whilst the role of the fighting Irishman has become more 
nuanced.222 It remains speculative whether the role of the Scots Guards and the Gurkhas 
during the Falklands War, at least in part, intentionally  sustained this myth. The reverse 
was also true because, in total war, the enemy became hollowed-out ciphers of total 
evil. As an assertion of continuity, Gray considered that ‘Most soldiers are able to kill 
and be killed more easily in warfare if they  possess an image of the enemy sufficiently 
evil to inspire hatred and repugnance’.223  It may be that the enemy was constructed as a 
subhuman, bereft of all humanity; or a superhuman where exquisite evil juxtaposed with 
Christian morality.224 Whatever the image, such constructions may, according to Jones, 
have rendered killing as, ‘[…] merely  a game […] commonly dehumanising opposing 
troops […] as a way of bypassing inhibitions about killing.’.225  Japanese atrocities 
during the Second World War are still living histories. Maj. John Winstanley  was a 
typical memoirist, ‘They had renounced any right to be regarded as human and we 
thought of them as vermin to be exterminated. That was important. We were aroused 
and fought well’.226 The nadir of demonising a racially distinct and non-Christian group 
arguably occurred during the Vietnam War. Many American servicemen admitted that 
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they  had not only  been given an ‘official’ sanction by their army instructors to rape local 
women, but also detailed advice on how to kill them afterwards.227  The symbolic event 
of the war was the My Lai massacre where between 300 and 507 innocent  civilians were 
massacred by a platoon of soldiers under the command of Lt. William Calley. Although 
the massacre was covered up for over sixteen months, eventually Calley was solely 
convicted of the murders and sentenced to life imprisonment with hard labour in 
military prison. Following mass public protest, President  Nixon commuted the sentence 
to house arrest, and eventually Calley  only served three and a half years in comparative 
comfort. Calley’s defence was that  he was only obeying the orders of his superior, 
Captain Stanley Medina. Medina was also prosecuted but acquitted, and now lends his 
name to the ‘Medina Standard’ which asserts that a commanding officer is responsible 
for the actions of his subordinates if he fails to prevent the commission of war crimes.228 
The relevance of My Lai to the issue of motivation is the likelihood of a similar 
recurrence. In 1980, Cockerham and Cohen concluded that those who enter the services 
intent on a career are less likely  to carry out illegal orders. However, in the absence of 
robust training, there remains ‘[…] enough ambiguity and disagreement among 
American soldiers on the subject of immoral and illegal orders that it  remains quite 
possible that an incident like My Lai can happen again’.229  Such ambiguities are not 
confined to American soldiers and the risks easily  extend to include British Forces. 
Bellicose leadership  and the demonisation of Irish peace protestors into terrorists are 
examples of potential catalysts.
2.6 Summary
 Since the Second World War, group theories have been central to an 
understanding of motivation during combat. The argument of this chapter is that the 
evidence is rather more nuanced because motivation has been a relationship between 
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group loyalty, regimental traditions, and leadership; with frenzied behaviour thrown into 
the mix.  
 Four pillars are integral to understanding primary groups: ideology, coercion, 
social bonding, and task cohesion. The influence of any  robust ideology has at best 
transient and more realistically  manifested in an inchoate sense that the outcome of 
combat was justified because of the integrity of the national collective view. 
Membership  of primary groups was conditional, and acceptance within them, meeting 
professional standards and performing to cultural norms, was implicitly coercive. More 
controversial was whether the basis of group cohesion was social or task based. 
Although combatants could form intense personal bonds, these were often expedient 
and short-term. The essence of primary group motivation remains a commitment to 
shared goals.
 The regiment persists as a corporatised primary group and its centrality to 
combat motivation has been powerfully advocated. However, the evidence suggests that 
whilst regiments have instilled a sense of belonging and notions of professional 
competence, combatants did not fight to sustain myths and traditions. The regimental 
system has been more powerful for officers as it has shaped their approach to 
leadership. Command and leadership  have been different concepts: commanders 
fulfilled a strategic role, whereas leaders were responsible for task completion. Effective 
leadership has required the charismatic exercise of expert position power, impartial 
reward and censure, and consistency.  An ineffective leader risked being supplanted by  a 
leviathan figure who had the personal power to take charge according to his own lights 
and limitations. Formal training inculcated combatants with a spirit  of aggression; 
however, during close combat this often elided into frenzy where ordinary men behaved 
out of character. It  was the role of leadership  to prevent frenzy  from becoming atrocity 
with its consequences on the post-combat psychological well-being of the participants.
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Chapter 3 - After Combat
 The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the impact of post-combat events on the 
motivation to fight. It comprises two parts:
 
Part one will initially consider self-enrichment through plunder and then investigate the 
attempts to replace it through the development and implementation of the British 
awards system. Medals and awards are central to the way society  understands heroism, 
the manner in which combatants understand recognition, and essential to the manner in 
which service culture frames its identity. Case studies of Lt.Col ‘H’ Jones and Cpl.s 
McLaughlin and Sturge will reveal the paradox in the expectations of these groups.
Part two sets out the journey along which combatants develop a sense of composure 
around their participation in combat. For some, this may mean repeating the process, for 
all, there comes a time when it is necessary to reintegrate back into civil society. 
The central argument within this chapter is that post-combat motivation depends upon a 
constellation of three distinct groups; the individual, society, and the military, each with 
their own set of needs. Therefore, it will seek to identify the conflict of expectation that 
arises between: what  the individual combatant expects, what society and the 
Establishment want, and what military culture is prepared to sanction.  
Part 1
3.1 Enrichment, Medals and Awards
 Medals, decorations and awards have served a paradoxical purpose, and it will 
be argued that their motivational power has been over-rated. On one hand they 
represented a meritorious award to an individual, but on the other, they have had an 
arguably greater symbolic and commemorative public purpose in binding the collective 
view to the state. To borrow loosely from Voltaire, if heroes did not exist it would be 
necessary  to invent them. Enduring popularity and cohesive celebration is accorded to 
Page 142 of 304
 
national heroes regardless of whether they win Oscars, Nobel Prizes or sporting majors. 
War-winners and life-savers fit  comfortably into this pantheon. Official forces’ doctrine 
for the distribution of honours and awards is set out in JSP 761. This was last updated in 
May 2008; however, the tenor of the document does not suggest that there has been a 
sea-change in official attitudes since 1982. Excepting the reforms in 1993,1  the 
philosophy and ethos that underpins this document remains rooted in traditional custom. 
JSP 761 sets out its stall with Churchillian rhetoric:
The object of giving medals, stars and ribbons is to give pride and pleasure to those who 
have deserved them.  At the same time a distinction is something which everybody does 
not possess. If all have it, it  is of less value. There must, therefore, be heart-burnings and 
disappointments on the borderline. A medal glitters, but  it  also casts a shadow. The task of 
drawing up regulations for such awards is one which does not  admit  of a perfect solution. 
It  is not  possible to satisfy everybody without  running the risk of satisfying nobody.  All 
that is possible is to give the greatest satisfaction to the greatest  number and to hurt the 
feelings of the fewest.2  
It is necessary  properly  to understand the last sentence. The most reasonable 
interpretation suggests ‘the greatest number’ means a combination of both the military 
and the broader public. The purpose of this chapter is to explain how these apparently 
egalitarian principles have remained rooted in mythology, and consider some examples 
and case studies from the Falklands War.3   The decision making process to grant an 
award has often fallen short of the Churchillian standards, both before and after he 
articulated them. Subjectively, I suggest that there are four basic outcomes following 
consideration for an award:
1. Deserved and Awarded. 
2. Deserved and Not Awarded. 
3. Not Deserved and Awarded. 
4. Not Deserved and Not Awarded. 
Because of the heroism/identity paradox that exists between military culture and the 
expectations of the public collective, the number of possible outcomes increases to 
seven (i.e. the public want an award and the military disagree, and vice versa), this is 
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further increased to fifteen because there are four levels of award4  and the possibility 
arises that the public and military may  disagree over the grade of award. For an award 
to satisfy the greatest  number, the awards’ committees have to be confident that their 
decision can be justified to the public. In substance, this means that the ‘borderline’ 
remains a huge gulf, the ‘shadow’ impenetrably black, and the ‘hurt feelings’ manifest. 
The consequence is that rather than acting as a motivational reward, the iniquities of a 
flawed system have the reverse effect. It can be argued that the award of a medal for 
meritorious conduct has had at least a short term benefit  for the recipient, his peer 
group, and the regiment. However, it has also been argued that the inherent unfairness in 
the way awards have been decided, often nothing more than a lottery, has been much 
more effective at demotivating soldiers. This is because of the consistent failure to 
reward those who are perceived by their comrades as being the most deserving.  As a 
First World War soldier put it:
I have known good men eat their hearts out  through want of recognition. How petty this 
sounds. Yet  a ribbon is the only prize in war for the ordinary soldier. It  is the outward 
proof to bring home to his people that he has done his job well. And say what you may, a 
man’s prowess will be assessed by the number of his ribbons.5
 In the aftermath of the Falklands War, these sentiments have resonated clearly in 
many primary  testimonies. Evidently  some of the veterans felt that they and/or their 
colleagues did not get what they  deserved. Therefore, it will be argued that the 
distribution of rewards was primarily determined by the Establishment to cement the 
role of the Establishment in the minds of the public as the agents of victory. By 
wrapping the Falklands campaign within a framework of restored national pride, they 
were used to preserve and justify hierarchies. Acts of gallantry  did not necessarily fit 
into this construction so recipients of awards had to be carefully vetted and quotas 
maintained so that the heroism was spread around fairly. It was not enough to be a hero; 
it was necessary to be the right sort of hero, satisfying to the national collective. This 
meant one who would not cause embarrassment to the carefully constructed myth that 
reinforces particularly British notions of what makes a hero. Most significantly, heroes 
had to be graded to ensure that the status quo was preserved. The government generally 
Page 144 of 304
 
4 See Appendix 6
5  Anthony Kellett, Combat Motivation: The Behavior of Soldiers in Battle, (London, Kluwer-Nijhoff, 
1982), p. 206 
and the MoD in particular had the bureaucratic mechanisms in place to ensure this 
happened. The outcome of their winnowing, purifying and rationing, was to ensure that 
a sanitised pastiche of heroes was presented for public consumption.  
 To develop the arguments that substantiate these assertions, four stages of 
analysis will be pursued:
1. To provide a sense of alignment of personal combat orientations to rewards that 
will frame the propensity of individuals to respond to their motivational power. 
2. To outline the development of the current awards system. It will be demonstrated 
that it is rooted in feudal principles of hierarchy and status, and show how this 
manifested itself in the distribution of awards following the Falklands War. An 
analysis of the 182 Victoria Crosses awarded during the Second World War will 
provide an informative benchmark. Unlike other awards, the full citation for a 
Victoria Cross award is published in the London Gazette. Not only does this 
reveal interesting aspects of rank and demographic distribution, but also insights 
into the orientation of heroism that led to an award. 
3. To understand the processes that go into the making of an award.  At its heart, the 
award of an honour should be motivational not only for the individual recipient 
but also to his peer group. Unfortunately, the system has too often demonstrated 
the reverse effect, so rather than reinforcing the positive aspects of reward it was 
undermined. 
4. To consider the relationship  of the public to heroes and the honoured as projected 
through the lens of the government. The evidence suggests that the authorities 
have been careful to induct only  the right sort of heroes into the community of 
the elect. This will be explored by  considering some case studies, which will take 
a measure of the possible outcomes referred to above. 
All potential recipients of honours were flawed; some substantially so, by the essential 
personal orientations that carried them into a combat environment.  As First World War 
veteran Cpl. Hawtin Munday put it:
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I’ve seen chaps - many times - who did things they should have got a Victoria Cross for, 
and I’ve seen the same chaps later on, worried, crying, depressed. Had they been seen on 
either occasion they’d either have had a medal or a court martial.6 
 The issue of medals from a motivational perspective has been overrated. As Newsome 
observed, they served a greater purpose of integrating heroism within the collective:
Material awards serve more to rationalize good performance for observers ex post than to 
encourage good performance by soldiers ex ante. Veterans are less impressed with awards 
for combat service than outside observers appear to be, with only one-third of World War 
II medal winners claiming their medals, for instance. Award inflation and corruption are 
common causes for their discreditation.7
Bourke commented on the lack of take up of Second World War medals with a nuanced 
analysis:
Only service women and sailors, that is, people unlikely to have seen active combat, 
showed a little more interest  in collecting these mementoes […] In part this lack of 
interest in medals was a reflection of the application of civilian values to a combat 
situation: many servicemen recognised that the hero was the most  effective killer - and 
not something they thought should be lauded.8
 
 Although existentialist warriors were less impelled to seek out honours; they 
were arguably the most likely to be considered for them, provided that they  were not 
likely to become an embarrassment. For the Falklands war, Cpl. McLaughlin is a 
relevant case study that will be discussed below. However, time-serving soldiers did 
step up a gear when the circumstances demanded. Cpl. Dave Abols was awarded the 
DCM  for his decisive intervention at Goose Green, and soldierly scuttlebutt contended 
he should have received the VC in preference to Jones.9  Abols professed no ideology 
and comfortably accepted that ‘You join the army and follow orders. That’s what 
soldiers should do’. On being asked what made him go over the top he commented, 
‘Pass! Just my job, I was a full screw […] it’s your job to lead them men’.10  An 
interesting suggestion of intrinsic motivation emerged from the fact that Abols’ Latvian 
father was awarded the Iron Cross on the Eastern Front during the Second World War.11 
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Abols emerges as a soldier who deserved an award and got a level 2. Whether or not he 
deserved the superstar status of a VC was dependent upon a range of impenetrably 
subjective factors and these may have included his father’s association with Nazism. 
 
3.2 Plunder
 It is a truism to say that the motivation of soldiers has had little to do with 
altruism and the prospect of loot and self-enrichment has always been relevant.12 It  was 
a self-justified entitlement that may on occasions have enjoyed tacit approval, it  remains 
particularly relevant given that the basic pay for soldiering has always reflected the 
parsimony of necessity. It was during the nineteenth century  that measures were 
introduced to replace booty with institutional rewards. Despite efforts to instil a culture 
of political correctness, the real-politick of the barrack-room meant that the practice of 
scouring the battlefield for souvenirs and booty  retained a consistent and occasionally 
grotesque appeal. Holmes noted that during the First World War:
The hunt  for souvenirs was universal […] And prisoners and the fallen were routinely 
pillaged of cash and collectibles. Those, British and Germans, who knew the rules 
ensured that watches and other valuables were easy of access at the moment of capture 
[…] one British officer was told that his men had been ‘given’ watches by their prisoners 
out of sheer gratitude, but was realistic enough to wonder.13
The practice had not changed during the Falklands War, except for the fact that officers 
were perhaps a little more in tune with their men. According to L.Cpl. Vincent Bramley:
We had gone only thirty metres when the OC tripped and nearly fell over an enemy 
corpse […] Nobody took any notice, except TP, who murmured, 'I wonder if he's been 
looted?' This brought  a grin to everyone's face. Greed for the spoils of war had begun to 
creep into all of us.14
This may  have been opportunistic, and there is evidence to suggest that  British soldiers 
not only looted for personal gain but also to replace or enhance their equipment, boots 
being a particular favourite. However, there is also evidence of calculated intent. 
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Geddes recalled vigorously admonishing a colleague for using secateurs to remove ring 
fingers from Argentinian corpses,15 similarly another junior soldier observed that: 
He [a senior soldier in 2 PARA] was in his late thirties and yet  remained a private. From 
his equipment  he pulled out  […] two pairs of dental pliers. I asked why he was carrying 
such things. He replied: ‘to acquire gold’.16
It was also an unfortunate feature of the Falklands War that soldiers were not above 
stealing from each other.  According to Major Ian Winfield on board HMS Fearless:
We discovered to our disgust  that while the Welsh Guards were in the Tank Deck 
yesterday some of them took the opportunity to go through the kit  that was stored there. 
Thank goodness I had mine in a steel ‘ammo’ box […] not a very happy situation.17
 
 The collection of souvenirs without  any intrinsic value is the macabre flip-side 
of self-enrichment. Anecdotally, Kitchener earned royal opprobrium for having the 
Mahdi’s skull disinterred and fashioned into an inkwell.  President Roosevelt declined 
the gift of a paper knife made from the bone of a Japanese soldier.18  During the 
twentieth century, Joanna Bourke’s research revealed that:
The tendency to collect  human trophies escalated during the conflicts in Korea and 
Vietnam when the bodily parts most favored were ears, teeth and fingers, but the 
collection of heads, penises, hands and toes were all reported […] Souvenirs conveyed 
immense power on the servicemen. The combat paratrooper Arthur E. ‘Gene’ Woodley, 
Jr. collected about fourteen ears and fingers which he strung around his neck. ‘[…] It 
symbolized that I’m a killer. And it  was, so to speak, a symbol of combat-type manhood. 
19
There is an aspect of Woodley’s construction of combat masculinity, developed in 
Vietnam, that clearly finds a parallel during the Falklands War, and this will be 
discussed in the McLaughlin case study in Chapter 3.7.
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3.3 Development of the Awards Culture
 The national honours culture remains rooted in a feudal tradition. According to 
current doctrine, ‘The United Kingdom Honours System relies on the concept that, “The 
Sovereign is the fount of all honour”’.20  Furthermore, ‘[…] though restrictions may be 
imposed, any state award appropriate to the rank and status of the individual may be 
recommended’.21  The important point to make is the distinction between rank and 
status. It was ever thus that the spoils of success were garnered by the commanders of 
victory (until 1815), with one exception. During the Interregnum, Parliament awarded a 
medal for participation in the Battle of Dunbar (1650), although the precise nature of the 
medal was graded according to rank. This dichotomy between the ordinary soldiers and 
their elite leaders was not lost, According to Private Wheeler, commenting on meeting a 
retired French sergeant following the Battle of Waterloo:
Since Napoleon's return he had been honored with the Cross of the Legion of Honor. I do 
not wonder that the soldiers of France are so attached to the Emperor, when the same 
honors are alike open to all ranks.22
It was Wellington, the anthesis of the authoritarian leader, who shortly after Waterloo, 
successfully  petitioned the Duke of York for the issue of a general service medal, which 
was to be the same for all ranks: 
I would beg leave to suggest  […] the expediency of giving to the non-commissioned 
officers and soldiers engaged in the battle of Waterloo, a medal. I am convinced that it 
would have the best effect on the army; and, if that battle should settle our concerns, they 
will well deserve it.23
From the mid-nineteenth century onwards, the practice of inaugurating institutional 
awards took off. 
 The VC remains the highest award for valour and is open to all ranks.24  Until 
1993, the DCM was the next level gallantry award for other-ranks. By contrast, the 
officers’ equivalent, the DSO, was awarded not only  for gallantry but also for service. It 
Page 149 of 304
 
20 JSP 761, p.1-1
21 Ibid, p.2-2
22 Basil Liddell-Hart (ed), The Letters of Private Wheeler 1809-1828, (Moreton-in-Marsh, Windrush, 
2000). p. 185
23 Ibid
24 Appendix 6
is now theoretically available to all ranks for ‘service’ but so far has only been awarded 
to senior officers. Following its inauguration the DSO almost immediately became 
associated with status, quickly assuming the moniker ‘Dukes’ Sons Only’.25  The upper 
crust were able to win the award for behaving like sabre-toothed tigers in battle or paper 
tigers on the staff. Awards for gallantry were augmented during the First World War 
with the introduction of the MC for officers and the MM for other ranks. This was a 
relatively clean distinction between the officer class and the common soldiery. 
However, allowance for greater social taxonomy within public service was facilitated in 
1917 with the Order of the British Empire The social elite got their GBEs and KBEs, 
others got CBEs, OBEs and MBEs, whilst the reward for stakhanovites was the BEM. 
In 1992, the award of this ‘working-class gong’ was discontinued because of its class 
associations; but reintroduced in 2012.26  The military  branch of the Order pegs status to 
rank,27  so the higher honours are normally reserved for OF7 rank and above, MBEs are 
for all ranks up to OF328  and the Brigadiers, Colonels and Captains get those in 
between. It is an interestingly futile exercise in social class for civilian recipients to 
gauge their comparative ‘rank’.29  Anecdotally, the Order has for many people passed its 
‘sell-by’ date because of its associations with Empire and imperialism.30  However, 
whatever the award, at whatever the level, the British way of regulating social 
enhancement, either for gallantry or public service, has been to keep a very tight 
control. During the First World War monthly quotas for gallantry awards were set31 and 
little had changed by 1982. Awards were only granted after being carefully filtered 
through the hierarchy before eventually  being decided by quota-constrained 
committees. Considering the distinction between awards to officers and other ranks, an 
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interesting hypothesis has been developed which is worthy of further development. This 
identified two combat orientations; soldier-saving and war-winning. Whilst war-
winning awards gravitated towards officers, according to Blake and Butler’s analysis:
The act  of awarding the medal represents an organizational attempt to strengthen, by 
reward, a latent role structure based on the military ethic and the professional 
brotherhood. We suggest  that soldier saving activities are deemed appropriate for enlisted 
men. We base our suggestion on the presumed connection between troop morale and in-
group loyalties.32
  For many  of the soldiers who fought in the Falklands War and were recruited 
during the 1970s, the first  stage in the hierarchy of earned professional distinction was 
the General Service Medal for service in Northern Ireland.33 It was not a particular mark 
of gallantry, nor a particular motivator to combat, but a step in a series of ‘career-
building’ awards for those on a long-service enlistment. For others, it was a mark of 
status in the transition from unskilled recruit  to being a respected soldier.34  For the 
career-minded individual, it was important to be able to demonstrate the right sort of 
experience in terms of the jobs done, performance reports obtained and importantly  the 
service awards accumulated. This has pejoratively  been described as ‘ticket-punching’ 
when the individual did the minimum required to achieve the badge, medal or 
distinction.35  It  seems that the higher the rank the easier this was to achieve. Surgeon-
Commander Rick Jolly noted that amongst the Falklands War awards:
The names of all the frigates of that  resolute D-Day picket line were there, with the 
Commanding Officers of HMS Antrim, Brilliant, Broadsword, Ardent, Argonaut, 
Plymouth and Yarmouth  receiving Distinguished Service Orders and Crosses for their 
tenacity and leadership during that vicious fight. One cannot help feeling that  it’s the job 
of a CO to do this and that awards should be for doing something truly exceptional. 
Lower down the pecking order it  is apparent that  many did excel but got either low grade 
or no recognition at all.36
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3.4 The Victoria Cross
 
 Because it is so rarely awarded, the VC has assumed a mythical status in public 
notions of heroism. Of the 1,355 awards made to date; the first was retrospectively 
made to Lieutenant C.D. Lucas R.N. on 21 June 1854,37  and the last was made 
posthumously on 14 December 2006 to Corporal Bryan Budd of 3 Para.38 Distribution 
of the VC by  era is shown in Appendix 3.1. This reveals that 85% of all VCs were 
awarded before 1920 and that it was awarded about 3.5 times more frequently in the 
Great World War than during the Second World War. Although always an infrequent 
award, from 1920 until the present day it has proved incredibly  rare. Therefore, it is 
implausible to suggest that it  has acted as an appropriate award for individual 
motivation, its purpose has been substantially symbolic. To perform an observed act of 
heroism of a VC standard was sufficient only to acquire a lottery ticket for the big prize 
draw.  Of the 182 VCs awarded during the Second World War,39  it is revealing to 
understand how the awards were distributed according to branch of service and by rank. 
40  Tables attached as Appendix 3 are derived from citations published in the London 
Gazette. Appendix 3.3 reveals that 56% were awarded to officers; however, there is an 
interesting divergence according to service. 77% of Airforce and 75% of Navy VCs 
went to officers, with the naval services showing a clear preference to accord valour to 
4-ring captains. By comparison, the imperial armies gave 48% of awards to officers, the 
highest ranking being to Brig. John Campbell DSO, MC.
            More detailed comparison amongst the various branches of imperial service are 
revealing in terms of the officer/man split.41  Canada, Australia and New Zealand 
supported all three services, whilst the contribution of the Indian Army was highly 
significant numerically and geographically. Ten of the awards to Indian and Gurkha 
troops were won in North Africa and Italy. The Indian Army was significantly more 
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meritocratic than the British Army with officers getting only a third of the awards. The 
most egalitarian service was the Australian Army, with officers only getting 17.5%. The 
overall colonial rate was officers 41%, other-ranks 59%.  
 The authorities were keen to ensure that the 61 VCs awarded to the British Army 
were distributed fairly, revealing the importance of regimental traditions. A detailed 
analysis is attached as Appendix 3.5, showing that the medals were spread around 43 
regiments. Each of the Guard Regiments picked up  at least one each as did twenty-three 
English regiments, four Scottish and two Welsh. Nine other Corps and non-regional 
regiments were also represented.
  As with much work on combat motivation that emanated from U.S. sources, 
cultural nuances constructed around national identity, as well as organisational 
differences such as the regimental tradition, suggest that American arguments were 
often persuasive without necessarily being conclusive. Building upon the Blake and 
Butler thesis, a reading of all 182 citations resolves into four distinct award orientations 
that have been applied jointly  or severally. In addition to ‘war-winning’ and ‘life-
saving’, it is clear that the British award system ascribed great value to ‘leadership’ and, 
in a more limited number of cases, ‘endurance’. As Field Marshal Slim put it, ‘We, the 
British, have our own special courage, the courage that goes on - and endurance is the 
very essence of courage’.42  It is not  surprising that two examples of endurance were 
displayed by RAF bomber pilots. In addition to his leadership of the Dambusters raid, 
Guy Gibson was cited for completing ‘170 sorties, involving more than 600 hours 
operational flying’.43  Similarly, Leonard Cheshire was cited for completing 100 
missions, ‘In four years of fighting against the bitterest opposition he has maintained a 
record of outstanding personal achievement, placing himself invariably in the forefront 
of the battle’.44
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 Appendix 3.7 reveals the range of orientations, and by aggregating them in 
Appendix 3.8, it is possible to get a sense of the most prized. For officers, ‘war-
winning’ and ‘leadership’ behaviours were dominant. Although ‘life-saving’ was more 
relevant to other-ranks, it was marked less significant than ‘war-winning’. Specifically, 
considering the British Army, Appendix 3.9 reveals that for officers, ‘war-winning’ and 
‘leadership’ behaviours remained the dominant characteristics. The relevant differences 
are revealed by the reduction in the display of ‘life-saving’ behaviours and the marked 
increase in the ‘leadership’ qualities displayed by NCOs.
  Three other analyses strongly suggest careful apportionment to give the greatest 
satisfaction to the greatest number. Appendix 3.6 shows:
1. how the VC was awarded in each year of the war, 
2. how it was apportioned by nationality, and 
3. balanced according to the area of campaign and intensity  of fighting. It  is an 
interesting factoid to note, given its place in the national mythology, that only 
one VC was awarded to a Battle of Britain pilot.45 
The inescapable fact remains that, during the Second World War in the British army, the 
award of VCs was biased heavily in favour of officers; unless one accepts a eugenicist 
argument that the rank-and-file from Australia, India and Nepal were inherently more 
valourous than their British counterparts. It is more cogent to argue that the public 
symbolism of the awards was required to fit a social context that was more hierarchical 
than egalitarian. The awards made following the Falklands War provide an opportunity 
to assess continuity and change.  
3.5 Falklands Awards
 The list  of awards for the Falklands conflict was published in a 
supplement to the London Gazette on 8 October 1982 and contained an 
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assemblage of public service and gallantry awards. To provide a sense of scale, 
29,700 South Atlantic campaign medals were issued:
To qualify, the recipient had to have at  least one full day's service in the Falkland Islands 
or South Georgia, or thirty days in the South Atlantic operational zone, including 
Ascension Island. Additionally, those who qualified under the first  condition were 
awarded a rosette to wear on the medal ribbon.46
The London Gazette revealed that this reduced to a modest  809 awards for personal 
distinction; 143 went to civilians and 666 to the military, of which 465 were for 
gallantry. This suggests that only 1.6% of the service participants were demonstrably 
heroic. Officers picked up 222 of the gallantry  awards and other ranks 243. When a 
weighting is applied to these awards, it emerges that  officers got 53%.47  Given the ratio 
between officers and other ranks (about one in seven) the inference of the linkage 
between heroism and leadership becomes evident. The land campaign of the Falklands 
campaign has been described as a war won by  junior NCO’s, riflemen and marines. This 
was to some extent reflected in the split between Army and Marine officers who got 
20% of all gallantry awards, whilst their other-ranks got  33%.  The bottom-line was that 
the ordinary soldiers and marines who did most of the hand-to-hand fighting picked up 
just 19% of the total awards, with 7% awarded to the Marines and 12% to the Army. 
Appendix 4.1 demonstrates the grading of the awards was also biased in favour of 
officers and is evidence that the function of awards was to sustain rank, status and 
leadership. Appendix 4.2 reveals a further and rather more emotive analysis of both 
Paratroop battalions, demonstrating who won the medals and who did the dying.
 It was arguably inevitable that efforts would be made to apportion awards in a 
manner that limited inter-service rivalries. So each Battalion/Commando that saw tough 
fighting got a quota of one DSO for each Commanding Officer; two for the Marines, 
two for the Paras and one for the Scots Guards. Considering awards of MCs and MMs, 
the Marines got fifteen, the Paras eighteen, and the Scots Guards five. Perhaps to 
balance up  the two VCs that went to the Paras, the Marines picked up the most MiDs 
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with 58 while the Paras had to make do with 33, and the Scots Guards 12. Appendix 4.3 
suggests an awards process that was sadly lacking in substance but obsessed with form.
 
 It is interesting to juxtapose those who received nothing with those that did. It  
might be a cheap shot to single out Mrs Bardsley, the canteen manageress of the 
Portsmouth NAAFI who got a BEM, but more serious to question the award of the OBE 
to Lt. Col. John Rickett, the CO of the Welsh Guards, following the avoidable disaster 
at Bluff Cove (Chapter 4.2).  It  has been asserted that Rickett was not personally to 
blame and that it was his subordinate who refused to disembark troops from the 
Galahad when vociferously encouraged to do so.48  Nevertheless, Rickett  had a 
vicarious liability for the disaster, so the award at this particular time, even if it was 
Buggins Turn, might be regarded as insensitive particularly as the official guidelines 
state:
Candidates are selected from the nominations put forward on the basis of achievement, 
for merit  and excellence or exemplary service […] [and] should reveal outstanding 
services in the fairly recent past.49
It might also be argued that even though the Bluff Cove incident rendered the Welsh 
Guards unfit for further action, as an elite regiment, they could not be seen to have 
failed. 
 
 The next section will consider the evidence to support the assertion from JSP 
761 set out above and investigate the processes by  which awards are made and, most 
importantly, how the significance of rewards is reinforced or undermined.
3.6 The Mechanics of the Awards Process
 
 According to the official mantra:
Honours and awards are intended as a means of recognising service of outstanding merit 
beyond the normal demands of duty. Competition is intense and the qualities required of 
nominees are extremely high. It is essential that great  care is taken in selecting personnel 
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to be recommended for honours and awards and that the correct  procedures are followed 
at all times.50
The problem is that historically  the ‘great care’ has sustained a cumbersome process. 
During the Second World War, it was not uncommon for a potential recipient to have 
been killed before the award was made. The system has also been regarded cynically  by 
the fighting forces because of the perception that all too often the wrong people ended 
up with the awards.51  Describing a general’s visit  during the First World War, Private 
Herbert Hall commented:
He said, ‘Did any of you people see anything meritorious?’ There wasn’t  a single sound 
[…] We thought  it was a very unnecessary question, and, of course, to insult us, they 
awarded the medals to the colonel’s runner and the senior stretcher-bearer.52
  The primary stage in the process required a recommendation by  a serviceman’s 
CO. Therefore, the first hurdle to overcome has consistently been any deficiency in the 
relationship  between officer and man. Marshall recounted the gallantry  of a Second 
World War infantry  sergeant as reported by  his peer group, and queried with his 
company commander why he had not been decorated. The response was telling:
‘When the fighting started, he practically took command away from me,’ he answered. 
‘He was leading and the men were obeying him. You can’t  decorate a man who’ll do that 
to you’.53
The second stage was to get the recommendation into the bureaucratic machine. The 
Falklands War awards were decided upon with remarkable rapidity  and were published 
in the London Gazette four days before the Falklands victory parade held in central 
London. This parade was noted for its celebration of Margaret Thatcher as the agent of 
victory; therefore, it is not  unreasonable to assert  that the speed of the awards process 
served a political imperative. As Connaughton commented, this placed significant 
pressure on officers to get their recommendations in:
The Brigade Commander [Julian Thompson] to whom all citations within his brigade 
went, admits that the matter of Falklands citations ‘irks me to this day’. 3 Commando 
Brigade were given forty-eight hours to get  their citations to divisional headquarters, 
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under pressure from Northwood to expedite submissions.  The effect of this was to give 
Commanding Officers twenty-four hours to comply.54
It is evident that the government considered ‘the greatest satisfaction to the greatest 
number’ would be achieved by subordinating the interests of the deserving individual by 
giving priority to getting the symbolic heroes in place for public consumption.  
 The process of writing up a recommendation risked devaluing combat 
experience. This is because it was necessary  for the recommendation to be written in 
such a manner as to sell it  to the approving committees. As a consequence, the 
recommendations were prone to being exaggerated or were dependent upon the creative 
writing skills of the recommender.55  According to Maj. Alfred Irwin during the First 
World War:
I recommended Captain Gimsun of the Royal Army Medical Corps, for a Victoria Cross 
[…] General Maxey, who was commanding our division, came up the next day and found 
me writing up Gimsun’s recommendation, and he told me that  it  wasn’t sufficiently 
journalistic, and rewrote it for me, and I think that’s why Jimmy didn’t get it.56
By contrast, the 1982 VC citation for ‘H’ Jones has been criticised because not only did 
it contain some fundamental errors but also offered a substantially  sanitised version of 
events leading up  to his undoubtedly brave, but predictably  terminal, intervention in the 
Battle for Goose Green:
As a directing staff Colonel at  the Staff College has put it, medal citations are written for 
the readers of the Daily Mail. Others might say Boy’s Own Paper would be more in tune 
with some citations […] A medal citation, in explaining why a soldier should be 
honoured, states what  he did to deserve it  and goes some way to explaining the 
circumstances.57
Therefore, it  may be argued that if citations are to be taken with a pinch of salt  or 
laughed off as innocent fabrications, then the awards become pointless if their only 
purpose has been to propagate and propagandise myths.58
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 Recommendations for awards are currently made using Form JPA S004.59  This 
is required to be countersigned by up  to four superior commanders, ideally  to include an 
officer of at least OF 7 rank, each of whom must add supporting remarks and indicate 
whether their recommendation is either; very strong, strong, or just a recommendation. 
As JSP 761 states, ‘the value of these comments to honours committees cannot be 
overstated’. Some issues arise from this process. Firstly, the lower down the hierarchy a 
recommended soldier is the more detached he is from the recommenders. A private 
soldier is unlikely to have had many dealings with his CO and is probably  unknown to 
the CO’s superiors.  As one Falklands veteran put it:
The CO [Jones] never really knew me or the rest  of us lower ranks; it  would be stupid to 
pretend he did. He never knew me as ‘Spud’ and I certainly never heard him being 
referred to as ‘H’.60
Secondly, no one making or endorsing a recommendation will want to have their 
judgment questioned by  having a recommendation declined, or for recommending an 
awardee who turns out to be an embarrassment to the military ethos. Much of this will 
depend on the relationship between the recommenders, and one might reasonably 
presume that  a formal recommendation for a prestigious award will be supplemented by 
off-the-record confabulations. JPA S004 is submitted to the AFOAC for their 
recommendation, then potentially to the MODSHC, who recommend to the HD 
Committee,61  before finally  seeking regnal approval. It  is not surprising that, with all 
these hurdles and elephant-traps very few awards are made. Holmes assessed the 
consequences:
 Whatever men might  say in public about  decorations, in private they were eager to 
discuss them at length […] Many of those who were most vocal had themselves been 
decorated, and were not  concerned on their own behalf. Rather, they agreed […] that ‘the 
monstrously inadequate distribution of awards to the other ranks’ was a flaw in the British 
system, and they regretted that  there were had not been enough awards available for the 
brave men they had led.62
In the aftermath of the Falklands, Wilsey observed that:
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One senior officer declared that after the war ‘medals’ posed more problems than 
anything the Argentines had done during it  […] The process is inherently competitive and 
very selective […] It is often argued that Britain is too parsimonious in this matter.63
The evidence of the Falklands awards suggests the use of a quota system and many 
personal accounts of this war are implicitly critical. David Cooper was the padre of 2 
Para and commented:
Chaundler went  on to win the Wireless Ridge battle, said to have been the best planned 
and executed of the whole campaign […] Despite this, Chaundler as the replacement CO 
received no official recognition, Chris Keeble, having acted one rank up after the death of 
‘H’ Jones, received a DSO, as did the other successful COs. The awards were given on a 
ration basis. The VC was more or less forced by the press and it  seemed to boil down to a 
DSO to each battalion involved in the fighting. In 2 Para, who gets it, Chris Keeble or the 
CO, David Chaundler? The whole world knew about Chris.64
 The quota system is euphemistically referred to in JSP 761 as the Operational 
Scale. This recognises that different operations will operate at different intensities, and 
the precise quota for each operation will be recommended to the Queen by the HD 
Committee. The anchor point  cited in the document is for a ‘low-intensity’ operation 
with a six-monthly quota of 1:1000 awards at  levels 1-3 and 1:400 at level 4.65  The 
quota for the Falklands War, clearly  a high intensity  operation, appears to have been set 
at approximately  1:200 and 1:90 respectively. One other rigid quota concerns the issue 
of the MSM  to senior NCOs who have completed 20 years service with an unbroken 
standard of conduct.  A maximum of 201 can be awarded each year.66  Arguably  the 
‘conduct’ criterion limits the pool of potential candidates.
 Perhaps one of the reasons that the authorities have remained steadfastly frugal 
resulted from the comparisons made with the largesse of the Americans. US forces 
underwent a process of rampant award inflation during the Vietnam War and issued over 
1.2 million awards for bravery.67  This debasement of awards fell to its nadir in October 
1983 when 20,000 US troops invaded the Caribbean island of Grenada and faced minor 
opposition for only three days. The US military  then contrived to award 15,000 
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gallantry  and distinguished service awards.68  A positive aspect of the American system 
that has no British counterpart has been the issue of unit awards. There are four levels of 
unit citation that can be made in addition to individual awards, the most prestigious of 
which is the Presidential Unit  Citation. Given the importance of group loyalty to 
motivation such a development could assuage much of the resentment felt  by awards 
considered deserved by participants but not given. It is a subjective opinion, but  obvious 
candidates would be ‘B’ Company of 3 Para for their efforts on Mount Longdon. It 
would also resolve the tendency to seek reflected glory  from the individual award of a 
unit colleague. In interview, Maj. Philip Neame, OC ‘D’ Company, 2 Para, rather 
struggled to find words to justify  Jones’ VC citation. He acknowledged that it  was 
written in purple prose and considered that  it was a justified award for the battalion’s 
efforts and that it should be shared.69  Unfortunately, he did not explain how.
 Neame emerges as one of the under recognised heroes of the Falklands War and 
it has been asserted that  he was the victim of army politics.70  Although he received a 
MiD, there is a body  of opinion that believes he should have been awarded the MC,71 as 
did the other two rifle company  commanders in 2 Para.72  Similarly, the vernacular 
Spanish-speaking, Captain Rod Bell used his unique skills not only at the sharp end, but 
was also heavily involved in the surrender negotiations at Goose Green and Stanley. 
According to Southby-Tailyour, ‘A great sadness to many friends was that this brave, 
calm and dignified officer was to receive no recognition at the end of the conflict’.73 
Most controversially, at least in the minds of his peer group, was the failure to 
posthumously reward Cpl. McLaughlin. According to L.Cpl. Vincent Bramley:
The apparent lottery system of the Reward system provoked an outrage because of its 
failings, The news that Corporal Stewart  McLaughlin was to receive no posthumous 
award was greeted with dismay and anger by all the privates, the JNCOs and many 
SNCOs and officers. Let  it  be clear that, while no one expected a medal, not even the 
South Atlantic Medal, official recognition was held in high esteem […] Among the men 
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of 3 Para there remains strong agreement. If a corporal can control for the most  part of the 
night  the major part of a platoon in addition to his own section, and do duty beyond his 
rank throughout a brutal, bloody fourteen-hour battle, that soldier deserves the highest 
decoration.74
The reasons for this will be explored below.
 Good leadership demanded that morale and motivation, following an 
exceptional performance, should be consolidated and reinforced. Unfortunately in the 
aftermath of the Falklands War there were a number of examples where achievement 
was undermined rather than consolidated. One of the most vociferous critics has been 
Robert Lawrence, famously the original text author and subject of the film Tumbledown 
(1988), named after the battle where he was seriously  injured. Despite his gallantry, he 
felt  that the Scots Guards considered his injuries an embarrassment and his attitude a 
liability, to the extent that when the film was in production a rumour was propagated 
within the Scots Guards that Lawrence was a bankrupt drug addict.75  In the opinion of 
Lawrence's father, his medal presentation by the Duke of Edinburgh was less than 
satisfactory, ‘He was still talking to him [the doctor] when he pinned on Robert’s medal, 
hardly  even looking at him’.76  Graham Carter was a private soldier in 2 Para, only six 
weeks out of training and heavily involved in the action which resulted in the death of 
his platoon commander Jim Barry.77 During his voyage home, he was outraged when his 
replacement platoon commander told him, ‘he did not think I was Parachute Regiment 
material’.78  This was a serious error of judgment given that Carter was to be awarded 
the MM. At a group level, members of 3 Para have been critical of the unsympathetic 
treatment they received. The Commanding Officer, Lt. Col Huw Pike, was replaced 
shortly after the war by  Lt. Col Rupert Smith. According to Dominic Gray (MiD), ‘The 
lads felt he had no respect for Falklands veterans or what they had achieved. I felt  I had 
been shat on from a great height’.79  Tony Gregory commented:
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I still can remember the new CO’s speech on the parade square. I felt he insulted us. I 
don’t  wish to repeat  what he said. It  infuriated me. I’ve never forgotten it. To me it 
summed up the army’s attitude. I feel he said it  because people up top wanted us out, but 
if he said it off his own bat then it’s unforgivable.80
One can detect the stentorian echo of a battery sergeant-major who, when the Armistice 
was announced in 1918, stated, ‘now the war is over, we can get down to real 
soldiering’.81  In both instances, it suggests a blimpish inability  or an unwillingness to 
reframe concepts of recognition, respect and esteem in the light of experience. Kevin 
Connery (MiD) advised that within a year of the Falklands 60 percent of those who had 
served in the Falklands had left the battalion.82 Another Falklands veteran, Mark Eyles-
Thomas, suggests that much of this turnover was prompted by the new CO’s 
unsympathetic attitude and a deliberate strategic intent to refocus the battalion. Smith 
publicly articulated a desire to rebuild the battalion, ‘he had no time for despondency or 
veterans with complacent attitudes’ and undertook to ease the demobilisation process of 
those who wished to leave.83  Lawrence also suffered a demoralising experience whilst 
recovering from his physical injuries. On a visit  to Chelsea Barracks, his new company 
commander told him, ‘You know I don’t think its very good for morale for the boys to 
see you limping around […] I’d hurry up and get out of the camp’.84
3.7 Creating Heroes
 Myths tend to be more palatable for the public than the unvarnished truth. When 
it comes to handing out  the medals the public wants a positive emotional connection to 
the process. However, the truth remains that to be a hero it has often been necessary to 
be brutal and uncompromising in battle. Falklands veteran Major Chris Keeble 
recounted that:
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It’s savage gutter fighting. Everything you’ve ever experienced before is nothing like 
it. It’s basic killing […] I don’t  know any ‘best  moments’. The whole affair is one of 
tragedy. War is a messy, dirty, miserable business, and we should never allow 
ourselves to go to war.85
However, this was not the message that the government wanted to project  after the 
Falklands War. Margaret Thatcher, the Conservative prime minister, was keen to cement 
herself as the agent  of victory and in the process airbrush the failings of her government 
for allowing the conditions for war to arise. The victory  parade that took place on 12 
October 1982 was analogous to a Roman triumph. It was not  attended by  the Royals and 
Thatcher was the guest of honour. The parade itself was sanitised as only able-bodied 
veterans were permitted to parade. Certainly the Keeble view of warfare was not to be 
allowed to pollute the renaissance of a ‘chivalric discourse’.86  Thatcher’s Guildhall 
speech, discussed below, leant heavily on images of justice, glory and heroism. Philip 
Smith argued that  the war was ‘semiotically valorised as a rational, sensible, legal and 
professional conflict’, that  tapped into a manichean British ritual code, which expressed 
the British as sacred and the Argentines as profane.87  With this construction, it is 
understandable that the heroes, winnowed out from the approval process for individual 
accolades, should be able to demonstrate that, despite the circumstances of battle, they 
remained law abiding, moral and rational.  
 That the British public recognised the need to support injured servicemen from 
the Falklands cannot be doubted.  The South Atlantic Fund raised over £20 million in 
public donations; however, Robert Lawrence discovered that it  was not beyond the 
authorities to manage this goodwill to their own advantage:
My new Rover, courtesy of Leyland, was eventually delivered to Chelsea Barracks […] 
About a year later when my donation from the South Atlantic fund finally arrived. From it 
had been deducted £11,500 for the car […] The incident highlighted […] The exploitation 
for publicity purposes that many Falklands casualties faced.88
 It has been open to those who received the highest awards to achieve great 
public prominence. There are currently only  three living British recipients of the VC. 
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John Cruickshank (aged 91), Bill Speakman (aged 84) and Johnson Beharry (aged 32). 
Despite having to cope with his own demons, Beharry  has negotiated a lucrative 
£1million publishing deal for his autobiography and during 2011 began to emerge as a 
television celebrity.89  As a ‘soldier-saving’ hero, he is celebrated in the media and 
features prominently in public commemorations. Beharry was awarded his VC in 2005, 
the first since the Falklands War. 
 The comparative rarity of gallantry medals means that recipients (or their heirs) 
stand to make significant financial gains from medal sales. At issue is the choice that 
some recipients are forced to make because medals are awarded in substitution of a 
financial settlement. In November 2009, Lord Ashcroft paid £1.5million in a private 
sale for the VC and bar awarded to Captain Noel Chavasse during the First World War. 
The Medals had originally been bequested to St Peter’s College, Oxford.90  In the same 
month, Spink & Co. auctioned Flight  Lieutenant Bill Reid’s World War II VC for 
£335,000.91  These sales raise moral issues that have yet to be worked through in public 
discourse. These include the profits made by auctioneers and dealers and the extent to 
which beneficiaries should make a contribution to the welfare of unsung heroes. 
Another area of nascent concern relates to the treatment of heroes who are forced to sell 
through economic necessity. In 2009, Captain Ian Bailey, who served as a corporal in 3 
Para during the Falklands War, sold his MM and other campaign medals for £70,000. 
One can empathise with Bailey’s comment that, ‘it was the second hardest decision I 
have had to make’. He had to do it  because of unemployment caused by his war 
injuries. The response from the MoD was depressingly  predictable. Bailey had 
contacted the Veterans Minister via his MP for help  but was advised to contact a charity. 
The MoD’s rebuttal was that Bailey  already received a tax-free pension.92  Falklands 
veteran CSM  Brian Faulkner left the army in 1987 and was beset with money troubles. 
He sold his DCM for £7,000 to a medal dealer but could not bring himself to tell his 
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wife. Eventually, he came clean when the medal was auctioned and donated to the 
National Army Museum. According to Faulkner, ‘If I won the lottery  I would buy  it 
back tomorrow and then give it back to the National Army Museum, but at least I would 
know it was wholly mine again’.93
 Of the two posthumous VCs awarded in 1982 one has proved controversial and 
the other not. Sergeant Ian McKay was widely recognised amongst his peer group as a 
deserving recipient. The only skeleton in his cupboard being that  he was involved in the 
Bloody Sunday incident. He was identified in the Widgery Report as Private T,94  and 
despite firing two shots in technical breach of the Yellow Card rules, escaped censure. 
However, this has not achieved much purchase in the public domain. By contrast, 
Jones’ biographer noted:
The spirit of a force is its heroes and every story has them. This process is fully worked 
through in the press reports of the most  famous of the 255 British dead, Lieutenant 
Colonel Herbert ‘H’ Jones.95
Some context to the gallimaufry of media coverage about Jones was provided by 
Falklands veteran Ken Lukowiak, and provides a foundation to deconstruct Jones’ 
motivations as a hero:
Hero or lunatic, Colonel Jones was a leader of men […] we read in a British newspaper 
that the late great Colonel Jones was ‘loved’ by his men, that we tragically mourned his 
death, that  the memory of our dead colonel […] had driven us to Port Stanley and ensured 
us of victory. Bollocks.96
 
It  may be asserted that Jones was ‘needs-motivated’ and is a case study for intrinsic 
motivation. He was launched into the Falklands War as an existential warrior and had he 
survived it seems likely  he would he have relished the VC as a reinforcement of his own 
values. Had he survived it is much more debatable whether he would have received one. 
Whilst not an authoritarian, Jones was a fully  paid-up  autocrat. This manifested itself in 
a hubristic solipsism that was the antithesis of achievement-motivated biddability. The 
Eton educated Jones was the scion of a very wealthy  family so had a career choice free 
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from financial worries. That he chose the military  would probably have come as a 
surprise to his contemporaries. He was an introvert and a loner, never achieved any rank 
in the Eton Rifles, eschewed responsibility, did not take to team sports and was 
academically uninspiring. (anti-intellectualism has historically been regarded as a 
military quality). What he did have was a love for military history  that combined with a 
passion for the romance of heroism.97 However, he was admitted to Sandhurst where he 
developed a reputation for being short  tempered and hasty.98  His lack of diplomacy 
became evident whilst adjutant in the Devon & Dorset Regiment because of his inability 
‘to suffer fools gladly’. At Staff College the directing staff observed, ‘tact and charm do 
not come easily to him’ and, ‘I have talked about his arrogance and tendency to ride 
roughshod over others’.99  Upon his eventual transfer to take charge of 2 Para:
One senior officer in another parachute battalion observed that  there were those in 2 Para 
who perceived Jones as being, ‘too spicy, too rich, too extrovert  and too 
unconventional’.100
Immediately  prior to the Falklands War, 2 Para was scheduled to be posted to Belize. 
The Anglian Regiment was on standby and should have gone to the South Atlantic, but 
Jones cut  short a skiing holiday, rushed back to London and pulled strings to get his 
battalion in the vanguard: 
H would have felt his whole service had been in preparation for this historic moment - 
that he personally had a destiny to fulfil. This incorrigible military romantic had dreamt 
in a thousand dreams of leading a charge against the Queen’s enemies.101
This was borne out by  a conversation with Major Ewen Southby-Tailyour whilst  on 
board Norland during the voyage south:
‘H’ looked at  me over a mug held in front  of his face with both hands, elbows on the 
table. ‘This is my big chance, I’m not going to waste it.’ I asked him what  he meant. For 
years he had dreamt  of leading his Parachute battalion into battle and it  was as simple as 
that […] he knew what he wanted to do with a clarity and determination I found 
disturbing.102
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  That Jones was highly critical of his superiors is evidence of his personality. 
His response to Brig. Thompson’s tactical delays before Goose Green was, ‘I have 
waited twenty years to go into action and I am not having some fucking marine 
preventing me now’.103 Robert Fox the BBC correspondent also reports of the fractious 
relationship  Jones developed with Admiral Woodward.104 More pertinently  Jones had a 
very forceful manner with his subordinates and ran his battalion on ‘restrictive control’ 
principles that allowed very limited scope for individual initiative. Jones wanted to 
make every decision, he perceived it to be his battle. To do this successfully, it was 
imperative for him to maintain a clear perspective of his battle plan. It was his job to 
maintain dynamic leadership, trust to the fighting skills of his subordinates and deploy 
them to the best of his ability. As Onasander put it describing the behaviour of leaders:
He who is so stupid that unless he comes to close quarters with the enemy believes that 
he has accomplished nothing worthy of mention is not brave but thoughtless and 
foolhardy.105
A leader who exposed himself to danger not only frayed the nerves of his subordinates, 
rather than motivating them, but also risked getting killed in the process, with 
potentially disastrous consequences for tactical leadership.106  Whilst Jones cannot be 
criticised for any lack of physical courage, it can be argued that his inability to delegate 
reveals an implicit  lack of moral courage. A quality according to Field-Marshal Slim 
that is ‘a much higher and rarer virtue’.107
 The narrative of events leading up  to Jones’ death have been exhaustively 
described in books and articles. The important questions in the context of his medal 
citation are firstly, whether Jones made a decisive intervention and secondly, was the 
award an effective motivator for his subordinates. The answer to both is a resounding 
‘No’. The victory was manufactured by his subordinate Chris Keeble. Keeble’s first step 
Page 168 of 304
 
103 Mark Adkin, Goose Green: a battle is fought to be won, (London, Cassell, 1992), p. 92; Wilsey, 
H.Jones VC, p. 246
104 Hugh McManners, Forgotten Voices of the Falklands, (London, Ebury Press, 2008), p .258
105 Frank Richardson, Fighting Spirit: A Study of the Psychological Factors in War, (London, Leo 
Cooper, 1978), pp. 84-85
106 Holmes, Acts of War, p. 347
107 Slim, Courage and Other Broadcasts, p. 6
was to turn restrictive-control on its head by introducing a policy of mission-command, 
which allowed his company commanders freedom of action. His second step was to 
take stock; as Falklands veteran John Geddes succinctly  put it, ‘Never play  poker with 
Chris Keeble’.108  2 Para was outnumbered, short of ammunition and on their chin-
straps. Keeble, with the assistance of Rod Bell, used a mixture of bluff and persuasion 
to encourage the Argentinian surrender. It required subtle interpersonal skills that Jones 
does not appear to have possessed to any  meaningful degree. Jones’ VC citation 
describes inter alia that: 
The devastating [sic] display of courage by Colonel Jones had completely undermined 
their will to fight  further […] This was an action of the utmost gallantry by a 
Commanding Officer whose dashing leadership and courage throughout the battle were 
an inspiration to all about him.109
The real test is what his subordinates thought. Their testimony contains little in the way 
of outright criticism and a strong sense of defensiveness. Given the tight bond of group 
loyalty and regimental tradition this is to be expected. Therefore, it is necessary to read 
between the lines, consider what they do not say, and note the absence of any sense of 
fulsome agreement with the citation.
 Both Neame and Crosland confirmed that  they knew little about Jones’s attack; 
it did not make much of an impact, it did not affect morale, and Jones did not achieve a 
great deal with it.110 Paul Farrar (OC ‘C’ Company) commented that Jones was prone to 
periods of ‘blind rage’ and inferred a lack of confidence in his subordinates. He did not 
communicate his intentions. The evidence suggests that the most  defensive of the 
company commanders was Dair Farrar-Hockley  (‘A’ Company).111  It was during a 
period where Jones had effectively taken control of ‘A’ Company  and undermined 
Farrar-Hockley’s authority that he was killed. According to Connaughton’s research:
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Becoming impatient for a result, ‘H’ required Farrar-Hockley to proceed at a pace the 
latter did not  consider sensible […] ‘H’ saw three men die in the unnecessary attempt  to 
force the pace.112
Farrar-Hockley  was ‘staggered’ to discover that Jones had led his own attack, and he did 
not coordinate with him. He most pointedly avoided direct comment on Jones during 
the battle and asserted that Jones’ contribution to the battalion occurred during 
peacetime, when he ensured it was trained to the highest standards. He stated he did not 
know why Jones died and commented, ‘I would rather that wasn’t part of your 
business’. Jones’ charge had no effect on ‘A’ Company  and news of his death did not 
spread widely or quickly. The success was down to the soldiers and NCOs. Jones’ 
bodyguard Sergeant Barry Norman acknowledged that his attack did not achieve a lot, 
was ‘comic book stuff’, and certainly  not his job.113  A view shared by  medical orderly 
Bill Bentley, who described Jones as both brave and foolhardy.114 Sergeant Blackburn, 
Jones’s radio operator, considered, ‘It was a death before dishonour effort; but  it 
wouldn’t have passed Junior Brecon’.115  It should be noted that all of these comments 
are expressed in the cultural construction identified by Dawson.116
 Fitz-Gibbon argued that Jones was shaped by an authoritarian personality. Based 
upon Dixon’s tests of authoritarianism this must be challenged.117  His ‘needs-
motivated’ autocratic personality and inability  to delegate put him in a straight-jacket; 
so that, when he reached the tipping point of his competence to command and 
desperately  needed the support of his subordinates, his moral courage failed and he 
pushed it away. Where Fitz-Gibbon seemed to be spot-on, was in his assertion that the 
authorities avoided any detailed examination of the evidence and were instead happy to 
dissimulate ‘some ripping yarns’.118  Whilst his award of the highest honour was 
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controversial in some military circles (not least in his battalion) there was no suggestion 
that he did not deserve something. However, for meeting the needs of the public 
collective his VC ticked all the boxes.
 The manufacture of a Falklands narrative extended beyond the role of Jones. As 
the American historian Barbara Tuchman, distastefully observed: 
No nation has ever produced a military history of such verbal nobility as the British. 
Retreat  or advance, win or lose, blunder or bravery, murderous folly or unyielding 
resolution, all emerge alike clothed in dignity and touched with glory.119
The fact is that public sentiment allowed little place for heroes who do not conform to 
the chivalric discourse. This is a blinkered myth. It  was Bramley’s book, Excursion to 
Hell: Mount Longdon a Universal Story of Battle (1991) that lifted the lid on atrocities 
allegedly conducted by  3 Para during the Battle of Mount Longdon, and initiated a 
police investigation. Bramley  did not name names but alleged inter alia the execution of 
PoWs and the desecration of corpses. The consequence was that Bramley faced the 
threat of prosecution. When its unsavoury  secrets were revealed it might be argued that 
the military and the authorities were quick to close ranks and launch ad hominem 
attacks. According to Lucy Robinson’s analysis:
Bramley’s memoir fits the standard structure of a soldier’s story: his background, his 
youthful criminality, his post-conflict  need for resolution and recovery were used to 
discredit what he had written.120
 Integral to British military  history  in general and regimental tradition in particular, has 
been the protection and nurturing of reputations. This appeared to be the stance of Field 
Marshal Lord Brammall who spoke on the issue of Falklands War crimes in the House 
of Lords:
 If there is any doubt about whether a prosecution should be brought, the benefit of the 
doubt should go to those who risked their lives in the national interest  [ …] In view of the 
lapse of time and the intense warlike circumstances […] there is bound to be doubt. 
Should not  the benefit  of that doubt  go to those who went 8,000 miles to risk their lives 
[…] for the benefit of the whole nation?121
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It has been suggested that Bramley’s revelations posed a threat to the stellar career 
ascent of Hew Pike. Pike was the CO of 3 Para in 1982, who by 1992 had been 
promoted to Major-General, and was eventually to retire in 2001 as a Lieutenant-
General. Pike was one of the few veterans to be interviewed under police caution in 
order to account for his knowledge of the allegations.
 Corporals Sturge and McLaughlin emerge as flawed heroes, and their actions 
reveal something of the true nature of an existentialist warrior. A potential culprit for the 
prisoner shooting was Corporal Gary ‘Louis’ Sturge; a name that is absent from most 
histories of the Falklands. During the assault on Mount Longdon Sturge has been 
described as leading his section with bravery, skill and sustained courage.122  He also 
showed a calming leadership when he interposed in the violent altercation between Lt. 
Cox and his subordinate Cpl. McLaughlin.123  As an immediate reward his Company 
Commander, Dave Collett MC (‘A’ Company), presented him with a captured .45 pistol. 
However, Sturge’s fall from grace came when he brought in a wounded prisoner and 
upon enquiring what to do with him was told, ‘put him with the others’. Sturge then 
shot the prisoner with his new .45.124 For someone who had shown such composure up 
to that point it  raises the important question why Sturge interpreted the order to him in 
such a dramatic manner. Collett has subsequently described Sturge as a ‘loony’. If such 
is the case then why reward him with a .45 automatic pistol? However, the truth remains 
shrouded in an impenetrable fog of war. What is evident from a whole range of sources 
is the ambivalent attitude towards the Geneva Convention and the taking of prisoners, 
particularly if this was likely to interrupt ‘momentum’. Journalists describe a lecture 
given onboard Canberra during the voyage to the islands on the subject of prisoner 
handling:
‘Under the Geneva Convention you are not, I repeat not, allowed to stick a bayonet in 
a newly captured prisoner,’ explained the instructor, a sergeant  in 42 Commando. ‘So 
what do you do if you capture an enemy trench with a couple of wounded Argies still 
inside?’
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‘Shoot their heads off,’ came the reply.
‘Quite right. But  remember if there’s a TV crew nearby you’ve got  to go through all 
the first-aid rubbish just as if they were your best mates’.125
It is unclear whether Sturge was immediately arrested or whether Pike held a summary 
court martial. It was reported in the Independent in 1993 that Maj. Peter Dennison of 3 
Para witnessed the shooting with inter alia Bramley  and Cpt. Mason and did arrest 
Sturge. He made a written report to his superiors although the MoD subsequently 
claimed no knowledge of it.126  By complete contrast, Jennings & Weale asserted that 
Sturge was recommended for a decoration.127  Given the public taboo surrounding 
prisoner killing, it is no surprise that the awards committee felt differently, and no 
evidence emerges that his peer group was troubled by the omission. In any event, Sturge 
was transferred to 1 Para where he was awarded the soubriquet ‘Line ‘em up Louis’, 
and retired 12 years later as a colour sergeant.  
 The peer group was not so sanguine about Cpl. McLaughlin. As late as 2008 a 
petition appeared on the No 10 e-petitions website seeking to give him a posthumous 
award.128  McLaughlin was part of a counter-culture within 2 Para which has been 
described as being a ‘green-eyed’ boy.129 His CSM  John Weeks, considered McLaughlin 
was a poor peacetime soldier but born for battle. He appears to have constructed a 
military personality around the idea of fighting excellence but a disdain for the 
established hierarchy. He was an aggressive rule breaker who had done time in 
Colchester’s military prison.130  According to Graham Tolson, who claimed to have 
known McLaughlin quite well, he was ‘a character and a bit  of a bully’.131  During the 
Battle of Longdon he is alleged to have despatched at least one Argentinian with a 
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Walther P38 pistol that he had illegally acquired from a pub in Liverpool,132 not that any 
criticism has been levelled at him for that. The attack on McLaughlin’s reputation 
followed his death. He was initially  wounded and whilst making his way to the RAP 
was killed by a shell blast. Lt. Cox, with whom McLaughlin had previously  had a 
falling-out, searched his ammunition pouches for spare food and found a batch of 
severed ears that  McLaughlin had collected as souvenirs.133  Someone tipped off the 
padre who then made the discovery public knowledge.134 With that disclosure went any 
realistic chance of McLaughlin receiving an award. When asked in interview about the 
ears, Weeks was very defensive, did not want to discuss it, and called it ‘a personal 
thing’.135 For those who wish to stand in judgement of McLaughlin, it should be borne 
in mind that his behaviour, although extreme, was not exceptional. As his subordinate 
Kevin Connery put it in describing the mood of frenzy that overwhelmed McLaughlin’s 
section:
All around there was killing and death. There was the acrid smell of battle and the awful 
smell of death. I was getting closer and closer to it. I was awash with adrenalin, floating, 
not the same guy at  all. All the training was taking over, it was becoming instinctive. The 
smell of battle and death was being absorbed into my body.136
There are other accounts of Argentine corpses being despoiled for monetary gain or 
simply  for amusement.137  In this context, McLaughlin’s actions might arguably  have 
had a certain savage nobility as he clearly did not do it for booty  but, perhaps in the 
spirit of Woodley, for some other symbolic reason. As Bramley put it:
In both world wars the Gurkhas […] cut off heads or ears. It  is accepted by the 
government that the Gurkhas do such things. But  in the Falklands it  was not  only the 
Gurkhas […] Normal standards of behaviour are left far behind and acts occur that are 
plainly out  of character. It is true that  victory is in some cases celebrated by the taking of 
ghoulish souvenirs. I have no doubt  I will not be the last soldier to make these 
observations.138
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The public have tended to react badly to such accounts because they reveal a side of 
combat behaviour that does not fit with the collective view. The authorities, keen to 
preserve reputations, have also been prone to denial. In August 2011, it was reported 
that a soldier from the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders had, whilst  in Afghanistan, 
collected the fingers of dead Taliban fighters. According to General Sir Richard Dannatt 
(former CGS who retired in 2009), ‘[…] it’s quite outrageous and I’ve never heard of 
anything like it before’.139  For a man with such an intimate official and unofficial 
knowledge of the army, his remark may reflect a certain economy with the truth. More 
recently  video footage of American soldiers laughing whilst urinating on the bodies of 
dead Taliban reveals that the conflation of frenzy, obscene humour and desecration 
persists and provokes worldwide condemnation.140
 In spite of his souvenir taking, many  of McLaughlin’s peers believed that his 
bravery  should have been rewarded. Weeks considered that, ‘He’d been a tower of 
strength throughout […] He was an extremely brave man’.141  Eyles-Thomas thought, 
‘Cpl McLaughlin was simply beyond belief […] His professionalism was unrivalled 
and his bravery without constraint’.142  According to Tony Kempster, ‘On that mountain 
he was an inspiration to us all. He found his hour’.143  Dominic Gray sums up a group 
sentiment:
I read through the medals and was horrified to see some of the names there, but  I was 
utterly disgusted to see who was not, particularly Stewart  McLaughlin, my section 
corporal, who had been killed. His name wasn’t  anywhere. I couldn’t believe it. As far as 
I was concerned then, and still am now, he was robbed. They robbed a dead man of his 
rightful recognition.144
 In many ways, McLaughlin and Jones are two sides of the same coin. Although 
their recruitment into the army and eventual roles exemplify entirely different class 
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backgrounds, they share the same essential motivational characteristics. Both were 
‘intrinsically-motivated’ and ‘needs-motivated’, and both had cultivated an intense 
warrior ethos. The essential difference was that not  only did McLaughlin make a 
decisive intervention in his battle but also earned the approbation of his subordinates 
and peers. By contrast, their composure of memory surrounding Jones is much more 
nuanced. In the context of awards, it  does not require a great leap of imagination to 
understand why an award to McLaughlin would never be acceptable to the public 
collective and a deaf-ear was turned to the entreaties of his comrades. Despite the 
demands of popular culture, real-life heroes do not emerge from combat untainted, and 
a more realistic appreciation of their motivations is required. The expectation that an 
awards system would fairly  recognise outstanding combat performance was not fulfilled 
during the Falklands War, instead, and with great haste, a quota system provided a 
formulaic solution to the political imperative. The substance of effective recognition 
was abandoned on the islands.
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Part 2
3.8 Wind Down, Ceremonial, Resettlement and Resolving Trauma
 The motivational impact of formal recognition is central to the ‘after combat’ 
validation of the fighting experience. Its concomitant is reintegration, and this should be 
considered as a four-part process:
1. Wind down - covering the immediate period after the combat experience and the 
first steps of reintegration with civil society. 
2. Ceremonial - The public commemoration of battles fought and wars won 
(defeats and stalemates, such as the Korean War, are seldom celebrated).
3. Resettlement - the process by which combatants embed reintegration with the 
general public both through continued military  service and when leaving the 
armed forces.
4. Resolving Trauma - dealing with the range of emotional fallout from combat that 
sits on a continuum from stiff upper lip to full-blown PTSD. 
In each of these categories, insufficient allowance has been made for the needs of 
individuals and small groups; instead they have been submerged into the collective. The 
post combat experience is all too often a life changing one that needs to be carefully 
managed. Unfortunately, society  in general and the military  authorities in particular 
have been slow to recognise this. The British twentieth century  post-combat experience 
is a long slow march to a yet unreached destination.
3.9 Wind down
 Describing the announcement of the Armistice in 1918, Corporal Clifford Lane 
commented:
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There was no cheering, no singing. That day we had no alcohol at all. We simply 
celebrated the Armistice in silence and thankfulness that  it was all over […] We were 
drained of emotion, that's what it amounted to.145
For the majority  of combatants, throughout the twentieth century, the end of hostilities 
reflected a profound sense of relief and a massive release of tension. There was no 
immediate place for celebration or revelry. As Jary  recalled from 1945, ‘Reaction to the 
end of the war, like aggression, increased the further behind the lines one went […] We 
had learned too much to indulge in shallow demonstrations’.146  It has been a common 
feature of all Britain’s wars that those at arms length or peripheral to the actual fighting 
have been quick to celebrate; however, because they were unaware of the realities of the 
combat experience, this inhibited their ability  to develop a meaningful sense of empathy 
with those who had done the fighting. Victory was constructed as a group  endeavour in 
which there was little place for the individual; therefore, a paradox emerges in the 
manner in which the psychiatric well-being of combatants has been viewed. Ellis 
explained this by comparing, ‘the mind numbing vastness of the whole military effort’, 
with the individual ‘sense of inconsequentiality, bewilderment and helplessness’.147 
There has been a strong sense of detachment between those who have fought and those 
that have not. According to historian and Falklands veteran Hugh McManners:
Being bloodied in combat  is an initiation rite, a graduation ceremony for soldiers that  has 
no equivalent in any other walk of life. It  affects them for the rest of their days, and 
separates them from the rest of humanity.148
 At a group level, there was arguably more of a presumption that  the adverse 
effects of combat were capable of a quick-fix. A discussion of the experiences of the 
IDF following the 1973 Arab-Israeli War suggested that the American doctrine of 
forward treatment (a brief period of rest, food and rehydration) successfully resulted in 
a rapid return to combat duty.149  Whether this outcome was only effective in the short 
term and left unresolved issues for the future remains an open question. The extent to 
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which professional intervention was a necessary concomitant of the wind-down process 
remained unresolved at the time of the Falklands War. Clinical psychiatrist Jonathan 
Shay argued that, ‘What a returning soldier needs most when leaving war is not a 
mental health professional but a living community  to whom his experience matters’.150 
By contrast Jolly  stated, ‘For some reason that I have never yet seen explained 
satisfactorily, the Army did not even send a field psychiatric team down to the South 
Atlantic’.151  However, both were agreed on the power of primary  groups to develop 
their own talking cures. The agency of the primary group derived from the fact that not 
only did the combatants have a shared experience but also a shared ethos in the way that 
their emotions had been task-conditioned from their earliest days of enlistment. 
According to Jolly, ‘[experiences] loosened by the sensible use of alcohol. This was the 
best form of post-incident “counselling” that there could ever be’.152  Kiszely took his 
company to a farm on West Falkland:
We unwound, and most  nights we met for a few beers, had a sing-song, talked about  those 
who had not  made it, that sort  of thing. As a result, by the time we eventually got back to 
Britain […] we had got a lot of the battlefield out of our systems.153
 Both battalions of the Parachute Regiment that  served in the Falklands were, for 
part of their journey  home, embarked on MV Norland and conducted a wind-down in 
their own spirited manner. David Brown described how the briefing was to go home, get 
drunk and forget about it.154 For him, the wind-down was all too perfunctory and twenty 
years after the war he still suffered from unresolved PTSD.155  The catalyst for the Paras 
was Airborne Forces Day. In a masterpiece of understatement CSM  John Richens 
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described it as a sports-day  and a wind down with, ‘a few good drinks’.156 In reality, it 
was an internecine riot as the rank-and-file of 2 and 3 Para laid into each other: 
Why did the riot  start? We all agreed overwhelmingly that  the brass's small issue of beer 
on Airborne Forces Day infuriated most  of us because it  added to our frustration. We also 
agreed that the riot had resulted from a massive release of the tension caused by our 
personal experiences during the war. Our punishment was no drinking for about  two days. 
However, by this time we all had our secret supplies anyway.157
The modesty of the punishment may well reflect the expectation of the authorities that 
trouble was likely, and their sense of relief that they had not embarked the Royal 
Marines, the Paras oldest adversaries, on the same boat. For some the wind-down 
experience was enough. Bill Bentley, a medical orderly  with 2 Para left  the army 
immediately after the war and resolved his experience into memories of comradeship 
and exhilaration. He felt he left  the army on a real high and referenced lost colleagues as 
‘heroic deaths’.158 Similarly, Lou Armour stated:
Coming home was great. I was feeling pretty good along with everybody else. I felt great 
because I had the best compliment you can get if you’ve been in that situation [...]  Your 
lads turning round and telling you that they thought you were bloody good down there, 
that you’d handled the section well.159
It took several years for Armour to come to terms with his experience as evidenced by 
his emotional reaction on a television documentary. After a pause in the recording he 
haltingly commented, ‘It’s took me four years to cry about a few dead people’.160
 The downside of the wind-down process, where there is arguably a place for 
professional intervention, related to the expectations of homecoming. Myth and 
tradition and the manner in which the media manipulate them, have had a strong part to 
play  in framing these expectations. In essence, homecoming has often been placed 
within the romance quest myth. A fantasy  was often created around notions of a social 
debt owed to the victor. The problem was that families did not necessarily share this 
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fantasy  and simply expected life to resume seamlessly.161  These unrealistic expectations 
have been described by Holmes as ‘a perfection of paradise’.162  Holmes also asserted 
that although the soldiers of the Parachute Regiment were keen to get the Falklands War 
over and done with, their readjustment was ‘relatively easy’.163  Emerging evidence 
would suggest that this needs to be qualified.
 David Cooper, the Chaplain of 2 Para, described Airborne Forces Day as ‘quite a 
party’, although there is no suggestion that he joined in with all the celebrations. He had 
a qualified view on the role of professional counselling, considering it suitable for some. 
However, he did recognise that most soldiers struggled to articulate their experiences to 
family and the wider public which, in turn, led to a sense of divorce from the wider 
community. A point that Cooper did not grasp was that the role of the professional in 
these circumstances was to provide the returning serviceman with techniques and 
reference points around which a meaningful and shareable narrative may have been 
constructed. Cooper’s own sense of disjointure arose from the demands of some 
families for repatriation of the dead whom he considered had been properly buried on 
the Falklands. On arriving home, the Paras were immediately sent on a long leave of 
several weeks. Cooper thinks that this was a mistake and the battalion should have been 
kept together for longer;164  there is evidence to support this view. The Parachute 
battalions were disembarked from Norland as Ascension Island, and completed their 
journey home by aeroplane. As one combatant noted:
I looked around the arrivals lounge. Families, at first  glance appeared to be enjoying their 
reunions and tears were flowing everywhere. On closer inspection though, I noticed the 
lads seemed dazed, confused, and unable to interact comfortably with the people they had 
known for years. It all seemed so awkward and false.165
In a state of continued confusion, febrile feelings lurched between anger and guilt. 
Anger often initiated by the jingoistic attitude of, ‘did you kill any Argies?’ and guilt 
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arising not only from survival, but also the sense of a rapid assimilation of experience 
that transmuted naivety  to a grim understanding of the realities of close-combat warfare. 
Bramley described feeling like an alien and experiencing a strong sense of unreality  that 
manifested itself in anger at the sense of normality  of the general public living a normal 
and untroubled life:
What  hit me most  was that I really hated the leave at first. It  was so fucking boring. There 
was no way I could relax. If I had been asked to go and do a tour of duty in Ireland I 
would have gone. More than anything I felt  the pinch of no longer having my friends 
around me. We had been together so tightly over the last  few months that  it  was as if now 
I had severed an arm.166
Connery described the extended leave period as ‘boring and frustrating because we 
were still hyped up inside’. He explained that there was no formal debriefing procedure 
and that  essentially they were cast adrift for the leave period. Many sought solace in 
alcohol with the implicit suggestion that this tested domestic relationships. According to 
Connery, the divorce rate of Falklands veterans soared during the subsequent years.167 
Armour had a similar experience, ‘I didn’t go home for the first  few days. I didn’t like 
all the flag waving […] Strangers would come up and say something stupid like ‘did 
you kill anybody?’.168  Lieutenant Alistair Mitchell of the Scots Guards provided 
evidence that a similar attitude existed within the military:
People in the army who weren’t  in the Falklands say to me ‘It  must have been a great 
experience.’ I’m not convinced […] It’s not  the sort  of thing I’d like to go and do every 
morning before breakfast, frankly. And I didn’t enjoy it in any sense of the word at all.169
 The argument that emerges endorses the Shay/Jolly view that the best means of 
winding-down from the combat experience was to allow the combatants time to talk it 
out amongst themselves. However, the military has tended to eschew matters of the 
mind, and arguably missed a trick in the provision of psychological aftercare. A 
combination of talking cures within the primary group and a steer from an effective 
counsellor may have mitigated some of the short term issues of reintegration. What is 
evident is that the group needed to be kept together until it had a chance to properly 
wind-down and this, despite the euphemism, probably included the need for a physical 
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release through managed violence. Moran cited a naval surgeon-commander from the 
Second World War:
Into a bar in Malta walked part of the crew of a destroyer that had recently arrived from 
Norway, pushing people aside and saying ‘make way for the heroes of Narvik.’ In the bar 
were members of my ship’s company who had been bombed frequently for six weeks. 
The battle royal which followed nicely illustrated the elation and aggression of the two 
crews.170
Unrelieved aggression has consistently required an outlet. Ferguson gave the example 
of addictive violence being practiced after the Great War on Irish Republicans by the 
‘Black and Tans’ and the ‘Auxies’.171  Following the Falklands War, a Marine from 40 
Commando (who had not fought) ominously  commented on the voyage back home, 
‘God help  the IRA when we get back to Northern Ireland. We’ve got a lot of pent up 
aggression to get rid of’.172  The important point is that if combatants did not have the 
opportunity to let off steam, aggression may have been externalised, or internalised with 
the potential to fuel post-traumatic disorders. Whilst  the collective may have been keen 
to commemorate a job well done, the combatant may have been dumped into 
ceremonials with a strong personal sense of unfinished business
3.10 Ceremonial
 Commemorative rituals provide a behavioural template, facilitate grieving, assist 
in the adaption of those wounded by combat, and can act as a ‘powerful catalyst for 
change’. Yet the subject of reunion is under researched.173 Television commentators may 
reverentially  extemporise about formal ceremonies being an expression of individual 
commemoration expressed in a group environment. However, combatants who buy this 
line of flummery or expect ceremonial to be focussed on their endeavour are likely to be 
disappointed. Scratch the veneer and public commemorations are exposed as explicitly 
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political; Establishment events that work to a robust nationalist  template of 
remembrance. As Kevin Foster has argued, this template represents; glory not gore, 
heroism not destruction, noble sacrifice not the cost  of wasted life.174  The reinvented 
form of ceremonial that began during the late nineteenth century has been the major 
driving force in articulating and impelling the memory of a dominant collective, defined 
by Ashplant et al. as ‘Official Memory’. These memories are refined as carefully 
selected images and narratives from new wars that are bound to those of the past. They 
seek to create a compelling narrative that will bind citizens to the state by inviting them 
to participate in what Benedict Anderson has termed an ‘imagined community’.175  The 
sense of nostalgia that is implicit within this narrative is reinforced by a taste for 
ceremonialism. This is expressed in the anachronistic appurtenances of full-dress 
uniform, spit and polish, and well-drilled parades.176  The positive aspect of ceremonial 
that sustains motivation arises because it not only reinforces self-esteem and group 
solidarity amongst the armed forces, but also strengthens empathy with the wider 
public. However, it is also a device for dealing with the fear of insecurity, and 
encourages procrastination in matters of necessary military management and reform.177
 Cultural historian George Mosse was  explicit about what he termed the ‘Myth 
of War Experience’; the purpose of the dominant myth has been to ameliorate death 
during wartime by making it  meaningful, legitimate and sacred; in order to make ‘an 
inherently  unpalatable past acceptable, important not just for the purpose of consolation 
but above all for the justification of the nation in whose name the war had been 
fought’.178  Ultimately it persuades future generations that the ultimate price of 
citizenship, dying for your country, is acceptable.179 In the aftermath of the Great War, 
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the commemoration of war dead required a national centre around which the collective 
could coalesce. It continued the trend of invented tradition that had developed with 
‘particular assiduity’ in the decades before the war.180  The Tomb of the Unknown 
Warrior had been constructed in Westminster Abbey, which was too small for public 
commemorations. It was one reason for the construction of the Cenotaph in Whitehall. 
Another was the fear that bolshevism might gain a hold in Britain and a new public 
monument would arouse a spirit of patriotism.181 
 In 1995, official celebrations were held to celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of 
VE Day. During the planning process, official memory excised the contribution of black 
African troops in Italy  and North Africa; consequently they were not to be represented. 
After protests were voiced, they were granted a rather lacklustre and mediocre 
recognition.182  These soldiers were an example of what Winter has termed a ‘Fictive 
Kinship’, a small group whose shared memory  might  not fully integrate with the 
collective and thus be excluded.183  To gain the visibility, recognition and reward that 
these groups felt they deserved required a refashioning of the official memory, and this 
did not come easily. To shift  from the margins to the mainstream is often a protracted, 
contested, conflicted and highly political process, this is because becoming part of the 
dominant narrative might often have meant forcing change upon another more 
established kinship group.
 The RBL celebrated its ninetieth anniversary in 2011, and it fulfils a dominant 
Establishment role in the politics of commemoration. Its first President was Field 
Marshal Douglas Haig and is currently Falklands veteran John Kiszely. It is most 
associated with the annual Remembrance Day commemorations. During the mid 1970s, 
the RBL saw off proposals by the Home Office to do away with this annual festival, 
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successfully  resisting ideas to modernise it and make it more relevant.184 The RBL has 
also proven to be selective about participation in its events. The War Widows 
Association was formed in 1971 as a kinship group  campaigning for removal of the tax 
burden from the war widows’ pension.185  It was not until 1982 that the War Widows 
were permitted on the Remembrance Day parade. Other groups that have struggled for 
recognition include the Shot at Dawn Campaign that in November 2006 gained a 
posthumous pardon for soldiers of the Great War executed for military offences.186 
 As late as 2008 there was a call (as yet unheard) for a campaign medal to 
recognise the aircrew of Bomber Command who risked a 50% survival rate during the 
Second World War.187  Although there is a plaque in Westminster Abbey honouring 
Fighter Command; there is none for Bomber Command. The aircrews have been forced 
to share in what Walzer described as ‘the dishonoring of [Air Chief Marshal] Arthur 
Harris’.188  
 In July 1982, the Archbishop of Canterbury led a thanksgiving service after the 
Falklands War in which he offered up a commemoration for the Argentine dead.  British 
troops tended not to be motivated by demonisation, they fought as professionals and 
were quick to reconcile with their enemy. So, whilst Robert Runcie’s message may have 
struck a chord with the British veterans, not so with the government. According to the 
Independent newspaper:
The prime minister was said to be ‘spitting blood’ over the archbishop's ‘unpatriotic’ 
attitude in playing down the British victory and offering prayers for dead Argentinian 
soldiers.189
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Arguably the group that has struggled most for the full measure of recognition has been 
those injured in mind or body. Official remembrance has not yet found a comfortable 
manner in which to juxtapose the myth of glorious death with the all too visible 
evidence of disfigurement and injury.
 The Falklands War experience has been incorporated within the national 
repertoire of commemoration. An interesting and perhaps telling point is that many of 
the personal accounts of the war did not integrate formal public commemoration or 
invest it with a sense of closure, and some testimonies suggest why. Bill Belcher, who 
was seriously injured when co-pilot of a Scout helicopter, believed that words of 
commemoration such as ‘hero’, ‘glory’ and ‘sacrifice’ were misused.190  At the higher 
reaches of the pecking order Brig. Thompson commented that:
The homecoming was a marvellous experience in that it  showed the appreciation of the 
country to the young men for what  they had done, and I am glad it happened from that 
point  of view […] [people] were perhaps putting the wrong connotation on what had 
happened, revelling in the fact of victory for the wrong reasons, as if it  had been a 
football match, which it was certainly not.191
The bottom end of the chain of command articulated substantially the same sentiment:
It  felt  somewhat contradictory that people were cheering us as we went  to remember our 
dead but  at  the same time I cannot  deny feeling warmth and pride that people held the 
Regiment in such high regard.192
The essential point is that the formal acknowledgements of Falklands victory accorded 
with Establishment protocols, not concerned with individual or primary group 
rehabilitation but cementing the citizen to the state. In 1982, this was undertaken with a 
calculated intensity that starkly  identified the war as a Conservative and Thatcherite 
victory that marginalised alternative political representations.193  Taylor asserted that, 
‘The Falklands War was transmuted into the most important British policy event since 
Suez [and it] changed the zeitgeist in this country’.194 Two speeches made by  Margaret 
Thatcher (Appendix 5) provide compelling evidence of this. In the ‘Cheltenham’ 
Page 187 of 304
 
190 IWM 13187 - Belcher, on audiotape, [recorded 1992]
191 Bilton & Kominsky, Speaking Out, p. 230
192 Eyles-Thomas, Sod That, p. 230
193 Ashplant, Dawson & Roper, The Politics of War Memory, p. 13
194 Taylor, ‘Touched with Glory’, p. 18
speech, Thatcher projected herself as the agent of victory  and custodian of the national 
myth. Those who legitimately sought alternative political and diplomatic solutions to 
the crisis were dismissed as ‘the waverers and the faint-hearts’. Victory in war was 
explicitly conflated with economic policy and trade union leaders implicitly branded as 
the enemy. In the briefer ‘Salute to the Task Force’ speech, peremptory expressions of 
grief and sorrow were subordinated in favour of celebration and triumphalism ending 
with a Churchillian anaphoric flourish. At the heart of these speeches was the notion 
that Britain had ‘re-lived’ the Second World War, establishing it as ‘the very  essence’ of 
collective identity.195  Therefore, it might be argued that the Thatcherite revalidation of 
war as an effective instrument of foreign policy provided the political foundation for 
Britain’s subsequent ‘Desert Sands’ campaigns. 
 In September 1982, Mass Observation initiated a follow up survey (Directive 9) 
to gauge public reaction to the Falklands commemorations. The 109 respondents only 
represent a small sample; however, a subjective analysis suggests that: 33.9% expressed 
unconditional approval, ‘fitting and traditional’ [F191]; 30.3% expressed qualified 
approval or low interest, ‘People are more concerned with their own problems’ [C118]; 
and 35.8% expressed outright disapproval, ‘Staged to restore the Tory Government 
image’ [C12]. One of the more perceptive respondents noted, ‘It seems sad that  so few 
of the wounded were invited’ [A13]. Monaghan asserted that the army and the 
Establishment were embarrassed about a public display of injury, because to recognise it 
required ‘calling into question the heroic myths that make wars acceptable’.196 
Bramley’s testimony reveals that this was at odds with the experience of combatants: 
I still feel a bit  angry that  the wounded went  unnoticed. A propaganda film on the task 
force's arrival home showed only the Para and the Marines and a Navy homecoming. Can 
you remember the badly wounded coming through the gates? I think not. Nobody wants 
to see the effects of carnage.197 
Another veteran, Robert Lawrence, interpreted this as a deliberate policy, ‘All family 
and press were banned from meeting us at Brize Norton. I learned only later, because it 
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appears they  didn’t want badly injured people […] to be seen’.198  Traumatophobia (fear 
of injury) was a consistently powerful de-motivator. Stouffer et al. (1949) determined 
that it was the most significant stressor.199  In 1982, around 65% of soldiers were most 
concerned about injury.200  The perceived failures of the authorities adequately to 
support the injured (Chapter 3.11) has, through memory  composure, the power to 
modify  pre-combat motivations. Since the Falklands War, and particularly as a result of 
IED injuries incurred during the recent desert campaigns, public representation of 
combat injury has improved but remains heavily mediated. High-achieving combat 
paraplegics who run marathons, race boats and adventure to remote places are 
celebrated as heroes who can overcome adversity; however, those who do not or cannot, 
remain in the shadows.
3.11 Resettlement
 
 After the First  World War, George Coppard was, ‘Demobilised just after his 
twenty-first birthday, with four and a half years service, picking up a £28 gratuity  and 
handing in his greatcoat for the £1’.  Then he was cast adrift to find work in an over-
saturated market, ‘It  was a complete let down for thousands of men like me, and for 
some young officers too’.201  Revealing a multi-generational continuity, Falklands 
veterans were also to find themselves subject to the caprices of the market. The single 
mindedness that the Conservative government had applied to winning the war was now 
turned on the veterans. As Foster argued, ‘In the government’s adherence to the letter of 
the bureaucratic law, its grudging provision of benefits, and its steadfast refusal to 
concede moral compensation or recognition’.202  Compared with the American 
experience, it is hard to dispute this view. In 1944, the U.S. Government introduced the 
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G.I. Bill which provided a range of educational benefits and business development 
loans to returning veterans.203  The Act has been through numerous iterations since 1944 
and remains integral to the U.S. Military, recognising that generous educational support 
for its service leavers is a key incentive to join-up, particularly for those from 
disadvantaged backgrounds. 
 British Armed Forces resettlement policy  is enshrined within JSP 534.204  For 
servicemen who enlisted before September 2002 leaving the armed forces under a 
normal discharge, settlement support is only available for those with more than three 
years service. For service between three and five years, this is restricted to JFO and is 
limited to preparing a job plan with a consultant, to be used in conjunction with Job-
Centres and local ex-service welfare organisations. For those who joined after 2002, the 
JFO threshold was increased to service between four and six years. Leavers with longer 
service receive full CTP support that provides career workshops, internal and external 
training, comprehensive job profiling, support in job applications, and two years post-
discharge support. In addition, GRT of between twenty and thirty-five days can be 
dedicated to resettlement activity. On the face of it, CTP and GRT resettlement 
provision appears adequate rather than generous until one considers that the average 
length of service for a combat infantryman is only  five and a half years, so most leavers 
do not get it. This raises a problem of motivation because the purpose of resettlement 
support is to build up intrinsic motivators that can be applied to civilian life, and to 
provide the leaver with a focussed sense of purpose about how their military skills can 
be applied to a new career. Because service life is highly organised, many leavers are 
cast adrift without anyone to tell them what to do or how to do it. Consequently, many 
fail to adapt effectively.
 There is a serious problem around the number of ex-servicemen who are in 
prison. Within the last few years, a survey by the National Association of Probation 
Officers estimated that up to 8,500 ex-servicemen (most of whom are ex-army infantry) 
are in prison out  of a total prison population of around 92,000. The findings were 
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disputed by the Ministry of Justice and the MoD, whilst the Howard League of Penal 
Reform thought that the figure was between 3% and 8% of the total prison population, 
which made it the largest incarcerated occupational group. The sad truth is that no one 
knows an accurate number or has a gauge of the underlying causes. PTSD, Depression, 
alcoholism, and return to a combination of poverty  and dysfunctional family life have 
all been put forward as reasons.205  Therefore, the question arises as to what has the 
MoD done to ensure that resettlement provisions are adequate and appropriate.
 In 2008, the House of Commons Public Accounts Committee reported on a 
number of key weaknesses.206 Amongst their key recommendations were:
1. Additional support should be targeted at early service leavers as the MoD was 
perceived by  the Committee to offer resettlement support as a reward for long 
service to leavers, many of whom did not really need it.
2. Because resettlement support was weak and poorly monitored for early service 
leavers, the MoD needed to introduce improved quality  assurance measures 
including feedback from leavers.
3. COs have not made it easy for service leavers to obtain resettlement support 
because of operational pressures. The MoD needs to require COs to give 
resettlement its necessary priority and attention.
4. The MoD needs to identify why the take up of, and satisfaction with, CTP is 
lower amongst junior ranks than with officers.  
5. Because unemployment is higher amongst early  service leavers, the MoD needs 
to grasp  the full extent of the problem and provide more support to those likely 
to be effected.
6. Some leavers have housing problems, and the MoD should work with local 
authorities to ensure adequate provision.
7. The MoD has done little to advertise its provision of mental health support to 
veterans and needs to improve its screening of leavers for potential risks. 
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These were overt criticisms and were framed around addressing problems that the MoD 
has allowed to become entrenched for many years. Injured Falklands veterans have been 
amongst the most vituperative and trenchant in their observations of the MoD. Robert 
Lawrence’s father, a retired RAF Wing Commander with an insight into the 
machinations of the MoD commented, ‘I just could not believe my eyes. He was being 
discharged […] with no guarantee of a pension […] without even a release medical to 
confirm he was fit  enough for discharge’.207  Jim Mitchell was also a Scots Guardsman 
injured on Mount Tumbledown; unlike Lawrence, he reflected positively on the help the 
regiment has tried to give him. He stayed in the army for four and a half years after 
being injured, but in a very taciturn interview from 1992, advised that he could no 
longer hold down a job as his medical condition was becoming progressively worse. He 
expressed bitterness at being reduced to a number and thrown on the scrapheap by the 
MoD. It tainted his view of official commemoration as he felt that only Second World 
War veterans could associate with Remembrance Day. With an awful lot of pushing 
from his interlocutor, he summarised his Falklands experience as, ‘whole life fucked up 
on Tumbledown’.208 The advice from the vilified Scots Guardsman Philip Williams was 
‘Don’t come back injured. You won’t fit the system if you do. They  don’t want injured 
heroes. They simply don’t  know what to do with them’.209  Jerry Phillips of the 
Parachute Regiment endorsed regimental loyalty  and support but accused the MoD of 
incompetence and parsimony, commenting that he received no advice whatsoever about 
his entitlements, and it  took him nearly six years to work out how to claim for his war 
disability. As payments were only  made from the date of claim and not the date of 
discharge, he calculated that the MoD has denied him £32,000, ‘All I get is the cold 
shoulder and letters full of bullshit and regulations. The government did fuck all to help 
me and the rest of us’.210 
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 In 1997, Denzil Connick, formerly  of the Parachute Regiment, co-founded 
SAMA 82 with Rick Jolly, the Senior Medical Officer of 3 Command Brigade. Connick 
believed that Lt. Col. Hew Pike was highly supportive of his injured soldiers despite the 
intransigence of the rest of the Army. He recalled being interviewed by  a well-meaning 
army officer who was neither qualified nor experienced to offer any  support for 
Connick’s problems (paraplegic with PTSD). It was not until 1994 that he discovered 
that he was entitled to a pension supplement because no one had told him, ‘The 
Government doesn’t  tell you and doesn’t seem to bloody care’.211  No doubt Connick’s 
experiences were a key motivator to set up  SAMA 82 as a welfare organisation, ‘[…] 
and ensure that due consideration is given to the interests of all Falkland veterans’.212 It 
currently has over 1,000 members, for many of whom PTSD is an enduring challenge. 
In 1997, John Ellis aphoristically commented, ‘The army still has no adequate 
counselling procedures for disturbed Falklands veterans […] it is yet to devise a decent 
army boot’.213  In recent years, the footwear has improved, but the unravelling story of 
the impact of combat on the mind has yet to reach a meaningful conclusion.
3.12 Resolving Trauma
 Kellett argued that, ‘Combat motivation can be profoundly affected by 
casualties, both to the soldier himself, or to his comrades or unit’.214  However, one 
certainty that emerges from a study of the stress reactions of combat is that it  has been 
massively under-researched both from historical and medical perspectives. Because 
campaigners have effectively politicised the issue, new areas of research are beginning 
to emerge. Although PTSD was formally recognised within the medical canon in 1980, 
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215  it  took the MoD until 2003, as ‘part of its duty of care’, to commission a study  into 
the psychological welfare of the UK armed forces. Under the aegis of Professors Simon 
Wessely  and Christopher Dandeker from KCL, this three-phase study  of over 20,000 
service and ex-service personnel is due to complete in 2013. Currently the MoD is keen 
to report a low incidence of probable PTSD that is not out of kilter with that found in 
the general population.216  Whether or not this is a panglossian jumping of the gun 
remains to be seen, because at present, no one really knows. Reaction to stress is clearly 
a key factor in combat motivation. However, as a major research project is clearly 
desirable, it  is outside the scope of this thesis to provide anything other than a context 
for how intrinsic and extrinsic motivations have been shaped by the experience of, and 
attitudes towards, stress reactions to combat. Evidently, such reactions are immediate 
and/or long-term, whilst attitudes towards such stress sit on a continuum.  This ranges 
from the enduring attitude that stress is either a failure of character, an excuse for 
malingering or the manifestation of a compensation culture; to the view that 
substantially  all combatants suffer some form of stress reaction, albeit  that the majority 
never report their symptoms, are never properly diagnosed, and develop  their own 
coping mechanisms. Past performance suggests that developing a robust hypothesis will 
not be easy because the obstacles to be overcome include: a military culture wedded to 
notions of character and leadership, a mistrust of psychologists, official parsimony and 
concern about compensation claims, and personal constructions of masculinity abjuring 
symptoms of mental fragility.
 The polarised arguments that, on one hand blamed susceptibility  to shell-shock 
on a deficiency of character, and on the other, a natural reaction to intolerable 
circumstances, were aired during the Lord Southborough’s special enquiry, convened in 
April 1920, to investigate the issue. It  was evident that many  witnesses brought with 
them jaundiced views concerning the fecklessness of the lower classes as well as 
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stereotypical prejudices against Jews and Irishmen.217  Charles Wilson (Lord Moran) 
was also an influential witness.  He concluded that, ‘The man who felt no fear […] was 
hardly  to be found in that war, at any rate amongst officers’.218  It led him to the 
conclusion:
Courage is will-power, whereof no man has an unlimited stock: and when in war it  is 
used up, he is finished. A man’s courage is his capital and he is always spending. The call 
on the bank may be only the daily drain of the front line or it  may be a sudden draft  which 
threatens to close the account.219
 
There was a general view amongst the committee that shell-shock could affect any type 
of individual. Nonetheless, the notion that all men were vulnerable to shell-shock had its 
opponents. Some doctors simply dismissed shell-shock as cowardice; whilst Lord Gort 
220  asserted that, because shell-shock was never found in first class units its occurrence 
was almost entirely a failure of morale that, ‘must be looked upon as a form of disgrace 
to the soldier’.221 His prescription was that discipline and drill would solve the problem 
provided that officers were trained to master soldiers in the same manner as they 
mastered horses.222  
 The conclusions of Southborough were predictable in that they advocated better 
selection and training, and determined that shell-shock should not be an official term 
(mental illness would be regarded as any other somatic condition unconnected with 
battle). What the committee failed to do was grasp  the essence of the problem. It ducked 
the issue of causation and left the challenge of compensating the injured, whilst 
penalising the malingerers, unresolved. It is a position that remains entrenched within 
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military culture; protect the injured man who had earned his spurs, but reject the man 
who has not earned any compassion.223 
 At the start of the Second World War, many of the lessons and much of the 
experience gained during the First World War, had been incorporated within civilian 
society.224  However, in the British army there were only six regular officers within the 
medical corps with any degree of psychiatric training.225  This suggests that the military 
mind strongly averred towards Gort’s analysis. Mental breakdown would be prevented 
by the right sort  of selection, training and leadership. This was the view the RAF took 
about their aircrews; their initial approach was draconian until experience revealed the 
opposite. The term ‘Lack of Moral Fibre’ was introduced as an attempt deliberately  to 
stigmatise those who temporarily refused to fly. It did not distinguish between 
exhausted ‘battle hardened’ warriors and terrified recruits with its ultimate sanction of 
loss of rank, dismissal from the RAF, and transfer to the army. It is no surprise that the 
highest traumatic casualties were from Bomber Command who underwent sustained 
periods of passive endurance.226  In their study of aircrews, Grinker and Spiegel 
concluded that anyone exposed to combat for a sustained period could develop a war 
neurosis:
Fear is cumulative, because the longer the individual stays in battle, the more remote 
appears his chance of coming out alive or uninjured. At one time in one overseas Air 
Force it  was a mathematical certainty that  only a few men out  of each squadron would 
finish a tour of duty.  The threat is inescapable and ubiquitous.227
Despite the accumulating evidence, the mistrust of mental health professionals within 
the armed forces was endorsed at the highest level. In December 1942, Winston 
Churchill wrote of psychiatrists:
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I am sure it  would be sensible to restrict as much as possible the work of these gentlemen, 
who are capable of doing an immense amount of harm with what may very easily 
degenerate into charlatanry.228
Therefore, it  is not surprising that, during the Second World War, the role of the 
professional was significantly circumscribed. The military psychiatrist was in effect 
partially counsellor, but primarily  policeman, and this reflected the balance between the 
use of persuasion and the use of force needed to get soldiers back into fighting ways.229 
Part of the persuasion was predicated upon imputing mental collapse as a feminine 
characteristic.230  The treatment handed down by officers was often also less than 
sympathetic, some men were not treated as battle fatigue casualties but were instead 
charged under the Army  Act and treated little differently  from deserters.231  It was only 
in the light of the experience of gruelling and sustained fighting that a link was drawn 
between battle casualties and psychiatric casualties, and empirical evidence to support 
Moran’s concept of an expendable bank of courage began to emerge. American studies 
concluded that substantially all soldiers would break down between 200 and 240 days 
into a sustained period of combat. British research suggested 400 days.232   Gillespie 
recognised that ubiquity was not an appropriate measure of combat suitability:
The fundamental truth remains that  in a fighting force the elimination of the unsuitable 
man - and he is more often unsuitable for temperamental reasons than by intellectual 
defect - at the earliest possible stage is all important.233 
 The impact of the Vietnam War was to play a pivotal role in the understanding 
and politicisation of PTSD. One conclusion was that once soldiers had been in a 
frenzied state (Chapter 2.5) they were changed for life and were likely  to suffer lifelong 
psychological injury.234  What the Vietnam experience did not achieve (in Britain at 
least) was a bridging of the gap between traumatised combatants and the military 
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authorities. If anything the politics of PTSD have hardened traditional attitudes towards 
‘character’ amongst conservatives within the military establishment. It was asserted by 
Ashplant et al. that:  
Social groups suffering injustice, injury or trauma that  originates in war have become 
increasingly prepared to demand public recognition of their experience, testimony and 
current status as ‘victims’ or ‘survivors’.235
The stereotype of the Vietnam veteran was exploited by opponents of the war who 
conflated the image of the traumatised veteran with notions of an unjust war. It was not 
just the Vietnamese who were victims of war, so were the rank-and-file soldiery.  As 
veterans' groups began to embrace the idea that they  were victims with rights, there was 
a curious inversion of primary group theory in that veteran soldiers created stronger 
political bonds with their fellow ‘vets’ than they ever had with their comrades whilst 
fighting.236  Harari argued that the soldier-victim has become a political cliché, one 
manifestation of which was that some veterans’ associations produced surveys claiming, 
‘[…] that between 25 and fully 100 percent of Vietnam veterans most of whom never 
saw combat, suffer from PTSD’.237  If there is a causal link between combat trauma and 
fighting ‘unjust’ wars then it  has yet properly to be identified. The challenge that many 
pressure groups faced occurred when they disingenuously attempted to gain leverage 
from events in pursuance of their political objectives, was that the ‘victims’ they 
purported to support were often discredited or marginalised. This has particularly been 
the case with PTSD. McManners expressed his contempt at the caucus, he asserted 
existed within the military, that believed heightening awareness about the psychological 
impact of combat had produced a ‘generation of weaklings who would sue for PTSD as 
an excuse not to continue doing their duty’.238 
 Applying the experience of combat trauma to the Falklands War, Lt. Col. Bob 
Leitch of the RAMC maintained a study of Falklands veterans and concluded:
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Everyone is affected to some extent  by what happens to them in wars; and those who 
claim otherwise are either kidding themselves, or suffering from some unnatural and 
possibly psychopathic lack of human emotion.239
What becomes evident from personal accounts of this conflict is the sense of bifurcation 
that arose from testimony of officers compared with that  of the rank-and-file. Within the 
officers’ mess of 2 Para, Moran’s observations relating to the ‘bank of courage’ were 
understood because Cooper, Crosland, and Chaundler have all referenced him,240  but 
arguably in a narrow and short-term sense. Chaundler provided a more fulsome insight 
when he expressed the belief that courage was readily replenished once away from 
battle. He also considered that the whole issue of PTSD was overrated and rather 
quizzically  questioned how lasting the effects of combat stress were. In his formulation, 
counselling was often unnecessary, he had never had it  or needed it. Whilst 
acknowledging there might be certain exceptions, such as the Welsh Guards’ experience 
arising from the Galahad incident, he believed that the people who suffer from PTSD 
mostly  came from unsettled backgrounds, and were in essence hypochondriacs who 
claimed the symptoms by dint of PTSD being a recognised syndrome. With masterful 
military meiosis he commented that PTSD is all ‘slightly  over done’. Neame bluntly 
affirmed this view, believing the need for counselling was all nonsense. Under his 
command ‘one bloke went a bit  funny’, but he believed this was part of an attempt to 
get money out of the South Atlantic Fund. Otherwise, because the battalion was 
successful, unlike the Welsh Guards, the effects of combat stress were assuaged. He 
claimed that only  three people in the battalion could not come to terms with the 
fighting; the Second in Command, the Padre, and the Doctor. Rather unfairly, given that 
they  all made decisive interventions, he accused them of being ‘one step  away from 
mud, blood and gore’.241  It suggests that the sense of denial derived from Gort’s view 
that elite units did not suffer from combat stress. It also strikes at the heart of the 
leadership ideal; a good officer will prioritise the welfare of his subordinates, so a 
failure to prevent PTSD will be viewed as a failure of leadership. It can also be argued 
that, officers particularly, have a career-limiting interest  in matters of perceived 
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emotional weakness. Bramley opined that attempting to discuss emotional problems 
with superior officers would be likely to have elicited a, ‘pull yourself together 
response’, in the expectation that a character assessment would be made on such soldier 
as, ‘what a wanker - no further promotion’.242
 Freed from the constraints of military hegemony, the Falklands experiences of 
ordinary  soldiers have provided some idea of what combat trauma is. For Lukowiak, it 
was the deep sense of shame he later felt because, on thinking he had been injured, his 
first thought was it would get him out of battle onto a hospital ship.243  Eyles-Thomas 
believed that vivid nightmares are stereotypical of post combat experience insofar as, 
‘they  take over your life and you become a slave to them’.244  Bramley believed it was 
impossible to articulate the intensity of feelings, particularly how the death of two of his 
pals had become ingrained as a whole-life experience.245  Graham Tolson was a career 
soldier and served for twenty-one years. His testimony encapsulated these 
experiences.246 He recounted how the image of a soldier terribly injured by  artillery fire 
was, ‘etched in my mind for years’, and how the injury to his friend Brian Milne247 left 
him with a profound sense of shame and cowardice because, in his mind, he did not do 
enough to help. After the war, Tolson professed not to have known about PTSD, it was 
not discussed in the army, and it would have been construed as a weakness. His solution 
was to suppress his emotions and work obsessively to blot out his memories. Many 
years later an injury denied him the safety blanket of work and with an advanced sense 
of paranoia he described getting drunk at a function for officers and Senior NCOs, and 
taking out his frustrations on an officer. Prevented by a colleague from launching a 
physical assault, he nonetheless felt he had brought his career to a dishonourable 
conclusion. Actively contemplating suicide, for the first time he discussed his problems 
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with a friend who set him on a long and challenging journey of professional 
counselling. At the end of this process, Tolson had feelings of pride and bravery, not of 
cowardice and shame, and had a much more balanced sense of memory and loss.
 As Jones and Wessely  pointed out, there was a tendency, particularly within elite 
units, to downplay the existence of battle trauma. The first medical reports following the 
Battle of Goose Green in 1982 suggested that 2 Para had none at all.248  To get some 
objective sense it is necessary to enter the contested field of ‘lies, damned lies and 
statistics’, where battles still rage. As late as 2003, Holmes was asserting that traumatic 
casualties were ‘uncommon’ after the Falklands and this evidence derived from a report 
made in September 2003 to the World Congress of Psychiatry. This stated that, amongst 
the British forces, only 3.6% suffered from a mental illness and 1.5% from a combat 
reaction.249  To provide a context, during the Second World War, psychiatric casualties 
amongst allied troops ranged between 8% and 54%, peaking at 20% for the British 
troops enduring the summer fighting in Normandy  in 1944.250  It has been estimated 
(once the political froth is discounted) that up to 15.2% of Vietnam veterans suffered 
from PTSD.251  Uncovering a semblance of truth concerning trauma casualties of the 
Falklands War remains a work in progress. Not least because, as Weston put it, there 
was no psychological provision when the troops came home, ‘it  is as if the powers at the 
Ministry of Defence simply shut their eyes to the problem […] not until 1993 did the 
MoD start to take it seriously’.252  Each of the services adopted their own approach to 
PTSD, and ‘[…] very little […] psychiatric material was ever reported on formally, or 
analysed professionally after 1982’.253
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 Five years after the war, Captain Steven Hughes (former MO of 2 Para) and Lt. 
Col. Stephen O’Brien conducted a widely  cited254  unofficial survey into symptoms of 
PTSD amongst serving Falklands veterans of 2 and 3 Para, using 1 Para as a control 
group.255  50% of the veterans described suffering some degree of PTSD whilst 22% 
suffered the full syndrome; only  28% had no symptoms at all. There was no relationship 
between age, rank, length of service or life events. Of all the veterans surveyed, most 
had friends killed or wounded and over 85% thought they had probably or definitely 
killed others. Most of the survey group complained about being inappropriately  treated 
as heroes on their return home, leading O’Brien and Hughes to consider that the 
inability to relate to the celebratory mood of the general public interfered with the 
manner in which the veterans were able to assimilate their experiences. The figures are 
disputed, as are the assertions that more Falklands veterans have committed suicide than 
the 255 who were killed in action.256  That PTSD has become a political hot potato is 
evidenced by the group action brought by over 2,000 British Veterans257  against the 
MoD.  Weston wrote that their complaint was not about psychological injury but the 
failure of the MoD to provide the necessary care. In 2003, the court determined that  the 
MoD was not under an obligation to identify PTSD victims: 
It  was up to the sufferers […] To put  themselves forward for treatment, when the whole 
macho culture of the military was screaming at them to keep quiet. In documents 
presented to the court, one general went so far as to suggest that  people suffering from 
psychological illness were a bunch of wets, completely lacking in moral fibre.258
If nothing else it demonstrates that despite all the experience gained throughout the 
twentieth century, in some quarters, military culture has proven impervious to change.  
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 3.13 Summary
 An effective rewards system remains culturally desirable and motivationally  
important, both for civilians and the armed forces, not just for gallantry but also for 
outstanding public service. However, the awards provision following the Falklands War 
was not fit for purpose. It continued a tradition rooted in status and hierarchy. This bias 
is revealed by an analysis of VCs awarded during the Second World War and the 
persistence of a quota system to prevent ‘honours inflation’. Although rewards were 
extrinsically applied, their real power was as an intrinsic affirmation of performance 
above and beyond the call of duty. Task motivated combatants required a form of 
recognition as a self-validator that acted fairly because they reacted strongly when the 
system appeared to fail. There was political advantage to be gained from an alignment 
with heroism; it created a bond between the state and the public. After the Falklands 
War, it can be argued that the Authorities took the easy  public relations option when 
they  accepted the media myth of heroic apotheosis manufactured around Lt. Col. Jones. 
The counterpoint was the response of the Authorities to those injured and traumatised, 
many of whom found that the substantive recognition they needed was in short supply.
 Political adroitness is also revealed by the rapidity  of the Falklands awards 
process, and the sanitised public commemoration as explicitly Conservative, with 
Margaret Thatcher as the agent of victory. For individual servicemen, an effective 
closure to combat was in many instances a need unfulfilled. In the aftermath of the war, 
the armed forces rapidly reverted to business as usual. The inadequacy of resettlement 
provision has been revealed, as has the failure adequately  to support the psychological 
welfare of combatants. Although sixty years separate the Southborough Report and the 
Falklands War, studies into the impact of PTSD remain a work in progress, not least 
because of the reluctance in some quarters to recognise the challenge it presents.
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Chapter 4 - Morale
 The term ‘morale’ lacks a robust definition and is thus ‘loosely used’,1  but it 
refers to the personal factors that have influenced combat motivation.  However, such 
factors are not of themselves determinative of motivation. The possible exception to this 
argument applies to existentialist warriors. The examples of McLaughlin and Jones 
(Chapter 3.7) and Garrison (Chapter 2.4) suggest that they defined themselves through 
combat. However, in Chapter 2.4 it was argued that the majority of combatants were not 
natural warriors. Therefore, it  can be argued that in addition to the processes outlined in 
earlier chapters, other factors have been at work. The seminal nineteenth century 
theorist Clausewitz stated:
So long as a unit fights cheerfully, with spirit and élan, great  strength of will is rarely 
needed; but  once conditions become difficult, as they must when much is at stake, 
things no longer run like a well-oiled machine.2
Morale can be construed as ‘spirit and élan’, whilst motivation keeps the machine 
working efficiently. The terms ‘morale’ and ‘motivation’ are often conflated and 
expressed in group terms, but it is a key  argument that they should be considered as 
‘substantially  different concepts’ that bear upon the individual combatant. According to 
Kellett, ‘Motivation is, in essence, the “why” of behaviour, comprising the influences 
shaping a person's course of action’.3  By contrast, morale is the spirit with which 
motivation may be sustained. For this reason, it  is no mere sophistry to analyse at an 
elemental level what these factors have been. Because each individual combatant will 
have compounded morale factors in different ways throughout the motivational cycle, it 
is my argument that they  should be separately identified. By contextualising morale 
research around the Falklands War it has been possible to identify a strong sense of 
continuity throughout the twentieth century. 
 An alignment of motivation and morale in support of group objectives has been 
the most powerful impetus towards the desired outcome. Discipline may have been used 
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to coerce task completion when such tasks opposed personal sensibilities. However, 
combatants may have had sufficiently high morale and social coherence to act in 
opposition to organisational goals. Therefore, it is possible to have had high morale 
combined with a low motivation to combat and vice versa. Morale and motivation 
clearly  overlapped but responded to different forces. As has been discussed in the earlier 
chapters, motivation has been predicated upon a cycle; however, it is the argument of 
this chapter that morale has been driven by a hierarchy of needs that demand a distinct 
analysis. It is evident from a review of the historiography that morale, as a distinct from 
motivation, is an under-researched area. As the military historian J.G. Fuller noted:  
The whole area of morale is pregnant with interest, but  historians have been 
handicapped by the limitations of the available sources […] they all have their 
shortcomings for the subject. There is relatively little in the great  corpus of official 
papers which bears directly on morale.4
Richardson typically  elided morale with motivation. He correctly identified the 
relevance of individual mental and physical factors but mixed them with ideological and 
primary group influences which were more properly  matters of motivation.5  Marshall, 
the military sociologist, came close to a definition:
Morale is the thinking of the army. It is the whole complex body of an army's thought; 
the way that it feels about the soil and about  the people from which it  springs. The way 
that it feels about their cause and their politics as compared with other causes and other 
politics. The way that  it  feels about  its friends and allies, as well as its enemies. About 
its commanders and goldbricks. About food and shelter. Duty and leisure. Payday and 
sex. Militarism and Civilianism. Freedom and slavery. Work and want. Weapons and 
comradeship. Bunk fatigue and drill. Discipline and disorder. Life and death. God and 
the devil.6
Although he reflected upon the extent to which needs and wants were satisfied, he did 
not untangle the fact that morale was often necessarily viewed in group terms, whereas 
needs and wants were essentially  individual. Marshall also lumped ‘needs’ together 
without recognising that they were building blocks, meaning that higher needs could 
only be satisfied once lower needs had been met. Field Marshal Slim seemed to 
recognise this, ‘[…] for a man, especially  an intelligent man […] his morale must have 
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certain foundations […] These foundations are, I think, First Spiritual, then Mental, and 
lastly Material’.7  In Slim’s construction, morale contained an implicit hierarchy that 
demands explicit analysis. 
 A consequence of morale often being perceived in group  terms meant there was 
a tendency to reduce it to the lowest common denominators. As one soldier commented 
in 1941, in response to a War Office edict that troops be lectured on the political 
motivations for war, ‘the average soldier appeared to have only three basic interests: 
football, beer and crumpet’.8  However, there is a historical dimension to an effective 
definition. As Baynes has asserted, social developments during the twentieth century 
have meant that soldiers have become more sophisticated, better educated and more 
used to comfort than their forebears. Consequently, greater effort has needed to be taken 
in matters of morale.9  Therefore, it is noteworthy from research, that during the first 
Gulf War:
Soldiers reported that  the major contributors to their personal morale were mail; 
showers; tents; rest  areas; hot food; cold drinks; being able to live as squads, crews or 
platoons in self-improved areas; entertainment; and some free time.10
The Falklands experience suggests that morale needs have proved to be consistent, what 
has changed according to time and context has been the relationship  between higher and 
lower morale needs, and the manner in which they have been expressed and satisfied. 
Because morale often reflected the exigencies of particular circumstances, the nature of 
combat has been to suppress higher intellectual needs. Professor Jesse Gray  reflected on 
his own military experience:
The majority of my fellows seemed content  with the satisfaction of their natural urges - 
eating, drinking, and lusting for women. Interests and refinements that  transcended 
these primitive needs, and that  I had built  up over the years, were rapidly falling away, 
and I felt that I was becoming simply one of the others.11
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 What Gray  revealed is that he, like Slim, recognised tiers of morale factors that 
lent themselves to a ‘Hierarchy of Needs’. Therefore, the purpose of this chapter is to 
define combat morale by  developing such a model, which ranges from basic sustenance 
through to higher intellectual demands for self-expression and creativity. The Hierarchy 
of Needs as a series of building blocks was first conceptualised in 1943 by Abraham 
Maslow. Maslow’s theory remains the foundation of the ‘humanistic’ approach to 
morale which seeks explicit links between morale/satisfaction and organisational 
performance.12  These links can be applied to understanding combat morale within the 
historical context of the Falklands War. The needs hierarchy is illustrated within the 
analytical model in Appendix 1. The essence of The Maslovian pyramid is that each tier 
represents a deficiency need that must  be met before the individual can move up a step 
at a time, finally  reaching the top level where the individual has eliminated needs 
deficiencies and is ‘self-actualised’ to explore the limits of their own potential. As each 
step is critical to the foundation, a deficiency will cause the individual to regress and 
(eventually) rebuild. If individuals are thwarted in attempts to step  up  a tier, then they 
may place overemphasis on the characteristics of the level at which they are trapped. It 
should also be noted that some research suggested a class bias to notions of needs: 
managerial/professional groups tended towards esteem and self-actualisation, skilled 
occupational groups towards esteem and belonging, whilst the semi and unskilled have 
been oriented towards belonging and the physiological.13  This means that morale 
requirements may emphasise the difference in status between commanders, junior 
officers and the rank-and-file. The analysis that follows will be to draw upon evidence 
from the twentieth century to reveal the continuity  experienced during the Falklands 
War. 
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4.1 Self-Actualisation
 
 This enables the individual free rein to establish a personal identity. Aesthetic 
values and self-concepts can be expressed, and these move beyond self-interest.14  It 
captures the essence of the needs-motivated soldier, and it is arguably not  surprising that 
such individuals, convinced of the rightness of their position, have struggled for 
purchase within a conservative and hierarchical culture where a challenge against 
conformity has often been unwelcome, and survival dependent on high-level 
sponsorship. Conceptually they  have been rare beasts and the twentieth century throws 
up comparatively  few examples. The five following exemplars are not an exhaustive list 
but reveal something of the nature of self-actualisation. They all applied a keen and 
creative intellect to effective task completion, were not deflected by a lack of moral 
courage, and were the antithesis of achievement-motivated conformity.15  It is 
noteworthy  that only one was a military  careerist. T.E. Lawrence emerged as an 
unorthodox soldier during the First World War. Although our modern understandings are 
shaped by the romanticised film Lawrence of Arabia (1962), in his lifetime his 
biographer commented, ‘I have attempted a critical study  of ‘Lawrence’ - the popular 
verdict that he is the most remarkable living Englishman, though I rather dislike such 
verdicts, I am inclined to accept’.16  During the Second World War Lt. David Stirling 
usurped the chain of command to form the SAS,17 and the controversial Maj. Gen. Orde 
Wingate, a career soldier, who has been described as an exceptional and unconventional 
genius,18  put his jungle penetration theories into practice by forming the “Chindits’. In 
1939, only two men volunteered for the army as privates and ended the war as 
brigadiers. Fitzroy Maclean, allegedly Ian Fleming’s model for James Bond, enjoyed a 
long career as a diplomat, politician and prolific author. During the war, he earned his 
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spurs as an envoy for Churchill fighting with Tito and his partisans. His obituary 
recalled:
Maclean's unorthodox methods, his refusal to go through channels […] infuriated 
Special Operations Executive, who felt that  he was meddling in areas that  were 
properly theirs. Friendly critics dubbed Maclean ‘the Balkan Brigadier’, ‘the Scarlet 
Pimpernel’ and even […] ‘Lothario in a kilt’.19
The other was the controversial politician Enoch Powell, who enjoyed the double 
distinction of having been the youngest professor in the British Empire (aged 25)20 and, 
for a short while, the youngest Brigadier in the army (aged 30). Although denied a 
combat role, Powell excelled at intelligence work and, whilst  posted in India, immersed 
himself in Indian culture, passing interpreter examinations in Urdu and Hindustani. 
Powell captured the quintessence of self-actualisation within a military culture, ‘The 
outward trappings of conformity […] are a helpful vehicle towards unique self-
expression […] Provided that you conform, you can think anything’.21  
 Evidence from the rank-and-file is harder to come by, and where it fleetingly 
emerges, it  has tended to manifest  as opposition to organisational goals. In the Great 
War, the growth of a ‘trench counter-culture’ was observed in which British and German 
troops attenuated hostilities in favour of their own needs.22  Cincinnatus revealed that 
during the 1960s, ‘There were GIs in Vietnam with the legend UUUU chalked on their 
helmets: “The unwilling, led by the unqualified, doing the unnecessary for the 
ungrateful”’.23  They used every opportunity  to undermine the war-effort. There is no 
inference of a subversive counter-culture during the Falklands War, instead the evidence 
suggests that any  opposition to formal command structures was shaped around effective 
task completion.
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 Jones and McLaughlin were exemplars of self-actualisation amongst the 
Falklands forces. Otherwise, Brig. Thompson had a fractious relationship with London, 
particularly about the politically-motivated directive to attack Goose Green. Despite his 
manifest concerns about resources for the battle, he was forced into compliance.24 There 
was an assertion that a counter-culture emerged in ‘B’ Company of 3 Para although, 
arguably with the exception of Stewart McLaughlin, this seems to have been more 
based upon mimicry than self expression.25  It is in the aftermath of the war that some 
Falklands veterans found a voice when released from military  service.  Along with those 
who wrote compellingly of their experiences, it can be argued that veterans such as 
Jolly, Connick and Weston have created instrumental saliences for their former 
comrades; those who stayed in the forces have remained constrained. In a taped 
interview, Brig. Mike Scot (Scots Guards) can be heard being instructed by  an unknown 
source, ‘don’t answer that’,26  which is not only evidence of morale suppression but also 
a caution as to the veracity  of such primary sources. Looking to the future, in the post-
modern world it has been argued by Moskos that the desire for ‘meaningful personal 
experience’ will become an increasingly  important aspect of voluntary  military service, 
possibly replacing more conventional motivations.27  It is an interesting hypothesis that 
awaits a quantum of evidence from recent conflicts.
4.2 Esteem
 Self-esteem aligns comfortably with a high degree of intrinsic motivation. It is 
built  around a sense of professional competence measured by success, achievement, 
influence, and the exercise of control. A military  context provides a highly supportive 
environment, not only  because military culture is hierarchical, but also because it 
provides a robust framework against  which achievement-motivated individuals can self-
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evaluate.28  Group loyalties and the regimental tradition have been powerful 
motivational forces; however, self-esteem inculcated a sense of elitism and superiority 
that may have elided into rivalry, impaired effective communication, and threatened 
hubris. It has been the fatal flaw embedded within British service culture which means 
that to win a shooting war it has first been necessary to call a cease-fire to the 
internecine personal and political battles being fought for resources and influence.29  As 
Sir John Nott30 put it, ‘The history of the Ministry  of Defence […] is the history of the 
war between the RAF and the Navy’.31 The Army has not been able to compete on equal 
terms because the regimental system meant it has been forever divided by its cap badge 
loyalties.32 
 The Falklands War was fought under the command of Admiral Sir John 
Fieldhouse, who controlled three strategic units: a naval battle group commanded by 
Rear-Admiral ‘Sandy’ Woodward and responsible for operations at sea; an amphibious 
group commanded by Commodore Michael Clapp, responsible for ship to shore 
logistics; and a land forces group, initially  commanded by Brig. Thompson and later by 
Maj.Gen. Jeremy Moore.33  Issues of personality constructed around relative authority 
and esteem soon arose. These were to infect  the relationship  between the strategic 
leaders and constrain their subordinates. According to Captain Jeremy Larkin of HMS 
Fearless: 
I already knew Admiral Woodward […] and realised it  was going to be very difficult 
building a relationship between him and Brigadier Thompson [a pattern was set] that 
was to continue to create difficulties throughout the campaign.34
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According to Captain Hugh Balfour of HMS Exeter, Woodward could not be persuaded 
to leave his aircraft carrier to be briefed on issues the land forces faced.35  BBC 
Correspondent Robert Fox noted the antipathy  between Woodward and ‘H’ Jones and 
observed that ‘inter-service rivalries have real point’.36  Clapp described a pre-invasion 
meeting in which Woodward attempted to dominate him and Thompson by  making 
wildly  inappropriate recommendations that embarrassed his naval colleagues and 
infuriated the other staff members present,37  ‘Trust was broken and it would take a long 
time to repair’.38  There was the suspicion that Brig. Wilson was ‘headline-grabbing’,39 
and ‘[…] one not averse to playing cap-badge politics to ensure that his Brigade was 
first into Stanley’.40  Considering his relationship  with top-level command, Maj. Gen. 
Moore ironically commented:
I admired my commander in chief's restraint. Despite having a secure voice link he 
never attempted to talk to me personally. Once he rang me to explain the likely political 
outcome of a proposal, and I phoned him with some bad news.41
At the grass roots, rivalry  was laid bare of gentlemanly  pretensions. According to Linda 
Kitson, the official Falklands war artist:
The rivalry between all the units and regiments horrified me. I had to listen to so much 
malicious stuff. I know a certain amount  of this is necessary, but it had the effect 
throughout the campaign, of mucking up each other’s operations, when units tried to 
maximise the glory for themselves, often knowing it would be at  the expense of other 
units.42
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The Parachute Regiment referred to every other regiment as ‘crap  hats’ and regarded 
being placed under the command of such soldiers as a humiliation.43As one junior 
soldier commented:
 If it  was a choice between a British Para giving his last  cigarette to a wounded British 
crap hat or a wounded Argentinean paratrooper who’s just killed half of his mates, you 
can bet he would favour the Argie.44
The Paras reserved special opprobrium for the Royal Marines; according to one junior 
soldier, ‘We had hated each other for years and the rivalry was very apparent’.45 
Journalists noted that a policy of keeping the Para and Marines separate and mutually 
antagonistic ‘was fostered lovingly by officers of both’.46  Ten years after the war Brig. 
Pike commented:
Add […] the close comradeship which tough and demanding training breeds in men, 
and […] the keen rivalry between marine, parachute and Guards battalions, and the 
result is a formidable collective will to win.47
This sustained a comfortable illusion that all the forces that went to the Falklands were 
working harmoniously  together with rivalry no more than an exposition of the 
Corinthian spirit. A case-study analysis of the events leading to the sinking of the Sir 
Galahad at Fitzroy on 8 June 1982 demonstrates how a reality encompassing hubristic 
notions of self-regard, superiority and antipathy, ended in nemesis. 
 Following the Battle of Goose Green, land forces were augmented by the arrival 
of 5 Infantry Brigade under the command of Brig. Tony Wilson. Following the sinking 
of the SS Atlantic Conveyor, the Task Force lost all but one of its heavy-lift Chinook 
helicopters, and it was not until 4 June that a second was brought into use.48  One 
consequence led to a defining memory of the Falklands War as the Paras and Marines of 
3 Commando Brigade foot-slogged their way to battle across the north of East Falkland. 
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Wilson’s brigade, which now incorporated 2 Para, were to pursue the southern overland 
route to Port Stanley via Fitzroy.49  Expedient use of the civilian telephone established 
that the Argentinians had not garrisoned Fitzroy, and armed with this knowledge Wilson 
improvised a coup de main.50  He commandeered the only Chinook, which had been 
tasked with moving prisoners and stores between San Carlos and Darwin.51  Van der 
Bijl provided a context, ‘Hijackings [are] part of the “can do, must do” culture on which 
the military thrives’.52  Necessity  may indeed be the mother of invention, but its 
illegitimate sibling is chaos. Wilson failed to inform 3 Commando Brigade of his 
actions. Packed with 84 paratroopers, out of its operating area and in daylight, it  was 
assumed that the helicopter was Argentinian.53  Lt.-Col. Vaux listened to a radio 
conversation:
Initially our gunner regimental HQ accepted this as an artillery target  [...Their urgent 
cancellation came after they had checked with Divisional Headquarters. But only a few 
seconds before the misunderstanding became a tragedy.54
On 6 June, a Gazelle helicopter was not  so lucky. Again Wilson’s brigade failed to 
inform Divisional Headquarters of a flight carrying its Signals Officer, believing it  had 
‘the autonomous right to fly  helicopters in its own area’. Unfortunately, no one told the 
Captain of HMS Cardiff who shot it down, killing the four occupants. To compound the 
mistake the incident was deliberately covered up by the MoD, who only  reluctantly 
revealed the truth in 1986. 55  Surgeon-Commander Rick Jolly admitted:
I should have stood up in the Coroner's Court  right there and then in protest  at such a 
falsehood, but  by then I had been […] made aware (in a number of subtle ways) that I 
was not exactly ‘flavour of the month’ with my professional heads of Branch up in 
London […] I remained silent, to my eternal regret.56
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The MoD claimed they dissimulated to protect the families. Given that the families had 
to go to the House of Lords to get the coroner’s verdict changed it rather suggests the 
family interests were less important to the MoD than maintaining the esteem of military 
competence.
 5 Brigade needed to move the Guards battalions to join the Paras at Fitzroy. The 
rapid transition of the Guards from public duties to Falklands deployment meant they 
were unprepared as effective fighting units. The CO of the Welsh Guards, Lt. Col. 
Rickett, lobbied hard to get his battalion selected, 57  and it should be noted that Jones 
did the same thing for 2 Para.58 It is a moot point whether the Queen’s Own Highlanders 
(equipped and trained for winter warfare)59  or the Royal Anglian Regiment, who 
replaced 2 Para on their Belize deployment, would have performed as well or better, but 
there remains the suspicion that Jones and Rickett  were better able to exploit their 
‘elite’ status to get chosen. As van der Bijl asserted, ‘It still remains to be explained why 
combat-ready units […] were not selected’.60 In terms of preparedness and choosing his 
words carefully, Moore acknowledged that the men of 3 Commando Brigade were 
harder and fitter,61whilst Spicer of the Scots Guards was more to the point, ‘The 
battalion was completely  unprepared for going to war’.62 Van der Bijl noted in his diary 
for 2 June:
The guardsmen seemed confused, unfit  and anxious […] no one seemed to be in charge 
and I wondered, again, at the logic of despatching ill-prepared troops to a combat zone. 
Wilson rejected as ‘nonsense’ the controversy surrounding the deployment of the 
Guards, commenting that:
You’ll always get  this kind of cap badge rivalry and people who reckon they can do 
things that  other people can’t do.  All I can say is that in the army everyone takes the 
same battle test standards and has to pass them.63  
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However, events were to expose the difference between theory and practice. Tasked to 
move the fourteen miles from San Carlos to Darwin, Rickett overestimated the 
capabilities of his battalion because after twelve hours they had to give up  their forced 
march and return to San Carlos. In Rickett’s words: 
It  had been my idea to move under our own steam self-contained, now it  was the turn 
of somebody else to give us the support we required to get us forward.64
The obvious comparison is with the Paras and Marines, who quite clearly  did manage to 
reach their objectives; it should also be noted that the Gurkhas marched to Darwin 
without problem. The failure of the Welsh Guards to complete even a ‘modest “yomp”’, 
‘aroused exasperation, even contempt, among 3 Commando Brigade’.65
 A plan was developed to move the Guards regiments over two nights (6 - 8 June) 
using the LPDs HMS Intrepid and HMS Fearless to get them within range of Bluff 
Cove and Fitzroy, where they  would be transferred to LCUs to complete the landings. 
The LPD’s had been classified as strategic assets not to be risked in daylight, and these 
instructions were taken to heart by Captain Dingemans of HMS Intrepid. He unloaded 
the Scots Guards (under the aegis of Major Ewen Southby-Tailyour) into LCUs well 
short of the planned transfer point, with the result that the guardsman undertook a seven 
hour journey whilst packed into open boats and in foul weather. The RMO of the Scots 
Guards described it  as the worst night of his life,66  a fact no doubt compounded by 
being star-shelled by  HMS Cardiff. It  would appear that on the toss of a coin, Captain 
Harris of HMS Cardiff this time decided to check out his targets before attacking them 
and having done so left them to the elements.67  Clapp asserted that he fully briefed 
Admiral Woodward,68  and Southby-Tailyour was trenchant in his criticism not only of 
Woodward for the communication failure, but also of Dingemans, ‘My final words to 
the Captain were, “I think the whole fucking thing stinks and what’s more sir, I want 
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you to remember this, if we don’t make it”’.69  He believed Dingemans ‘behaved 
timidly’ in his ‘disgraceful’ treatment of the 600 Scots Guardsmen.70  When the Scots 
Guards eventually landed they  were, according to David Cooper, ‘wet, miserable and 
unhappy and looked like a defeated army’.71 
 The next night the Welsh Guards were to be shipped in HMS Fearless. 
Unfortunately, the LCUs that had been kept at  Fitzroy  from the previous night did not 
make the rendezvous; consequently, some of the Welsh Guards were transferred to RFA 
Sir Galahad. It transpired that Keeble of 2 Para had commandeered the transports. 
Under strict orders, the Marine NCO’s had at first resisted the ‘hijack’, but when Keeble 
threatened them with his pistol they were forced to yield. Maj. Gen. John Frost 
defended his old regiment, praising Keeble’s style of ‘bluff and rhetoric’;72  but for 
Southby-Tailyour it was a ‘despicable performance’.73  Equally  despicable was the 
performance of some of the Welsh Guards aboard HMS Fearless, who chose to 
vandalise and rob the kit lockers of the sailors who had vacated their mess-decks to 
make the soldiers’ journey more comfortable. It caused Moore to wonder whose side 
they  were on.74  With Sir Galahad moored at Fitzroy in daylight, the private soldiers 
were running a book on how long it would take to be bombed.75  Had they realised that 
Woodward had at this critical time moved the aircraft carrier HMS Hermes eastwards 
for routine boiler cleaning, and thus restricted the amount of air cover,76 the odds would 
probably  have shortened. Whilst Southby-Tailyour was responsible for unloading Sir 
Galahad, and his priorities were to get men and ammunition off rapidly, he faced two 
insuperable problems. The first  of these was another ‘hijack’, this time by Lt. Col. 
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Roberts of the Field Ambulance, who pulled rank to offload his vehicles.77 The second, 
and most  significant, was the refusal of the senior Welsh Guards officer (Maj. Guy 
‘Gunner’ Sayle) to disembark. Not only did Sayle argue that his troops were supposed 
to be taken to Bluff Cove and not Fitzroy, but also that men and ammunition should not 
be transported on the same vehicle. According to Southby-Tailyour: 
I could have got those men off in twenty minutes, no question of that whatsoever and 
anybody with any professional sense would have taken the advice of the on-the-spot 
expert, regardless of rank. But unfortunately, I was not  wearing the rank of a 
Lieutenant-Colonel who, as far as I can make out, was the only man he was prepared to 
listen to.78
 The Argentine air attack left fifty-one dead,79 and yet it was a tragedy that could 
have been avoided with better planning, less arrogance, improved communication, and a 
sense of self-regard that  embraced the needs of others. In his diary for 8 June 1982, van 
der Bijl provided his summary of the negative concomitants to self-esteem:
Why had 5th Infantry Brigade not learned the lesson [of getting men ashore quickly]? 
Was it perhaps a desire not to be left  out of the action or perhaps the fear that 3rd 
Commando Brigade would win the non-existent race to Stanley? Men had died 
needlessly.80
Subsequently, 5 Infantry  Brigade was reorganised and Wilson, in an apparent denial of a 
lack of competence, opined that  Moore was playing politics and favouring Thompson. 
According to Wilson:
I think we started to suffer to some extent from what appeared to be a cap-badge 
rivalry, when it seemed that most of the resources were being allocated to the other 
brigade.  And therefore [we had been] cast in the role of the Cinderella of the 
Falklands.81
Esteem has to be earned and its value comes from being hard won. In the event, Wilson 
was denied a ticket to the Falklands’ awards ball, being the only senior commander not 
to receive an honour. He left the military shortly  after the campaign. The notion of 
esteem feeds into the bigger picture of combat motivation, specifically the regimental 
tradition and the distinctions between command and leadership. By linking esteem with 
the facets of leadership  set out in Chapter 2.3, it  may be asserted that Thompson was 
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able to combine clarity  of command strategy with charismatic leadership. The 
consequence was that his brigade operated as a cohesive task group notwithstanding the 
antipathies between the Paras and the Marines. By contrast, the evidence suggests that 
Wilson was a command careerist whose improvised approach failed to rein in the 
limited capabilities of his brigade.
4.3 Belonging
 Conditional belonging is fundamental to military  culture. The power of being 
accepted within a group, and the intensity  of peer group pressure means that the 
individual can overcome deficiencies in the lower orders of safety and physiological 
needs, even if group  participation imposes additional risks and dysfunctionalities (i.e 
bullying and/or abuse). This section will investigate two aspects of maintaining 
belonging within the military group: Firstly, how humour not only acts as a bonding 
agent as a shared means of communication, but also draws the sting of fear and loss; 
secondly, how social and task groups are augmented and challenged by family life.
 According to Baynes, ‘The impression of men with good morale is one of good 
cheer’. This does not  resolve into a permanent state of humour, but suggests that 
occasional outbursts of ‘devilment’ and misbehaviour should be viewed positively.82  It 
is a truism to assert that military  humour is often earthy and robust, and whilst 
sometimes lacking the sophistication of ‘Cambridge Footlights’, it  is nonetheless 
grounded in Edwardian cultural traits of ridicule and irony. According to J. G. Fuller, 
British humour possessed, ‘the war-winning quality’.83  Evidence of continuity is 
suggested because this brand of humour asserted itself in 1982. According to one 
officer, ‘Humour and black humour is endemic, without it life can become very 
tedious’.84  Such tedium can be deconstructed into four parts: a response to the 
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functioning of military  life, as an antidote to fear, endurance of appalling circumstances, 
and the vicarious pleasure of discomforting rivals and superiors.
 The expression ‘hurry up and wait’ describes the military propensity for constant 
activity whilst occasionally lacking a robust plan. A similar sense is derived from the 
acronym SNAFU. Frustration caused by constantly changing and contradictory  orders 
that result in much wasted effort, can only be reflected through humour. Describing the 
run up to Operation Market Garden in 1944 Major Ian Toler commented:
Order and counter-order and the consequent disorder were the order of the day. We 
spent the whole of one day loading and unloading our gliders - when the order changed 
for the sixth time that  day, we just sat back and laughed. It was a good job we had a 
sense of humour.85
 Many from a non-military background will be able to empathise with humour as 
a response to organisational inefficiency. However, few outside the uniformed services 
will have experienced it as an antidote to fear. As one Falklands veteran noted: 
 The constant humour never ceased to make me laugh […] It  was almost certainly a 
way of masking fear, fear of death itself, or at least the unknown. When I look back 
now I can only remember waiting with shattering fear, but  also the humour that 
overcame it.86
Richens commented on how the ‘very sick sense of humour’ within the Parachute 
Regiment was used to deal with problems and injuries, but even this was tested as they 
watched HMS Ardent and HMS Antelope sinking with people still on board.87 
Following the death of colleagues, despite being angry and emotional, soldiers would 
still use humour as ‘a pressure release valve’. Another junior soldier suggested ‘It’s a 
British thing, we’re good at taking the piss out  of ourselves, and squaddies are better 
than most’.88 In an adrenalin-fuelled state, humour can seem to the objective viewer as 
inappropriate, grotesque and bizarre. During the assault  on Goose Green, whilst under 
artillery fire, Ely  described how seeing a sheep being blown up invoked much laughter 
about ovine flying:
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I will never forget  that most  of us turned around and started shouting, ‘Run away! Run 
away!’ in the tones of the Monty Python team. I was pissing myself laughing - damn 
good film, Monty Python and the Holy Grail.89
 
 In his seminal survey, Stouffer concluded that  humour enabled the combatant to 
endure the unavoidable, and ‘achieve a kind of distance from their threatening 
experiences’.90  Humour, according to Lord Moran, that used ridicule was a ‘working 
philosophy’.91  This was borne out by Watson who asserted that mockery  enabled 
combatants to formulate a more positive reinterpretation of the environment.92 Because 
it has been easier to control fear when the enemy was reduced to a caricature, the use of 
pejorative or patronising nicknames to describe them has enjoyed a long tradition. The 
two world wars produced a rich crop of soubriquets to describe the Germans, whilst 
during the Falklands war the enemy was generally referred to as Argie, Dago or Spic. 
The tradition has continued into the Desert Sands era with Islamic opponents referred to 
(with royal endorsement) as Ragheads93 or Terry Taliban.94  Besides the immediate risk 
of death and injury, soldiers had to find a means of coping with the visceral detritus of 
combat. During the First  World War, Corporal Clifford Lane explained how humour 
inured him to dealing with distended corpses, ‘Every time we trod on him his tongue 
would come out, which caused great amusement among our people’.95  A similarly 
grotesque experience was observed by Lt. Bates at the end of the Falklands War:  
 I noticed a group of soldiers who […] were standing around a corpse. They were 
smoking cigarettes and joking as the dead man was being offered one as well. They 
claimed that  to justify smoking the dead man’s cigarettes they had to offer him one as 
well.96
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Whilst civilian sensibilities may be ruffled at these apparent denials of dignity, one 
interpretation that partially justifies such behaviour is that by reducing the dead to a 
cipher, humour has consistently become a bastion against emotional breakdown.
 Given the importance of hierarchy and group loyalties within the military, it  was 
inevitable that the opportunity for banter with bite would be exploited at every 
opportunity. A number of Paras recalled an example during the return from the 
Falklands, that combined both. On board Norland, they  were assembled to be 
congratulated by Thompson, who rather misjudged the mood by  alluding to a cessation 
of antipathy between them and the Marines:
 ‘Fuck off, hat,’ came one shout from the back of the red berets standing bunched 
together. 
The abrupt insult only stalled the commander for a few seconds, then he shrugged it  off 
with a broad grin.
‘As I was saying, the red and green have always hated each other and its nice …’.
‘We still fucking hate the wankers too!’ came the next shout.
All the officers were looking into the huge crowd of Paras, trying to find the culprits. 
All the Paras were laughing loudly.
‘Well it  seems you still have the humour you’re famous for. It’s great  to see that you 
will be home first and …’
‘Yeah flying home through the back fucking door,’ came the last shout.97
Unsurprisingly, Thompson did not recall this event in his book No Picnic (1985), but 
would recognise that military  humour emerged as a special language that expressed 
social cohesion, bonded small groups around a task identity, and acted as an antidote to 
fear. Cohesive groups have been described as surrogate families;98  therefore, it  is 
relevant to explore how they fit with ‘real’ families.
 According to Professor Samuel Hynes, ‘For everyone except career soldiers, 
military service is a kind of exile from one’s own real life, a dislocation of the familiar 
that the mind preserves as life in another world’.99  It will be recalled that the average 
period of army service is under eight years (less in the infantry). For many, a family  life 
has embodied a sense of retaining this other world and, whilst  it may have challenged 
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the orthodoxy  of tradition and the parsimony of defence budgets, enabling married 
soldiers to maintain a fulfilling home life has been a contributor to combat 
effectiveness, made increasingly relevant by changing social expectations. During the 
Second World War, a study by Ginzberg et al. discovered that men with broken 
marriages were twice as likely to be poor soldiers, and soldiers with intact marriages 
were twice as likely  to recover from battle fatigue.100 A study in 1973 of the IDF, found 
that soldiers ‘[…] who had stable personal and family lives were less likely than other 
soldiers to suffer combat-related psychiatric breakdown’.101 The military has had to face 
this rise in social expectations of its potential recruits. This has been driven by recruits 
from the traditional areas of disadvantage, who have moved away from a ‘work based 
culture’ to one that is centred around the comforts of home life and consumerism.102 
Maintaining a family  potentially placed the combat soldier in a dilemma of belonging 
which resolved into two important aspects: firstly, it is necessary to consider the 
tensions between the military  establishment and the soldier who wanted to maintain a 
family in comfortable and secure accommodation; secondly, the importance of 
communication between combatants and their families during extended periods of 
absence.  
 The late 1960s marked the period when military personnel policy began to shift 
its social outlook from one of separation towards civilian integration. Much of this was 
driven by  servicemen who ‘welcomed the “civilianisation” of their social lives’.103 
Therefore, such changes were more a matter of necessity than altruism. Increasingly the 
desire of service wives to have a stable platform from which they could take ownership 
of their home life and careers has caused many talented servicemen to leave the armed 
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forces.104  The bifurcation between the military and domestic families has thus been 
regarded as a necessary irritation because of its potential threat to operational efficiency 
and its undermining of traditional extrinsic motivators. Beevor pointed out that the 
military has sought to ‘[…] draw in and subject the families under its charge to its 
authoritarian structures and disciplinary regime’.105  A substantial body of opinion 
amongst senior officers wishing to prohibit the marriage of young soldiers has 
remained, ‘The delusion that soldiers’ lives and aspirations could be determined by 
imperial ukase has been extraordinarily  persistent’.106  A particular area of stress 
concerned the quality of SFA.  Official policy  is currently  set out in JSP 464107  which 
states that service personnel are to be provided with ‘satisfactory’ accommodation. 
However, no definition of ‘satisfactory’ is provided and policy  does not recognise 
quality as a basis for rejection. There are five classes of accommodation for officers and 
three for other ranks, ranging from five bedrooms and 251 square metres at the top, to 2 
Bedrooms and 85.5 square metres at  the bottom. It is impossible to discount economics 
from the provision of accommodation. An unmarried private soldier living in barracks 
might be expected to share a room with three others, clearly  this is inherently  cheaper 
than providing him, if married, with a two-bed flat. The pressure on defence budgets is 
perhaps a reason why so much accommodation is sub-standard.108 Beevor asserted that, 
whilst those at the top have tended not to take housing complaints too seriously, ‘the 
cumulative effect on those who have to live in the unmodernised variety can be deeply 
demoralising’.109  A Falklands veteran, brought up in a mining village in the Rhondda 
Valley, recalled his first housing allocation:
As we reached the married quarters, grey, bleak and run-down [his wife] looked out  of 
the window and said, ‘Oh, look at those horrible flats over there. Who lives in them, 
poor things?’
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‘You and me, love,’ I said and she burst into tears.110
 The requirement for servicemen to spend extended periods away from home has 
been a consistent cause of stress. Ashplant et al. concluded that during the First World 
War, ‘One of the most corrosive anxieties afflicting soldiers […] was their sense that 
women at  home were not fully committed to their cause’.111  During the Second World 
War, this was articulated in a suspicion of infidelity. The Army Morale Report for May-
July 1942 commented that:
A worry which is constantly sapping the morale of a great part  of the Army is due to 
the suspicion, very frequently justified, of fickleness on the part of wives and ‘girls’.112
If suspicion became reality, and soldiers were ‘bluntly  informed […] that they were no 
longer wanted’ by their partners, the effect  was to raise levels of combat anxiety with 
the risk of breakdown.113  By the time of the First Gulf War, it  was perceived amongst 
the forces that young and recently  married soldiers were most at risk. According to 
research, ‘Rumours of widespread marital breakup and perceptions of increased 
incidence of “Dear John” letters had negative effects on morale’.114  For most of the 
twentieth century, post was the only means of family communication, even in the era of 
global telecommunications phoning home from a combat zone is beset with problems. 
Maintaining an efficient postal service that delivered good news remained important for 
sustaining morale. 115 However, one Falklands veteran noted that bad news was a 
morale-breaker:  
 You would often see someone standing in the corridors [of Canberra] moaning that 
he’d had a ‘Dear John’, or some other bad news. For the majority of us, though, the 
mail was just the boost we needed.116
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 The Army developed an efficient mass-mail service during the First World War, 
when it seldom took more than four days to deliver a letter to the Western Front, and has 
maintained a high standard ever since. This was not only a recognition of the 
importance of family contact, but  also a subtle means of sustaining morale by 
impressing upon the individual combatant the organisational efficiency of the Armed 
Forces.117  Reflecting on his role running the postal service during the Falklands War, 
Maj. Ian Winfield observed, ‘The attitude of the troops when there is no mail is quite 
astonishing’. Quite literally the messenger was vituperatively blamed, often by 
experienced soldiers, despite the inevitable problems of delivery. ‘They go off muttering 
and grumbling and they’re just the same if mail comes in and individually they don’t get 
any’.118  The reason for this was that correspondence from home was the only means by 
which a combatant  retained some semblance of a private identity.  McManners provided 
an interesting reflection on the military  family, ‘Soldiers who didn’t receive any mail 
would often be given letters by their mates to read - usually with the “sports page” 
omitted!’.119  Another veteran recalled:
I didn’t  get  a single letter from my parents in all the time I was away. At the time, I 
didn’t give it  a second thought, but in later years I’ve realised it’s actually quite sad. 
Knowing someone is at  home, who loves and cares about  you, helps you to get through 
things.120
The downside of contact with home was the possible displacement effect. In combat, 
the soldier has been conditioned to rely  on the primary group  for physical and emotional 
needs, but a regular contact with home, particularly on short missions, meant that group 
commitment was often conditional.121  Because combatants were powerless to provide 
patriarchal support and resolve domestic problems, they became anxious, potentially to 
the point of obsession.122 A Falklands Parachute officer recalled that he:
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Dreaded the arrival of mail because it  reminded him that there he had another persona: 
in addition to being merely a cog in a military machine and of little individual value, he 
was also a husband and a father whose death would have devastating consequences.123
 Humour and the post combined as a morale booster. Hundreds of women took to 
writing to members of the Task Force in search of pen-friends. Many enclosed pictures 
and these were enthusiastically and ribaldly assessed for pulchritude and sexual 
potential.124  However, in many  respects the relationship  between the surrogate military 
family and home life were irreconcilable. Robust black humour may have acted as a 
combat protection, but was not something easily  shared with spouses and children, by 
post or otherwise. That many combatants were unable to find the language to express 
their combat experience to their families, arguably  combined with the domestic pressure 
of poor quality housing, is reflected in the post Falklands divorce rate.125
4.4 Safety
 As was discussed in Chapter 3.10, ‘threats to life and limb’ emerged as one of 
the key needs deficiencies that those engaged in combat have had to resolve.126  Three 
categories emerged from twentieth century combat experience as integral to meeting 
safety  needs and are well referenced within Falklands testimony: physical, the provision 
of medical support in case of serious injury; spiritual, embracing religion and/or 
superstition specifically as a defence mechanism; functional, the ability to rely on 
equipment to perform as required. The evidence suggests that each of these was linked, 
so that a deficiency in one was not compensated by a superfluity of another. 
 Part of the unwritten military covenant is that those injured in battle will receive 
the best  medical support that circumstances permit. The fear of crippling injury, 
particularly for experienced soldiers, far outweighed the fear of failure or even death.127 
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During the Falklands War Keeble considered, ‘a very  efficient  and worthwhile casualty 
care system’ as the ‘principal thing’ to sustain morale.128  McManners took this a step 
further in his construction of medical provision as a precondition of combat; soldiers 
would only fight if they believed that when wounded they would be cared for, even if 
expectations and reality did not coincide.129  Before the twentieth century, battlefield 
health care was rudimentary, and even minor injuries could result in infection and death. 
It was during the Great War that the term ‘blighty wound’ entered the unofficial military 
lexicon. Typically, Corporal Tansley of the York & Lancaster Regiment recalled an 
experienced old sergeant expressing the desire to receive a non-vital injury on going 
over the top: 
And he got his wish. He went over just in front  of me, and he got  one through the knee. 
He was down right  away. Clean, it  was clean out. If it was a Blighty - that  was lovely! 
130
Whilst the desire to avoid a traumatic injury or death was explicit, there was also the 
implicit expectation that  the medical logistics were sufficiently advanced to ensure that 
the injured party would enjoy a relatively trouble free repatriation and recovery. Whilst 
no evidence emerges that soldiers in the Falklands War sought out ‘blighty wounds’, 
traumatophobia was a constant source of stress. As Keeble recalled:
No, I was not scared of dying. What  I was scared of was being physically maimed and 
returning from this conflict as a vegetable. I did not  want  to return to my family […] 
unable to fulfil that responsibility.131
It was not only the fear of being reduced to a state of vegetative dependency which 
eroded morale but  also the fear of emasculation. As Holmes observed, genital damage, 
‘continues to rate highly  amongst the most feared wounds’.132  During the Battle of 
Goose Green:
The lads watched open-mouthed as Brum pulled his trousers down in the middle of the 
battlefield and started examining his wedding tackle. It  looked like the poor bastard had 
had his balls shot off.133
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He hadn’t, but other soldiers did receive serious injuries and the problems of the 
medical logistics would surely have mitigated any possible desire to suffer a ‘blighty’. 
Falklands medical care resolved into a three-phase process: immediate treatment by the 
medical team at a RAP; transfer to the improvised Accident & Emergency centre at 
Ajax Bay; finally, transport to SS Uganda, a schools-cruise ship  that had been converted 
to a floating hospital. Although Jolly  has been able to assert that every wounded 
serviceman that made it to Ajax Bay  survived, it was a claim that flattered to deceive. 
The loss of helicopter transport not only  compelled the land forces to march to their 
objectives but also prevented the effective evacuation of injured soldiers, many of 
whom had to wait many hours or even days to be moved. Even then the resources at 
Ajax Bay were limited.134 Following the Galahad incident:
It  was simply heartbreaking to turn nearly ninety young men away from the Accident  & 
Emergency Department door that they had paid so much to reach, but there was no 
other way.135
  
Jolly unofficially had to call for naval helicopter volunteers to evacuate these soldiers to 
the Uganda as every official request was refused, ‘[…] no helos available today, but 
maybe tomorrow?’.136  This may be another example of the unforeseen consequences of 
the ‘hijacking’ culture, but it also resonates with a sense of denial and avoidance 
relating to the broader issue of injury that followed the disaster. The Brigade 
Commander and the Assistant Director of Medical Services failed to visit Ajax Bay as 
did any officers from the Welsh Guards. Jolly recalled, ‘I began to wonder whether the 
Galahad incident was such bad news that nobody  wanted to know about any  subsequent 
problems related to it’.137  It  has been speculated that the freezing conditions in the 
Falklands, in some instances, induced an injury  stasis, but the opposite is perhaps more 
plausible; delayed evacuation, combined with extreme cold and wet, led to the death of 
the ‘marginal cases’ before they could be treated.138 
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 Spiritual faith may have acted as a carapace, and the military  have consistently 
excelled at religious ceremonial; however, it may be argued that the substance of 
spiritual observance is more nuanced. The next stage of this section is to investigate the 
extent to which combatants sought out supernatural reassurance. As Falklands veteran 
Lt.Col Peter Bates’ revealed: 
All my study and interviews have led me to conclude that  it  is quite clear that a soldier 
needs to be totally prepared in every way for all phases of war. Therefore Religion and 
Spirituality do have a definite place on the modern battlefield. There is a requirement 
for soldiers to be in a position or environment where spiritual support is readily 
available.139
Bates moved beyond the notion of religious faith as a protective carapace and believed 
that the essence of spirituality  was ethical integrity. Although some soldiers possessed 
this ‘ingredient’, the role of the military chaplain was vital because his authoritative 
presence reinforced, ‘overtly and covertly’, the need for integrity.140  Successful padres 
preached a muscular military  Christianity. During the Great War, Geoffrey Studdert-
Kennedy MC assumed almost mythical status by  combining his generosity with 
cigarettes whilst proselytising the bayonet.141 Cast from a similar mould, David Cooper 
was 2 Para’s padre during the Falklands. He remains a frequently referenced 
commentator, and one of the few outspoken advocates for ‘H’ Jones. Along with his 
pastoral duties, he was an expert shot who trained the battalion snipers. Although 
recommended for a MC in the strongest terms by both Thompson and Moore, he fell 
foul of the quota system and had to make do with a MiD. In interview, Cooper 
commented on the noticeable trend, whilst sailing south on Norland, for attendance at 
his services to increase. He pointed out that most soldiers would not ‘publicly express 
their fears’. These were not so much of death, but of serious injury and the 
consequences for their families.142  This was not a false perception because Bates’ 
survey of Army Chaplains revealed that the demand for spiritual contact increased by 
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300% during wartime, accounting for over 75% of all soldiers.143  Speaking from the 
ranks, Falklands veteran Tony  McNally  admitted to not being particularly  religious, but 
attended a church service as ‘a case of hedging my bets’. He recalled being surprised at 
some of the attendees at the service but that his sense of feeling protected and ‘being on 
the good side in a crusade against evil’ was largely mutual.144  During the final church 
service before landing on the Falklands, ‘God was playing to a full house’.145  Military 
religion was not overly pious and certainly not ‘high church’. An example from the 
Falklands that combines this sense of robustness with humour and faith, occurred 
during the Easter Service on board Sir Percivale:
There were a lot  of people standing by enjoying the sunshine. One of the sergeants-
major bellowed across to them, ‘Come and get  your fucking souls cleansed’ which got 
us off to a good start.146
In the moments leading up to the Battle of Mount Longdon, CSM John Weeks 
remembered honestly  describing to his soldiers the risks that they were all about to 
encounter, and the outcome they could expect. He encouraged them all to say a prayer 
and is convinced from his subsequent  conversations that most of them did, ‘After the 
battle I sincerely believe that there is someone who listens to us’.147
 There are different layers of spirituality and faith in the supernatural extends 
beyond formal religion. Its concomitant is superstition that often manifested in the 
possession of lucky charms. Some combatants developed a fatalistic outlook that  their 
future existence was not subject to the caprices of warfare but was either predetermined 
or subject to the agency of a supernal power.  A talisman with the apparent power to 
bring good luck often became a vital appurtenance. Whilst faith in such charms may 
appear harmless and have been the subject of humorous banter, at a ‘psychodynamic’ 
level they may  have served to undermine cohesion by displacing faith in the primary 
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group.148  The protective power of the amulet  has shown remarkable consistency 
throughout twentieth century  warfare. During the Great War, all soldiers and officers 
who served in the trenches possessed one.149  During the Second World War, journalist 
and author John Steinbeck observed:
The practice is by no means limited to the ignorant or superstitious men. It would seem 
that in times of great  danger and emotional tumult a man has to reach outside himself 
for help and comfort, and has to have some supra-personal symbol to hold to. It can be 
anything at all, an old umbrella handle or a religious symbol, but he has to have it.150
A similar observation is made of the Falklands War and the perceived power, ‘[…] of 
amulets and ritualistic patterns of behaviour’.151 Such rituals may have been individual 
or collective in nature.152  Anxiety displaced objectivity amongst  even the most rational 
of people and left a space that superstition and preordination could fill. Steve Hughes, 
the MO of 2 Para, recalled a powerful premonition, ‘I had this sense of impending doom 
and became convinced that I was going to die on my birthday. It seemed logical that I 
should die on that date’.153 Similarly Lukowiak, who has built a post-Falklands career as 
an author and war journalist, constructed the memory of the ghost of his aunt appearing 
on the Goose Green battlefield and beckoning him away  from incoming shellfire. ‘One 
day I shall thank Aunt Letty. It is one of the few certainties I have’.154  Whilst  it  may be 
argued that an existentialist warrior such as Jones or McLaughlin was entirely self-
confident whilst in combat, for the vast majority anxiety, and therefore morale, had to 
be managed by faith. This meant faith in the primary group, religion, pre-destiny and 
luck, or uneasy permutations of all three. The alternative was to leave the combatant as 
a fatalistic outcast where death seemed inevitable, and the future had no meaning.
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 Along with souvenirs and medals, any piece of military equipment could become 
a talisman but of more significance was its functional utility. In 1981, an IDF survey 
cited ‘trust in one’s weapons’ as a key component of personal morale.155 This extended 
to other items of essential personal equipment. Strachan concluded that training was the 
‘qualitative edge’ that resulted in victory  in the Falklands. He premised this argument on 
the basis of the relative number of combatants and the comparability of equipment with 
the Argentine forces.156  However, the evidence suggests that in many respects the 
quality of the British equipment was not of a comparable standard; therefore, other 
aspects of motivation and morale had to compensate. According to Spicer, ‘We were 
very badly equipped to go into that sort of environment and I think it was only the 
determination and training of the soldiers that got people through it’.157  In interview, 
Moore acknowledged that certain items of Argentine equipment were better, but he 
rather dismissed the acquisition of such equipment by  British troops as a magpie 
characteristic rather than one of necessity.158  Whilst souvenir-hunting was undoubtedly 
popular, a strong body of opinion asserted that the parsimony of the MoD made the 
liberation of Argentine equipment a functional necessity. Few of the Royal Marines 
carried steel helmets and yet these were a vital protection against shelling. 
Consequently, some were taken from Argentine corpses, whilst others were, ‘in the 
ruthless pragmatism of frontline logic’, illegally liberated from prisoners.159 
Deficiencies in the specification of equipment ranged from the high-tech to the 
mundane. According to Stewart MacFarlane of HMS Coventry, at the time HMS 
Sheffield was attacked (and sunk) she was making a satellite transmission, and this 
meant that the electronic warfare sensors used to detect Exocet  missiles were switched 
off, ‘An MoD “money-saving” measure meant that a set of filters was never installed so 
ships could do both at the same time’.160  Michael Nicholson, the ITN correspondent, 
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noted that one survivor from HMS Sheffield died because his polyester clothing had 
melted into his skin, ‘[…] naval penny-pinching had done away with the cotton clothing 
they  used to have’.161  McNally expressed extreme anger that the Rapier air defence 
missile system could only be operated by him in daylight hours because the DN181 
blind radar sighting system had not been issued.162  Similarly, Weeks asserted that  the 
night sights issued to the Paras were ‘pathetic’ compared with the versions used by  the 
Argentinians.163  At the most basic level, the two essential items of equipment for an 
infantry soldier were bundook and boots. The rifles used by  British and Argentinian 
forces were based on a Belgian design, the FN. The Argentinian derivative, the FAL, 
was capable of fully  automatic fire, whilst the British SLR only  fired single shots. This 
economy measure put the British soldiers as a significant disadvantage. However, an 
ingenious ‘Heath Robinson’ solution had been improvised, by jamming a broken match 
into the firing mechanism the SLR could be made to fire short bursts.164  As a cost 
saving exercise it  brings to mind the old proverb, ‘[…] all for the want of a nail’. At the 
time of the Falklands war, the army  had replaced its traditional hobnailed boot with the 
DMS type. As Rick Jolly opined: 
It  was a scandal that the standard-issue Army (and Royal Marines) boot  had been 
designed to an inadequate specification, then built  to a low price by different 
contractors, who cared not a whit  as to how these items subsequently performed under 
arduous conditions.165
From the junior ranks, John Geddes was more trenchant, ‘Some of us thought the civil 
servant who ordered them must have been in the pay  of the Soviets’.166  The problem 
was that the boots never had the chance to dry out. For many soldiers they became 
saturated with sea water when they  initially landed, and the water was constantly 
replenished by the sodden conditions in the Falklands. It led to the onset of ‘trench-
foot’; a problem many would assume was resolved after the Great War. Describing his 
experiences during 1917, Lieutenant Burke commented:
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Trench foot was owing to the mud soaking through your boots and everything. In 
many cases your toes nearly rotted off. We lost  more that way than we did from any 
wounds or anything.167
Despite advances in technology, it can be argued that Great War boots were actually of 
better quality than DMS. Practically  every primary source from the Falklands War 
references the inadequacy of footwear. The condition was, ‘Characterised by a dull 
thumping ache all over the foot, with blueness at the edges’.168  It was not  an isolated 
problem because during the Falklands campaign, ‘B’ Company of 2 Para lost  fourteen 
men (around 10%) incapacitated by  trench-foot.169  Inevitably the better quality 
Argentine boots were regarded as legitimate spoils of war, and many pairs were 
‘liberated’;170 Geddes observed that in the aftermath of the engagement at Goose Green, 
many of the Argentine dead were not wearing boots.171  Regardless of the impact on 
morale, those not lucky enough to find replacements had to endure the extended 
marches required of them. It is a testament to the coercive power of group loyalty 
(Chapter 2.1) that many soldiers, such as Mark Eyles-Thomas, ignored medical advice 
and remained with their colleagues, ‘I felt  I had let everyone down and would be 
branded a “waste of rations”’.172  More disturbingly, some soldiers took to injecting 
morphine phials into their feet and legs to keep going.173  Since the Falklands War, the 
standard issue army boot has been through a number of iterations but is still extensively 
criticised. Many servicemen now buy their own commercially  available boots, the 
current favourites being manufactured by Lowa and Altberg.174  At a current cost  of 
around £150 per pair, it  is perhaps no surprise that they are not standard issue, 
particularly since many personnel seem happy to make the investment themselves.
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4.5 Physiological
 
  Provision for basic needs is the foundation upon which all other morale factors 
are built. The final section will consider three aspects of physiological morale boosters 
that not only  sustain the body but also assuage the mind: food, emollients (tobacco, 
alcohol and drugs), and sex. A strand of continuity  that extended to the Falklands War 
was expressed by Gary Sheffield in his examination of the First World War soldier, 
‘Regular supplies of food, drink and tobacco, were all important in maintaining the 
morale of soldiers of all social classes’.175 Although the authorities have made provision 
for the necessary  calories and for the ‘little vices of life’, much of it has been reduced to 
a form of grudging tokenism, as Ellis observed, ‘A finally frustrating travesty  of the 
“real life” equivalents’.176 However, this has to be balanced by the enduring problem of 
logistics. During the Falklands War, there were occasions when the combatants had to 
go hungry just as their antecedents generations earlier.
 The quality  of military food has been subsumed into the collective myth. 
However, during the twentieth century, and when the logistics chain was working, it 
was plentiful if tedious. A minimum of 3,000 calories a day was essential to sustain a 
soldier in combat, even if did not provide balanced nutrition.177  During the Great War, 
frontline soldiers were initially rationed at  4,200 calories, whilst their rear-echelon 
colleagues got 3,472.178 ‘Bully Beef’179 became subsumed into the public consciousness 
and, although plentiful, its quality was highly variable depending on manufacture. 
Primary  sources are replete with references to the density  of hardtack biscuits, the 
ubiquity of apple and plum jam, and the appalling quality of Machonochie’s tinned 
stews. One soldier commented, ‘The head of that firm should have been put up against 
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the wall and shot for the way they  sharked us troops’.180  Gunner Alfred Finnegan 
recalled that complaints about the food prompted an order from GHQ, ‘On opening a tin 
of pork and beans, soldiers must not be disappointed if they find no pork. The pork has 
been absorbed into the beans’.181  During the Second World War, the reliance on bully 
beef and hardtack ensured that the diet of combatants was consistently  monotonous. 
Occasional attempts to lift morale with something appetising could be counter-
productive. During the Battle of Monte Cassino, Lieutenant Bond recalled, ‘During the 
last four months, whenever there was a big attack, they  had been served steak, and they 
dreaded seeing it come’.182 
 Whilst the logistics of supplying food remained an issue during the Falklands 
War, improvements in food technology: enrichment, dehydration, and freeze drying, 
meant that  combat rations had improved significantly  and offered a variation of menus. 
Known colloquially as ‘rat packs’ or ‘compo’, an individual 24-hour ration pack 
contained a combination of tins and sachets of calorie-packed food and beverages. Each 
pack could be broken down and its contents distributed in pouches and pockets. Food 
could be warmed, and water boiled, using a hexamine cooker; a small, folding and 
disposable device on which a mess tin could be balanced and heated using a solid fuel 
tablet that burned in all conditions. Its downside was that it coated the mess tin with 
black and glutinous soot. Lukowiak found that the boost to his morale, because of being 
able to prepare hot food in the most adverse circumstances, was profound:
The chocolate oats I ate that night  upon the battlefield of Goose Green were without 
doubt the most delicious food I have ever had the pleasure of putting into my body.183
 An arguably  intended consequence of eating compo rations was that they caused 
constipation, and for this reason fresh rations were periodically  required.184  For many 
combatants this outcome, even if intended, did not arise because of an apparent 
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misunderstanding at the beginning of the logistics train. Compo rations came in two 
varieties: GS (for use in temperate climates), and Arctic. The majority of ration packs 
supplied to Falklands troops were of the Arctic variety. Although these had the 
advantage of providing 5,000 calories, they  were dehydrated, designed on the 
assumption that a plentiful supply of snow would be available to rehydrate them. 
Unfortunately, much of the water on the Falklands was polluted, and each man was 
rationed to a pint and a half of clean water per day. Consequently, GS Compo became a 
luxury item.185 As Armour recalled, it became necessary  to use ground water which was 
black with peat, and attempt to sterilise it. The consequences were inevitable, ‘I never 
had any  underpants on by the time we got to Stanley, and there were quite a few guys 
like that because of having the shits’.186  The availability of fresh food was not only 
important for health but also for morale; captured Argentinian food supplies were 
consumed with gusto. As Richens explained, the British army rat packs were good, but 
the solid food they  found was better and a morale booster.187  Bramley described the 
pleasure of eating fresh bread after two weeks surviving on Arctic rations as ‘impossible 
to explain’.188  However, the limited supplies of ‘luxury’ food items tested group 
loyalties to breaking point and beyond. One soldier expropriated fresh food meant for 
his group:
We caught  Chaderton hiding behind a bush eating a bloody big pile of strawberry 
sandwiches […] we never forgave Chad’s selfish act. What his eating those 
sandwiches, meant for all of us, is talked about to this day.189
Tensions were similarly raised on Sussex Mountain. Whilst cigarettes (discussed below) 
were issued to smokers on an either/or basis, non-smokers were issued with chocolate 
bars. This proved to be contentious as soldiers keen to have a choice of brand were all 
too ready to get into fights about perceived unfairness of distribution.190  Another 
indicator of the fragility of group loyalties.
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 Emollients to stiffen sinews and soften stresses have traditionally fulfilled an 
important military  role throughout the combat motivation cycle, not least because of 
their ability to aid the group bonding process. Access to them sits on a continuum of 
toleration and perceptions of fairness in availability can test group and regimental 
loyalties, particularly when the junior ranks are rationed but the seniors are not. The use 
of alcohol is embedded within military culture, tobacco consumption has tended to 
mirror social mores, whilst the use of recreational drugs continues to result in draconian 
penalties. McManners pointed out that ‘The use of alcohol is an institutionalised ritual 
for all ranks in the British Army; in some units, not drinking is still considered a sign of 
weakness’.191  However, the use of alcohol extended beyond fermenting group  loyalties 
to becoming a necessity. Faced with the boredom of barracks life it is not surprising that 
alcohol abuse and dependency  have consistently emerged as potential problems. 
Ferguson asserted that, ‘Without alcohol […] the First World War could not have been 
fought […] ordinary soldiers would get drunk at every opportunity’.192  Beer and wine 
were deemed appropriate for the rank-and-file whilst whisky was the preserve of 
‘officers only’. Holmes revealed that during the Second World War, some soldiers 
would go to desperate lengths to get their alcohol fix:
Some of the more inventive defenders of the Anzio beach-head collected copper wire 
from crashed aircraft to make stills which produces a savage raisin jack, a welcome 
alternative to the 'swipe' made from after-shave mixed with orange juice.193
The Falklands experience reveals continuities: the popularity of alcohol, rank 
demarcations, and the inventiveness of soldiers to get extra supplies. Sailing south on 
Canberra, the bar was constantly  packed and drunk dry in a matter of days, with extra 
supplies having to be brought in. Whisky was banned for the junior ranks although 
illicit supplies, with the connivance of the ship’s crew, were readily obtained.194  With 
extra supplies on board, the rank-and-file were restricted to two cans of beer per day. 
The ration was intended to be enforced by  issuing each man with photocopied vouchers; 
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however, these were easily  recopied to obtain more.195  This provides an interesting 
insight into hierarchical relationships. Firstly, the implicit assumption that, without 
actual supervision, the Paras’ behaviour could be controlled by such a naive method; 
secondly, the expectation that they could not be trusted to maintain any  sense of 
discipline. The evidence, from two embedded journalists, is to the contrary:
Drunkenness was never a problem. The soldiers had an ability only to fall over when 
nobody with pips or crowns on their shoulders was watching. Only one man was 
caught, charged and fined (£200).196
Further evidence from the Falklands emerged of how old soldiers sustained their whisky 
fix:
How Ron managed to get regular supplies of whisky I will never know, but  in the two 
weeks we had been on the island Ron's hip flask had never run out  […] Nothing passed 
his lips without  being flavoured by some of the best  double malts Scotland had to 
offer.197
The erroneous expectation that drunken British troops would run amok once the war 
had been won emerged when the landlords in Port Stanley got together and invented an 
official ban, ‘Magistrates order. From today, all bars are closed’.198  The ban was not 
observed by  officers although they  were similarly categorised with their subordinates. 
The nadir of in vino veritas hospitality was reached when Des King, the landlord of the 
Uplands Goose Hotel, told Chaundler and Keeble, ‘First the fucking Argies, now you 
lot. When are you going to clear off and leave us in peace?’.199
 Holmes argued, ‘It is hard to overstate the consumption of cigarettes in both 
world wars’.200  This assertion easily extrapolates to include the Falklands. As well as 
suppressing the appetite of hungry troops, nicotine has a soothing quality. It releases a 
whole host of positive neurotransmitters that not  only increase concentration and 
alertness but also ameliorate pain and anxiety, and produce a sense of well-being. The 
mere act  of smoking is a manipulative activity that acts as a stress reducer. During the 
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Second World War Lt.Col. John Whitfield, a non-smoker, tried to ban smoking during 
exercises ‘but discovered it produced an appalling effect on morale’.201  Thereafter he 
always ensured his troops had an adequate supply. Despite the logistical problems faced 
in the Falklands, the troops were well provisioned with cigarettes even if they had to 
give up the chance of chocolate. One junior soldier observed that:  
A lot of Toms took up smoking during the war, they gave it  up on the way home after 
puffing their way through their free issue of a thousand tactical fags.202
 During the Second World War, amphetamines were enthusiastically  issued by 
British medical officials,203  but the practice of recreational drug taking is a matter that 
has focussed the minds of the military  establishment since the 1960s. It is not surprising 
that young men who have acquired a taste for the illicit may wish to continue the 
practice into their service life. In Vietnam, the American army faced a serious problem 
that has acted as a warning to the MoD. In 1971, estimates suggested that 50.9% of 
troops smoked Marijuana and 28.5% had taken opiates. 11,000 servicemen were 
prosecuted for taking narcotics although it is estimated that only 20% of offenders were 
detected.204   Concern about illegal drug taking during the Falklands war was evident to 
Jolly who smashed hundreds of captured morphine ampoules, ‘There was a mood of 
happy - even reckless - celebration about, and I certainly  wasn't going to take any 
chances in leaving serious drugs like morphine lying around’.205  Although there is no 
substantive evidence of illegal drug taking during the war, it seems that his concerns 
were not misplaced because Falklands veteran Philip Williams confessed that:
I must  have been asked now a hundred times at  least  what  made me take to drugs. Hard 
drugs, I mean. Not  pot. Lots of the guardsmen have the odd puff of that now and again, 
although I would expect that would be officially denied.206
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The problem was not confined to the Scots Guards. Evidence of drug abuse emerges 
from within the Parachute Regiment, but with the added complication that it  was used to 
self-medicate for the effects of PTSD.  According to Corporal Tom Howard:
I’d started drinking heavily and smoking drugs by September 1982 […] The 
combination provided an escape for me, and in Aldershot drugs were easy to get from 
people in the army.  We smoked hash - even opium, sometimes - in the unit  club. I 
don’t  know how we got  away with it. I mixed with friends in 2 Para which had the 
same problems. We all used drugs and drink for the same purpose.207
 Current practice is to conduct regular drug testing of personnel. Between 2003 
and 2007 the average number of servicemen dishonourably discharged for failing them 
was 587 per year.208  Assessing the detection rate is entirely speculative but if it 
approaches the American experience then the authorities face a material problem. The 
fact that 80% of world opium production is currently estimated to originate from 
Afghanistan and is accessible to British forces is a statistic presumably  not lost on the 
military establishment.
 As Stouffer et al. noted, sex is a traditional military preoccupation because ‘the 
average young man in our culture does not make a virtue out of sexual deprivation’.209 
The military authorities, well aware of this fact, have generally  maintained an 
ambivalent attitude towards carnal urges, and suggestions that bromide was used as an 
anaphrodisiac in the tea are a myth. Concern has been to maintain operational efficiency 
by limiting the impact of venereal diseases, often unsuccessfully.210 Although not overly 
concerned with moral issues, the military  authorities have had to contend with 
occasional outbursts of public prurience, which inhibited the ability for any official 
provision or control. The essential paradox is that the armed forces have instilled a 
sense of hyper-masculinity  that has been unleavened by any material sense of 
companionate femininity. As Dixon pointed out, many young men who joined the army 
did so because of doubts about their physical and/or sexual inadequacy. The army 
provided a compensatory environment which reassured against  such fears and was a 
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means of asserting masculinity and assuaging fears of effeminacy. Dixon termed this 
type of behaviour as ‘butch’. Because the military  placed a premium on exaggerated 
masculinity, the individual not only benefited from it but  also had an investment in its 
cultural continuity.211  Fears of sexual adequacy  have often been exploited ruthlessly 
during recruit training when it has been made clear to recruits that they will only be 
regarded as real men once they have successfully completed their training.212  The 
combination of latent sexual anxieties and ‘butchness’ of a closed male group led to a 
set of attitudes that fitted within the construction of a Madonna-Whore complex. 
Professor Jesse Gray noted that, ‘Anyone entering military  service for the first time can 
only be astonished by  soldiers’ concentration [...] upon the sexual act’.213 Also, military 
historian and former officer Anthony Beevor commented:
A private soldier tends to classify women in three categories: prozzies, slags and the 
girl from home whom he’ll marry. They only go with prostitutes when abroad, either 
‘because there’s nothing else’, or because they treat it as a form of sightseeing.214
Anxieties promoted by participation in combat, or the prospect of it, had the effect of 
encouraging ‘a special hedonism and lasciviousness’.215  During the First World War, 
416,891 soldiers of the British army  were treated for VD. The effect on manpower and 
resources was significant because treatment of syphilis required around 50 days 
hospitalisation.216  The peak was reached in 1918 when 3.2% of British and Dominion 
forces were admitted to hospital.217 Half a century later, matters had arguably got worse. 
In infantry battalions stationed in Germany, the VD rate among junior ranks ran at over 
5% and increased substantially  following postings to Belize, with its rudimentary 
approach to regulation and hygiene.218  Although the authorities have occasionally 
handed out severe punishments for ‘self-inflicted injuries’, their approach has been 
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generally  pragmatic when faced with the inevitable. Problems arose when sections of 
the public became aroused against military turpitude. During the Second World War, 
Montgomery  was nearly sacked for supporting official brothels to provide ‘horizontal 
refreshment’ for the troops.219  In India the well-run official brothels were shut down 
following a burst of moral outrage but this did not prevent the trade. According to 
Corporal Bratt (RAMC), ‘Within three weeks every bed in the previously deserted VD 
ward […] was full’.220  John Steinbeck was critical of what he saw as public hypocrisy. 
Plentiful supplies of condoms were issued to the troops, but ‘[…] it  had to be explained 
that they were used to keep  the moisture out of machine gun barrels - and perhaps they 
did’.221
 Accounts of sexual shenanigans during the Falklands War are very limited 
although this undoubtedly was because of a shortage of willing partners. In the late 
1970s, a local courtesan known as ‘the Yellow Submarine’ plied her trade from a 
shipping container on the public jetty in Port Stanley, but by  the time of the war she had 
apparently  shut up shop.222  Anecdotally  during the voyage south some of the female 
crew members onboard the QE2 had relationships with the troops.223  However, the 
image projected by the tabloid press was rather different. They  inevitably conflated sex 
and war, and in the process, reinforced notions of hyper-masculinity and submissive 
femininity. The few female personnel on board were characterised as potential sexual 
partners rather than military professionals. The Sun reported ‘Sexy capers on the ocean 
rave, QE2 cuties fall for heroes’.224  An outburst  of Madonna and Whore behaviour 
occurred whilst Canberra was resupplying at Sierra Leone. A British family has visited 
the Freetown docks to cheer the troops. The teenage daughter of the family was invited 
by a married member of 40 Commando to ‘get your kit off and show us your tits’. 
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Unfortunately, his endearing turn of phrase was televised and earned the opprobrium of 
wife and family.225  The nature of the war on the Falklands meant that most of the 
available women were too young. A noted example was the daughter of the manager of 
Port San Carlos settlement, the authorities were required to preempt any  unpleasantness 
by letting the troops know that despite appearances she was only thirteen years old.226
 An aspect of hyper-masculinity  that links the Great War with the Falklands War 
has been its aversion to the love that dare not speak its name. The assumption that 
effeminacy elided into homosexuality  meant that practices and characteristics that  might 
be deemed feminine have often been actively discouraged. These included hair length, 
taboos concerning non-manly pastimes such as interest in art and music, and an 
aversion to wearing protective equipment (helmets, ear defenders, etc.) In terms of 
gendering, this included a strong bias against  women encroaching into traditional male 
roles and activities.227 Until the ECHR ruling in 1999, homosexuality was prohibited in 
the British Armed Forces. Before 1984, it  was a court-martial offence and thereafter it 
would lead to administrative discharge. During the twentieth century, this military 
culture was framed within a carefully  delineated construction of personality that 
tolerated masculine homosexuality  but vigorously extirpated any traits of effeminacy. 
Amongst most personnel, there was a preferred tendency to turn a blind-eye, providing 
that the serviceman was not  blatant and in all other respects one of the chaps.228 Joanna 
Bourke argued that homosexuals could be highly motivated for combat:
By the Second World War, delineating the relationship between homosexual desire and 
combat had many adherents […] homosexuality had two effects. Unconscious inverts 
who turned their aggression inwards showed self-sacrificing devotion to their 
comrades; unconscious inverts who turned their aggression outwards were killers.229
In 1914, Britain’s most famous soldier, the conspicuously ruthless Field Marshal 
Kitchener, was anecdotally reported as having ‘the failing acquired by most of the 
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Egyptian officers, a taste for buggery’.230  Maj. Gen. Hector MacDonald was a national 
hero who committed suicide, apparently  on the suggestion of the King, shortly before 
being court-martialled for pederasty. The Establishment was spared the embarrassment 
of a court martial and the files were conveniently destroyed. MacDonald was a crofter’s 
son who had joined the army as a private and risen to general rank, as such he was an 
outsider and it is suggested that the authorities were not prepared to protect him.231  By 
contrast, Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck was let off with a high level warning for 
his homosexual predilections.232  Following the Wolfenden Report (1957), public 
attitudes towards homosexuality have become increasingly tolerant. By  1999, 70% of 
the public believed that homosexuals should be allowed to serve in the armed forces.233 
By contrast, the attitude of the military authorities appeared to have hardened. In 1952, 
the Adjutant General reported to a parliamentary  committee, ‘Once you get it started in 
a barrack room you get the whole lot corrupted […] just like the vicious type of public 
school dormitory where vice spreads quickly’.234  Perhaps personal experience was his 
reference point; however, it promulgated an attitude that essentially  created a chimera 
that had to be hunted down and rooted out. Statistics are quite revealing, during the 
Great War, 292 soldiers were court-martialled for ‘indecency’.235  This was rather less 
than the number ‘shot at dawn’, despite the attitude from some military  psychiatrists, 
that victims of shell-shock had their ‘latent homosexuality […] brought to the surface 
by the all-male environment’.236  Between 1990 and 1995, 363 men and women were 
administratively discharged, often following witch-hunts that extended well beyond 
military premises into the private sphere.237 Following the reforms in 1999, General Sir 
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Anthony Farrar-Hockley commented, ‘[…] the overwhelming majority of those in 
military service today find homosexuality abhorrent.’ There was the expectation of mass 
departures, in the event only  one brigadier resigned. Lord West, the former First Sea 
Lord and Captain of HMS Ardent during the Falklands War, better captured the 
zeitgeist, ‘I don’t believe it’s got anything to do with how efficient or capable their 
forces will be - it’s to do with prejudices I’m afraid’.238  In microcosm, 3 Para of the 
Falklands War encapsulated both sides of the debate. On board SS Canberra, a gay 
P&O steward was encouraged to make a pass at  McLaughlin, for his trouble he was 
beaten up  and McLaughlin tried to stuff him out  of a porthole.239  By contrast, journalist 
Hugh Bicheno recalled that ‘Many members of 3 Para’s tough Mortar Platoon were 
devout homosexuals: a matter of absolutely  no military significance (vide the deadly 
Spartans)’.240  Prior to the war, a platoon member had been court-martialled for 
homosexuality. He enjoyed some support  from his comrades on the basis that he was, ‘a 
“giver” rather than a “taker”’. According to CSM John Weeks:
He was a male prostitute. He got done for it, but  don’t get  me wrong, [he] was a very, 
very hard man. He never interfered with anybody in the battalion, he went up for his 
weekend as a single guy and did what he wanted to do.241
In terms of morale, the pragmatic approach to the history of military sex suggests that 
rules have always be regarded as being for the obedience of fools and the guidance of 
the libidinous.
4.6 Summary 
The terms morale and motivation have been used interchangeably, but they  are not the 
same. Although they are very closely linked and interact, it  is not sophistry to 
distinguish between them. Whilst morale needs have shifted in accordance with the 
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cyclical framework that drives motivation, they have responded to a different set  of 
forces. This is because motivation comprises the factors that sustain and drive 
participants in combat whilst morale is the spirit in which it is undertaken. Therefore, it 
has been possible to have high morale but a low desire to fight or vice versa. Whilst 
high morale linked to strong motivation suggests the most powerful combination; 
morale has become dysfunctional if not aligned to organisational goals. The key 
intervention of this chapter has been to establish a new definition of morale by using an 
established technique. By applying Maslow’s hierarchy of needs to morale, the tendency 
to corporatise individuals and perceive their morale satisfaction simply  in terms of basic 
physiological needs, has been discounted. Instead, morale comprises a series of tiers. 
Once low level morale deficiencies have been met, each individual will require 
satisfaction of higher level emotional and intellectual demands. The evidence from 
British twentieth century combat  experience, culminating in the Falklands War, suggests 
a rather patchy  approach to morale. Official parsimony and cultural expectations have 
been strands that had a deleterious effect, particularly for the rank-and-file whose 
morale requirements have tended to operate in the lower three tiers of the hierarchy. For 
officers, particularly those who aspired to higher rank, the competitive nature of 
leadership, elitism, and the need to assert a place in the pecking order, may have meant 
that satisfying their self-esteem deficiencies led to a lack of cohesion in the command 
structure. It has been all to easy to ignore deficiencies in morale following victory. Put 
simply, it was not sufficient to rely  on extrinsically managed task motivation, the spirit 
with which combat was undertaken was a vital concomitant  that needs to be properly 
understood.  
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Conclusion
	
 The study of combat motivation is as old as Herodotus, yet the range and depth 
of its historiography reveals it  remains topical and demanding of new insights. The 
purpose of this thesis has been to centre research around the Falklands War of 1982 
whilst placing it in its twentieth century  context; a period that starts and ends with small 
volunteer armed forces, but includes the social and cultural legacy of total war when the 
British population was conscripted and indentured to the logistics of combat. By 
drawing upon evidence from earlier wars, it has been possible to reveal continuity  of 
combat motivation throughout the twentieth century. This also reveals how media 
representations of the American experience of war have been subsumed into the British 
cultural template. There are good reasons to research combat motivation through the 
lens of the Falklands War, one of which relates to its implications for the British 
contribution to later ‘Desert  Sands’ campaigns. By conceptualising motivation as a 
cycle, it is revealed that: collective culture informed expectations of combat, 
participation in combat has often been a transformative experience, and the subsequent 
composure by combatants that  entered the public domain has caused a subtle reshaping 
of collective culture. Between 1914 and 1982 this cycle reveals significant continuity 
with two notable exceptions. In 1914, a blast of imperialist ideology  inspired around 
three million volunteers from across the social spectrum into Kitchener’s army, yet less 
than eighteen months later conscription became necessary. The 1982 watershed revealed 
the increased politicisation of the post-combat experience. Not only  have published 
Falklands memoirs become ‘a pile a mile high’,1 but also marked a shift in the nature of 
military history. Initially  the published accounts by journalists and senior officers 
followed the traditional command strategy analysis; however, after 1997 the ‘rank-and-
file’ sought to offer a bottom-up perspective of the realities of warfare.2  Whilst some of 
these memoirs were a leap  onto the commercial bandwagon, many more were a 
cathartic response to trauma and/or a desire to expose the shortcomings of the military 
establishment. Composure of the post-combat experience was inhibited by the way that 
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victory in the Falklands was forced into collective culture. The narrative of Margaret 
Thatcher’s government seamlessly  elided the Falklands back to 1945, effectively 
becoming the last  campaign of World War Two. Politically this reinvention enabled the 
Thatcher government to eliminate any  vestige of Butskellism and pursue its dogma of 
rebranding left-leaning unionists, notably miners, as ‘the enemy within’.3   Not only did 
this traduce the memory of the Kitchener volunteers and Ernest Bevin’s later cohorts,4 
but also their legatees from the industrial working class who provided the bedrock of 
the Falklands armed forces. The Falklands campaign had little to do with the Second 
World War; it was arguably the first post-modern war. Applying this term unleashes a 
range of philosophical arguments; nonetheless, it is a convenient device to describe the 
evolution of warfare. The argument that the Falklands campaign was a throwback to the 
Second World War is supported by the nature of the land fighting, and the gendering of 
combat as a masculine endeavour; however, the following outline of geopolitical 
considerations, economic retrenchment resulting in reduced defence budgets, and use of 
advanced military technology, suggest otherwise:
• Geopolitically, peace keeping under the aegis of the UN is a feature of post-
modern warfare. Following the Argentine invasion, Britain fought tenaciously to 
achieve UN Security Council Resolution 502. Whilst the Task Force sailed 
south, British self-determination was subordinate to the diplomatic efforts of the 
United States and Peru. 5  The self-determining status of the Falkland Islanders 
was also dispensable. During 1980, the government developed recommendations 
for a ‘leaseback’ arrangement with Argentina. Although these were never 
progressed, the provisions of the British Nationality Act 1981 meant that 
Falkland Islanders were to be downgraded in citizenship status. After the war 
this potential embarrassment was swiftly removed by the British Nationality 
(Falkland Islands) Act 1983. 
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• Economic considerations meant that the Government was not prepared to sustain 
a ‘Fortress Falklands’ policy. Cuts to military expenditure proposed in the 1981 
Defence Review White Paper required HMS Endurance, the South Atlantic 
patrol ship, to be decommissioned in April 1982. Also to be decommissioned 
was the aircraft carrier HMS Hermes, whilst  Britain’s only other serviceable 
aircraft carrier, HMS Invincible, was to be sold to Australia. Following the 
Argentine invasion these plans were scrapped. However, the Royal Navy  had to 
rely  on the commercial sector to make up  the required capacity of the Task 
Force.
• Cutting-edge military  technology was deployed under water and in the air. The 
nuclear submarine HMS Conqueror sank the General Belgrano, and its 
continued threat kept the Argentine Navy out of action. As enthusiastic 
purchasers on the international arms market, the Argentine military has acquired 
five Super Étendard strike fighters and five air-launched Exocet missiles. Exocet 
missiles destroyed HMS Sheffield and SS Atlantic Conveyor, ‘had the Royal 
Navy in a blue funk throughout the campaign’, and nearly led to an escalation of 
the war with a plan to destroy them at their mainland base.6
 At a micro-level, victory allowed a complacency to settle over the military 
establishment, particularly in the way it failed to adapt to the after-combat consequences 
of such post-modern warfare. This is starkly revealed by the fact that the MoD has taken 
thirty years properly to address the issue of PTSD (Chapter 3.12). At a macro-level, by 
suturing collective attitudes to the past, successive governments have been able to 
reinvigorate warfare as an instrument of foreign policy, notably in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
Whilst the Falkland Islanders wanted to be liberated, Iraqis and Afghans have been 
more resistant to western notions of political restructuring. The consequences for future 
combat motivation are clearly a work in progress, but an aim of this thesis has been to 
establish how a fresh understanding of the past might inform the future. It  worth 
speculating that future changes in the way the British armed forces approach combat in 
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the future will cause pressure for change. The armed forces will become smaller, and 
more reliant on technology; therefore, recruits will be better educated and include more 
women. They will demand rewarding careers and the MoD need to improve retention 
rates. Expansion of reserve forces and the demands placed upon them will need to be 
adroitly managed. By definition, they want to be part-timers, not existentialist warriors.
 Research reveals that a convincing case for combat motivation does not resolve 
into a few simple tropes and pet  theories; it is layered, faceted and nuanced. To provide 
a research framework that recognises such complexities an analytical model has been 
developed that breaks down combat motivation into three main components: morale, 
personal orientations, and the combat cycle; the granularity of these components is then 
revealed. Although the terms morale and motivation are often conflated, they are 
different; motivation explains why  combatants fight, whilst morale reveals the spirit 
with which such fighting is undertaken. Chapter Four presented distinct arguments for 
morale based upon Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs. This approach revealed that fighting-
spirit cannot be corporatised and sated by  simply meeting basic physiological desires; 
instead, morale has been an individual requirement that step-changed according to 
circumstances. Discussion of personal orientations has illuminated the various case 
studies that have been used in evidence in the substantive chapters. The argument is that 
individual combatants had an attitude towards military service that was shaped by  a 
combination of three orientations, each of which sat on a continuum: intrinsic versus 
extrinsic, a sense of personal justification that contrasted with outside coercions; needs 
versus achievement, the attainment of personal standards rather than the approval of 
others; and existentialist warrior versus jobseeker, the lust to fight compared with the 
desire for career prospects. The overarching and defining argument that the analytical 
model sets up is the sense that motivation during combat was informed not only by 
preconditioning, but also what happened afterwards; therefore, it was not  a linear 
process but a repeating cycle. Consequently, Chapters One to Three explored the before, 
during and after of combat.
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 The essence of Chapter One has been to argue for the power of intrinsic 
motivation as an encouragement to the recruitment of volunteer armies, and as a 
validation for conscripts who clearly did not have a choice. Fussell's assertion that ‘men 
will only attack if young, athletic, credulous’7  does not stand up to scrutiny; however, 
there is no doubting that the military preferred young recruits who were malleable and 
not so intelligent as to be likely  to challenge the status quo. At Mount Longdon in 1982, 
the average age of the twenty-three soldiers killed was twenty-two and included two 
seventeen year olds. In 2010, around 30% of recruits were aged under eighteen. No 
academic qualifications were (or are) required to join the infantry  rank-and-file, and for 
potential officers, only  a modest academic attainment remains necessary. At the time of 
the Falklands War, ‘character’ and the ability to ‘fit in’ were prerequisites of the RCB. 
The result was that 50% of officers came from public schools, despite representing only 
6% of their age group. 
 There is a clear distinction between the motivation to enlist and the motivation 
to fight. Whilst each recruit had their own reasons for enlisting, there were key  features 
common to most. These included not only  the opportunity  for adventure and personal 
development, but also the sense that the job was an honourable calling because it was 
legitimate and socially useful. Potential officers had the opportunity to exercise 
management at an early  age and exhibit the symbols of personal status within a 
prestigious organisation. For ordinary recruits, enhanced economic motivations could be 
discounted. As Janowitz concluded:
For the potential recruit […] a positive attitude is based […] on the fact  that  the 
military offers an adequate and respectable level of personal security […] for the 
enlisted man it offers relatively promising possibilities.8
It has been argued that no-one joined in expectation of high material rewards. During 
peacetime, the armed services have consistently  continued to recruit their rank-and-file 
from the most disadvantaged social groups who have had limited alternative choices in 
the unskilled labour market. Pay remains modest, whilst ancillary benefits such as 
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housing have been of variable quality. There is a greater expectation that officers will be 
able to live off their pay; however, in some elite regiments, an additional income 
remains integral to its social milieu. Despite sharing many of the intrinsic motivations, 
the middle-classes have found themselves under-equipped socially and economically, 
and overqualified educationally, to find a natural home in the armed forces. Whilst the 
role of private education has been consistent in turning out  templates for the officer 
cadre, state education of the rank-and-file has seen a profound shift. At the beginning of 
the twentieth century, the role of elementary education was to condition pupils to accept 
their place in the social pecking order and to be biddable servants to the demands of 
empire. During the last  decades of the century, the emphasis had shifted towards anti-
militarism; therefore, it  can be argued that many  ordinary recruits enlisted despite their 
education rather than because of it.
 Popular culture, rather than political ideology, has been the consistent factor in 
shaping the expectations of military service and warfare throughout the twentieth 
century because, as research by  Grinker and Spiegel revealed, ‘The political, economic 
or even military justifications […] are not apprehended except in a vague way’.9  Books 
and film have sustained a British brand of militarism that has evolved with a modern 
shape. The disillusionment oeuvre that emerged after the Great War may have enjoyed a 
discriminating following; however, according to Fussell, popular war adventure stories: 
[…] ascribe clear, and usually noble, cause and purpose to accidental or demeaning 
events. Such histories thus convey to the optimistic and the credulous a satisfying, 
orderly, and even optimistic and wholesome view of catastrophic occurrences.10
Central to these fictional histories was the celebrated soldier hero who, according to 
Dawson, ‘has become a quintessential figure of masculinity’.11  For potential recruits, 
such soldier heroes transmuted into powerful Kleinian imagos that often inspired 
enlistment with a wholly unrealistic set of expectations. According to Janowitz, ‘[...] 
outdated and obscure conceptions of the military  establishment persist because civilian 
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society […] prefers to remain uninformed’.12 It was the role of training to reshape them 
with vigorously applied extrinsic motivators, and strip  recruits (whether officer or 
otherwise) of their civilian sensibilities. By  ingraining successful recruits with new 
skills, recognition of accomplishment, a strong sense of earned group belonging, and a 
‘fit’ with organisational goals, a new set of shared intrinsic values were created. It is 
perhaps one reason why it has been so difficult for non-members to be fully  accepted 
within military  social groups, and why, at a strategic level, military operational groups 
can be so resistant to changes perceived as threats, even when in the wider public 
interest. These new intrinsic values were quite capable of being sustained in a 
hierarchical, and occasionally authoritarian, organisation that restricted personal agency, 
provided that external rewards were ‘explicitly and legitimately allocated’, and external 
sanctions were ‘not unexpected and counter-normative within the setting’.13  Ultimately, 
pre-combat motivations were predicated upon a tacit consent and a legitimate covenant 
with the military  hierarchy, and the ongoing trend during the twentieth century has seen 
the replacement of ascriptive control with persuasion and manipulation.14 Nonetheless, 
the authorities have liked to keep some big sticks, such as the death penalty, close to 
hand. Substantially, these have proved unnecessary because offences that challenge the 
military covenant have been remarkably  rare and usually point to a failure of leadership. 
Minor misdemeanours may have been more plentiful, but  official discipline based upon 
the ‘conduct prejudicial’ coda remains heavily biased in favour of the authorities, who 
can also rely on unofficial peer-group sanctions for letting the side down.
 
 Chapter Two was founded on the argument that motivation during combat did 
not operate in isolation and could not be detached from what went on before. Volunteers 
were motivated to join the armed forces by a sense of intrinsic justification that  had 
been shaped by a common culture. As Fuller asserted, ‘The whole structure of 
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prejudices, beliefs and loyalties, which society sets up  in the mind of individuals’.15  To 
extend the Bartov and Fritz argument towards a coherent sense of ideology in the mind 
of the British rank-and-file during combat, other than a sense of rightness, is to over-egg 
the argument. The purpose of this chapter has been to unpick the core elements of 
motivation during combat: group cohesion, regimental tradition, command and 
leadership, the role of informal leadership leviathans, and frenzy. The assertion of this 
thesis is that it is impossible to isolate one element as they were all mutually dependent. 
Leadership was arguably the most significant element as it was the catalyst of 
coherence, whilst the regimental tradition served its greatest  purpose before combat by 
extrinsically inculcating a sense of professional belonging and competence.
 The arguments surrounding primary  group theories reveal the difference 
between social cohesion and task cohesion. It was task cohesion that was responsible 
for motivation. Combatants may have formed strong friendships but had to form 
effective task groups. These had their own informal rules and belonging was conditional 
upon compliance with them. The sense of belonging that was engendered may have 
been strong, but friendship  remains different from comradeship, although these bonds 
are still widely misinterpreted. Falklands veteran Curtis stated that during the Battle of 
Goose Green, ‘I felt totally  devastated and gripped by an overwhelming sense of loss. 
One of my best friends lay 20 yards away, his body  covered with a poncho’.16 However, 
he was soon back into the thick of it, and was to enjoy a fifteen-year career in the Paras 
and the SAS, during which time he proved capable of forming new relationships. High 
casualties may have debilitated social groups, but whilst in combat task groups rapidly 
reformed. There was little doubt that the regimental tradition invested the Royal 
Marines and Army regiments that served during the Falklands War with a strong sense 
of identity. However, the evidence from the world wars, when the regimental system 
was debased, was that it had little effect on combat motivation. The power of the 
tradition was to inculcate a sense of mutual confidence, and according to Falklands 
veteran John Kiszely, ‘[this] must be built long before the times of need and danger 
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appear’.17  Kiszely went on to argue that the regimental tradition imposed a standard of 
conduct on the battlefield.18  However, the extent to which it did this was determined by 
the nature of leadership. Command was not the same as leadership, and the most 
effective leaders inspired task cohesion linked to formal goals by creating their own 
personal blend of position power, reward power, consistent values and charisma. If they 
failed then it is possible that their place would be usurped by a self-appointed leviathan, 
an existentialist  warrior who may have mobilised fighting spirit in alignment with 
official goals but may also have courted disaster when their personal power outstripped 
their professional competence. It may be strongly argued that a failure of leadership was 
responsible for atrocity. Jary maintained that the Second World War did not brutalise 
any of the members of 18 Platoon, rather it enhanced their sense of humanity. His 
assertion that, ‘We were not an aggressive generation, a fact which may  explain my 
failure to understand some present day attitudes […] particularly in the Royal Marines 
and the Parachute Regiment’,19  rather suggests a reality occluded by nostalgia. It may 
have been that the Marines and Paras ascribed particular value on ‘aggression’ but it 
was a quality embedded within the broader regimental tradition. Having been 
conditioned through training to kill on command, it was no surprise that in the febrile 
and adrenalin fuelled circumstance of hand to hand combat, survival instincts took over. 
Reflecting on his experience in Basra whilst in Iraq, Ben Close of the Coldstream 
Guards commented:
Training took over […] one round through the windscreen, end of story […] it got  so 
much easier the time after and the time after that […] I was like a time bomb ticking, 
waiting to go off. I was ready to kill in an instant.20 
Combat was certainly  not a clinical duel of knights, and it was no great surprise that 
cultivated aggression elided occasionally into frenzy. Leadership may have mitigated 
the worst instances or encouraged them; however, what has been of more concern is the 
reluctance of officialdom to admit it and deal with the consequences. As David Smith, a 
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psychologist from the New England Institute of Cognitive Sciences put it, ‘It is in the 
interests of governments not to be too straightforward about the consequences of 
killing’.21 Shay argued that the outcome for the combatants could be profound:
On the basis of my work with Vietnam veterans, I conclude that the berserk state is 
ruinous, leading to […] life-long psychological and physiological injury if [the soldier] 
survives. I believe that  once a person has entered the berserk state, he or she is changed 
forever.22
Therefore, understanding how the consequences of combat feed into the cycle of 
motivation was the subject of the Chapter Three.
 
 The overarching argument of this chapter was that post combat motivation 
derived from a nexus between the needs of the combatant, military  culture, society, and 
the political establishment. Such motivation comprised two parts: formal recognition, 
and reintegration back to a peacetime role. The evidence reveals that, in both regards, 
the expectations of the Falklands forces were not fulfilled. The aim of the first part  of 
the chapter has been to assert that an effective rewards system was and is culturally 
desirable and motivationally  important, both for civilians and the armed forces, not just 
for gallantry but also for outstanding public service. However, evidence has been 
presented to reveal that  the awards system that recognised endeavour during the 
Falklands War was not fit for purpose. It continued a long tradition rooted in status and 
hierarchy; the issue of awards was, just as with VCs of the Second World War,23  not 
only biased towards the top, with 53% of gallantry awards going to officers,24  but  also 
carefully  apportioned amongst fighting units. Additional analysis of VC citations 
revealed that war-winning and leadership rather than lifesaving or endurance were the 
dominant characteristics of army recipients. The understandable desire to avoid 
‘honours inflation’ embedded the quota system in the approval process. This might be 
reasonable in peacetime, but during a war, it can reasonably  be argued that recognition 
should have been driven by events and not by quotas. The consequence during the 
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Falklands War was that a massive void is revealed between the 465 service personnel 
who were recognised and the 29,700 who had to make do with the campaign medal. A 
number of units (including 3 Para) performed magnificently  but had to bathe in the 
rather dissipated glory of a handful of awards to their peers.  After the war, 3 Para also 
had the indignity of being brought back down to earth by  a rather unsympathetic 
commanding officer, who seems to have rather misjudged the importance of recognition 
as an adjunct to reward. The truth was that, although rewards were extrinsically applied, 
their real power was as an intrinsic affirmation of performance above and beyond the 
call of duty. 
  ‘Needs-motivated’ and ‘intrinsically-motivated’ soldiers required an effective 
form of recognition as a self-validator. The requirements of an achievement oriented 
military remain obvious in that an outward display of awards not only  gains approval, 
but also asserts status and improves promotion prospects. The majority of soldiers, 
particularly other-ranks, tended not question the status quo but did expect the system to 
operate fairly. The evidence surrounding Stewart McLaughlin suggested they reacted 
strongly when they perceived the system failed properly to weigh-up  courage and 
frenzy. The support for McLaughlin, notwithstanding his extreme behaviour, must be 
juxtaposed with the less than fulsome approbation accorded to ‘H’ Jones by his 
immediate subordinates. It  signalled the desirability  of a much more realistic attitude 
from the authorities about the making of a hero. However, there was political advantage 
to be gained from an alignment with heroism because it created a bond between the 
state and the public. In the aftermath of the Falklands War, it can be argued that the 
Government and the MoD not only acted with unseemly haste to link awards with an 
overtly political victory commemoration but also took the easy  public relations option 
when it accepted the media myth of heroic apotheosis manufactured around Jones. A 
lesson from the Falklands War was that it  was better to offer combatants a fighting 
chance of official recognition rather than trust to the caprices of self-reward; however, 
to do this required a much greater understanding of the paradoxical demands of 
combatant, military  establishment, and public collective, implicit within the awards 
process.
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 The second part of Chapter Three demonstrated that post-combat motivation 
depended upon effective peacetime reintegration, by analysing four aspects of the 
process: wind-down, ceremonial, resettlement, and response to traumatic stress. 
 At the end of the Falklands War, whilst some units improvised a sensible 
approach to wind-down by remaining within their task groups and talking out 
unrelieved aggression with the judicious application of alcohol, others were not so 
lucky. The Para battalions were rapidly transported out of theatre on MV Norland and 
assuaged their unrelieved aggression with an internecine riot. They did not have the 
benefit of an extended voyage home but completed the journey by air and were 
immediately sent on extended leave. Denied the protection of their task groups and any 
form of professional counselling, many found themselves detached from their families 
and wider society. They had formed unrealistic expectations of homecoming which in 
many cases elided into a confrontational mindset. 
 Little individual comfort  could be derived from official commemoration because 
post-Falklands ceremonial was the acme of political justification. Margaret Thatcher 
was able, with ‘audacious ingenuity’,25 to transmute her initial government failings over 
the Falklands into an overtly Conservative victory. It continued a long British tradition 
of drawing a veil over the realities of war, whilst justifying to the public the value of 
‘the old lie’ of dying for your country. In 1982, there was little public space for heroic 
disfigurement and none at all for glorious mental injury. Since 1921, the shape of 
Establishment commemoration has been largely defined by the RBL who have been 
adroit at selecting groups worthy of commemoration. The lack of Establishment 
sponsorship was evident in the campaign for recognition of those who served in Bomber 
Command during the Second World War. Consistently  denied a campaign medal, a 
measure of official recognition came with the memorial, funded by public subscription, 
unveiled on 28 June 2012. Eric Jones, an 89 year old former pilot, captured the 
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importance of recognition to the task group, ‘It's very definitely too late - so many 
would have loved to be here. I'm the last surviving member of my crew’.26  
 Arguments against  the sentience of social groups as a prime motivator emerged 
from the approach to resettlement. Statistics revealed that most  personnel were not 
persuaded by social ties to pursue a long career; however, official resettlement support 
has been the privilege of the long-serving, a fact that was trenchantly criticised in 2008 
by the HCPAC. That  many service leavers were ill-equipped for civilian life was 
revealed by  the statistics of ex-servicemen who may, according to the Howard League 
of Penal Reform, still constitute up  to 8% of the prison population. Others have been 
forced to sell medals, and a strong body of evidence suggested that the MoD applied the 
letter of the law when it came to benefits and allowances. Moreover, the onus was on 
veterans proactively  to research their entitlements. Such was revealed by the court 
judgement made against the PTSD sufferers in a group action against the MoD in 2003. 
 PTSD entered the medical canon in 1980 and has been under-researched; 
however, a long-term study  is currently  being conducted at KCL and is due to complete 
in 2013. The long shadow of Southborough still falls over this topic. There are those in 
the military who still consider it a weakness of character, or an opportunity to benefit 
from a compensation culture, or a political bandwagon. The evidence from some of the 
Falklands commanders was rather disparaging in that they did not consider PTSD much 
of an issue, arguably  because to acknowledge it would be regarded as an implicit 
criticism of their leadership skills within the framework of military  culture. The widely 
divergent statistics on PTSD provided ample space for traditional views to be sustained. 
In 2003, at the World Congress of Psychiatry, it  was asserted that only 5.1% of 
combatants had a psychological reaction after the Falklands War. By contrast, earlier 
research by Falkland veterans Hughes and O’Brien suggested it was as high as 72%. 
Evidently  many  Falklands Veterans have suffered in silence, not  wishing to express 
emotions that are still alien to military culture. The litmus test will be the reaction of the 
MoD once a robust body of evidence emerges.
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 The final chapter was predicated on the argument that although the terms morale 
and motivation have been used interchangeably to describe the combat experience they 
are not the same. Motivation comprised the factors that sustained and drove participants 
in combat whilst  morale was the spirit  in which combat was undertaken. Whilst high 
morale linked to strong motivation suggested the most powerful combination; morale 
could become dysfunctional if it  was not  aligned to organisational goals. The key 
intervention of this chapter has been to establish a new definition of morale by using an 
established technique. By  synthesising Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, first developed in 
1943, with evidence relating to morale, it has been possible to discount the tendency to 
corporatise individuals and perceive morale simply in terms of satisfying basic 
physiological needs. Instead, morale should be seen as comprising a series of tiers. 
Once low level morale deficiencies were met, each individual would require satisfaction 
of higher level emotional and intellectual demands. The evidence from British twentieth 
century combat experience, culminating in the Falklands War, suggested a rather patchy 
approach to matters of morale. Official parsimony and cultural expectations were 
strands that had a deleterious effect, particularly  for the rank-and-file whose morale 
requirements tended to operate in the lower three tiers of the Maslow hierarchy. For 
officers, particularly those who aspired to a higher rank, the competitive nature of 
leadership, elitism, and the need to assert a place in the pecking order may  have meant 
that satisfying their self-esteem deficiencies led to a dangerous lack of cohesion in the 
command structure. The case-study of the events culminating in the Sir Galahad 
disaster during the Falklands War graphically reveal the consequences. It is all too easy 
to ignore deficiencies in morale following victory. Put simply, it was not  sufficient to 
rely  on task motivation, the spirit with which combat was undertaken was a vital 
concomitant that needed to be properly shaped around the needs of each individual.   
 Much of the primary  source evidence within this thesis derives from oral and 
published testimony of Falklands veterans, and the nature and purpose of this testimony 
has to be placed in context. Hynes noted that after the Great War:
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Nearly all of the millions who fought […] died silently or survived, but in either case 
left  no record, because they were poor, inarticulate, unlettered, shy; or because it 
simply did not occur to write down what had happened to them.27
It is asserted by Harari, that those who did followed a structure which reflects the cycle 
of motivations around which this thesis is structured, ‘pre-war illusion led men to war, 
the war shatters these illusions, and the embittered survivors have the ability  and duty to 
disillusion the public’.28  The evidence from the Falklands is not only  more nuanced but 
also revealed a greater propensity of veterans of all ranks to offer personal testimony 
that has ‘intensely individuated meanings’.29  Memory production from Falklands 
veterans has become something of a competitive industry  often at  odds with official 
histories and commemorations. Two further caveats emerge: the first is that memory 
production reflects the interplay  between selected memories of the past  and the current 
identity  of the narrator that have to be reconciled, 30  the second is that memories are 
recomposed as they integrate the testimony of their co-narrators with their own.31 
Nonetheless, whilst this may burr the edge of the evidence, the point of it remains 
targeted and incisive.
Page 263 of 304
 
27 Samuel Hynes, The Soldiers’ Tale, (New York, Viking Penguin, 1997), p. 31
28 Yuval Noah Harari, ‘Martial Illusions: War and Disillusionment in Twentieth Century and Renaissance 
Military Memoirs’, in The Journal of Military History, Vol. 69, No. 1 (2005), p. 44
29 Timothy Ashplant, Graham Dawson & Michael Roper (eds), The Politics of War Memory and 
Commemoration, (London, Routledge, 2000), pp. 47-48
30 Alistair Thomson, Anzac Memories: Living with the Legend, (Melbourne, OUP, 1995), p. 10
31 Robinson. ‘Soldiers’ Stories’, p. 580
Bibliography
Primary Sources - Manuscript
Cabinet Office, CAB/106/320, List of the Recipients of the Victoria Cross
Hansard, HL Deb 09, June 1994, Vol. 555, cc1319-22
Hansard, 7 May 2008: Column 912W
Hansard, 16 Oct 2008: C1400W
Hansard 18 May 2009: C1168W
Hansard, HL Deb, 6 Jul 2011, c303
IWM, Colbeck MSS, Cat. 1182 IWM, McKay MSS, Cat. 317
IWM, MoD - The British Army in the Falklands, Cat. K.38/2588
IWM. Smith MSS, Cat. 1165
IWM, van der Bijl MSS, Cat.3898
IWM, Winfield MSS, Cat. 1267
Mass Observation Archive (University of Sussex) Replies to Special Directive 5, the 
Falkland Islands Crisis 1982: War with Argentina and replies to Special Directive 9, 
Falklands/Malvinas Postscript: Reactions to the Falklands Parade, October 1982
Mass Observation Teaching Booklet No.5, Mass Observation in the 80s: Special 
Directive, 19 April 1982 “The Falkland Island Crisis, (Falmer, University of Sussex 
Library, 1988)
National Army Museum, Accession No. 1977-06-81-32
National Army Museum, Accession No. 1977-06-81-47
Noakes L, Mass-Observation, Gender and Nationhood: Britain in the Falklands War, 
(M-O Archive Occasional Paper No.5, University of Sussex Library, 1996)
Primary Sources - Published (memoirs)
Arthur M, Above All Courage: Personal Stories from the Falklands War, (London, 
Cassell, 2002)                     
Arthur M, Forgotten Voices of the Great War, (London, Ebury, 2003) 
Arthur M, Forgotten Voices of the Second World War, (London, Ebury, 2005)
Arthur M, Last Post: The Final Word from our First World War Soldiers, (London, 
Phoenix, 2005)
Arthur M, Lest We Forget: Forgotten Voices from 1914-1945, (London, Ebury, 2007) 
Bijl (van der) N, Nine Battles to Stanley, (Barnsley, Pen & Sword, 1999)
Bijl (van der) N & Aldea D, 5th Infantry Brigade in the Falklands, (Barnsley, Pen & 
Sword, 2003)
Bishop P & Witherow J, The Winter War: The Falklands, (London, Quartet, 1982) 
Page 264 of 304
 
Bramley V, Excursion into Hell: Mount Longdon a Universal Story of Battle, (London, 
Bloomsbury, 1991)
Bramley V, Forward into Hell, (London, John Blake, 2006)
Bramley V, Two Sides of Hell, (London, John Blake, 2009) 
Clapp M & Southby-Tailyour E, Amphibious Assault Falklands, (Barnsley, Pen & 
Sword, 2007)
Colbeck G, With 3 Para to the Falklands, (London, Greenhill, 2002)
Curtis M, CQB: Close Quarter Battle, (London, Corgi, 1998)
Ely N, For Queen and Country, (London, Blake, 2003)
Eyles-Thomas M, Sod That for a Game of Soldiers, (Sevenoaks, Kenton, 2007) 
Geddes, J, Spearhead Assault, (London, Arrow, 2007)
Graves R, Goodbye to All That, (London, Penguin, 1957) 
Hastings M & Jenkins S, The Battle for the Falklands, (London, Pan, 1997)
Hennessey P, The Junior Officers’ Reading Club, (London, Penguin, 2010) 
Herr M, Dispatches, (Basingstoke, Picador, 2004)
Holmes R, Dusty Warriors, (London, Harper Perennial, 2007)
Jary S, 18 Platoon, (Bristol, Sydney Jary, 1998)
Jolly R, The Red and Green Life Machine, (Saltash, Red & Green Books, 2007)
Liddell-Hart B(ed), The Letters of Private Wheeler 1809-1828, (Moreton-in-Marsh, 
Windrush, 2000)
Lawrence J & Lawrence R, When the Fighting is Over, (London, Bloomsbury, 1988)
Levine J, Forgotten Voices of the Somme, (London, Ebury, 2008) 
Lukowiak K, A Soldier’s Song: True Stories from the Falklands, (London, Phoenix, 
1999)
McGowan R & Hands J, Don’t Cry for me Sergeant Major, (London, Futura, 1983)
McLaughlin S, Squaddie: A Soldier’s Story, (Edinburgh, Mainstream, 2007) 
McManners H, Falklands Commando, (London, Harper Collins, 2002) 
McManners H, Forgotten Voices of the Falklands, (London, Ebury, 2007) 
McNally T, Watching Men Burn: A Soldier’s Story, (Wolvey, Monday Books, 2007) 
Southby-Tailyour E, Reasons in Writing: A Commando’s View of the Falklands War, 
(Barnsley, Pen & Sword, 2003) 
Thatcher M, The Downing Street Years, (London, Harper Collins, 1993)
Thompson J, No Picnic, (London, Leo Cooper, 1985)
Page 265 of 304
 
Vaux N, March to the South Atlantic: 42 Commando Royal Marines in the Falklands 
War, (Barnsley, Pen & Sword, 2007)
Weston S, Walking Tall, (London, Bloomsbury, 1989)
Weston S, Moving On, (London, Portrait, 2003) 
Williams P, Summer Soldier: The True Story of the Missing Falklands Guardsman, 
(London, Bloomsbury, 1990) 
Primary Sources - Published (government and official publications)
Armed Forces Bill Team, An Overview of the Service Justice System and the Armed 
Forces Act 2006
A Guide to the Military Corrective Training Centre,
HMSO, The Falklands Campaign: the Lessons, Cm. 8758 (1982)
House of Commons, First Report from the Defence Committee, The Handling of Press 
and Public Information During the Falklands Conflict, 1982/1983 HC17
London Gazette, No’s. 34868 - 38614
London Gazette, Friday 8th October 1982, No. 49134,
MoD, DCDS (Pers) Service Conditions & Welfare SP 05.04.04.01, Tri-Service 
Accommodation Regulations, 16 Sep 2010
MoD, HC 351, Ministry of Defence: Leaving the Services, 18 July 2008
MoD, JSP 534, The Tri-Service Resettlement Manual, Issue 2, April 2004
MoD, JSP 761, Honours and Awards in the Armed Forces, 2nd Edition, May 2008
MoD, JSP 830, Manual of Service Law, Version 2.0, January 2011
The Rt Hon The Lord Saville of Newdigate (Chairman),The Hon William Hoyt OC, 
The Hon John Toohey AC, Report of the Bloody Sunday Inquiry
Primary Sources - Published (newspapers and magazines)
‘News Review’, in Sunday Times, 14 August 2011
Junger S, ‘It’s OK to be Scared. Just Don’t Show It’ in Observer Magazine, 23 May 
2010
Primary Sources - Oral Interviews (Imperial War Museum)
IWM 17146, Abols, (1996)
IWM 13187, Belcher, (1992)
IWM 17138, Bentley, (1993)
IWM 10215, Brown, (1988)
IWM 23277, Brown et al (2002)
Page 266 of 304
 
IWM 569 - Burke, (1975)
IWM 28300, Butler, (2002)
IWM 13004, Carter, (1992)
IWM 14152, Chaundler, (1994)
IWM 13419, Cooper, (1993)
IWM 17145, Cooper, (1996)
IWM 17140, Crosland, (1996)
IWM 15742, Crosland, (1995)
IWM 16361, Elliott, (1996)
IWM 13008, Farrar, (1992) 
IWM 15612, Farrar-Hockley, (1995)
IWM 17141, Farrar-Hockley, (1996)
IWM 12427, Fox, (1992)
IWM 6391, Fox et al,(1982)
IWM 20255, Freer, (2002)
IWM 13190, Jolly, (1992)
IWM 17148, Keeble, (1996)
IWM 6450, Kitson, (1982)
IWM 6844, Kitson, (1982)
IWM 17147, Margerison, (1996)
IWM 12957, McAlester, (1993)
IWM 17143, Meredith, (1996)
IWM 13020, Mitchell, (1992)
IWM 10482, Moore, (1988)
IWM 17139, Neame, (1996)
IWM 14597, Neame, (1994)
IWM, 17134, Norman, (1996)
IWM 28299, Patton, (2002)
IWM 28301, Pettinger, (2002)
IWM 16074, Richens, (1995)
IWM13044, Scot, (1992)
IWM 13191, Simms, (1992)
IWM12787, Southby-Tailyour, (1992)
Page 267 of 304
 
IWM 12428, Thompson, (1992)
IWM 17144, Thompson, (1996)
IWM 20697, Tolson, (1996)
IWM 6454, Warsap, (1982)
IWM 20696, Weeks, (1996)
IWM 13045, Williams, (1992)
IWM 17149, Worsley-Tonks, (1996)
Secondary Sources - Published (books)
Addison P & Calder A, Time to Kill: The Soldier’s Experience of War in the West, 
(London, Pimlico, 1997)  
Addison P & Crang J, The Burning Blue: A New History of the Battle of Britain, 
(London, Pimlico, 2000) 
Adkin M, Goose Green: a battle is fought to be won, (London, Cassell, 2003)
Aldgate T, ‘The Battle of Britain on Film’ in Addison P & Crang J, The Burning Blue: 
A New History of the Battle of Britain, (London, Pimlico, 2000)
Aldgate T & Marwick A, Between Two Wars, (Milton Keynes, Open University, 2001) 
Ashplant T, Dawson G & Roper M (eds), The Politics of War Memory and 
Commemoration, (London, Routledge, 2000)
Ashworth T, Trench Warfare 1914-1918: the Live and Let Live System (London, 
Macmillan, 1980)
Astor D (pseud.), The Official ARSSE Guide to the British Army: What it is and How it 
Works, (London, Bantam Press, 2011)
Aulich J, Framing the Falklands War, (Milton Keynes, Open University Press, 1992) 
Badsey S, Havers R & Grove M (eds), The Falklands Conflict Twenty Years On: 
Lessons for the Future, (London, Frank Cass, 2005) 
Baynes J, Morale: a Study of Men and Courage; the Second Scottish Rifles and the 
Battle of Neuve Chapelle 1915, (London, Leo Cooper, 1987)
Beckett I, Total War’, in McInnes C & Sheffield G (eds), Warfare in the Twentieth 
Century: Theory and Practice, (London, Unwin Hayman, 1988)
Beevor A, Inside the British Army, (London, Corgi, 1991)
Belenky G (ed), Contemporary Studies in Combat Psychiatry, (London, Greenwood, 
1987)
Belenky G, Noy S & Solomon Z, “Battle Stress, Morale, Cohesion, Combat 
Effectiveness, Heroism and Psychiatric Casualties: The Israeli Experience’, in Belenky 
G (ed), Contemporary Studies in Combat Psychiatry, (London, Greenwood, 1987)
Page 268 of 304
 
Ben Ari E, Mastering Soldiers: Conflict, Emotions and the Enemy in an Israeli Military 
Unit, (New York, Berghahn, 1998) 
Bettelheim B & Janowitz M, Dynamics of Prejudice: A Psychological and Sociological 
Study of Veterans, (London, Harper, 1950)  
Bicheno H, Razors’s Edge: The Unofficial History of the Falklands War, (London, 
Phoenix, 2006) 
Bidwell S, Modern Warfare: A Study of Men, Weapons and Theories, (London, Allen 
Lane, 1973)
Bilton M & Kosminsky P, Speaking Out: Untold Stories from the Falklands War, 
(London, André Deutsch, 1989) 
Blakeway D, The Falklands War, (London, Sidgwick & Jackson, 1992)
Bond B, The British Field Force in France and Belgium 1939-1940’, in Addison P & 
Books LLC, British Army Personnel of the Falklands War, (Memphis, Books LLC, 
2010) 
Bourke J, An Intimate History of Killing: Face-to-Face Killing in Twentieth Century 
Warfare, (London, Granta, 1999)   
Browning C, ‘One Day at Josefow: Initiation to Mass Murder’, in Marwick A, Emsley 
C & Simpson W (eds), Total War and Historical Change: Europe 1914-1955 
(Buckingham, OUP, 2001)
Calder, A, Myth of the Blitz, ( London, Pimlico, 1992)
Calder A, ‘The Battle of Britain and Pilots’ Memoirs’, in Addison P & Crang J, The 
Burning Blue: A New History of the Battle of Britain, (London, Pimlico, 2000)
Chickering R & Forster S (eds), Shadows of Total War 1919-1939, (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2003) 
Cincinnatus (pseud. Cecil B. Currey), Self-Destruction: The Disintegration and Decay 
of the United States Army during the Vietnam Era, (New York, Norton, 1981) 
Clayton A, The British Officer - Leading the Army From 1660 to the Present, (Harlow, 
Pearson, 2007) 
Cohen E, Commandos and Politicians: Elite Military Units in Modern Democracies, 
(Cambridge Mass, Harvard University Press, 1978)
Cohen E, Citizens and Soldiers: The Dilemmas of Military Service, (Ithaca, Cornell 
University Press, 1985)
Connaughton R, A Brief History of Modern Warfare: The True Story of Conflict from the 
Falklands to Afghanistan, (London, Constable & Robinson, 2008) 
Cooksey J, 3 Para Mount Longdon: The Bloodiest Battle, (Barnsley, Pen & Sword, 
2004)
Crang J, ‘The British Soldier on the Home Front: Army Morale Reports, 1940-45’, in 
Addison P & Calder A, Time to Kill: The Soldier’s Experience of War in the West, 
(London, Pimlico, 1997)
Page 269 of 304
 
Crang J, The British Army and the People’s War 1939-45, (Manchester, MUP, 2000) 
Dawson G, Soldier Heroes: British Adventure, Empire and the Imagining of 
Masculinity, (London, Routledge, 1994)   
Dixon N, On the Psychology of Military Incompetence, (London, Pimlico, 1994) 
Duffett R, ‘A War Unimagined: Food and the Rank and File Soldier of the First World 
War’, in Meyer J (ed), British Popular Culture and the First World War, (Leiden, Brill, 
2008),
Ellis J, The Sharp End of War, (Newton Abbott, David & Charles, 1980)  
Ellis J, ‘Reflections on the “Sharp End” of War’ in Addison P & Calder A (eds), Time to 
Kill: The Soldier’s Experience of War in the West, (London, Pimlico, 1997)
Evans E, The Forging of the Modern State, (Harlow, Pearson, 2001) 
Ferguson N, The Pity of War (London, Allen Lane, 1998)    
Ferguson N, Empire: How Britain Made the Modern World, (London, Penguin, 2004)
Figley C & Nash W (eds), Combat Stress Injury: Theory, Research and Management, 
(Abingdon, Routledge, 2006)  
Finlan A, ‘War Culture: The Royal Navy and the Falklands Conflict’, in Badsey S, 
Havers R & Grove M (eds), The Falklands Conflict Twenty Years On: Lessons for the 
Future, (London, Frank Cass, 2005)
Fitz-Gibbon S, Not Mentioned in Dispatches ...: The History and the Mythology of the 
Battle of Goose Green, (Cambridge, Lutterworth, 2002)   
Foster, K, Fighting Fictions: War, Narrative and National Identity, (London, Pluto 
Press, 1999) 
Freedman L, Britain and the Falklands War, (London, Blackwell, 1988)
Freedman L (ed), War, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1994)
Freedman L, The Official History of the Falklands Campaign: Vol. II,(London, 
Routledge, 2005)  
French D, Raising Churchill’s Army, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000)  
French D, Military Identities: The Regimental System, the British Army and the British 
People 1870-2000, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005)  
Frost J, 2 Para Falklands: The Battalion at War, (London, Buchan & Enright, 
1983)  
Fuller J, Troop Morale and Popular Culture in the British and Dominion Armies 
1914-1918, (London, Clarendon, 1991)
Fussell P, Wartime: Understanding and Behaviour in the Second World War, (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 1989)
Fussell P, The Great War and Modern Memory, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2000)    
Page 270 of 304
 
Gilbran D, The Falklands War: Britain Versus the Past in the South Atlantic, (Jefferson, 
McFarland, 1998)    
Gillespie, R, Psychological Effects of War on Citizen and Soldier, (New York, W.W. 
Norton & Co, 1942)
Ginzberg E, Anderson J, Ginsburg S & Herma J, Patterns of Performance: The 
Ineffective Soldier, (New York, Columbia University Press, 1959)
Graves R, Lawrence and the Arabs, (London, Jonathan Cape, 1927)
Gray J, The Warriors: Reflections on Men in Battle, (New York, Harper Torchbook, 
1967)
Grinker R & Spiegel J, Men Under Stress, (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1963) 
Harris R, The Media Trilogy, (London, Faber & Faber, 1994)
Hastings M, All Hell Let Loose, (London, Harper Press, 2011)
Hauser W, ‘The Will to Fight’, in Sarkesian S.(ed), Combat Effectiveness: cohesion, 
stress, and the volunteer military, (London, Sage, 1980)
Heffer S, Like the Roman: The Life of Enoch Powell, (London, Weidenfeld & 
Nicholson, 1998)
Henderson D, ‘The Scottish Soldier: Reality and the Armchair Experience’, in Addison 
P & Calder A, Time to Kill: The Soldier’s Experience of War in the West, (London, 
Pimlico, 1997) 
Henderson W, Cohesion: The Human Element in Combat, (Washington DC, National 
Defense University Press, 1985)   
Hobsbawm E, ‘Mass Producing Traditions: Europe 1870-1914’, in Hobsbawm E. & 
Ranger T. (eds), The Invention of Tradition, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
2009)
Hobsbawm E & Ranger T (eds), The Invention of Tradition, (Cambridge, Canto, 
1992)  
Hockey J, Squaddies: Portrait of a Subculture, (Exeter, University of Exeter, 1986)
Holmes R, Soldiers: A History of Men in Battle, (London, Hamish Hamilton, 1985)
Holmes R, ‘The Italian Job: Five Armies in Italy, 1943-45’, in Addison P & Calder A 
(eds), Time to Kill: The Soldier’s Experience of War in the West, (London, Pimlico, 
1997)
Holmes R (ed), The Oxford Companion to Military History, (Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2001)  
Holmes R, Acts of War, (London, Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 2003)
Holmes R, Tommy: The British Soldier on the Western Front 1914-1918, (London, 
Harper Collins, 2004)  
Holmes R, Soldiers, (London, Harper Press, 2011)
Page 271 of 304
 
Holmes R & Keegan J, Soldiers: A History of Men in Battle, (London, Hamish 
Hamilton, 1985)
Howard M, War in European History, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1977)  
Howard M, Clausewitz, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1983)  
Huntingdon S, The Soldier and the State, (Cambridge Mass, Harvard University Press, 
1957)  
Hyam R, Empire and Sexuality: The British Experience, (Manchester, Manchester 
University Press, 1990)
Hynes S, The Soldiers’ Tale, (New York, Viking Penguin, 1997)     
Janowitz M, The Professional Soldier. A Social and Political Portrait, (New York, Free 
Press of Glencoe, 1961)  
Janowitz M, Sociology and the Military Establishment, (New York, Russell Sage 
Foundation, 1965)
Jennings C & Weale A, Green-Eyed Boys, (London, Harper Collins, 1996)  
Jones E and Wessely S, From Shell Shock to PTSD, Military Psychology from 1900 to 
the Gulf War, (Hove, Psychology Press, 2005) 
Keegan J, The Face of Battle, ( London, Cape, 1976)  
Keegan J, ‘Towards a Theory of Combat Motivation’ in Addison P. & Calder A. (eds), 
Time to Kill: The Soldier’s Experience of War in the West, (London, Pimlico, 1997)
Kellett, A, Combat Motivation: The Behavior of Soldiers in Battle, (London, Kluwer-
Nijhoff, 1982)  
Kellett A, ‘Combat Motivation’, in Belenky G (ed), Contemporary Studies in Combat 
Psychiatry, (London, Greenwood, 1987)
Killingray D, ‘“If I Fight for Them Maybe Then I can Go Back to the Village”: African 
Soldiers in the Mediterranean and European Campaigns, 1939-1945’, in Addison P & 
Calder A (eds), Time to Kill: The Soldier’s Experience of War in the West, (London, 
Pimlico, 1997) 
Kiszely J, ‘The Land Campaign: A Company Perspective’, in Badsey S., Havers R. & 
Groves M. (eds), The Falklands Conflict Twenty Years on: Lessons for the Future, 
(London, Frank Cass, 2005),  
Knightley P, The First Casualty, (London, André Deutsch, 2003) 
Liddell-Hart B(ed), The Letters of Private Wheeler 1809-1828, (Moreton-in-Marsh, 
Windrush, 2000)
MacCurdy J, The Structure of Morale, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1943)  
McInnes C & Sheffield G, Warfare in the Twentieth Century: Theory and Practice, 
(London, Unwin Hyman, 1988)  
MacKenzie S, Politics and Military Morale, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1992) 
McManners H, The Scars of War, (London, Harper Collins, 1994)  
Page 272 of 304
 
Manning F, Her Privates We, (London, Serpent’s Tail, 1999) 
Marshall S L A, Men Against Fire, The Problem of Battle Command in Future Wars, 
(Washington, Combat Forces Press, 1947)  
Marshall Cavendish Partworks, The Falklands War: 25th Anniversary, (London, 
Marshall Cavendish, 2007)  
Marwick A, Emsley C & Simpson W (eds), Total War and Historical Change: Europe 
1914-1955 (Buckingham, Open University Press, 2001) 
Mateczun J & Holmes E, ‘Return, Readjustment and Reintegration: the Three R’s of 
Family Reunion’, in Ursano R (ed), Emotional Aftermath of the Persian Gulf War, 
(American Psychiatric Press, Washington DC, 1996
Meyer J (ed), British Popular Culture and the First World War, (Leiden, Brill, 
2008)  
Middlebrook M, The Falklands War 1982, (London, Penguin, 2001) 
Monaghan D, The Falklands War: Myth and Counter-myth, (Basingstoke, Palgrave, 
1998)   
Moskos C, The American Enlisted Man, (New York, Russell Sage Foundation, 1970) 
Moskos C, Williams J & Segal D (eds), The Post-modern Military: Armed Forces After 
the Cold War, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000) 
Mosse G, Fallen Soldiers: Reshaping the Memory of the World Wars, (New York, 
Oxford University Press, 1991) 
Noakes L, War and the British: Gender and National Identity, 1939-91, (London, 
I.B.Tauris, 1998)
Norwood A. & Ursano R, ‘The Gulf War’, in Robert Ursano (ed), Emotional Aftermath 
of the Persian Gulf War, (American Psychiatric Press, Washington DC, 1996)
Oakley D, The Falklands Military Machine, (Staplehurst, Spellmount, 2002)  
Parker J, The Paras: The Inside Story of Britain’s Toughest Regiment, (London, Metro, 
2002) 
Parker T, Soldier, Soldier, (London, Heinemann, 1985) 
Perks R & Thomson A (eds), The Oral History Reader, (London, Routledge, 1998)
Pike H, ‘The Army’s Infantry and Reconnaissance Forces’, in Washington L (ed), Ten 
Years On: The British Army in the Falklands War, (London, National Army Museum, 
1992)
Regan G, Great Military Blunders, (London, 4 Books, 2000)   
Richardson F, Fighting Spirit: A Study of the Psychological Factors in War, (London, 
Leo Cooper, 1978)
Sarkesian S (ed), Combat Effectiveness, Cohesion, Stress, and the Volunteer Military, 
(Beverly Hills CA, Sage, 1980) 
Page 273 of 304
 
Shay J, Achilles in Vietnam: Combat Trauma and the Undoing of Character, (New 
York, Atheneum, 1994) 
Sheffield G, ‘The Shadow of the Somme’ in Addison P. & Calder A. (eds), Time to Kill: 
The Soldier’s Experience of War in the West, (London, Pimlico, 1997)
Sheffield G, Leadership in the Trenches: Officer - Man Relations, Morale and discipline 
in the British Army in the Era if the First World War, ( New York, St Martin’s Press, 
2000) 
Sheffield G & Todman D, Command and Control on the Western Front: The British 
Army’s Experience, 1914-1918, (Staplehurst, Spellmount, 2007)  
Simpson A, Hot Blood & Cold Steel, (London, Tom Donovan, 1993)  
Slim W, Courage and Other Broadcasts, (London, Cassell, 1957)  
Stewart N, Mates and Muchachos. Unit Cohesion in the Falklands/Malvinas War, 
(Washington DC, Brassey’s, 1991) 
Stouffer S, Lumsdaine A, Lumsdaine M, Williams R, Brewster Smith M, Janis I, Star S 
& Cottrell L (eds), The American Soldier: Combat and its Aftermath, Volume II, (New 
York, John Wiley & Sons, 1965)   
Strachan H, ‘Total War in the Twentieth Century’ in Marwick A, Emsley C & Simpson 
W. (eds), Total War and Social Change: Europe 1914-1955, (Buckingham, Open 
University Press, 2001)
Taylor J, ‘Touched with Glory’ in James Aulich (ed), Framing the Falklands War, 
(Milton Keynes, Open University Press, 1992)
Thomson A, Anzac Memories: Living with the Legend, (Melbourne, Oxford University 
Press, 1995) 
Ursano R & Norwood A (eds), Emotional Aftermath of the Persian Gulf War. Veterans, 
Families, Communities and Nations, (Washington DC, American Psychiatric Press, 
1996)  
Van Creveld M, The Art of War: War and Military Thought, (London, Cassell, 2002)    
Walters D (ed), After the Falklands: Finally Ending the Nightmare of PTSD, (Penryn, 
Ecademy, 2007) 
Walters D, ‘Overview of PTSD’ in Walters D (ed), After the Falklands: Finally Ending 
the Nightmare of PTSD, (Penryn, Ecademy Press, 2007
Walzer M, Just and Unjust Wars, (New York, Basic, 2000)  
Washington L, Ten Years On: The British Army in the Falklands War, (London, National 
Army Museum, 1992)  
Watson A, Enduring the Great War: Combat, Morale and Collapse in the German and 
British Armies 1914-1918, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008) 
Wesbrook S, ‘The Potential for Military Disintegration’, in Sarkesian S. (ed), Combat 
Effectiveness: cohesion, stress, and the volunteer military, (London, Sage, 1980)
Page 274 of 304
 
Wilsey J, H. Jones VC: The Life and Death of an Unusual Hero, (London, Hutchinson, 
2002)  
Wilson C (Lord Moran), Anatomy of Courage, (New York, Avery, 1987)
Wong L, Kolditz T, Millen R & Potter T, Why They Fight: Combat Motivation in the 
Iraq War, (Carlisle PA, Strategic Studies Institute, 2003)  
Wright K, Marlowe D & Gifford R, ‘Deployment Stress and Operation Desert Shield: 
Preparation for War’, in Ursano R (ed), Emotional Aftermath of the Persian Gulf War, 
(American Psychiatric Press, Washington DC, 1996) 
Yerkes S & Holloway H, ‘War and Homecomings: The Stressors of War and of 
Returning from War’, in Ursano R (ed), Emotional Aftermath of the Persian Gulf War, 
(American Psychiatric Press, Washington DC, 1996)
Young P (ed), Defence and the Media in Time of Limited War, (London, Frank Cass, 
1992) 
Ziegler P, Soldiers: Fighting Men’s Lives 1901-2001, (London, Chatto & Windus, 2001)  
Secondary Sources - Published (journal articles)
Biddle S & Long S, ‘Democracy and Military Effectiveness: A Deeper Look’ in Journal 
of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 48, No. 4, (2004), pp. 525-546 
Black J, ‘Military Organisations and Military Change in Historical Perspective’ in 
Journal of Military History, Vol. 62, No. 4, (1998), pp. 871 - 892 
Blake J & Butler S, ‘The Medal of Honor, Combat Orientations and Latent Role 
Structure in the United States Military’ in The Sociological Quarterly, Vol. 17, No. 4, 
(1976), pp. 561-567  
Bogacz T, ‘War Neurosis and Cultural Change in England, 1914-1922: The Work of the 
War Office Committee of Enquiry into Shell-Shock’ in Journal of Contemporary 
History, Vol. 24, No. 2, (1989), pp. 227-256 
Bowman T, ‘Officering Kitchener’s Armies: A Case Study of the 36th (Ulster) 
Division’ in War in History, Vol. 16, No.2, (2009), pp. 189-212 
Cockerham W & Cohen L, ‘Obedience to Orders: Issues of Morality and Legality 
among U.S.Army Paratroopers’ in Social Forces, Vol. 58, No. 4, (1980), pp. 1272-1288
Cockerham W & Cohen L, ‘Combat Missions: An Attitudinal Study of U.S.Army 
Paratroopers’ in The Pacific Sociological Review, Vol. 24, No. 3, (1981), pp. 329-354
Doherty T, ‘Full Metal Genre: Stanley Kubrick’s Vietnam Combat Movie’ in Film 
Quarterly, Vol. 42, No.2, (1988-1989), pp. 24-30 
Dollery B & Parsons C, ‘Prisoner Taking and Prisoner Killing: A Comment on 
Ferguson’s Political Economy Approach’ in War in History, Vol. 14, No.4, (2007), pp. 
499-512 
Donnelly W, ‘“The Best Army that Can Be Put in the Field in the Circumstances”: The 
U.S. Army, July 1951-July 1953’, in The Journal of Military History, Vol. 71, No. 3, 
(2007), pp. 809-847
Page 275 of 304
 
Edgerton D, ‘Liberal Militarism and the British State’, in New Left Review, I/185, 
(1991), pp.138-169
Eley G, ‘The People’s War, British Collective Memory and World War II’ in The 
American Historical Review, Vol. 106, No.3, (2001), pp. 818-838 
Englander D, ‘Soldiering and Identity: Reflections of the Great War’ in War in History, 
Vol. 1, No.3, (1994), pp. 300-318 
Farr M, ‘A Compelling Case for Voluntarism: Britain’s Alternative Strategy, 
1915-1916’ in War in History, Vol. 9, No.3, (2002), pp. 279-306 
Fox E, ‘Mass Communications in the Falklands/Malvinas War’ in Media, Culture & 
Society, Vol. 6, (1984), pp. 45-51 
Freedman L, ‘Bridgehead Revisited: The Literature of the Falklands’ in International 
Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 58, No.3, (1983), pp. 
445-452 
Freedman L, ‘ A Theory of Battle or a Theory of War’ in Journal of Strategic Studies, 
Vol. 28, No.3, (2005), pp. 425 - 435  
French D, ‘Discipline and the Death Penalty in the British Army in the War Against 
Germany During the Second World War’ in Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 33, 
No.4, (Oct 1998), pp. 531-545 
Fritz S, ‘Field Observations and Surveys in Combat Zones’ in Social Psychology 
Quarterly, Vol. 47, No. 2, (1984), pp. 186-192  
Fritz S, ‘ “We are trying ... To Change the Face of the World” - Ideology and Motivation 
in the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front: The View from Below’ in Journal of Military 
History, Vol. 60, No.4, (1996), pp. 683-710 
Fuller B & Dornbusch S, ‘Organizational Construction of Intrinsic Motivation’, in 
Sociological Forum, Vol. 3, No.1, (1988), pp. 1-24
Gibson F & Teasley C, ‘The Humanistic Model of Organizational Motivation: A 
Review of Research Support’, in Public Administration Review, Vol. 33, No. 1, (1973), 
pp. 89-96
Gratton L, ‘Analysis of Maslow's Need Hierarchy with Three Social Class Groups’ in 
Social Indicators Research, Vol. 7, No. 1, (1980), pp. 463-476
Goodacre D, ‘Group Characteristics of Good and Poor Performing combat Units’ in 
Sociometry, Vol. 16, No. 2, (1953), pp. 168-179 
Griffith J, ‘What Do the Soldiers Say?: Needed Ingredients for Determining Unit 
Readiness’ in Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 32, No.3, (2006), pp. 367-388 
Hacker Hughes J, Cameron F, Eldridge R, Devon M, Wessely S, & Greenberg N ‘Going 
to War Does not Have to Hurt: preliminary findings from the British Deployment in 
Iraq’ in British Journal of Psychiatry, No, 186, (2005), pp. 536-537 
Harari Y, ‘Martial Illusions: War and Disillusionment in Twentieth Century and 
Renaissance Military Memoirs’ in Journal of Military History, Vol. 69, No.1, ( 2005), 
pp. 43-72 
Page 276 of 304
 
Hayward P, ‘The Measurement of Combat Effectiveness’ in Operations Research, Vol. 
16, No. 2, (1968), pp. 314-323 
Henning K & Frueh C, ‘Combat Guilt and its Relationship to PTSD Symptoms’ in 
Journal of Clinical Psychology, Vol. 53 No.8, (1997), pp. 801-808
Henriksen R, ‘Warriors in Combat: What Makes People Actively Fight in Combat?’ in 
Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 30, No. 2, (2007), pp. 187-223  
Horowitz M & Rosen S, ‘Evolution or Revolution’ in Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 
28, No. 3, (2005), pp. 437-448 
Janowitz M, ‘The All-Volunteer Military as a “Sociopolitical”Problem’ in Social 
Problems, Vol. 22, No.3, (1975), pp. 432-449
Jones E, ‘The Psychology of Killing: The Combat Experience of British Soldiers during 
the First World War’ in Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 41, (2006), pp. 229-246
Jordan K, ‘Right for the Wrong Reasons: S.L.A. Marshall and the Ratio of Fire in 
Korea’ in Journal of Military History, Vol. 66, No. 1, (2002), pp. 135-162     
Keegan J, ‘The Historian and Battle’ in International Security, Vol. 3, No. 3, 
(1978-1979), pp. 138-149   
Kelty R, Kleykamp M & Segal D, ‘The Military and the Transition to Adulthood’, in 
The Future of Children, Vol.20, No.1, (2010), pp. 181-207
Kolditz T, ‘Research in in Extremis Settings: Expanding the Critique of “Why They 
Fight”’ in Armed Forces & Society, Vol. 32, No.4, (2006), pp. 655-658
London M, ‘Toward a Theory of Career Motivation’ in The Academy of Management 
Review, Vol. 8, No. 4, (1983), pp. 620-630 
Lynn J, ‘The Embattled Future of Academic Military History’ in Journal of Military 
History, Vol. 61, No. 4, (1997), pp. 777-789  
MacCoun R, Kier E & Belkin A, ‘Does Social Cohesion Determine Motivation in 
Combat?: An Old Question with an Old Answer’ in Armed Forces & Society, Vol. 32, 
No.4, (2006), pp. 646-654    
Machalek R, Katayama A, Patrey J & Born D, ‘Suspending Routine Duty: The 
Sociological Significance of Military Holidays and Ceremonies’ in Armed Forces and 
Society, Vol. 32, No.3, (2006), pp. 389-404   
Mayer A & Hoult T, ‘Social Stratification and Combat Survival’ in Social Forces, Vol. 
34, No. 2,(1955), pp. 155-159 
Mead P & Bidwell S, ‘Orde Wingate - Two Views’, in Journal of Contemporary 
History, Vol. 15, No. 3, (1980), pp. 401-404   
Meyer J, ‘Separating the Men from the Boys: Masculinity and Maturity in 
Understandings of Shell Shock in Britain’ in Twentieth Century British History, Vol. 20, 
No. 1, (2009), pp. 1-22  
Mileham P, ‘Fifty Years of British Army Officership 1960-2010: Part I: Retrospective’ 
in Defense & Security Analysis, Vol. 20, No.1, (2004), pp. 69-86 
Page 277 of 304
 
Mileham P, ‘Fifty Years of British Army Officership 1960-2010: Part II: Prospective’ in 
Defense & Security Analysis, Vol. 20, No.2, (2004), pp. 179-199 
Milgram S, ‘Behavioral Study of Obedience’, in The Journal of Abnormal and Social 
Psychology, Vol.67, No. 4, (1963), pp. 371-378
Millett A, Murray W & Watman K, ‘The Effectiveness of Military Organizations’ in 
International Security, Vol. 11, No. 1, (1986), pp. 37-71 
Miner J, Crane D & Vandenberg R, ‘Congruence and Fit in Professional Role 
Motivation Theory’ in Organization Science, Vol. 5, No. 1, (1994), pp. 86-97  
Morgan K, ‘England, “Britain and the Audit of War”: The Prothero Lecture’, in 
Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, Vol. 7, (1997), p. 145
Mueller J, ‘Changing Attitudes towards War: The Impact of the First World War’ in 
British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 21, No. 1, (1991), pp. 1-28    
Newsome B, ‘The Myth of Intrinsic Combat Motivation’ in Journal of Strategic 
Studies, Vol. 26, No.4, (2003), pp. 24-46   
Norpoth H, ‘The Falklands War and Government Popularity in Britain: Rally without 
Consequence or Surge without Decline?’ in Electoral Studies, Vol. 6, No. 1, (1987), pp. 
3-16    
O’Brien S & Hughes S, ‘Symptoms of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder in Falklands 
Veterans Five Years After the Conflict’, in British Journal of Psychiatry, Vol. 159, No.1, 
(1991), pp. 135-141
Osterloh M & Frey B, ‘Motivation, Knowledge Transfer and Organizational Forms’ in 
Organization Science, Vol. 11, No. 5, (2001), pp. 538-550    
Popper M, ‘The Development of Charismatic Leaders’ in Political Psychology, Vol. 21, 
No. 4, (2000), pp. 729-744  
Potts A, ‘Eye Witnesses of the Falklands War’ in History Workshop, No. 15, (1983), pp. 
192-195 
Puckett K, ‘The Life and Death and Death of Colonel Blimp’ in Critical Inquiry, Vol. 
35, No. 1, (2008), pp. 90-114
Ramsden J, ‘Refocusing “The People’s War”: British War Films of the 1950s’ in Journal 
of Contemporary History, Vol. 33, No.1, (1998), pp. 35-63 
Robben A, ‘Combat Motivation, Fear and Terror in Twentieth Century Argentinean 
Warfare’ in Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 41, No.2, (2006), pp. 357-377 
Robinson L, ‘Soldiers’ Stories of the Falklands War: Recomposing Trauma in Memoir’ 
in Contemporary British History, Vol. 25, No.4, (2011), pp. 569-589
Rodgers T, ‘Billy Yank and G.I. Joe: An Exploratory Essay on the Sociopolitical 
Dimension of Soldier Motivation’ in The Journal of Military History, Vol. 69, No.1, 
(2005), pp. 93-121 
Rogers A, ‘War Crimes Trails under the Royal Warrant: British Practice 1945-1949’ in 
The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 39, No.4, (1990), pp. 780-800
Page 278 of 304
 
Roper M, ‘Re-Remembering the Soldier Hero: The Psychic and Social Construction of 
Memory in Personal Narratives of the Great War’ in History Workshop Journal, 50, 
(2000), pp. 181-204   
Rose A, ‘The Social Psychology of Desertion from Combat’ in American Sociological 
Review, Vol. 16, No. 5, (1951), pp. 614-629 
Rose A, ‘Neuropsychiatric Breakdown in the Garrison Army and in Combat’ in 
American Sociological Review, Vol. 21, No. 4, (1956), pp. 480-488 
Scraton P, ‘The State v. the People: Lessons from the Coal Dispute’ in Journal of Law 
and Society, Vol. 12, No. 3, (1985), pp. 251-266
Shamir B, House R & Arthur M, ‘The Motivational Effects of Charismatic Leadership: 
A Self-Concept Based Theory’ in Organization Science, No.10, (1999), pp. 577-594 
Shils E and Janowitz, ‘Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War 
Two’ in Public Opinion Quarterly, No.12, (1948), pp. 280-315 
Shirom A, ‘On Some Correlates of Combat Performance’ in Administrative Science 
Quarterly, Vol. 21, No. 3, (1976), pp. 419-432 
Shy J, ‘The Cultural Approach to the History of War’ in The Journal of Military 
History, Vol. 57, No. 5, (1993), pp. 818-838      
Slocum D, ‘Cinema and the Civilising Process: Rethinking Violence in the World War II 
Combat Film’ in Cinema Journal, Vol. 44, No. 3, (2005), pp. 35-63 
Smith D, ‘The Freudian Trap in Combat Motivation Theory’ in Journal of Strategic 
Studies, Vol. 25, No.3, (2002), pp. 13-26 
Smith P, ‘Codes of Conflict: Towards a Theory of War as Ritual’ in Theory and Society, 
Vol. 20, No.1, (Feb 1991), pp. 103-118  
Spiller R, ‘Isen’s Run. Human Dimensions of War in the 20th Century’ in Military 
Review Vol. 68, (1988), pp. 16-31  
Strachan H, ‘The British Way in Warfare Revisited’ in The Historical Journal, Vol. 26, 
No.2, (2003), pp. 447-461     
Strachan H, ‘The Civil-Military “Gap” in Britain’ in Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 
26, No.2, (2003), pp. 43-63  
Strachan H, ‘Training, Morale and Modern War’ in Journal of Contemporary History, 
Vol. 41, (2006), pp. 211-227    
Summerfield P, ‘Culture and Composure: Creating Narratives of the Gendered Self in 
Oral History Interviews’, in Cultural and Social History, Vol. 1, No. 1, (2004), pp. 
65-93
Summerfield P, ‘Public Memory or Public Amnesia? British Women of the Second 
World War in Popular Films of the 1950s and 1960s’, in Journal of British Studies, Vol. 
48, No. 4, (2009), pp. 935-957
Talbott J, ‘Psychiatrists and Combat Trauma’ in Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 
Vol. 27, No. 3, (1997), pp. 437-454     
Page 279 of 304
 
Taylor D, ‘From Fighting the War to Writing the War: From Glory to Guilt’, in 
Contemporary British History, Vol. 23, No. 3, (2009), pp. 293-313     
Watson A, ‘Self-Deception and Survival: Mental Coping Strategies on the Western 
Front, 1914-18’, in Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 41, (2006), pp. 247-268 
Weinberg K, ‘The Combat Neuroses’ in The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 51, 
No.5, (1946), pp. 465-478   
Wessely S, ‘Twentieth-Century Theories on Combat Motivation and Breakdown’ in 
Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 41, (2006), pp. 269-286    
Williams R, ‘Field Observations and Surveys in Combat Zones’ in Social Psychology 
Quarterly, Vol. 47, No. 2, (Jun 1984), pp. 186-192      
Wilson P, ‘ Defining Military Culture’ in Journal of Military History, Vol. 72, No. 1, 
(2008), pp. 11-41      
Winter J, ‘Film and the Matrix of Memory’ in The American Historical Review, Vol. 
106, No.3, (2001), pp. 857-864    
Woodruff T, Kelty R & Segal D, ‘Propensity to Serve and Motivation to Enlist among 
American Combat Soldiers’ in Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 32, No.3, (2006), pp. 
353-366   
Wong L, ‘Combat Motivation in Today’s Soldiers: U.S. Army War College Strategic 
Studies Institute’ in Armed Forces & Society, Vol. 32, No.4, (July 2006), pp. 659-663     
 
Secondary Sources - Unpublished (theses, dissertations and articles)
Bates P, ‘An Investigation into, whether Religion has a place on the modern battlefield 
and whether it has any influences on the British Soldier', (unpublished Master’s 
dissertation, School of Defence Management, Cranfield University, 1995)
Hodges P, ‘The British Infantry and Atrocities Western Front, 1914-1918', (unpublished 
doctoral thesis, University of London, Birkbeck College, 2006)  
Robinson L, ‘Explanations of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder in Falklands Memoirs: 
The Fragmented Self and the Collective Body’, (unpublished article, 2012)    
Whittle E, ‘British Casualties on the Western Front 1914-1918 and their Influence on 
the Military Conduct of the Second World War, (unpublished doctoral thesis, University 
of Leicester, 1991) 
Websites
A Guide to the Military Corrective Training Centre’, http://www.army.mod.co.uk/
documents/general/promptsmctcguide.pdf
‘Army Strength’, http://www.armedforces.co.uk/army/listing/10086.html
‘What boots?’, http://www.arrse.co.uk/military-clothing-boots/174279-what-boots-
would-you-buy.html
Page 280 of 304
 
‘Ten Years of Gays in UK Forces’, http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/word/americas/
8493888.stm  
‘The Paras’, http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p00hjtl0
‘Poppy Fascism’, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/6134906.stm
‘Bomber Command Memorial’,http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-18633791
‘Birthday Honours’, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-18456068 
‘Ian Bailey’, http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/
england/surrey/8390468
‘British Casualties: Afghanistan’, http://www.casualty-monitor.org/p/british-casualties-
in-afghanistan.html
‘Shameful Army Accommodation’, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-444065/
Shameful-army-accommodation-40-cent-British-troops-families.html 
‘Bill Reid’, http://dailymail.co.uk/news/article -1229285
‘Student Protestors’, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2058726/Police-right-
rubber-bullets-Wednesdays-student-protests-London.html
‘A Squaddies War’, http://www.edcaesar.co.uk/article.php?page=2&article_id=43
‘Commemoration’, www.ekklesia.co.uk/content/reimagining
‘Taliban Fighters’, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/video/2012/jan/12/video-us-
troops-urinating-taliban
‘Prince Harry Faces Racism Enquiry’, http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2009/jan/12/
prince-harry-racism
“RBL Tell Nick Griffin to Stop Wearing Poppy’, http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/
2009/jun/13/royal-british-legion-nick-griffin,
‘ Recruitment Surge’, http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2009/sep/27/British army 
recruitment surge
‘Charles Whiting obituary’,  http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/2007/aug/23/
guardianobituaries.booksobituaries
‘Sven Hassell Obituary’, http://www.guardian.co.uk/books/2012/oct/02/sven-hassel
‘Falklands War Crimes’, http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/lords/jun/09/Falklands-
war-crimes-investigation
‘Army Pay Rates’, http://www.hmforces.co.uk/content/army_pay_rates_2009
‘MoD “told about Falklands crime’”, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/mod-told-
about-falklands-crime-2323350.html? 
‘Sir Fitzroy Maclean Bt’, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/obituaries/sir-fitzroy-
maclean-bt-obituary-1337837.html 
‘Reluctant Archbishop’,http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/this-britain/death-of-
the-reluctant-archbishop-707035.html
Page 281 of 304
 
‘Purchasing Power’, http://www.measuringworth.com/calculators/ppoweruk
‘Cpl Stewart McLaughlin’, http://www.militaryforums.co.uk/forums/viewtopic.php?
p=203944
‘Health and Wellbeing’, http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/AboutDefence/
WhatWeDo/HealthandSafety/Healthresearch/
AStudyIntoTheHealthAndWellbeingOfTheUkArmedForces.htm 
‘My Lai’, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/introduction/mylai/
‘Sama 82 History’, http://www.sama82.org.uk/about-sama/history.aspx
‘The Way Ahead’, http://www.screenonline.org.uk/film/id/460745/index.
‘Info’, http://www.shotatdawn.info
‘A Walking Talking Ramrod’, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/4721758/A-walking-
talking-ramrod.html
‘Bomber Command Deserves a Medal’, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/3556063/
Bomber-Command-deserves-a-medal.html
‘Cenotaph Service Almost Abandoned’, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/
1506534/Cenotaph-service-was-almost-abandoned.html
‘Johnson Beharry’, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article567882.ece
‘Ian Bailey’, http://timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article6927245.ece
‘Marines Smash Terry Taliban’, http://www.thesun.co.uk/sol/homepage/news/
campaigns/our_boys/article2343994.ece
“Home Page’, http://www.warwidows.org.uk
‘BBC's Poppy Wearing Policy Offensive’, http://www.westtyronesinnfein.com/news/
15040
Audio-visual Material
BBC, The Kill Factor, Prod. Adele Armstrong, BBC Radio 4, Broadcast 20 August 
2011, [on iPlayer]
Eagle Media Productions, The Falklands War: A Military History, (London, Discovery 
Communications, 2002) [on DVD-ROM] 
Kosminsky P (dir), Falklands War: The Untold Story, (Leeds, Yorkshire Television, 
1987) [on VHS-Tape]  
Page 282 of 304
 
Appendix 1
Page 283 of 304
 
Appendix 2
TABLE OF BRITISH ARMED FORCES RANKS 
(SOURCE: WWW.MOD.CO.UK)
Officers
Nato 
Code Royal Navy Royal Marines Army Royal Air Force
OF 10 1 Admiral of the Fleet Field Marshal Marshal of the RAF
OF 9 Admiral General General Air Chief Marshal
OF 8 Vice Admiral Lieutenant General Lieutenant General Air Marshal
OF 7 Rear Admiral Major General Major General 2 Air Vice-Marshal
OF 6 Commodore Brigadier Brigadier 3 Air Commodore
OF 5 Captain Colonel Colonel Group Captain
OF 4 Commander Lieutenant Colonel Lieutenant Colonel Wing Commander
OF 3 Lieutenant 
Commander
Major Major Squadron Leader
OF 2 Lieutenant 4 Captain Captain Flight Lieutenant
OF 1 Sub Lieutenant/ 
Midshipman
Lieutenant Lieutenant/
2nd Lieutenant 5
Flying Officer/
Pilot Officer
1 Promotion to Admiral of the Fleet, Field Marshal and Marshal of the Royal Air Force 
is now held in abeyance in peacetime.
2 Originally Sergeant Major General until the early eighteenth century  when the name 
was shortened
3 In 1922 the rank of Brigadier-General was replaced by Colonel-Commandant and in 
1928 this changed to Brigadier. Although this rank remains equivalent to Brigadier-
General in many other NATO armies, It is regarded in the British Army as a field rank 
(i.e. Senior Colonel) rather than the most junior General.
4 In the British Armed Forces this is pronounced ‘Leftenant’, NOT ‘Lootenant’ as in the 
US Armed Forces.
5 In the Foot Guards the name Ensign is retained, similarly some cavalry regiments 
retain the name Cornet.
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Other Ranks
Nato 
Code Royal Navy Royal Marines Army Royal Air Force
OR9 Warrant Officer Warrant Officer 1 Warrant Officer 1
Regimental Sergeant 
Major
Warrant Officer
OR8 Warrant Officer 2 Warrant Officer 2 Warrant Officer 2
Company Sergeant Major
-
OR7 Chief Petty Officer Staff Sergeant/
Colour Sergeant
Staff Sergeant/
Colour Sergeant
Flight Sergeant
OR5/6 Petty Officer Sergeant Sergeant 5 Sergeant
OR4 Leading Rate Corporal Corporal 6 Corporal
OR3 - Lance Corporal Lance Corporal -
OR2 Able Rate Marine Private Senior Aircraftman /
Leading Aircraftman / 
Aircraftman
OR1 - - - -
5 The Household Cavalry does not use the term Sergeant instead Corporal of Horse is 
used. The rank above is Staff Corporal or Corporal Major and the rank below Lance 
Corporal of Horse. 
6 Foot Guards use the term Lance Sergeant, and Corporal for the rank below. In full 
dress uniform a lance sergeant’s insignia comprises three white chevrons, whilst a 
Sergeant has three of gold. In the Royal Artillery a Corporal is called Bombardier.
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Appendix 3 .1
 
Victoria Cross Awards by ERA
Total to Date 1,355
1856 - 1914 522
1914 - 1920 (First World War) 633
Inter - war 5
1939 - 1945 (Second World War) 182
1950 - 1969 (Korea, Malaysia, Vietnam) 9
1982 (Falklands War) 2
2004 - 2006 (Iraq, Afghanistan) 2
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Appendix 3.3
Analysis by Detailed Rank and Service
Armies Navies Airforces TOTALS Posthumous
Senior Officer 1 4 0 5 2
Field Officer 20 7 9 36 10
Company 
Officer
40 7 14 61 32
Sub-Total 61 18 23 102 44
Senior NCO 20 2 7 29 12
Junior NCO/
Enlisted
47 4 0 51 27
Sub-Total 67 6 7 80 39
TOTALS 128 24 30 182 83
Senior Officer = OF 5 & above; Field Officer = OF3 - OF4; Company Officer = OF1 - OF3 
(inc)
Senior NCO = OR5 - OR9 (inc); Junior NCO = OR2 - OR4 (inc).  
See Appendix 3
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Appendix 3.4
Analysis by Rank and Branch of Imperial Service 
 Armies Navies Airforces Totals
 Officer OR Officer OR Officer OR Officer OR
African 1 2 0 0 1 0 2 2
Australian 3 14 0 0 1 1 4 15
Canadian 6 4 1 0 2 0 9 4
British 37 24 17 6 17 5 71 35
Indian 10 20 0 0 0 0 10 20
Fijian 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
N.Zealand 4 2 0 0 2 1 6 3
Totals 61 67 18 6 23 7 102 80
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Appendix 3.5
British Army Analysis by Regiment/Corps
Officer OR Officer OR
Guards Regiments
Coldstream Guards 1 1 Grenadier Guards 1 1
Irish Guards 0 2 Scots Guards 1 0
Welsh Guards 1 0  
English Regiments
Duke of Wellington’s 0 1 Durham Light Infantry 1 1
East Lancashire 1 0 East Surrey 1 0
East Yorkshire 0 1 Essex 1 0
Green Howards 2 1 Kings Shropshire Light Infantry 2
Lancashire Fusiliers 0 1 Loyals 1 0
Queen’ s Royal West Surrey 1 0 Royal Hampshire 2 0
Royal Lincolnshire 1 0 Royal Norfolk 3 2
Royal Northumberland Fusiliers 2 0 Royal Sussex 1 0
Royal West Kent 0 1 Sherwood Foresters 1 0
Somerset Light Infantry 1 0 South Staffordshire 0 1
West Yorkshire 0 1 Wiltshire 0 1
York And Lancaster 0 1
Scottish Regiments
Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders 2 0 Gordon Highlanders 0 1
Highland Light Infantry 1 0 Royal Scots Fusiliers 0 1
Welsh Regiments
Monmouthshire 0 1 Welch 1 0
Other Regiments & Corps
General Service Corps 1 0 Kings Royal Rifles 0 1
Parachute 1 0 Rifle Brigade 1 0
Royal Armoured Corps 3 0 Royal Army Medical Corps 0 1
Royal Artillery 1 0 Royal Engineers 1 1
Royal Horse Artillery 2 0
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Appendix 3.6
Analysis by Rank, Service & Year
Date of Armies Navies Airforces Totals
Action Officer OR Officer OR Officer OR Officer OR
1940 4 2 4 1 3 2 11 5
1941 8 6 1 1 3 1 12 8
1942 12 9 8 2 2 1 22 12
1943 8 8 2 0 6 1 16 9
1944 20 23 1 0 8 1 29 24
1945 9 19 2 2 1 1 12 22
Totals 61 67 18 6 23 7 102 80
Analysis by Nationality (Place of Birth)
Officer OR Officer OR
African 4 3 British Colonial 10 0
Australian 4 13 English 36 29
Canadian 12 4 Channel Islander 1 0
Danish 1 0 Irish 5 2
Fijian 0 1 Manx 1 0
Indian Empire 6 13 Scottish 10 4
Nepalese 2 7 Welsh 4 1
New Zealander 6 3
Analysis by Region of Action
Officer OR Officer OR
Atlantic 10 0 Home Front 2 1
Burma 19 18 Pacific 3 9
N. Europe & Greece 34 23 North Africa 23 12
Italy 7 15 Mediterranean 4 2
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Appendix 3.7
Total Awards - Award Orientation
Officers OR Officers OR
Life Saving 8 13 Life Saving &
Endurance
4 0
War Winning 22 38 War Winning & 
Leadership
42 16
Leadership 1 0 War Winning & 
Endurance
1 0
Endurance 3 0 War Winning &
Life Saving &
Endurance
0 1
Live Saving &
War Winning
7 7 War Winning &
Life Saving & 
Leadership
6 3
Life Saving &
Leadership
2 2 War Winning & 
Leadership & 
Endurance
3 0
Leadership &
Endurance
2 0 War Winning &
Life Saving & 
Leadership &
Endurance
1 0
Appendix 3.8
Total Award Orientation - aggregate of factors
Officers % OR %
Life Saving 28 16 26 26.8
War Winning 76 43.4 65 67
Leadership 57 32.6 5 5.2
Endurance 14 8 1 1
Appendix 3.9
British Army Award Orientation - aggregate of factors
Officers % OR %
Life Saving 9 11.8 7 19.4
War Winning 35 46.1 20 55.6
Leadership 27 35.5 8 22.2
Endurance 5 6.6 1 2.8
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Falklands Gallantry Awards
Appendix 4.1
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4
Officers 1 20 62 139
Other Ranks 1 10 52 180
Appendix 4.2
2 PARA - Goose Green 3 PARA Mount Longdon
Medals Deaths Medals Deaths
Lt. Colonel 1 1 1 0
Major 3 0 2 0
Captain 0 2 0 0
Lieutenant 1 1 0 0
Sergeant 2 0 4 1
Corporal 3 4 1 3
L. Corporal 4 3 0 4
Private 2 5 1 13
Appendix 4.3
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4
Royal Marines 0 2 22 60
Parachute Regiment 2 2 23 33
Scots Guards 0 1 8 12
Welsh Guards 0 0 3 4
Others 0 1 12 58
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Appendix 5
1982 Jul 3 Sa
Margaret Thatcher Speech to Conservative Rally at Cheltenham
Document type: public statement
Document kind: Speech
Venue: Cheltenham Racecourse
Source: Thatcher Archive: CCOPR 486/82 http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/104989
 Editorial comments: Embargoed until 1430; extract only. A section has been checked against BBC Radio 
News Report 2200 3 July 1982 (see editorial notes in text).
Importance ranking: Key
Word count: 1509
Themes: Defence (Falklands War 1982), Industry, Strikes and other union action, Health policy, Pay, 
Public spending and borrowing, Monetary policy, Transport, Famous statements by MT
Today we meet in the aftermath of the Falklands Battle. Our country has won a great  victory 
and we are entitled to be proud. This nation had the resolution to do what it  knew had to be done 
- to do what it knew was right.
We fought  to show that  aggression does not pay and that the robber cannot be allowed to get 
away with his swag. We fought  with the support  of so many throughout the world. The Security 
Council, the Commonwealth, the European Community, and the United States. Yet  we also 
fought alone - for we fought for our own people and for our own sovereign territory. 
Now that  it  is all over, things cannot be the same again for we have learned something about 
ourselves - a lesson which we desperately needed to learn.
When we started out, there were the waverers and the fainthearts. The people who thought that 
Britain could no longer seize the initiative for herself.
The people who thought we could no longer do the great things which we once did. Those who 
believed that our decline was irreversible - that we could never again be what we were.
There were those who would not  admit it  - even perhaps some here today - people who would 
have strenuously denied the suggestion but - in their heart of hearts - they too had their secret 
fears that it was true: that  Britain was no longer the nation that had built  an Empire and ruled a 
quarter of the world.
Well they were wrong. The lesson of the Falklands is that  Britain has not  changed and that  this 
nation still has those sterling qualities which shine through our history.
This generation can match their fathers and grandfathers in ability, in courage, and in resolution. 
We have not changed. When the demands of war and the dangers to our own people call us to 
arms - then we British are as we have always been: competent, courageous and resolute.
When called to arms ah, that's the problem.
It  took the battle in the South Atlantic for the shipyards to adapt  ships way ahead of time; for 
dockyards to refit  merchantmen and cruise liners, to fix helicopter platforms, to convert hospital 
ships - all faster than was thought  possible; it took the demands of war for every stop to be 
pulled out and every man and woman to do their best.
British people had to be threatened by foreign soldiers and British territory invaded and then - 
why then - the response was incomparable.  Yet why does it need a war to bring out our 
qualities and reassert  our pride? Why do we have to be invaded before we throw aside our 
selfish aims and begin to work together as only we can work and achieve as only we can 
achieve?
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That, ladies and gentlemen, really is the challenge we as a nation face today. We have to see that 
the spirit  of the South Atlantic - the real spirit of Britain - is kindled not  only by war but  can 
now be fired by peace.  
We have the first pre-requisite. We know we can do it - we haven't lost  the ability. That  is the 
Falklands Factor. We have proved ourselves to ourselves. It is a lesson we must  not  now forget. 
Indeed it  is a lesson which we must  apply to peace just as we have learned it  in war. The 
faltering and the self-doubt  has given way to achievement  and pride. We have the confidence 
and we must use it.
Just look at the Task Force as an object lesson. Every man had his own task to do and did it 
superbly. Officers and men, senior NCO and newest recruit  - every one realised that his 
contribution was essential for the success of the whole. All were equally valuable - each was 
differently qualified.
By working together - each was able to do more than his best. As a team they raised the average 
to the level of the best and by each doing his utmost  together they achieved the impossible. 
That's an accurate picture of Britain at war - not yet of Britain at  peace. But the spirit has stirred 
and the nation has begun to assert itself. Things are not going to be the same again.
All over Britain, men and women are asking - why can't we achieve in peace what we can do so 
well in war?
And they have good reason to ask.
Look what  British Aerospace workers did when their Nimrod aeroplane needed major 
modifications. They knew that only by mid-air refuelling could the Task Force be properly 
protected. They managed those complicated changes from drawing board to airworthy planes in 
sixteen days - one year faster than would normally have been the case.
Achievements like that, if made in peacetime, could establish us as aeroplane makers to the 
world.
That record performance was attained not only by superb teamwork, but  by brilliant leadership 
in our factories at  home which mirrored our forces overseas. It is one of the abiding elements of 
our success in the South Atlantic that  our troops were superbly led. No praise is too high for the 
quality and expertise of our commanders in the field.
Their example, too, must  be taken to heart. Now is the time for management to lift its sights and 
to lead with the professionalism and effectiveness it knows is possible.
If the lessons of the South Atlantic are to be learned, then they have to be learned by us all. No 
one can afford to be left out. Success depends upon all of us - different in qualities, but equally 
valuable. 
During this past week, I have read again a little known speech of Winston Churchill, made just 
after the last war. This is what he said, 
We must find the means and the method of working together not  only in times of war, 
and mortal anguish, but in times of peace, with all its bewilderments and clamour and 
clatter of tongues.
Thirty-six years on, perhaps we are beginning to re-learn the truth which Churchill so clearly 
taught us.
We saw the signs when, this week, the NUR came to understand that  its strike on the railways 
and on the Underground just didn't  fit - didn't  match the spirit of these times. And yet on 
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Tuesday, eight  men, the leaders of ASLEF, misunderstanding the new mood of the nation, set 
out to bring the railways to a halt.
Ignoring the example of the NUR, the travelling public whom they are supposed to serve, and 
the jobs and future of their own members, this tiny group decided to use its undoubted power 
for what? - to delay Britain's recovery, which all our people long to see.
Yet  we can remember that on Monday, nearly a quarter of the members of NUR turned up for 
work.
Today, we appeal to every train driver to put  his family, his comrades, and his country first, by 
continuing to work tomorrow. That is the true solidarity which can save jobs and which stands 
in the proud tradition of British railwaymen.
But  it  is not  just  on the railways that we need to find the means and the method of working 
together. It is just  as true in the NHS. All who work there are caring, in one way or another for 
the sick.
To meet  their needs we have already offered to the ancillary workers almost exactly what we 
have given to our Armed Forces and to our teachers, and more than our Civil Servants have 
accepted. All of us know that there is a limit  to what every employer can afford to pay out  in 
wages. The increases proposed for nurses and ancillary workers in the Health Service are the 
maximum which the Government can afford to pay.
And we can't avoid one unchallengeable truth. The Government  has no money of its own. All 
that it has it takes in taxes or borrows at interest. It's all of you - everyone here - that pays.
Of course, there is another way. Instead of taking money from our people openly, in taxation or 
loans, we can take it  surreptitiously, by subterfuge. We can print money in order to pay out of 
higher inflation what we dare not tax and cannot borrow.
But  that disreputable method is no longer open to us. Rightly this Government has abjured it. 
Increasingly this nation won't have it. Our people are now confident enough to face the facts of 
life. There is a new mood of realism in Britain.
That too is part of the Falklands Factor.
The battle of the South Atlantic was not won by ignoring the dangers or denying the risks.
It  was achieved by men and women who had no illusions about  the difficulties. We faced them 
squarely and we were determined to overcome. That is increasingly the mood of Britain. And 
that's why the rail strike won't do.
We are no longer prepared to jeopardise our future just  to defend manning practices agreed in 
1919 when steam engines plied the tracks of the Grand Central Railway and the motor car had 
not yet taken over from the horse.
What has indeed happened it that now once again Britain is not prepared to be pushed around.
We have ceased to be a nation in retreat.
We have instead a new-found confidence - born in the economic battles at home and tested and 
found true 8,000 miles away.
That confidence comes from the re-discovery of ourselves, and grows with the recovery of our 
self-respect.
And so today, we can rejoice at our success in the Falklands and take pride in the achievement 
of the men and women of our Task Force.
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But we do so, not as at some last flickering of a flame which must  soon be dead. No - we rejoice 
that Britain has re-kindled that  spirit  which has fired her for generations past  and which today 
has begun to burn as brightly as before.
Britain found herself again in the South Atlantic and will not  look back from the victory she has 
won.
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My Lord Mayor, ladies and gentlemen
May I thank you for that  wonderful applause, but we are here to thank you for what you have 
done for our country.
And I am proud and honoured to join today with the city of London in its salute to the task 
force.
Military parades and pageants are part of the distinguished history of the city of London.
And it is right  - and the whole nation will feel that it  is right - that  we gather in the heart  of the 
city of London to honour all those who took part in the Falklands campaign.
And what  a wonderful parade it has been. Surpassing all our expectations as the crowd, deeply 
moved and sensing the spirit  of the occasion, accompanied the band by singing "Rule 
Britannia".
The Falklands campaign was one of the most brilliant  achievements of modern times - a 
triumph of endeavour and skill of planning and imagination.
We owe that triumph to the best, the bravest  and the most professional armed services in the 
world.
We thank you all:- those who are here - the many more who, for reasons of space, could not be 
here - the 777 valiant young men who were wounded. - the 255 who gave their lives and whose 
memory will be honoured forever. we grieve for them and we think especially of their families 
in their sorrow.
We also thank:- those who served in the royal fleet  auxiliary - the merchant  seamen - the 
workers in the dockyards and supply depots - the nurses and other volunteers - and those in 
British industry who made such splendid efforts to ensure that  the force was properly equipped 
and supplied.
My Lord Mayor, this magnificent feat of arms has our unstinted praise. But our thanks go 
beyond even this. In those anxious months the spectacle of bold young Britons, fighting for 
great  principles and a just  cause, lifted the nation. Throughout  the land our people were 
inspired. Doubts and hesitation were replaced by confidence and pride that our [younger 
generation too could write a glorious chapter in the history of liberty.
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As the Reverend Sidney Smith said of our countrymen many years ago: and I re-affirm his 
words today, 
I have boundless confidence in the British character … I believe more heroes will 
spring up in the hour of danger than all the military nations of ancient and modern 
Europe have ever produced. 
Today we know that is true.
But  my Lord Mayor It  is not only the people of the Falklands who feel gratitude to the task 
force. And they will be rejoicing with us today and their hearts will be full. We, the British 
people, are proud of what has been done, proud of these heroic pages in our island story, proud 
to be here today to salute the task force. Proud to be British.
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Appendix 6
British Gallantry Awards
Medal From To Remarks
Level 1
Victoria Cross 1856 Current All Ranks
George Cross 1940 Current All Ranks
Level 2
Distinguished Service Order 1886 Current Until 1993 to Officers for ‘Gallantry’ and 
‘Leadership’. From 1993 All Ranks for ‘Service’ 
and replaced for Gallantry by CGC
Conspicuous Gallantry Cross 1993 Current All Ranks
Distinguished Conduct Medal 1854 1993 Other Ranks
Conspicuous Gallantry Medal 1874 1993 Other Ranks
George Medal 1940 Current All Ranks
Level 3
Military Cross 1914 Current Until 1993 to Officers, from 1993 to All Ranks
Distinguished Service Cross 1901 Current Until 1993 to Officers, from 1993 to All Ranks
Distinguished Flying Cross 1918 Current Until 1993 to Officers, from 1993 to All Ranks
Air Force Cross 1918 Current Until 1993 to Officers, from 1993 to All Ranks
Distinguished Service Medal 1914 1993 Other Ranks
Military Medal 1916 1993 Other Ranks
Distinguished Flying Medal 1918 1993 Other Ranks
Air Force Medal 1918 1993 Other Ranks
Queen’s Gallantry Medal 1974 Current All Ranks
Level 4
Mentioned in Dispatches 1920 Current All Ranks awarded retrospectively to 1914
King’s/Queen’s Commendation for Brave Conduct 1939 1994 All Ranks
King’s/Queen’s Commendation for Valuable Service 
in the Air
1939 1994 All Ranks
Queen’s Commendation for Bravery 1994 Current All Ranks
Queens’ Commendation for Bravery in the air 1994 Current All Ranks
Queen’s Commendation for Valuable Service 1993 Current All Ranks
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